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The Nigerian Governments in speeches to the public and foreign
missions and in Parliamentary Debates have repeatedly emphasised the
need for foreign private capital and the desired measures to attract
it to Nigerian manufacturing. The reasons for this are clears 
deficient
Nigeria is deficit in physical capital as well as in the knowledge of 
modern industrial and managerial technique. She therefore needs 
foreign capital and expertise to supplement her own resources. The 
extent of this reliance is illustrated in the fact that the Federal 
Government financed 40 Per cent of hex' 1955/62 Development Plan from 
foreign sources; and the National Development Plan, 1962/68, depends 
for its successful execution on a 50 Per cent contribution from foreign 
resources.
So far, however, no proper study has been made of the amount of 
foreign private investment in Nigerian manufacturing, the factors that 
influenced its stock and distribution, the mechanism and channels by 
which it entered Nigeria, or an evaluation of its possible contribution 
to Nigeria's economic development. This study attempts to fill this gap.
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter One examines 
the amount and the main factors which influenced foreign private invest­
ment in Nigerian manufacturing during 1939/54 a^d finds that' it is small 
and that government policy played a negative role. Chapter Two analyses 
the amount and sectoral distribution of foreign manufacturing investment
during 1955/65 and finds that it is considerable relative to the period, 
1959/54* Chapters Three and Four examine the main factors responsible 
for this and find that the two most important favourable factors were 
government policy and Nigeria1 s potential market*
The location of foreign manufacturing is examined in Chapter Five 
which finds that it is concentrated in Southern Nigeria and in the 
principal town or regional capital within the Regions. Chapter Six, 
which examines the mechanism of foreign private investment in Nigerian 
manufacturing, finds that partnership between, indigenous and foreign 
capital is now common. The channels of investment are examined in 
Chapter Seven. It is found that about 69 per cent of foreign private 
investment in Nigeria during 1961/64 came from sources internal to the 
companies and that retained earnings accounted for about 29 per cent of 
net new investment during 1961/65.
Chapter Bight examines the contribution of foreign manufacturing 
investment to Nigeria*s economic development, summarises the main findings 
of the study and highlights the main defects of Nigeria's industrial 
policy. An appendix relates foreign private investment in manufacturing 
to all foreign private investment in Nigeria during the period of this 
study. •
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FOREIGN.' PRIVATE 'iNVESGMTC? IN NiGERIM MAITOFACTURING. 1939-1965
'• . INTRODUCTION ■ ■ . ; ■/"'.■•
Nigeria is; a potentially rich country. Her .area of 356,669 
square miles,is inore than four times .that of Ghana .and. three times . 
that of the United, Kingdom. : This area extends more than J00 miles
from East to West and more than 650 miles from South to the North; 
and' it embrac e s, a diver si ty of agr i cul tur al and mineral res ource s.
She is, however, principally an agricultural country.. In 1962 
agriculture, livestock, fishing and forestry accounted for 65 per cent 
of her Gross Domestic Product, and for 71 per cent of her total export 
earnings at the end of December, 1965* Her.principal agricultural / 
products are groundnuts, cocoa, , paloil and palm kernel, cotton and . 
rubber. - In 1965 these together accounted for 57 ■ pe**:'-cent of her total 
export earnings.; Besides she is a leading v/orld producer and exporter 
of most of these products; she is the world's largest exporter of palm 
produce and groundnuts, the second largest producer of cocoa, after 
Ghana, and the-fifth largest producer of natural rubber. : ; Because 
these products are produced in such large quantities , they, have provided 
a basis for establishing processin'g' plahts.'for'the. products. . . * ;:-
. Apart from.the above, Nigeria has enormous mineral and .power 
resources. She. possesses the'only mined coal, field in West Africa. !
She is the sixth largest world producer of tin and supplies over 80 per 
cent of world columbite', and has been named to be the tenth largest
6. world producer of mineral oil within the next few years, When fully / . .
completed' Toy September 1968, the £80ni. Niger Dam project, at a .capacity 
of 960,000:kilowatts equivalent to l.Jm-horse power, is expected to be 
sufficient to supply' all her energy requirements till 1982. This is 
in addition to" her tremendous coal and gas resources in Southern \
: Nigeria. > . ,*- I"-' . -V.' ' v-’. 1,-. . •.
. Nor is Nigeria, deficient in man power. The 1952/53 census put ; •
her population at 32mv After two disputed censuses in 1962 and 1963 ■//■:
y \ the population was put .at 55♦8m* of which 29* 8m. was attributed to the .
North, 12.4m* to the Bast, 10.jm. to the West, 2.5m. to the Mid-West,
. : and 665?000 to the Federal territory of Lagos. If it is assumed that
the population is oyer' 5Qm. then. thie rmeans that Nigeria is the most ■ '.*
■ - populous country in Africa, accounting for more than a sixth of the v/hole,
population of Africa, and. the third largest population in the Commonwealth 
1: . after India and.'.Pakistan. .. : V ; ' . ■ . v / ■ '
..This large population also provides Nigeria with a large labour 
■ force. This is measured by the' percentage of the population that. is .
■ X, . . . economically active, that Vis,, those between the ages' of 15 and 55* The ;
detailed breakdown of the 1963. census is not yet published. Table 1.1 
. shows that about 48 per cent or 15m. of the 32m. population of Nigeria
. in 1952/53 were economically active^  compared with 54 per cent in Pakistan, . ■
V 55;per cent in.Canada, 41 per cent in Ghana, and 46 per cent in the
1. U.S. Dept, of Commerce Quoted in The Times, London, June 26, 1964..;
TABLE 1.1
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION IN SELECTED
COUNTRIES
Country
Ghana
Nigeria
Canada
United States
J amaica
Ceylon
Japan
Pakistan
India
Italy
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
U. Kingdom
Total of EoonomiBlly 
Year Total Population active population fo
I960 672681?
1952-53 32156000 
1963 18857000
189278000 
1609814
1963
1960 
1953 
1963
1961 
1961 
1963 
I960 
I960 
I960 
1951
8O97895
96I6OOOO
90282674
439234771
51506000
314889
11461964
3591234
50225224
2723026
14913000
6658OO
75712000
654582
2993349
47650000
30205981
I88675500
20134000
129686
4168626
1406358
23213404
40.5 
47-9
35.3
40.0 
40.7
37.0
49.6 
33-5
43.0
39.1
41.2
36.4
39.2
46.2
Economically active = male and female between the ages of 15 and 55* 
Source: Year Book Labour Statistics 19&4» M>le One.
United Kingdom.. Three criteria may be used to illustrate the quality 
of'the labour force in Nigeria.
The first is the rate of adult literacy. The latest figure for 
Nigeria relates to 1950. Table 1.2 shows that this varied between 
11 "25 per cent. .This was the same as in Kenya, Algeria, Ghana and 
Egypt; and -less, than the 25 per cent in Uganda and Congo Leopoldville; 
and, higher than the ,5™10 per cent in Tanganyika, , Within Nigeria the 
literacy rate.in 1952/55 was 49 Pe^ cent in Lagos, the .Federal- Capital,
15.6 per cent in the West, 16.2 per cent in the East, and 7*2 per cent 
in the North (Table l.j)*
‘The second indication is the ratio of school enrolment. Table 1.2 
shows that the ratio of primary school enrolment in Nigeria in I960 
varied between 26-59 P®** cent. This was less than in the Congo, Kenya, 
Egypt and Lybia, where it was; over 40.per emit; but it was more than the 
15-25 per cent in Tanganyika. On the other hand, the secondary school 
enrolment ' ratio .‘was. 5“9 per cent in Nigeria compared with over 19 per 
cent in Kenya, Lybia, Egypt, and Ghana,.and less than 2 per cent in Niger. 
The breakdown of the Nigerian, ratio is shorn? in Table 1.5 for 1965*. It 
shows.that the primary school enrolment -ratio was 5*2 per cent for the 
whole; of Nigeria, 16.2 per cent in Lagos,. 10.8 per cent in the West,
10.5 per' cent in the East, and 1.4 per cent in the North. The 
corresponding secondary school enrolment ratios were 0.5 per cent in
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the whole of-Nigeria,. 2.J per cent in Lagos, 1.6 per cent in the West,
0.4.P©r cent in the East, and 0,07 pe** cent in the North;
The third indication of the quality of the labour force is labour 
efficiency. After a field work on the subject in Nigeria, Peter Kilby 
concluded! "First, the African does not possess any inherent incapacities 
or attitudeswhich are detrimental.to efficient production. In fact, 
it can be argued that regarding continuous labour and repetitive 
operations, he is particularly well-suited to modern production.
Secondly,, the African's willingness to work considerably.exceeds that of 
.labourers in developed countries ... Careful selection, monetary incentives 
and surveillance from higher management will reduce supervisory weak­
nesses to manageable proportions.: Thus we may, say, that the.quality of
the African labour is adequate to-meet.the needs of the continent's 
developing economies, now and in theforseeable future". \
After a recent study on "The Establishment of Manufacturing in 
Nigeria", Alan Sokolski concluded: "It may be observed that managers, in . 
general, do complain about a lack of employee loyalty. ; They are -
constantly shppping for a better offer, and v/ill move on if they see an ■ v 
opportunity. The ebullient Ibos are singled out as.typically thinking 
they can all be a "Zik" some day. In the south, where most of the 
• opportunity.lies, motivation abounds".
1. Peter Kilby:"African Labour Productivity Reconsidered", Economic 
Journal, June 1961, 273-291 (underlining mine).
2. Alan Sokolski: The Establishment of Manufacturing in Nigeria,
London . 1965? p*67'* . . . •
It is clear from the above that Nigeria has the mineral and
agricultural resources for development. She aleo has an abundant
' 1 
labour force which is mobile, eager to learn; willing to work, and
reasonably literate. ’’Indeed, a major reason for the government1 s
-interest in the promotion of industrial development is the considerable
over population and consequent under-employment that exists in several:
- 2 ' ■ • . 
parts of the country”. .
Nigeria’s industrial policy aims at.effectively and rapidly 
developing the above; resources. Although this policy is affected by 
her Federal structure of four largely autonomous and rival regions and a 
constitution which empowers, both the regions and,the centre to legislate 
concurrently on industry, all the governments of the Federation are 
agreed on the above overall policy and on establishing industries which 
manufacture import substitutes, employ Nigerian labour and provide 
opportunities for Nigerians to acquire technical skill and managerial 
experience, and increase the value of Nigeria’s.exports by processing 
the raw materials before export.
The strategy adopted in this’* endeavour is illustrated in her 
Development Plans which started with the ’’Ten Year.Plan for Development
1. There are many more people willing'to attend school, than there are 
places in Nigeria. "We were told that over a thousand Nigerians, 
all qualified to enter a university, applied to come to the Uni­
versity College, Ibadan,.last year,(1959) and there were places for 
only about 500 of them”. See Investment in Education - The Beport : 
of the Committee on Post-School Certificate and Higher Education.. 
Federal Ministry of Education, Nigeria, i960, p.4* '
2 . Investment Opportunities in Eastern Nigeria, Economic Intelligence 
UnilTno' date')"7 pi 2 1 .  ~ ~ ~ ~
15
and Welfare, 1946-1956". The 1955-1960 plans concentrated attention on 
the provision of the necessary infrastructure. This was continued in 
the I962-I968 Plan with greater emphasis on development. This plan 
originally aimed at a total capital expenditure of £676.8m; but this 
was later revised to £828.9m* The objective was to achieve a 4 
cent annual growth rate over the plan period and to ensure that at the 
end of the plan period in 1967-68, Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product 
would have increased from £1112.5m. in i960 to £1456.lm. To achieve 
this it was to invest at least 15 per cent of her G.D.P. each year during 
the period of the plan to bring the total gross investment- at the end of 
the plan period to £1206.9m. But she lacks the capital and the high
level man power to make this successful.
An illustration of this lack of high-level man power is shown in 
Table 1.2, which shows that in 1957-58 Nigeria had one physician to over 
25,000 inhabitants, compared with under 8,000 inhabitants to a physician 
in Egypt. Moreover, the proportion per 100,000 population enrolled in 
post-secondary education in i960 was lowest at 4 in Nigeria compared with 
599 in Egypt, 70 in Algeria, 49 in Lybia and 29 in Ghana. Despite 
recent improvements in education, the number of inhabitants to a 
physician was still as high as 8,900 in 1965; and for the North it was 
20,000.
In the industrial field, the need for technicians was even greater. 
"Every employer of technical and scientific man power who has given 
evidence to the Commission has complained in forceful terms the dearth
of Nigerian technicians qualified to fill the middle grades of industrial
employment * arid tHe inadequacy of 'the. facilities for training' them. A 
serious consequence of .this is that,' in many cases, professional engineers 
are being’ unecphomtcally employed upon . duties which could he adequately 
performed by, well qualified technicians. Accordingly,Nigeria1 s most 
urgent task in the field of technical- education is to remedy this 
, dangerous defect''.^  . ! ‘
The Ashby Commission proposed an educational machinery which would 
produce at least 8,000 young people every year with some post-secondary .. 
education. ; . ’’This rate of flow sustained over ten years would provide. / 
the reservoir of essential high-level man power if Nigeria’s development 
is not to suffer. Even at this level, when Nigerianisation is completed 
and the high level manpower objectives are reached by 1970» the percentage 
of Nigerians with professional and sub-professional training will still be 
far too low, lower even than the present percentages in Egypt or Ghana ... 
Capital canhot.be productively.employed in Nigeria to promote economic 
development unless at the, same;time the required high level man power is 
forthcoming”. ' ' h . . '
But Nigeria lacks the capital.;/and this is the second limiting 
factor. This lack of capital is mainly due to her very low per capita 
incomes. Table 1.4 shows that, at under ^80 in 195® > Nigeria* s per 
' capita income is one of the lowest in the world. ; 11 Tims rapid growth 
is required to raise her living standard even to a level equivalent 
to the average of the world’s presently underdeveloped countries”.
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It. is 'because of these two .reasons, that is, because of the lack . 
of capital and expertise, that ..Nigeria has chosen to rely on foreign 
capital and on the .‘management., and technical skills which accompany it.
The extent of this .reliance is illustrated in the fact that the, 19,62/68 . . ; 
Development Plan depends on 5P per cent contribution from foreign sources;, 
for its successful, execution. ' ".-.'.This contrasts; with the 1955/62 period 
when the Federal Government - financed '40-per. cent of its. plan from . 
external sources . But- the 50 per cent contribution expected from . :''
external sources under the 1962/66, plan is hot necessarily high. Other 
African countries, at various times in the past, financed their develop­
ment plans;with a higher,proportion of external finance. This is 
illustrated in Table 1 which shov/s that Kenya financed 92 per cent of 1 
her 1960/64 development plan from external sources. In Tanganyika the 
proportion of external finance in her I961/64 plan 'was 80 per cent, and 
in Basutoland it was 100 per cent .I s, - - ■ ’ '
It is necessary to point out that the above development is envisaged' 
in the context of a free enterprise economy* The higerian Governments 
Have generally resigned themselves to providing the necessary infra- \ •
structure and favourable environment for private enterprise to exploit 
any available opportunities. It is realised, however, that this 
traditional, role would be ineffective or. inadequate in Kigeria owing to 
the fact that the level and size of domestic saving’s in the private ’ 
sector is. limited! and such shms as exist have generally b e e n ,  invested 
in real estate, or in trade and road transport. Because of this, and
TABLE 1*5
FINANCING OP DEVELOPMENT PLANS IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES
Country Period Local Sources Internal
i° fa Sources
Ghana 1959-64
A
761 24
Kenya 1960-6? 8 ^22
Uganda 1955-1960 57 43
Fed.Rhodesia &
Nyasaland 1959-63 58 42
Tanganyika 1961-64 20 80
Nigeria Fed. 1955-62 60 402
Angola 1953-58 95 5
Basutoland 1960-64 - 100
Gambia 1955-60 6 94
Congo Leopoldville 1950-59 48 52
Ethiopia 1957-1961 56 44
Source: United Nations: Economic Bulletin for Africa Vol 11,
No.2, June 19&2, p.42.
Notes: 1. Include external assets.
2. H loans raised locally.
because, mainly for political reasons, some foreign investors make 
Nigerian participation a condition for their projects, the Nigerian 
governments have actively Intervened and either established or 
participated in establishing industrial projects when no private capital 
is available or when this is necessary to call forth the necessary . 
foreign private capital.; The result is ;that for the vrhole of Nigeria, 
the government controls about 22 per cent of the manufacturing sectOra, . 
indigenous private Nigerians 10 per cent, and foreign private investors 
68 per cent.. The governments have however always emphasised the 
special circumstances which necessitated their investments and have 
pleaded that this: should not be interpreted as a movement away from a 
free enterprise economy. ; .
1 II PURPOSE OF TEE THESIS . :'
It is significant that although foi'eign private investment thus 
constitutes over two-thirds of Nigerian manufacturing, and despite the 
emphasis on foreign capital in the development plans., there was no study 
of foreign investment in the Nigerian economy until late 1965 and early 
1966 when a book and two articles were published. The book"^  dealt 
mainly with legal problems of foreign investment in Nigeria. Of the 
two articles, the first, by R.S. May, was based on his inverview of
1. Paul 0. Proehl: Foreign.Enterprise in Nigeria, Laws and Policies,
The University of North Carolina Press, I965. .
2. R.S. Mays ’’Direct Overseas Investment in Nigeria 1953-63* Some Aspects 
of its constitution and Contribution to Nigeria1s' Economic Develop­
ment" , -Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1965*
eighteen British companies with ..".appreciable investments in Nigeria, 
and questionnaires to 88 others, out of whom 58 responded". Although 
May states that the net assets covered in this survey represented some 
60 per cent of total investment from overseas, the survey was neverthe­
less limited. It dealt generally with some aspects of the constitution 
' of all private investment and its contribution to Nigeria’ s economic . ; 
development, and did not therefore deal specifically with manufacturing. 
Besides, it was limited to British investments in Nigeria and therefore 
omitted investment from other countries. •
The other, article, by A.H; HakaaD,^  was based on his interview of 
68 firms operating in Nigeria., Hakahi did not.indicate the nationality 
of the firms interviewed? but, unlike.May1s survey, he dealt specifically 
with; foreign industrial investments. Nevertheless, although.he stated 
. that his survey Covered 58 per cent of total industrial investments and 
50 per cent of employment in foreign;operated industries, it was,limited 
to "the motivation to invest and:the locational pattern."
, It is obvious from the above that there is so far no. comprehensive 
study of foreign private investment in Nigerian manufacturing, ,and of 
the factors that influenced its; size, its location, nationality, \ ,
mechanism^ channels and contribution to Nigeria’s economic development. 
This-thesis attempts to fill this gap. ■ ‘
• 1. A.N.\ Hakaui:, "The Motivation to. Invest and the Locational Pattern 
of Foreign Private.industrial Investments in Nigeria", Nigerian .. 
Journal of Economics and Social Studies, March 1966. ■
The study is based largely on many unprocessed official, reports' \ 
and documents of the United Kingdom Government and of the Nigerian 
Governments. including the Parliamentary Debates of the Federal and 
Regional Houses of Assembly in Nigeria, and on the publications of the 
United Africa Company Ltd. These were very helpful but would have 
been grossly inadequate but for the statistical materials contained in:, 
the .1964 arid 19.65 Nigerian industrial directories and ;in the 1965 
industrial survey published in. January 1966 by the1 Nigerian Federal 
Office of Statistics. ’. Most of the industrial .Tables in. this study., 
were compiled from these .documents and it is necessary to be aware of 
their limitations. . • ' : ,
. ; The analysis of industrial location in Chapter Fdve and the 
classification of industrial projects between "Nigerian" and "foreign" 
in Chapters One and.Two were. based on tables compiled from the industrial 
directories. These directories, however, did.not inall cases^ 
indicate the year of establishment or the year in which projects . '
commenced operations nor did. they indicate which projects were foreign 
and which were Nigerian., The method (and its limitations) I adopted 
to overcome,these problems have been clearly indicated in the appropriate 
sections. More important is the warning given in the directories that 
although every attempt'was made to make the .lists--"as. complete as 
possible, there may be errors' and omissions because there has never ., 
been a complete, official census Of manufacturing firms in the country, ,/. 
upon which to base the directory, and there is no formal method by which
changes, ih;company status, are communicated to the Ministry (of Industry).
It is possible that some information, is not up to date or that companies 
exist which have been overlooked”.
. The industrial survey covered 785 establishments primarily engaged 
inmanufacturing in 1963 and employing ten or more persons and having a
minimum, annual value of production of £100. Manufacturing was defined ‘ / 
to include assembly of component parts and repair work; and an 
establishment as a factory or workshop, i.e., a producing unit at a
: •' ■ ' ' .'N
single location rather than an enterprise or firm which might comprise / 
more than one establishment. Unlike the industrial directory, the 
survey contained a more comprehensive information on most essential 
aspects of industry-employment, wages, capital investment, output, 
consumption of raw materials, fuel, changes in stocks, etc* Neverthe­
less, it was limited,because only 649 or 85 per cent of the 785 
establishments responded* in terms of employment the response was about 
90 per cent of total industrial employment. Although the survey 
covered the regionsj only the'tables relating to the Federation as a 
whole have been published. For comparative analysis, I requested 
information from the regional ministries of economic planning; but only .
the East and the West responded with tables showing industrial distri­
bution of, paid up capital and the relative proportions contributed by 
foreign private investors, private indigenous Nigerians and the regional 
governments or public corporations. Although the number of reporting 
projects was shown in each case, therew&S no indication of .what proportion 
of response it represented or of employment covered.
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I'll THE ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS .
The thesis covers a period of 26 years from 1959 to 196 5* Fo1* 
the purposes of, this study, however, the period is divided.into twos 
1959-1954j and 1955-1965* This is a most valuable time division.
The first period covers the war. and the early post-war change. Its ; 
termination in 1954 coincided with the decontrol measures in the 
United Kingdom, thus making the year dshe first post-war year in which 
trading conditions approached normality. 1954 is also historic as 
marking the introduction of regional autonomy in the Federal constitution 
- of that year which gave Nigerians the freedom to develop their economy 
and their interest in industrialisation. The. second period, 1955-1965> 
witnessed.a most extensive development of this interest, the introduction 
bf self rule'in the East and .the West in 1957 ^<1 in the North in 1959» 
independence in i960, and a republican status in 1963* .The second 
period ended"in 1965 before the Military Disruption of 1966,
The thesis is divided into 8 chapters. Chapter One studies the 
extent of foreign private investment in Nigerian manufacturing and the 
main factors which influenced it during the first period, 1939-1954*
Its general findings are: that it was too small -and that it was adversely 
influenced by Government policy.. In Chapters Two, Three and Four the 
extent of, and the maanffactors which affected foreign private manu­
facturing investment during the second period,1955-1965? are examined. -
.. . . i ;
The general findings are that, relative to the first period, foreign 
private investment in Nigerian manufacturing was considerable and that
the main factors which favourably influenced it were government policy, 
apparent political stability, during, this period relative to other 
African countries outside South Africa, and Nigeria's potentially 
large market of 56m. people. Though the significance of this was 
limited by.her low: per capita income, foreign investors nevertheless 
considered it larger than most markets, in Africa and with the prospects 
of a West. African or ;an African Common Market^ $his proved a strong 
factor- in foreign investors' choice of. Nigeria over other developing 
African countries. ' N’. • ■ • •' '1 ■
Chapter Five examines the destination or location of foreign 
manufacturing in Nigeria. It found, that 84 per cent of the industrial' 
establishments' in Nigeria at the end of 1965 was located ::in Southern -
Nigeria and 16 per cent in the North. This was due mainly to. the South' 
proximity to the sea, and the concentration of resources and markets.in 
the South. Chapter Six examines the mechanism of investment and finds 
that ^ partnership-betv/een foreign, and indigenous .capital is favoured- as a 
compromise between the foreign investors' reluctance to invest owing to 
fears of nationalisation without’ adequate compensation ,^ and Nigeria1 s 
desire to participate in the ownership and control of her,industrial 
enterprises. ,vV. ■ ' ■/, " ....
■:. Chap ter Seven, whi ch examine s the channeIs of foreign,inve s tment, 
finds that 69 per cent of foreign capital investment came from sources 
internal to. the companies, through retained earnings,, and suppliers: and ’.
'V -■ A / / i - - - ;’* /i'"\.;:V-' ■” -. ..////:.■ \-y 24 "■
• ' ", ■ : A' ' ; '- A ' '.. ; . and. .'N;, , : f) /. : . N ■-
. other, credits from the head offices;/that firms generally depend on h- . -
, : the hanking .system for working capital. Foreign-private investment /
: ' is also .channelled through, such long-term- institutions, as the Nigerian . y
Industrial Development Bank and. the Commonwealth Development Corporation. : •
. It finds that the NIDB has great potentials, for this.; purpose which" could; 1-1//-,-
be further improved by .some modifioation; of its operational techniques.
The Lagos Stock Exchange isused by foreign investors a s ,a channel to . . .•/
associate.Nigerians in the ownership of : their business as a'qualifying . i ■
condition for obtaining; privileges under■ the Aid to" Pioneer Industries
.r  ’ .Act. ’ Its role has, however, fbeen. limited by the, reluctance of regional V -  ‘ -
governments to offer shares of companies in which they participate to :
the public, through the Exchange . for :fear that they; would .be- bought by . -;, :
indigenes of rival .regions. . . ; :
: , Chapter:Eight analyses the contribution of foreign private ;
investment in Nigerian manufacturing to Nigeria1s economic development, .
summarises the main findings of the study, and highlights some observed .
defects "in Nigeria1 s;. industrial htfategy which require rectification so ,/'
as to maximise the future inflow and contribution of foreign private .
manufacturing investment in thecountry. ‘ ; \ ; -
The National Plan, 196.2/68, set a target for anticipated foreign
private investment; but it made no atteriipt to allocate this aggregate :/•/•
to particular sub-sectors or projects. Thus, no separate targets are ,
set for foreign private investment in manufacturing or in agriculture* 
Although this study is concerned with foreign private investment in 
manuf ac turing, it is considered necessary to give a picture of the 
overall foreign private investment in Nigeria during the, period covered 
by this study* This is attempted in Appendix A which finds that in 
1964 manuf acturing accounted for 18 per cent of total paid up capital, 
reserves, and other liabilities, and for 23 per cent of net investment 
in fixed assets of all the foreign private firms in Nigeria; that mining, 
including petroleum, has attached the biggest proportion of foreign 
private investment, and. that the United Kingdom is the biggest source 
of foreign private, investment in Nigeria, followed by Western Europe and 
the United States of America*
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NOTES
1. Unless shorn In the text, all the statistical tables and
maps are in appendices A.B & C.
2. I have occasionally used the West, the East, the North, and the
Mid-West respectively for the Western Region, the Eastern Region, 
the Northern Region and the Hid-Western Region of Nigeria*
3* Other abbreviations used are:-
(a) CDG for Commonwealth Development Corporation;
(b) ICON for Investment Company of Nigeria Ltd;
(e) FBI for the Federation of British Industries;
(d) NIDB for the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank Ltd.
(e) ENDC for the Eastern Nigerian Development Corporation*
(f) NNDC for Northern Nigeria Development Corporation.
(g) NNDC for Wee tern Nigeria Development Corporation
(h) CBN for Central Bank of Nigeria.
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' CHAPMV^E '. ■’
: FOREIGN. PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN NIGERIAN
MAtBJFACTIXRING, 1939-1954
INTRODUCTION :
The World Bank Mission to Nigeria, in 1954, Pound that during the 
15 years between 1959 tttf-d 1954> the Nigerian economy underwent a 
remarkable economic, political, and social transformation to such an 
extent-that it bore little resemblance to the pre-war economyl This \ 
chapter attempts to examine what transformation there was in Nigerian 
manufacturing and /bhe role of foreign private investment in this- 
transformation during this period.
The chapter is divided into two mainparts. Part One analyses 
. the number and significance of foreign manufacturing establishments 
and. pa^t two:examines the. main factors which influenced them during the 
period,; . . ' .
- Part One ,
;.The Number -and Significance of foreign manufacturing Establishments .
/ ' -a- ' in Nigeria, 1959-1954 •
The .<• first-. attempt.to estimate the number of manufacturing plants 
; . fin .^ Nigeria-was .made by Dr, J. Mars in. 1948, . He. found < that in 1956,
: apart a from:. 7 small plants producing such miscellaneous-items .as aerated .
! l;*j. vIi.-BRD; yThe Economic Development of Nigeria, Baltimore, .1955PP* 3-15
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waters and timber, Nigeria had no manufacturing industry worth mentioning. :
Although Dr. Mars omitted, such manufacturing plants as the Nigerian
Tobacco Company Ltd., established in 1933* the Unilever's soap factory
at Apapa, in Lagos, which was established in .1924, Dr. Mars* generalisation
stands, as these two plants were obviously very,small at that time.
In 1964* Dr. P.N.C. Okigbo, at that time the economic adviser to
the Federal Government of Nigeria, was quoted as telling a group of
British business men with West African interests that there were really
2only 5 industrial establishments in Nigeria in 1950* There was no 
indication of the size of manufacturing establishments Dr. Okigbo had in 
mind. He probably meant the Nigerian Tobacco Company, the Nigerian 
Breweries, the African Timber abd Plywood factory, the Unilever1 s soap 
factory and a metal fabricating factory. These were the five biggest 
manufacturing plants in Nigeria in 1958 and were all foreign-owned. 
According to Nigeria's 1964 Industrial Directory, each of these establish­
ments employed more than 200 persons. If, however, manufacturing estab­
lishment is defined to include those employing 10 or more workers, there 
were, in 1950, 126 manufacturing establishments in Nigeria, and %  of 
these were foreign-owned.
Neither Dr Okigbo nor Dr Mars would have been exepfcted to estimate 
exactly the number of manufacturing plants in Nigeria by 1950 because of 
the lack of statistics. There was no reliable industrial register; and
1. M. Perham (ed.) , Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria, London 1948,
pp.47, 51 aud 67. ■
2i Quoted in West Africa, March 21, 1964, p*329»
3. Calculated from Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industries Lasros
until the passing of the Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance in 1952, 
there was no legal compulsion for firms to register, or to advise changes 
in their status., Even then, it was only those expecting to benefit from 
the provisions of the Ordinance that were under compulsion to register. 
Finally, there was neither an industrial directory nor an industrial 
census. In 1954* a limited industrial census, covering only soap making, 
mining, and ground nut milling, failed “because the firms were reluctant to 
give information. Although a statistical Ordinance was passed in 1957 
empowering the Government to collect statistics on Mfactories,’ mines and 
productive industries generally*1, because of the staff shortages at the , 
Federal Office of Statistics, not much was done until 1963 when the first 
industrial directory was published with the assistance of the Arthur D. 
Little Inc. which was sponsored by the United States Agency for Inter­
national Development. , This directory was said to contain a **comprehensive** 
list, of manufacturing establishments existing in Nigeria in 19&3 an(^- 
employing 10 or more persons. :
Table 1.1 is compiled from the.1964 and 1965 editions of the Directory 
Caution is required in interpreting this Table. The directory did not 
indicate the year which some plants started operation or were established; 
but I have assumed that this would only affect indigenous establishments. 
Foreign firms would not ordinarily have failed to record the date they 
were established or to supply this information.
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■ Secondly the directory did not distinguish between foreign arid 
indigenous plants. I have adopted two criteria to do this. The first
is the size of employment. It. has been found that indigenous firms are 
very small in terms of employment per plant. For instance, Peter Kilby 
found recently that the" average indigenous plant employed 2.7 persons in 
the east and 2.8 persons in the North, Only 2. per cent of the 1,704 
firms studied in the North, and one out.of every nine of the 10,728 
establishments in the East employed 10 orinore persons.**'■ The directory 
covered only establishments, employing 10 or more persons. In view of the 
. small percentage of indigenous.plants which Kilby found employed 10 or ,, 
more persons, and the very low-average employment per plant in indigenous 
industry, I have assumed that, with some.exceptions, ho indigenous manu- 
facturing plant employed more than-50 persons. Thus, with the. exceptions 
to be mentioned below, I assumed that all manufacturing establishments 
employing more than $0 persons were foreign. v  •,
, The second criterion is the name.of the.firm or establishment. 
Between 1939 and 1954)manufacturing plants were few and the big or 
outstanding foreign plants were known. These included the five factories 
mentioned above and foiir Lebanese groundnut processing mills in the North. 
Similarly, the outstanding indigenous establishments were known. These 
included the African Development Corporation Ltd., the Government Boat
4* Indigenous Industry in Nigeriaf ,An evaluation and Proposal for . ,•
. Technical Assistance, TJ.S.A.I.D., 1964* pp.24-25*
Yard at Opobo and the established Nigerian printing presses * : These
. employed more . than 5.0 persons : each, according to the directory. These
were therefore exceptions to the-first criterion which classified as
foreign all the establishmentsthat'employed more./than 50 persons.
. It is not claimed that by using the above criteria, ail the
manufacturing plants established .between:1959 and 1954 and outstanding .
at the end.of 1965 .Have been included ih the Table. This is not possible•
As the 1964 edition of the Industrial Directory warned:
"Although .we have tried to make this list as complete as /
possible therepmay-He*"errors and omissions- because there it
has- never been aicokplete official census of manufacturing • 
firms in the country upon which to base this directory".
In the 1965 edition, , -it-was cautioned that: ; '
' | "there: is no formal methiod by ■\vhich change4, in. company.
• status are communicated to.the. Ministry. It is possible \
. that some-information.is not up to date or that companies .
exist which have been overlooked". V . ; .
: : - ' V/ith the above observations, in mind, we may now study Table 1.1.
It shows that at the end of 1954> there.were 204 manufacturing plants,in
Nigeria employing ten or more persons. 52 of these, were foreign plants.
Since 9 of these were established before 1959> it means that between 1959
and 1954> .45 foreign manufacturing plants established.;. In Nigeria..
Twenty of these 45 foreign, plants were listed under the timber, - .
wood ahd. paper products, printing and furniture sector , In terms of •/•’
employment the ITnited Africa Company * s' African Timber and Plyvrood factory
at; Sapele was the :;biggest. in this; sector. Of. the six foreign plants' ' -
listed/omder^.the food, beverages, and tobacco; sector, the Nigerian 
Breweries and. the Nigerian Tobacco Company were the biggest in terms ;, 
of employment. Apart from Unilever?s soap factory at Apapa in Lagos,
. .and four Lebanese groundnut processing factories in ICano, all the foreign, 
plants listed finder the chemicads, oils, paints, and petrol e-urn products 
sector were engaged . in palm oil and palm kernel milling. The. two plants 
listed under the metal products sector, produced metal drums and;steel . 
■structures, while two of the three plants under the transport and 
machinery sector assembled vehicles and the third produced roiling stock.;;/ 
No foreign plant was established.iif the textile and wearing apparel sector / 
during 1959/54* $he foreign plant'listed under this sector as established 
before 1939 was the ginning station of the British Cotton. Growing 
Association in Northern Nigeria. ; This had thirteen branches and was 
engaged in ginning- cotton for export. ;
. The•significance of the above foreign plants may be illustrated by 
the capital investment involved. Unfortunately this is not available.
The United. Africa;. Company stated that/the net capital investment in their. 
Nigerian Breweries and the African Timber and Plywood Company in 1950 
were £465 >000 and £5nn respectively. ^ . ■ ,
; . Table 1.2 shows that the capital expenditure on fixed assets by
major foreign firms in Nigeria doubled from about £4ni. in 1950. to about 
£8m. in 1952. Although "major" y/as not defined, it is assumed that these
1. Their letter dated
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firms were foreign firms in view of the fact that the average indigenous 
private firm is very small indeed, as was pointed out above. Although 
the gross capital expenditure on fixed assets by these firms in 
manufacturing and processing increased by about three times from 
£271?000 in 1950 to £947,000 in 1952, and its. percentage of the total 
rose from 6 per cent to 13 per cent during the same period, this is 
considerably less than the gross capital.expenditure on fixed assets in 
mining which was 22 per cent of the total in 1952. It is also very much 
less than the 27 par cent accourited for by the trade, business and 
services1 sector. . • :
Another illustration of the significance of manufacturing and 
processing in Nigeria during 1939/54 is given by its contribution to
Nigeria*s Gross Domestic Product* A.R.-Prest and I.G. Stewart estimated
• / . 1 ' ' ' . 
Nigeria’s GDP at. £595*4 m., in. I95Q> value added by manufacturing at
2 ’ • . .
£0*8m. The manufacturing establishments theyvi covered were beer, soap,
groundnut processing, cigarettes, metal containers, and cotton ginning. \
These were all foreign owned.
In 1958, the .Federal Government, of. Nigeria commissioned Mr. E.F,.
Jackson* a Fellow of St. Antony’s College, Oxford, and Dr. P.N.C. Okigbo
to”enquire into the national income of Nigeria with the aim of bringing
out the.significant changes which have occurred since the Prest-Stewart
Report for 1950-51” • This study had a wider coverage than the Prest-
1.. R. Prest and I.G. Stewart: '’The National Income of Nigeria, 1959/51”» 
HMS0, 1953, p.38.
2. Ibid. - ■' r /“■
3. P.N.C, Okigbo; The Nigerian National Accounts,, 1950-1997, Enugu 196!
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Stewart survey. Indigenous manufactures, suoh as bakeries and textiles, 
omitted by Prest and Stewart, were covered by Okigbo and Jackson. Also 
omitted by the former and covered by the latter were rubber processing, 
tyre re-treading, furniture and fixtures, and perfumery and saw-milling.
A s  a result of this wider coverage and because the figures were based on 
1957 prices, Jackson and.Okigbo estimated Nigeria’s GDP in 1950 at £687*lm. 
and the value added by manufacturing at £5-dm* The corresponding estimates 
for ,1954 were £872.2m.ah$ £6.47m. respectively. . '
Table 1.5 shows the'breakdown of the value added by manufacturing 
in 1950 and 1954* The dominance of the food, beverages and tobacco 
sector is obvious. This sector accounted for 54 po** cent of the total 
value added by manufacturing in 1950 and for 47 cent in 1954* The
next biggest sector is timber and wood products which accounted for 17 
per cent of the total in 1950 and for 25 per cent in 1954* Thus these 
two sectors accounted for 71 Pe^ cent of the total value added by manu­
facturing in 1950 and for 'JO per cent in, 1954* . This is not surprising 
since they included the three-biggest manufacturing establishments in 
Nigeria at that time. These were the African Timber and Plywood Company, 
the Nigerian Breweries, and the Nigerian Tobacco Company Ltd.
C O N C L U S I O N S  u •
By the end of 1954 there were 204 manufacturing plants in Nigeria 
employing ten,or more persons. 52 of these were, foreign establishments,
45 °f v/hich were established,during 1959/54- In- 1952 the gross capital 
expenditure on fixed assets by the major firms (which are assumed to be
foreign) in manufacturing and processing was £.9m. This represented 
about 15 per cent of the total gross capital expenditure of £7*6m. by 
these firms in 1954* At the same date value added by manufacturing 
was £6.5m. out of a total GDP of £872.2m.
' Among the larger foreign manufacturing plants were the African Timber- 
and Plywood,factory, the Nigerian Breweries, a cigarette factory, a <
steel fabricating plant,, four groundnut processing plants,and a ginnery.
As the. World 'Bank Mission pointed out, ’’lest this recital prove misleading, 
it must be emphasised again that the majority of the enterprises are 
quite small, In a country of;Nigeria1s.size and population, this degree 
of industrialisation is;hardly noticeablen. This.is further Illustrated
by the fact that in 1950 manufacturing accounted for, 0.5 per cent of 
Nigeria’s GDP and for: 0.7$ in 1954* This is, insignificant compared
with such sectors’ as agriculture and distribution which accounted for 64 
per cent and 27 per cent respectively of the GDP in 1954* Although all 
manufacturing was thus very small by the end of 1954j the foreign component 
was significant in the sense that the two:sectors which included the three 
biggest foreign’plants accounted/for JO ^per cent of the total value added 
by manufacturing in.1954* ,The following section examines the. main /
factors which.influeiiced foreign private manufacturing investment in 
Nigeria during 1959/54* , ’
1.. IBRDi The Economic Development of ;Nigeria, op.cit., p.547*
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\ ... part (mo
. - FACTORS AFFECTING PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN NIGERIAN .■
v'“~ ‘
INTRODUCTION - ■ ,
The 1959/45 World War was a turning point in Nigeria1 s economic 
history. It caused world, shortages in her principal export products 
and changed the system of marketing these products. It led to a fall 
in the quantity of her imports; :and, as people moved.from the villages 
to the towns to take advantage of the work opportunities created hy 
military requirements, there was a fall in domestic food production.
The threat of inflation resulting from the rise in prices due to these 
developments and to the increase in expenditure owing to military 
expenditure - and spending from increased export earning helped to shape 
government policy towards local manufacture of!some goods which were 
previously imported. All these, factors affected foreign private invest­
ment in Nigerian manufacturing, during-1959“54* In. addition, the rise
in militant nationalism which partly resulted from the return, of 
demobilised soldiers led to disturbed political situations and rapid 
political changes which affected the foreign investors assessment of 
Nigeria^ investment climate. Other factors were inadequate market for 
some products and inadequate raw materials for some manufactures, and 
lack of technique.
All the above factors are discussed below under three broad headings 
government policy, political factors, and other factors.
■ ' ; Government Policy
Government policy affected foreign private investment in Nigerian 
manufacturing during 1959/54 through statutory marketing of groundnuts, 
and through the government's industrial policy, tariff policy, and-policy 
towards the "dollar problem".
1. 'STATUTORY MARKETING OF NIGERIA'S PRODUCE 
Introduction
When the War broke, out in 1959? most of the overseas markets for
West African cocoa were almost cut off at once. To enable the cocoa .
producers to maintain their export earnings, the West African Cocoa .
Control Board was formed by the United Kingdom Government to buy British
1
West Africa's entire cocoa output.
With the fall of the Far Eastern colonies at the beginning of 1942, 
the supply to the United Kingdom of essential commodities was drastically . 
cut.\ Accordingly, Nigeria's production of some of these commodities 
assumed a great importance and she was asked to double her tin exports,
raise by tenfold her meagre pre-war rubber output and greatly increase
. 2 . • • ' ' 
her, timber exports. In particular Nigeria's production of oils and
oilseeds-groundnuts, paim oil and palm h^c.el and cotton became a vital
1. Statement of Policy proposed for the Future Marketing of Nigerian 
'.•Oils, Oilseeds and Cotton. Government Printer,- Lagos, 1948? Sess.
Paper no.18, 1948? P*3*
2. , U.S. Ford in M. Perham ed. Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria,
op.cit., p.13.
48
factor in. the successful prosecution of the war. Accordingly the 
West, African Cocoa Control Board was enlarged and renamed the Y/est 
African Produce. Control Board to include the purchase and the disposal 
of the entire exportable surplus of oilseeds from the British Y/est 
African territories ”at a price which would serve to ensure maximum
production and at the same time avoid as far as possible domestic
2 . . . .  ' .; ' ' 
inflation.” In 194& the West African Produce Control Board’s cocoa
marketing was taken over by the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board and in .
1949 the . Cotton, Groundnut, and Palm Produce Marketing-functions were
taken over by the .cotton, groundnuts and palm produce marketing'boards;
These Boards concluded bulk purchase agreements’with the United
Kingdom’s Haw, Cotton Commission and Ministry of Pood. . Under the
contract these institutions undertook to buy all the exportable surplus
of Nigeria’s oils and oilseeds. \ These contracts, scheduled to expire
in 1952, were renewed for another four years but were mutually terminated
at the end of June 1954* •
Prom the wider point of view of Nigeria’s economic development, ,
these marketing arrangements had far reaching effects. They adopted a
price policy which-paid the producers less than the market value of
their produce .and therefore accumulated large sterling balances which
1. -Statement of Policy, op.cit., p*4*
2. Ibid.
'were invested in Sterling ^assets. At 31 March, 195.4» these assets
i ■ . ' . . ■
amounted to £60.6m... These were subsequently drawn upon to finance- 
research and development. Moreover, through.incentive price policies, . 
the.Boards stimulated the production and improved the quality of these/ 
products which subsequently-formed the basis for the establishment of 
large scale processing plants in Nigeria.
The statutory marketing arrangements, however, adversely affected 
the. prospect for foreign investment in Nigerian groundnut processing . 
between 1939/54* To illustrate tliis,- it is necessary to distinguish
between three forms of these arrangements. , The first was the West . •
African Produce Control Board during 1942/1948 and the other two were
the bulk.buying agreement with the U.K. Ministry of Pood, and the Ground­
nut Marketing.Board during 1949/54*
The. first groundnut processing factory in Nigeria was established 
by a Lebanese in 1942 shortly before the marketing of groundnuts was 
taken over by the West" African Produce Control Board. Prom then till 
1947 local mechanical processing of.groundnuts was banned, with 
quantitatively negligible exceptions for the armed forces. In 1947 
Lebanese applied for permission to process a few hundred tons of groundnuts 
to be sold in Southern. Nigeria or to be exported to other West African . 
countries or to the Ministry of Pood.- This v^ as refused. The&e
1. Overseas Economic Surveys, HMBQ, 1957 j P*58*
2». P.T. Bauer, West African Trade, Cambridge, 1954? p.430*
These prohibitions were officially defended as necessary in the interest 
of the maximum export of groundnuts to the United Kingdom.^ " However, , : 
they effectively barred new entrants into the industry. They.also 
.limited the scope for the expansion of the lone firm which established 
in the industry before the ban came into operation in.1942 since it 
could neither process for domestic consumption in Southern Nigeria-nor 
.for export.
The Built-Buying Agreement with the U.K. Ministry of Food limited 
foreign private investment in groundnut processing in three ways.
First, it was the deliberate policy of the Ministry to buy the groundnuts 
wherever possible, in unprocessed form. This meant that the scope for 
local processing in Nigeria was limited by this agreement since, because 
of its preference for unprocessed nuts, the Ministry of Food would normally 
be reluctant to buy the Nigerian processed products. This would not have 
mattered much if the processors were allowed to export the processed 
products to other markets than the U.K. Mr. Gardiner, who investigated 
. the scope for a' large scale groundnut processing in Nigeria recommended 
that the processors be allowed complete freedom to do this. The 
Government emphatically re jected this on the ground that it would be . 
inapplicable w^hile' the Groundnut Marketing Board’s contract with the 
Ministry of Food lasted”.^
1, Report of the Committee Appointed to inquire into the Production and
Export of Vegetable Oils and Oilseeds in the West African Colonies,
HMSO Col.211, 1947> p.13-
2. G.C..Leubuschers Bulk Buying in the Colonies, Q.U.P. 195&) p.113 fn
3* . J.C. Gardiner; Oilseed Processing in Nigeria, Government Printer 
..Lagos, 1953) P«66. . ,
•4- 6Al&aBd_fapoe8Slng in .HigerW statem^t of Polimr. ■
. , Printer,. Lagps.,. 1954;,. p.io" — ------ :---- - r"ner,t
51
After- a study of the bulk™buying arrangements in the. colonies,
C. Leubuscher concluded■that "on the whole: it favoured export of 
unprocessed materials as against that of -processed materials", and 
that "it may thus prove an obstacle to the setting, up of processing 
..industries in the producing colonies and prevent internal measures to
- ■ p  .' ■
this end". She further stated that "this assertion is not disproved 
by the.fact that seed crushing industries - of copra in Fiji and in 
.Zanzibar, of cotton seed in Uganda - have been developed in.spite of 
bulk purchase since the war.; .In these cases, the Ministry of Food was 
.not- greatly interested, in deliveries of the unprocessed materials because 
of the small quantity of copra, involved in the case of Fi&i and Zanzibar, 
and of the low oil content of cotton seed in the case of Uganda".
The third form in which statutory marketing of groundnuts limited
foreign, private investment' in-Nigerian groundnut, processing was through ■
: the Groundnut Marketing Board’s monopoly powers.' Mr. Gardiner had
suggested that, because no,large local demand for groundnut'oil and cake
existed in Nigeria, the-, prospects for. large scale groundnut processing 
depended on the export market. , He found that this would be possible if 
the Nigerian processing were undertaken by a big foreign private investor 
with .extensive overseas marketing,outlets through which the Nigerian 
product would be sold overseas. He concluded that "bearing in mind the; 
monopoly position occupied by the Marketing.Boards, and other political
1. op.cit., p.108. ,
2. Ibid., p. 109.
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. - considerations , overseas firms with large; organisations in the' major
v,; .consuming countries are unlikely 1 to seek to establish crushing plants - -
. . ih Nigaria^ even if developments of-this kind were, considered economically
’ desirable".^  After studying the operation of bulk-buying arrangements
: : " ' in. the colonies, C. Leubuscher came to the same conclusion.^  ..
. Mr. Gar diner, did not give details of the "other political considexa- y 
tions". 'In the absence of published information, one may really never ' t , 
: ' know what they were.. Both Professor P.T. Bauer and the World Bank > ' :'j .-
: . Mission, to Nigeria recorded the ^ "unfavourable'attitude of the. authorities-j,
• -'in'--Nigeria-- towards: processors; wiiich; showed itself in the form, of denial /
; :' ;.- of: 'permits - for factory land and for: immigration -of - technical, staff. ? J\-.
■ Professor Bauer,, in particular, recorded that in one or two instances,
'. the. authorities stated in official communications to. actual or pi'ospective.
-.' processors .that they. did not favour the establishment; of private.expatri” ;
.- ate processing, enterprises-for the .export market.^  \lhatever these -p.'-
. political considerations weue.V'hov/eyer,. it is'proposed here, to analyse ■
V the •.effect of the Groundnut Max’keting Board1 s monopoly- powers On the .
prospects for foreign private investment,;in .-Nigerian groundnut processing
. : : industry between 1949 and 1954* ..
■ .' These monopoly powers derived from the Board’s complete control over
iv;, . the raw materials - gromidimts1,™ .and;over:the export of the .processed -
1. . Oilseed Processing in Nigeria, , op.cit.', p.64 .(underlining is,mine)
. 2 .  Bulk Buying the Colonies, op.cit.., ^ p. 112, 1 ' :' ; , . ; : .;
. 5. The Ecpnomic Dev. of Nigeria, op.cit.,. p..5.7Q? and P. T. Bauer, West 
i v ,• ■ V;^ African .Trade, op.cit.:, p♦ 450«:- ‘ ■'-,/v 11 .:
4*. Ibid.. ■ ' . ■ - ■’ . \
.groundnut oil And cake. .Under its Ordinance all groundnuts for local.- ' 
processing had to be purchased from.the Board and;all exports of the 
processed products .had to.be made by the Board.^ .: The Board was also 
statutorily charged to secure the most favourable marketing arrangement '. 
.for the interest of the groundnut producers. In:April 1949. the Board' 
informed the crushers (who were all= Lebanese) that in future all ground­
nuts had to be bought.from the.Board and that all processed oil or cake .
3 ■ - - ■ "  '■ - ' ' '  ■
had to be exported by the Board. . In exercising; these powers the Board..
was conscious of two things: .its responsibility to, groundnut producers
.and th.e pioneering contribution of groundnut processing. . The task vjus .'
■ • ■ "• - ' . ' - - - ; ' ; - 4 ' ■ '
.therefore how to make these two objectives compatible.. .
The, formula.'adopted to. :'meet,.this objective was. as follpY^ s. . Under,; -
the statute, the.processors were free to sell their processed products in
. the local market. . Only those not. sold in the home market had to- be sold
to the.-Board for overseas export. To encourage the processors, the home
market was defined to include, the :other British West African.,territories...
.Another concession from the.Board-was that processors could sell their
processed. products-directly to; the.v export market overseas but licences for
this could be granted only.if, on each shipment, they paid an amount
sufficient to secure for the .Board the ...same- profit as it would have .
- 1. Nigerian Groundnut Marketing Board, 'Annual--Report, 1949" 1950, p.24*
2,- Statement of Policy proposed for the future "Marketing of Nigerian 
oils, oilseeds, and cotton, op.cit., p.15*
3* . Nigerian Groundnut Marketing Board, Annual Report, 1949-50» pv24« .
secured, if it had. exported, the groundnuts by itself. It was believed 
that by the above method, statutory marketing would not affect the 
prospects of.the processors either way; that it would neither, penalise. 
nor subsidise them. A lower, levy, it was held, would deprive the Board ' 
of the* funds which would otherwise accrue to it and this would mean that 
it would not be able to discharge its primary responsibility to the 
producers which" was to secure for them the most-favourable-marketing 
arrangement for their products.
Nevertheless.'the method of exercising the Board’s monopoly powers 
adversely affected the processors. They bought the groundnuts from the 
Board at a price" higher than the local price and they sold the processed 
products for export to the Board at a price which was found to be 
inadequate to,cover the costs of local processing and allow them a 
reasonable margin for profit.
The processors bought the groundnuts from the Board at the 
statutory market price plus a licensed;buying agents’ fee and an allowance 
to cover the Board’s administrative costs-of the marketing scheme. In 
1953/54? although the producer price was. £36 per ton, the processors paid"
the Board £41.17*6d per ton. This included licenced buying agent’s fee
. 2 
of,£5*6.9d and an administrative fee of 10s*9d. If the processors were
free to buy in the open market, they,would have paid only the statutory
producer price and would have largely avoided the extx^ a buying and
3 -administrative experiences, as these were largely incurred by the Board
1. ' Ibid.
2. The Groundnut Marketing Boards Annual Report, 1953-54,
3. . Oilseed Processing in Nigeria..Statement of Policy, op.cit.. p.lo.
1 . . 
on export sales of groundnuts, , It is for this reason that Iih?'* Gardiner
recommended,’that the whole or part of these extra costs he -waived for the
' 2 • 
crushers. This was rejected by the Board. These extra expenses, of
course, raised the local processing costs. In addition the processors.
were required to comply with some .formalities such as inspection of bags
which contributed to raising.local processing costs and which would have
been avoided if the Board had not intervened. . .
The price at which the. Board bought the processed.products from the
processors was fixed at the cost of the nuts plus a "crushing fee". The
Board fixed this fee at the same rate as that paid by the U.K. Ministry
of food to crushers in the U.K. In 1953/54 groundnuts were sold to the
crushers at C4i.i7.6d per ton. After allowing £4*16*8d for containers,
the Board bought the groundnut oil and cake at £108.13.51 Per so that
3 .■
the crushing fee amounted to £61.19*2d. ^he crushers objected to. this
fee as inadequate. They, felt.it did not take sufficient account of local
conditions and wanted an independent assessor to determine the crushing
fee to be paid to them. The Board rejected these suggestions, asked its
internal auditors to assess the local, processing costs and, upon their
report, adhered to the crushing fee on the ground that it "covered the
costs of an average efficient local expressor, with allowance for profit".
  :   — — <*£
1., They would still have incurred administrative expenses but^they 
carried lower overhead costs than the Board, the extra expences 
would, be lower than those paid to the -Board.
2. Gardiner1 s Report, op.cit., p.66.,
3. Calculated from the .1955/54 Annual Report.
4. Groundnut Marketing.Board, Annual Report, 1951-52, p.16.
' . . : '--•. ■ ■,;; "■'■-r-? -vi./-'- . ., . Ob  j
- 4 ’ i ,The:crushers .pressed 'their'claim for ah., adequate crushing fee.
Eventually, the Board was compelied to do just, what the processors had been 
‘ pressing for ,call in,an. independent arbitrator.- -The arbitrator, Mr.
J. C. Gardiner, who previously made a study of the groundnut processing 
industry'in Nigeria,iargued, that the-Board could not justify the fee it 
paid to the crushers. He therefore awarded costs and retrospective 
' .payment s. to, the '.crushers v0.'/V: •
To the above considerations ..which operated to increase the costs of 
local processing was added' the burden of an export tax on processed ground­
nuts. Under -the operative tariff in 1953/54? an ad valorem export duty 
was .imposed on ^oundhuts , groundnut ’ oil and groundnut cake , at the . same ; 
rate. -: As the value of processed groundnuts and cake is higher because of
the processing costs incurred, the pro rata ad valorem duty amounted to taxing 
/ ‘processing costs. Mr. Gardiner estimated this export tax as about 10s .
!‘per ,ton* . -This meant tlmt,vih 'effect, the expoi^ t of groundnuts was. being 
subsidised .and that of groundnut oil and cake being penalised by this duty.
Mr. Gardiner emphasised that this put the Nigerian crusher at a” competitive 
• .disadvantage compared with .his.competitor overseas where no such tax, was 
imposed. Following Mr..Gardiner’s recommendations, this anomaly was 
partially corrected at the end of 1954- '•
Although the above export tax'did not apparently emanate from the 
..statutory marketing scheme/such, it nevertheless added to the other 
\. restrictive tendencies of the Marketing Board .system to raise the costs and
1. ' See the Oalil Case; West Africa, Jan 'J, 1956, pp.1-2.. The dispute.
,. was long; drawn and las ted, for about ..three years. Mr. Gardiner awarded •
. - them £106,000 plus “costs* .; . '
limit the competitive power of groundnut processing in Nigeria.
Statutory marketing also reduced- the quantity of nuts available to the 
crushers for processing. ' . ,. .
In 1954 when the. processors1 capacity had reached 100,000 tons per
year, the Government restricted the .quantity of groundnuts available for
local processing to 40,000 tons per year, thereby leaving the processors -
with an excess capacity of 60,000 tons. Mr. Gardiner-had recommended,
. , > . . .  
and the Government agreed, to allow the crushers unrestricted freedom to
develop; but this curtailment was defended 011 the grounds that it was
undesirable to process for export. This was clearly, stated by the
Governmenti ’
"The'-[authorities] are prepared to follow the recommendations. 
of the [Gardiner] report, in. affording to these enterprises 
adequate opportunity to develop on.normal commercial lines, 
on the understanding that the enterprises for their part 
will direct their activities primarily towards production 
for the domestic market as recommended in the report. A 
local industry which directed its activities primarily 
towards large-scale production for the export market could 
not lay, claim to facilities for unrestricted development in 
view of the general conclusion of the report on the - "
unfavourable prospects for large-scale crushing in Nigeria 
and the acceptance of these conclusions". 1
This was a misreading or misinterpretation of Gardiner’s report.. . . ; 
Mr. Gardiner was commissioned in 1951 "to make a survey of the economics . 
of the local mechanical expression of oil seeds .in Nigeria.with, particular 
reference to the question whether there, is a prima facie case for the 
Government of . Nigeria and or, the Nigerian Marketing Boards to establish a .
-1.. .Oilseed Processing in-Nigeria! Statement of Policy, op.cit., pp.7~8*
plant for the large '.scale,- expression of. oil seeds" * Mr. Gardiner found 
that the prospects for the export market were too uncertain to justify, 
the investment, of Government money, for'this purpose and suggested that the 
development'of processing in.Nigeria be left to private enterprise.. He 
repeatedly emphasised that private processors should hot be restricted.
He even recommended. a subsidy and the granting of pioneer status and 
privilege^ to the industry. ' In his :view the industry was to be regarded ., 
as an experiment', the, heavy costs of which had been borne by private . 
enterprise.. If the experiment succeeded the Industry would develop and;. 
flourish. If it failed, the necessary lessons would have .been learnt as 
effectively as if the authorities had undertaken it. . If after a. period 
of years it should become apparent that for reasons that could not bey 
forseen at the time of -his. investigation, the industry, was not developing - 
on lines which were considered to- be- in the interests, ’of Nigeria, it would 
still be possible for the;Government to intervene to protect the interests 
of the; country.^ < Thus, although he objected to investing publxc money - 
in. the project,‘Mr. ..Gardiner had no Objection, to private investors risking 
their own funds. y '
’ Mr. Gardiner reported in 1952 end the official statement,of policy y 
was issued in 1954* It is tempting to argue in favour of the policy 
statement that events unforseen in 1952 had occurred by 195.4 to -justify
1. Ibid, pp. 1-2 (underlining mine):. :
2. . ,-Gllseed Processing in Nigeria, op.cit., 65.
the restriction, or the intervention of, the .authorities in accordance 
with the report. . This ‘becomes more persuasive when the additional 
reasons given for the restriction are considered. These were that the 
domestic market was saturated. According to the Government, "The 
• industry in Kano has , - unaided, already expanded - its. capacity far in 
.excess of domestic needs, which makes it necessary to restrict its 
production". This-conclusion was derived from the Board’s selling 
experience in 1 9 5 3 “ 5 4 *  ‘ The crushers were required■primarily to sell 
their processed products in the domestic market and to sell to the Board 
any surplus for the export' market. Thus the proportion of groundnut oil 
and cake sold to the Board became a measure of the saturation of the 
domestic,market. In 1 9 5 2 - 5 3 ? the Kano crushers sold about 8 7  per cent . . 
of their groundnut oil,,and 82  per cent of groundnut cake to the Board for 
export. In.19 5 3 ^ 5 4 ?  the Board’s, annual report complained that only 
"a very small proportion of the oil ahcL cake produced was sold locally by 
the oil millers, the bulk being purchased for export by the Board".'
These large sales to the Board for export.made it conclude that the local, 
market for groundnut cake and oil was saturated.^  \
•:This conclusion was not correct. The crushers had the option of. 
selling in. two markets, - the. Board and the domestic market. .'Much
advertising- and transport costs.were involved in selling in the domestic
' V  v" i : \Z 1 , /;
1. Oilseed Processing in Nigerias Statement of Policy, op.cit., pp.6-9-
2. Groundnut Marketing Board; Annual Report,. 1952/3? P*6.
3 .  Statement of• Policy, op.cit.-, p . 6V
market; if they sold to the.• Board, the crushers avoided these costs.
The extent of advertising cost involved in selling in "the domestic 
market is illustrated by the experience of the Northern Region ' 
Production Development Board which spent £2,444*19*3h between 1952 and ■ 
1954 in free distribution of groundnut cake to popularise its use as 
cattle feed.^;/ In addition, because of the great distances involved . 
between the North and the South, on the one■ hand, and between towns in 
North on the other, much transport costs were involved. Paced with 
these extra costs, the crushers obviously sold more of their, processed 
products to the Board.to avoid these costs. The'Northern Region 
Production Development Board could bear, the '.casts because it is not 
necessarily a profit-making concern. If the crushers incurred tku.vtl10 
; re suiting, delivered price for their products Y/ould-be uncompetitive with 
the prices of local competing substitute's. For instance, it was found 
that in Northern Nigeria the .delivered price of groundnut cake was £21' . 
per ton, in Bauchi Province and .£16 per- ton. in ICatsina Province. On the 
. other hand, the price* of, the competing local substitute., called MbranM 
was £10 in Katsina-Province; and £16 per ton in. Bauchi Province. ^ It was 
therefore uneconomic for the crushers to sell in the domestic market. 
This explains why they sold more of.their products to the Board.-It was 
therefore wrong for. the government to conclude that/because the crushers
1. Northern Region. Production Development'Board: Annual Reports - •
1952/53 and 1954/55. : b  ■'-'/
2. Ibid. :
sold about 90 per cent of thei'r processed product to the Board, the
local market was saturated
It is because of these costs and the pioneering efforts of the
processors that Mr. Gardiner recommended that a small and declining
subsidy and pioneer privileges under the Aid to Pioneer Industries
Ordinance, 1952, be accorded to the industry to help it to develop.
The Groundnut Marketing Board rejected this recommendation. It argued
that if the processed products found favour with the public, then there
would be no need-to subsidise them. If, however, they were less liked,
this, in itself, would be a reason for not promoting their sales 
1
artificially* The.high nutritional values of groundnut cake and meal 
were appreciated; but the Board argued'that the need for a subsidy in ’ 
this case, arose in Eastern and Western Nigeria. Since the greater part 
of the groundnuts and groundnut products were consumed in the North, the 
Board felt it would not subsidise the. industry. On the other hand, . 
Eastern and Western Nigeria could not provide the money.for the subsidy. 
This refusal to assist the industry seems unfortunate. In view of what 
has been said above, about the prohibitive distribution costs', it is 
obviovis that a temporary subsidy would have assisted in expanding the 
local market.and would have enhanced the prospects.of local processing 
and of foreign,investment into the industry.
The restriction of the quantity of groundnuts available to the 
crushers for local processing was also justified on the ground that it
1. Oilseed Processing in. Nigeria; Statement of Policy, op.cit., p.8.
was uneconomic to process for the export market, because it was 
considered that the export of the processed products proved less 
remunerative than the export of the groundnut in unprocessed form. 
Restriction was therefore considered necessary since the Board would 
otherwise be prevented from executing its primary responsibility to' 
the producers to maximise their returns by securing the most favourable 
marketing arrangements for their produce.
The Board based the above conclusions from its selling experience 
in 1952-53• In that year it made a net profit of £ 1 1 .0 8  per ton on 
its groundnut sales, £4*71 ton on its groundnut cakes, and a loss of 
£1*4 pgr ton on its sales of groundnut■oil. "Calculated on the basis.of 
the'normal equivalents" the Board concluded, "these figures mean that on . 
the exports of oil and cake,, the Board’s margin was .less by approximately 
£3. per.ton than that obtained on the corresponding quantity of nuts".1 
"In respect of the sales of (these) processed commodities", said the 
Government’s policy'statement, "the Board was-prevented from fulfilling 
its statutory obligation to secure for the groundnut producers the most 
favourable selling arrangements for their produce. In the light of these 
considerations, it is the intended policy of the Groundnut Marketing Board, 
based on, the recommendation of the Northern Region Government, that 
supplies of groundnuts to the.local crushers' should be limited ..iThe . 
recommendation in paragraph 212 (a), that no restriction be placed on the 
quantity of groundnuts purchased'by the crushers for processing, has thus
1. Groundnut Marketing Board; Annual Report, 1952-53? P*16.
not been accepted". ...
Three reasons make1 the above,-conclusion unacceptable. First, it 
has been slr&yn that the pro rata:expOrt duty on groundnuts and groundnut 
processed products operated to tax the'later and to subsidise the export \ 
of the former, i.e., export of groundnuts.. Secondly, the experience' ■ of 
one of the Nigerian crushers in the marketing of his processed groundnut 
oil and cake from his factory'in.the French territory in the Chad did not 
support the view that the export of .groundnut processed products was - . 
necessarily less remunerative than the export of groundnuts. Without the 
intervention. of the'Marke ting, Board system in the Chad, this ■ processor 
obtained better prices for his oil and cake than he,got from the equiva­
lent amounts' of. .produce sold through the Board and achieved such a success
that the French authorities were reported as willing to assist the
* ■ L , • • 2 ... • ' 
expansion of his factory. • • • •
Thirdly, even if the selling of the processed products by the Board’, 
was'less remunerative than the selling of the grountnuts, it is strange 
that restriction was imposed, on the crushers' at .the moment when the " 
termination of the. bulk, purchase agreement with the. Ministry of Food would 
have made.it;possible to allow■the crushers the , freedom to try other 
overseas markets .than.the U.K. The resulting gain or loss from this 
would have been. the. responsibility .of.;the’crushers and their future would 
then have, had to depend on the outcome,; that is, on their competitive 
strength in the open market. y - \
!• pp..6-9- ■ " , ■ ■ ' ’ • ,
2. '’Why! Crush; the Crushers ?n fetprioa., Hoy.6,'1954, p.1049
It" has been suggested .that the decision to restrict the operation 
of the crushers was influenced by political considerations.1 . However,.': 
the decision ran counter to the recommendation not only of Mr Gardiner ■ . 
but also of - the World Bank Mission. This mission found" that as:the 
growth of ..the Kano -groundnut' processing industry "could only benefit, y
not hurt, the Nigerian economy, we:see no reason why it should be
2 1 ' ' - ' • . 
discouraged". / Professor-P.T. Bauer called the restriction " a policy .
■ * ■ Dof de-industrialisation unheard fof- since the 18th century". The 
restriction certainly Increased the processors' operating costs.by 
creating an-excess,.capacity of 60,000 tons of groundnuts per year. . . The , 
Board suggested to the crushers to utilise this excess capacity in 
processing cotton. Not only was..this Inpracticable because it required
a complete new set of■equipment, it was found uneconomic after an
‘ a , '■ • . . .
independent expert inquiry. Under these conditions, it ,xs easy to see
that not only would it .be rather too’ difficult for the processors to cover
their costs, the industry was-unlikely to attract new investment unless
the policy was modified.
Statutory Marketing of Nigerian Groundnutss Conclusions. .
The preceding pages have attempted to analyse the Influence of 
statutory marketing of Nigerian‘groundnuts .on foreign private investment 
in Nigerian manufacturing between 1942 and 1954* It was shown that
1. C. Leubuscher;. Bulk Buying from the colonies, op.cit., p. 112
2. Econ. Dev. of Nigeria, op.oit.y p.371
3. P.T. Bauer; Groundnut Economics in Nigeria, New Commonwealth,.
'■Pe?V 1955? P*572. \ ‘ v ■
4. . E.A. Wells ■& W.A. Warrington, op.cit., p.90. .
during the operation of the West African Produce Control Board, there ' 
was a ban ,on-the establishment of new manufacturing plants in the. ..., , / 
.groundnut processing, industry and that the expansion ‘of the lone factory ■ 
established in 1942 shortly.before the marketing of groundnuts v/as taken ■ 
over by the. Board^ was severely restricted and permission to process for 
the. domestic market .in the South or for export to the Ministry of Food 
or to'other West African markets was refused. .
, The bulk buying contract with the -Ministry of Food which expired 
at the end of June 1954 restricted .the prospects for foreign investment 
• in the groundnut processing industry-by the preference of the. Ministry 
of Food for unprocessed groundnuts. This restricted the prospects;for 
local processing in Nigeria, and limited the markets available for they 
locally processed products. V
The Groundnut Marketing Board had: powers over the quantity, the 
price and the marketing prospects of the local processing industry. The. 
Board restricted the quantity of nuts supplied for local processing which 
was sold to the :crushers at higher than the producer prices; and bought the 
processed products at-prices which did not take adequate account of local 
processing costs. The export market for the processed products was 
restricted by. the'refusal to allow, the. processor the freedom to try markets 
other than the U.K.ior indeed to sell their products in the 1 open1 'export 
market.. Finally, at the time ?/hen the. termination of the contract with . 
the Ministry of Food would have made it possible to allow the cxushers the 
freedom to develop and market their produce freely, both in the home .and;.
in the export market, their manufacturing capacity was cut. by the Board
to two-fifths of their effective capacity. All these created , ;
mfavoixrable prospects-which limited!foreign private enterprise in the. 
industry. ^ . , ■ ;! ■ ;
- ~'V ■ ■ ' GOVEimiENT POLICY . - - . =
2;:. The •; Bvolut ion of the Government Vs Industrial Policy 19 39-19 54*.
-> • One of the immediate effects of the.disruption .of communications:. • 
.v/hich followed .the outbreak, of-the yrar in 1939 was the fall in imports 
:into - Nigeria and.the. consequent rise .in import' prices. Table.1* shows 
that it was only in 1942 that the total value of imports, at £10m. -
exceeded the.1938 -total of £9m*. At the end of the war in 1945 ? total . 
Imports, at £14m.‘, was over' 100 , per cent the 1939- value. ' , However, as 
.Table 1.5 shows, this rise in the value of imports was mainly-due to the 
rise- in the price of Imports which had risen by.123 per cent by the end 
of 1945- . The volume of imports, after some fluctuations throughout - the 
.war-years, was 10 per cent lower in 1945 than in 1939* '
After the loss'of,the .Far,eastern.colonies, certain-gtemteof , .
Nigerian :exports,. such.as' oils:and.oilseeds, assumed greater importance 
in the war effort,of the British, Empire. ' This was partly reflected in 
the. rise in the total value of exports from-about £10m. in 1938 to. £18m. 
in 1945* Table 1*5 shows-that' although., the-value, of exports rose by - 
71 per cent at the. end of 1945> txport prices rose by 80 per cent. . 
Although, the; volume of exports fluctuated less than the volume of imports 
it Was only in three years 'during the .war, 1941-1943> that the. volume of 
exports exceeded the 1939 level; .it.equalled it in 1944. And was less by'
5 per cent' in 1945 «• ' : Throughout the war , import prices rose-..fas ter 
than export prices. In 1945-ft .•'was 123 per cent higher than. in '1939? 
while export prices merely rose by 80 per cent. . ■I '
The inflationary.threat from the above developments was reinforced' .
by effects of .increased spending due. to the very considerable military
' - . 1.1' •' ' • " "  " . 1 ’ . . - • ' • ■ ■■ - 2 ■ , . ' 
expenditure, the.virtual/doubling of wage rates during the-war,
increased.export earnings and food-scarcity .which followed the drift of
labour from the. farms to the towns due to the employment opportunities
create d.by mili tary . cons true tion. ‘ h .
This inflationary potential was however, moderated by the rise in
[domestic savings -as is shown/ by the increase in .both the number and 1
value of Post Office Sayings Bank Deposits, and in savings and time i :
deposits in.the commercial banks:(Table 1.6); and by the anti- : ;
inflationary effect of the Government revenue. surplus, which was £2.5m. -
in 1945 (Table 1.7)* Moreover, the increase, in export earnings was.not :
fully reflected in producer incomes because government policy deliberately \
limited prices paid for crops, e.g.'cocoa, to •. prevent any diversion of
effort from the production of oilseed and as an anti-inflationary measure.^ =
For instance, although the producers earned £15-£l6 per ton for. the best
quality' cocoa in 1939/40, despite the rise inpricesthey were only paid .
1, ■ Complete statistics are;not' available; but Px’est records that between-'-*- 
. £3'* 5m.. and' £4m* was.' spent . in Nigeria ; on mili tary , expend!tur e in p&£h
• 1943-44 and 1944-*5 And that f i■■was-., probably somewhat' higher .ip^942-43 
when military needs were more pressing. See A.R. Pfest, War Economies 
of Primary Producing Countries t1.U.P. ■ 1948? -P*242.n*4 '
.2.. ■ Ibid.pp.249-250» For instance, v/agea.of-unskilled-w&blfers rose from /. 
l6’/6d;per month in 1939 to 'between 30/- and 40/-. in 1942*
t .. ■> A.R. Presl, op.cit. . p.;254. :'/,. . . . : - ;
£I0“£11 per ton for the same quality cocoa in 1942. Other anti- 
,inflationary measures included subsidies and controls. Despite these. - 
measures, however, the cost of living index continued to rise and by 
1945 it was 76 per cent higher than the 1939 level (Table 1*5)* This
led to the award of cost of living allowance to Government employees in .
. ' l  . ' "
1944, which was increased after the Tudor Davies Report; ■ and to a ..
' , p
change' in Government policy towards local production of import substitutes. .
The first indication of this change seems to bea.letter from the 
Colonial Office to all colonial Governors- in June 1941 stressing the need 
to encourage, the production of commodities of special war time .value 
including the development of local production to replace imports. This 
policy was' adopted' in Nigeria. Certain government departments instituted * 
schemes to manufacture such products as bacon.and butter which were’ 
previously imported and a department, of .commerce and industries was created 
under the Ten Year Plan for Development and Welfare to develop certain- 
schemes such.as pioneer oil mills,' to be handed eventually to African 
management. : . ■ '
Nevertheless, little progress was made in industrial development : 
between 1939 and 1954- Government policy emphasised agricultural 
development, for it was thought that., it would be unwise to invest large.
1 *; W. Tudor Davies, Report of the Enquiry into the Cost of -Living and 
the Control of the cost of living in the Colony and Protectorate ;of 
Nigeria, Government Printer, Lagos, 1945*
2. Nigeria, Annual Reports, 1947-195Q*
3••1 Financial Policy in the Colonial Empire - a circular despatch from
the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Colonial Governors, 
June 1941 .* (underlining mine)
stuns-in new industrial development. Emphasising this policy in the 
Nigerian Legislative Council in 19.45? ^e Governor of Nigeria, Mr.
Boudillon, declared that while the government's economic policy was to ; ■
• develop* Nigeria1s resources,. and while this might.lead to the develop­
ment of subsidiary industries, "there was no intention whatever of
turning.the people of Nigeria from a race of farmers into a race of
labourers. The peasant proprietor is the backbone of Nigeria and I -1
- - . . . 2 ' - ‘ ’ • ... '
hope he will always remain so, Industrial development was not to be 
ignored as a matter of policy; hut the Development Secretary, Mr. E.Y. Smith 
warned, "that development was not necessarily going to be the industrial- ■
ization of Nigeria", and that^Nigeriafs general condition'and size do not
■ ■ .. 3
lend themselves to industrialisation in a big way".
Government policy,..of course, was not opposed to the industrialization
of Nigeria; It rather preferred this to be through, the establishment of
cottage or village industries rather than of factory level or large-.. .
scale industries.-,, Emphasising this policy in the Nigerian Legislative
Council, the Development Secretary, Mr. E.Y. Smith, stated, that there
was no desire on the part of the Goverhmeiit to suppress large scale.
industrial activities; "but, in the main, we do feel; many of these
industries should be developed more on a village and peasant basis than
1. ■ Industrial Potentialities - of Northern Region, Ministry, of' Trade, and
‘.Industry, Kaduna, 1963? p.lit '
2. Nigerian Legislative Council Debates, March 1940, pp. 9-10.
3. See The Nigerian Legislative■Council Debates, 23rd Session, 1945
p»51j Development Plannings Preliminary Statement, Sessional Paper
No.6', 1945? p.5* '
on a factory basis. That is what we want to see done in order that . 
the people in the village may. have the best results from the Development . 
Plan" .1 ■'■'■■■■■ '• . - ; ' ■ - :
The Effect of. the Government1s Industrial Policy . .
It is thus, seen that although the .shortages in imports and.-in 
local food irroduction, and the consequent rise in prices led to the change 
of government policy to encourage the manufacture of some, goods previously 
imported, the Government preferred this to be on a village and peasant 
basis rather than on a factory basis. As foreign private; investment in 
manufacturing had to be on a factory basis, this policy militated-against 
the establishment of foreign manufacturing plants and therefore limited-, 
foreign private investment in Nigerian manufacturing during this period.
The mechanism. seems to be as follows . Since the government was 
opposed to factory level industrial establishment, it would not encourage 
such establishments and this prevention seems to have taken many forms.
One was immigration restrictions. In the Nigerian Legislative Council in 
1949 a member alleged that the government used immigration laws.to prevent
a Czechsolvakian firm from establishing a rubber processing factory, to
' ' 2 ■ 
manufacture crepe, soles.from Nigerian natural rubber. No details were
given, of how this was done but the government did hot refute the allegation.
Another, method’was ..direct prohibitions for instance,- Miss M. Perham recorded
1. Nigerian Legislative Council Debates, Feb.7-8, 1946? P*53*
2. Statement by N. Azikiwe,^Nigerian, Legislative Council Debates, 1948-
49? P»437.
that, the United'Africa Company Ltd. was. disuaded by the government; from 
starting, a spinning ,and weaving mill ■ in Northern Nigeria and a garment 
factory near ■ Lagos. . ■ No . further detail is' available ' on this. Another, 
method was the Government’s attitude of’Vcoolness",.towards proposals to 
. establish foreign maiuifacturing. . For instance, a German'firm which \ 
wanted to establish.a furniture' factory in Nigeria to produce household ; V 
equipment,; using local:,materials, found that "some people were unwilling- 1 
to conduct business-with.German firms" .^  ; The people 'were'not-specified; j 
but there is -little doubt that it was the-government which would arrange I 
immigration and foreign,exchange permits to make such investment possible/
:: Another illustration of government policy being "cool" to proposalsl
~ to'establish foreign manufacturing,iniNigeria’during.this.period is the - 
proposals for'the; establishment of textile.plants. : Two textile projects - 
were proposed in 1952.- One was to be a partnership between a British ' 
firm and one of the.Nigerian Development Corporations to. establish a mill 
of 15,000 :spindles and 300-550 looms at a cost of about £.9m, of. which, the 
Government would.have provided ' £. 5m.and the British f irm .£ ,4m in,addition 
to. under talcing the planning, management, and training; of Africans, The 
other proposal was made by an Italian firm for. a small, mill at Aba in 
Eastern Nigeria.. • He offered to provide the .fixed capital of £150,000 .
1. ■ M. Perham (ecL), Mining, Commerce', and Finance, op.cit., p.74*
2. . 'Such''details are not easy to get. The United Africa Company Ltd.
. formerly operated a singlet, factory, in Lagos but sold it in 1949*
In reply to my request for further information, the Company saids 
"The Lagos Singlet Factory. 1 am afraid the story behind this is 
, highly confidential and we are.not prepared to release it"..
3* Reported in West Africa, April, 1952,, p.323.,
I'd.
: provided the Eastern Nigerian Government provided the site and £60,000
for working capital,. In 1953. another proposal was made for a textile 
plant in Western Nigeria by ty/o foreign firms who -undertook to provide, a
substantial part of the capital required. Despite these proposals, by, *y
the end of 1954>■ no foreign ; textile plant had been established in Nigeria, / , .
It is clear that this was not due to the absence of proposals. It was /
not, also due to lack of demand for textiles in Nigeria nor to lack of the : v 
necessary raw materials* Table 1.8 which shows Nigeria’s imports;of . v k  
textiles and export of raw cotton makes this clear.,
The Table shows-that Nigeria’s exports of raw cotton varied between 
: 10m. tons a year in 1937 and 19m. in '1942* . Erom -1943 it declined to 7m.■
tons and only In 1950 that it equalled its. 1937 level of ‘IOnu--; tons, .--The--,
declines during these years were due'to the demand of the expanding ;
domestic peasant textile industry and partly due to a deliberate government 
policy -of ■paying -/lower prices., for'Cotton; purchased for, export so as - not • to . y 
divert effort'from the .production of groundnuts which was .given top priority. 
From 1950 onwards, however, exports began to increase again and by 1952
.totalled 19m* tons. . - / •: f v ■ ■ ' - :• ' ' :
■ 1, . .The■ Colonial Development, Corporation5: Cotton in 'Nigeria, A Report to .
the Nigerian Government, 1955> P*7*: . Nor instance, in 1948 when cotton .
,sol'd in the.domestic market; was, costing..4d per lb .in,Bauchi Province, , ■ 
•.. • . in the North, the. price. paid for cotton bought by the British Cotton
./; Growing Association for export was. fixed at. per lb. Accordingly,
: , producers • found it/more -advantageous to sell “ their.' .cotton in , the ‘ •
domestic market rather £hah. for export. Hehce.y the export figures 
.grossly, understate the quantity of; local production of cotton sinco:.- 
. only a: small proport ion was generally sold' for export and the . rest
retained for consumption in the peasant textile: industry. The propor­
tion thus retained .was-' estimated at 60 per cent in 1947 and 1948. . .
‘ Column- 2/of the-Table shows/the'size of Nigeria's import market 
for textiles*.-';Except in 1954 when it anmmted - to 24 per cent of Nigeria's 
total merchandise imports, in no year between 1948 and 1954 was it less 
than .25'per cent; of. the,-total 5 and .for 9■ years. during the period it was :
30 per cent or oyer. ..These imports merely supplemented domestic peasant 
production which was-described as; "exceptionally wasteful". , These 
figures illustrate that the Government' s-failure to encourage the - 
establishment of foreign textile manufactures'in Nigeria during the perio6j 
was not due to a lack of.a big domestic.market for textiles or of raw 
materials for < the manufacture. . . .
E.A. Wells and W.Ai Warmington attributed the failure, to "problems j' 
concerning,finance, siting, management, and the* training of.labour". . .
This explanation is untenable. The prospective.investors offered to providej 
substantial sums of the required capitalprovide, management of the factories 
'and train Nigerian labour, ' ' Nor was the local, capital .lacking! the. \ 1. ' 
Development Corporations and the .Nigerian Marketing Boards had large sums of 
■money which would have been-utilised for the purpose. , . ■
The .real explanation must, be-found in the government attitude towards 
the proposals.! ' The World; Bank ..Mission which visited Nigeria in 1953/54 
found this, ahtitu.de to be "cool ;and over- cautious". According to the 
Mission, "proposals, of- this' type warrant..active consideration rather than .
1. Empire Cotton Growing Association! Report on a-visit to Nigeria, '
. ' , . Nov. 2—10th Dec*, 1947 by J#B* .Hutchinson - and. E.0* Pearson, p.7-
2. P.A. Wells & - W .A . Warmington, Studies, in'industrialisation in Nigeria 
aiid the Cameroons, .0*11.P. 1962,. p.113. ■ ' . -
the cool and over cautious reception which they appear to have received".
It pointed out that Nigeria had. room for a variety of independent textiles 
enterprises in all the regions if competent operators could he found. 
"Keeping in mind the technical, skills .-which accompany foreign investment 
capital",, the mission further emphasised, "we suggest that the proposed 
regional development corporations be especially receptive to textile 
manufacturing schemes that appear sound enough to‘ interest overseas 
investors"
Plow does one explain the Government *s.,lukewarm attitude to the textile
projects especially when it is remembered that, in the interests of.the
«<?
Sterling Area, Nigeria agreed in 1952* i° switch at. least 15-per cent-^er 
textile imports from non-sterling to Sterling Area countries, which, in
effect, was-to Lancashire. This. would not..have ,been strange if Lancashire
. .' . , • 3
ttould satisfy Nigeria's demand; but it was reported that it-could not.
Opportunity would have been taken of the dollar problem (as in fact was done
in the case of beer and tobacco manufactures) to establish modern textile .
manufacturing in Nigeria. This was not done.
One. would think that this'was‘due to the declared policy against the
establishment'-of factory-level manufactures. This is not apparently so. ,
This policy was enunciated in 1945 &nd could be regarded .as a colonial
. 1 ,  J.B.'R.D. Economic Development of Nigeria, op.cit., p.387* :
2. Ibid. - '
3 .  Reported in West Africa, June-2 1 ,  1952, P-557* This was because
"Lancashire... suffered^ from a severe labour shortage and was unable to 
weave any thing/'sufficient quantities of the kind of cloth required by 
Nigeria. Higher grade cloth, for other markets being more profitable...
many people thought ^ 9$ Lancashire's reduced labour, force would continue
for a long time to be too, small."
government policy over which Nigerians had no say. By the time the 
textile projects were discussed in 1952/53 two ©vents had intervened to 
alter the situation. First, the 1951- Constitution came into effect in 
1952 and,, by introducing ministerial government, enabled Nigerians to 
have a more effective; voice in' formulating government policy. This* point/' 
was - emphasised by the late A.C. Nwapa,. the first Nigerian central minister 
of commerce and industries to,, a British, audience in 1952. -'The economic 
policy of my Government", he said,, "depends upon the decisions taken by my 
colleagues and myself, the Council of Ministers. .Naturally, we weigh 
carefully advice' tendered to us by. the officers of the Colonial Office but 
we have gained the right, -which we intend, to exercise, to decide our policy 
and to pursue it. There is. no question of any dictation of the choice of^ 
path which Nigeria is to tread".
The first manifestation, of the exercise of the above "right" seems - 
'to-,be. the passing of the Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance" in 1952 with 
retrospective effect from July 1951* This apparently changed the policy 
against factory-level manufacturing establishments.by affording limited 
tax concessions (see later) to encourage the establishment of "pioneer" 
industries on factory level basis. On the face of it, therefore, the . 
governments luke-warm attitude which led to. the failure to establish any 
of the three textile projects examined in 1952/53 couid not be attributed . 
to the industrial policy of 1945 since it had already-been changed with
effect from 1951*
1. "A Minister Speaks for Nigeria", West Africa, June 14, 1952.
The real explanation is that the Government postponed, decisions oh 
manufacturing and.other development projects pending the Report of the
' S • . ■
World Bank Mission which-'visited Nigeria in 19§3 and reported in 1954 ■ 
Foreign textile manufacturing was one of the schemes affected. This was 
'the answer given by A.C,.. Nwapa, the Minister of Commerce and Industries, 
to. a quest ion. in-the House'of Representatives in 1953- Asked why'there 
was no foreign, cotton, spinning mill, in the , country, Mr. Nwapa stated that 
"the: Government appreciated the necessity for establishing one which will 
be considered after the International Bank for Reconstruction and . .
■ ■ ■: _ .. '. .p  - ; .. -  . . • -
Development1 s..Report". . The receipt of this report at the end of 1954 
coincided with, the'introduction'of the Federal Constitution of that year. 
This led to'further postponement (see below).
.III. THE TARIFF POLICY 
The third form in which government policy affected foreign private 
investment in Nigerian manufacturing, during 1939-54 was through its tariff 
policy.' . Normally an entrepreneur-would be willing to invest in Nigeria 
if his cost. calculations''”showed that, the project would yield, him a margin, 
after costs, which he considers adequate. Some projects: would yield this, 
return if,initially they are projected from--foreign competition by tariff, 
and other tax concessions which would enable, them to withstand foreign 
competition and be able to,plough back.profits and amortise capital in
1. House of Representatives; Debates, March 1953? p.1032. Question ho. 
W.58 by S...Akinola,' MP from Western Nigeria. .
the early years until- they are able to stand on their' own. Y/ithout these
concessions, such projects may not be undertaken. This is what happened
with some projects, in Nigeria, during this period. .
When the United Africa Company Ltd. in 1947 investigated the'
feasibility of establishing a textile factory in Nigeria, it found the
project "unattractive" but was willing to proceed with it if certain tariff
concessions would be granted by the Government, The Government rejected
this request because it was no.t prepared to sacMfice the revenue from the
tariff. "As we get our revenue from tariffs", the Government told the
Company, "if you took away a lot of the imports from which we collect our
revenue now, then we might have to put an. excise tax on the goods you make
in your mill".^ The company abandoned the project on the ground that
2"nobody can start an enterprise under those conditions." In 1950. the
Commonwealth Development Corporation complained that projects for.textile
manufactures were held up because of doubts about increasing Japanese
competition; import duties are usually ad valorem and, do not give adequate
3protection to local production".
Tariff concessions became available under the Aid to Pioneer Industries 
Ordinance 1952. Section three of the Ordinance enabled, the Governor in 
Council to determine what new industries it would be in the interest of
1. Quoted by Mr. Geoffrey, Heyworth in His evidence to the U.K. Select 
Committee on Estimates, British Parliamentary Papers, Vol.8, 1948>
- P-92. *■ *
2. Ibid,
3. ICVD.C. Annual Report, .195°? p.6.
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. Nigeria to establish or develop and to declare such industries pioneer 
industries. . The industries would either be new to Nigeria or not yet 
. carried on "on a commercial scale suitable to the economic requirements 
or.developments"pfNigeria".: There had also to be favourable prospects , ■
of further development of the industry or insufficient facilities in.
Nigeria to,enable . the-industry to be carried on on a "suitable scale**.
. ; ■ , Onee an industry, had been declared a "pioneer", any existent or
. . intending.company .contemplating to construct a factory (including a mine)-
, . . in Nigerid;-to/manufacture, the ''pioneer'’ : products'would apply for a pioneer -
■ certificate entitling it to".-a period of tax. relief under certain;conditions.
- v ■; These include starting/operations; within a. specified period and confining . .
. ..operations to. the pioneer product.-. ' The companies, which must be .public . . y 
. . .cdnipanies-.registered in Nigeria, would be eligible for tax relief in the
.' : first instance for a period of two years... This period may be extended to .
. , , three years if the Minister responsible was: satisfied that the company had
• already-inciirred fixed, capital, expenditure of-not'less than £15?000; or to .
; . "-five- years when this :sura:is-aaot less' thaii £100,000.. . . Profits and dividends - V'-. 
would be. tax-free' during'the . tax' relief . period, . Losses incurred during the 
tax holiday, period"would be- carried forward and set against future'profits,- 
• • for tax piuposes, .after' the tax holiday-period, . .
. This Ordinance;, . which was given a retrospective . effect from 1 July,
1951,■ aroused much, expectation. : -Mr-. Awolowo, the Leader of the Oppositioi^
. 'in.the. House of Representatives, feared\that. it would compromise Nigeria,1 s• . . 
future political,independence, because "this very inducement alone is 
"hy sufficient to produce, an influx of foreign investment into this country
>;-vV iv" ; . -y'j////v.h-'/ 7^
at this . , . Howevery, by fher.;erid of 1953?; ,Qhly 25 applications had
been received of viiich -6; were being considered. 'But by the end of 1954? ■
•/-..‘no, ihdustrylhad- been;; dec fared-- ad’pioneer'hahd therefore no company had Z . - . ;. 
•/ benefited-from the Ordinance./ In. deed, although the Ordinance had
retrospective.effect from July: I,- .1951> the first industry .to be declared 
./ a pibheer/.ihdustry dvas .cottonseed processing in September , 1955- Y/hy .
.••. was ..this .so ? .There/ are' two explanations. ■ /- - /■■ . '//' '■
The;first- is that ' the provisions of "the Ordinance Were narrowly .
. interpreted by the Ooveriiment.. ' One of the factors to be considei*ed before . 
declaring an ihdusfr}?- a . "pioneer" was whether/it was. in the "public .interest’'V 
'■An. application to declare a match industry a pioneer-was rejected/on; the
' excuse that- the. chemicals for the match/head would have.. to be imported.^/ ; .
But the chernicals .would have to be .imported in the match in'any case . "If .
- the ordinance is to be effective," cautioned the World Bank Mission, "this/ -•
•" V broad . discretionary power must be exercised in the .most liberal', manner :
Indeed if indiistriaiisatioh' through-private enterprise, is, desired /as- a - 
matter of policy, ; then, unless it .clearly-, appears that a particular industry 
. would be: harmful to the country , we suggest that it is "expedient in the •../ /
.public interest", to encourage' every new industry not .yet sufficiently
/active in Nigeria-for which private:-capital , is available.^ //- . /, .
' 1 • ’. House .of Representatives: -Debates, -vol.* 11, /April , 3-9 ? 1952;?: p.99Q ■/ . . • ’: .
' 2.’ Ibid., p.359- 1 / • /•■ / ' - = / /, '
/B..: Ibid.'-y - v . - ■/■ /-.' 1/ - - ./' : '
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The second explanation, is that the'Government postponed major 
decisions on industry, pending - the /Report of the World Bank Mission.
A Member of Parliament in the House of Representatives /had criticised 
/the.Government's/industrial policy-and had wondered how long.the Government ; 
.would tsik.of,encouraging industry without actually doing anything practical 
The Minister of Commerce and/Industries, Mr. A.C. Nwapa replied that the 
Government was waiting for . the report of the pending World Bank Survey on ■ 
thefresources available for future development and the -possibilities of 
future development, in the major sectors of the; economy with 'recommendations/ 
for practical steps to be taken? including the timing and co-ordination .off 
developmental- activitiesV The Minister. emphasised that' the "Council of . f 
.Minislei’s found. the survey was a pre-requisite for the sound planning, of 
industrial'development*. It is.our'firm belief that.it.is of the highest 
.importance to the whole community that plans for an industry of any 
/significance should be framed in the light of the best available expert 
opinion on the possibilities of the economic development on a countrywide 
.scale. We believe also that the co-operation of such a body as the '
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development would, be ah invaluable 
addition to our resources; and/it would not therefore be in our best 
.interests to go ahead with new plans at a time when we are expecting the 
visit of the Mission'from the,Bank"..
1. House of Representatives Debates, 4 Marclr.1955? The M.P. was
the Hon. B.C. Ugwu from-the Has tern. Region. .
2. Ibid., po 141 • ; • -f ‘ ' Af, ■ - ./;
The Mission'arrived in Nigeria in.late:September 1953? remained [ 
•until mid-December 1953? and submitted its report to the Nigerian 
Government in September 1954• By this time, however, another major event 
had introduced a new element,into the consideration. As a result of the. 
London and Lagos constitutional conferences in 1953 and 1954? a federal, 
constitution had been a,greed upon. This came into effect on 1 October 
1954* This was significant; it created strong and rival regions.; and it 
ma.de industrial development a concurrent subject between., the regions..and , 
the centre. Further decisions on pioneer status for-industries had 
therefore to put off still further until- things had sorted themselves out. 
This largely explains why no industry had been declared a pioneer and no . 
company■granted a pioneer - certificate by the end of 1954? even though the 
Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance became effective from 1 July 1951* -
2. POST-WAR' SHORTAGE' OF■ CAPITAL".GOODS- ..
The allocation of capital goods was another way in which Government 
policy limited foreign private, investment, in Nigeria manufacturing during 
1939/54' allocation was necessitated by the post-war shortage of
capital goods which'seriously limited investment and development projects 
in Nigeria- and in other countries during the period. This was stressed, by 
Mr. Geoffrey Heyworth, Chairman of.Lever Bros, and the Unilever Ltd., in his 
evidence to. the United Kingdom Select Committee 011. Estimates in 1948? when 
He said it was the ''principal" and the "over-riding'.1 difficulty in the way 
of^private enterprise development during the postwar years. "The position", 
he said, "was becoming more painful. It affects the transfer of the.
necessary, capital.. To be specific, it means, that if you want to build a 
building, you would not get the steel allocation for it in this country
[U.K.]-. Certainly if it required dollars today, you Would have to make .
' l
a. very good case to be able to get dollars1'. •
Mr. Iieyworth then described the various hurdles through which a
project had to go before it was executed, if at all. The approval of the
X>roject by the Nigerian Government would not ensure the steel allocation. .
This was .the i-esponsibility "of the U.K. Ministry of Supply. Normally, a
project was "born" in London. , If it was of sufficient magnitude, the
Colonial Office would be sounded, and then the Nigerian Government. If
the latter approved of the project, it would be returned to the Colonial.,
Office to assure it that it was in line with the policy of the Nigerian
Government and to ask for its. backing for steei allocation. If satisfied,
the Colonial Office would says "that is a sensible thing to do. We quite
agree with it. It is in accordance with general colonial policy and the
2particular policy of the colony.. Here is our blessing".
The backing of the Colonial Office Would still not assure the 
allocation of the necessary capital goods and other materials for the 
project. -This was the responsibility of the Ministry of Supply. It was 
here that the greatest obstacle was met during the period. This was due 
to frequent conflicts between the demands of private enterprise and that
1*' British Parliamentary Papers, vol.8, 1948? pp*90 &,98*
.2. . rIbid, p.97-
of the Governments owing to an accumulation of arrears of maintenance 
work during.the war years, the desire on both sides to clear these arrears 
•and'the pressure of current development projects, especially under the 
Nigerian Ten Year Plan for Development and Welfare 1946-1956■ ^  there
were.plenty of 'supplies, there would be no conflict. But where everybody 
was trying to. get the same thing there was bound..to. be conflict. .
' The magnitude of this conflict, or rather the seriousness of the
'.capital goods shortage in, limiting Government projects is illustrated in 
the following accounti The' importance of Nigerian groundnuts in the war . 
and the post-war effort of.'the British Empire, has already been illustrated 
in an earlier section. Groundnut production was stimulated in Nigeria,- 
but the bottleneck turned out to be the, inability of the Nigerian railway . 
to. evacuate all the groundnuts produced from the North, principally Ka.no, 
to the coast in the South for shipment, to the- U.K. . By 1946 "groundnut 
pyramids"'were already a familiar, site in: Kano. As. Mr. Heyworth put its-.;
"The railway is the bottleneck... There is a year's supply.of groundnuts 
there, [in Kano] now which could be on your breakfast table if the railways 
could evacuate them" . The inability of the railways: to evacuate the 
hynundnuts was due to' limited capacity. Efforts to. obtain steel allocation
to expand the railway capacity failed. The following memorandum speaks
for itself: . . ' . . • . .
’■ "It is unnecessary to say more about these.two factors
[shortage of capital goods and .the dollar problem] beyond 
' emphasising that their solution does not lie in Nigeria and
that the reasons for past, failures to solve them,can 
only be investigated in the United Kingdom. Suffice 
it' to . say that if H.M.G. desire the maximum evacuation 
of oilseeds and,other.vital products to the port, it can 
only be’accomplished if these indents for spares and 
locomotives are fulfilled. The Mission is particularly 
invited-to - study the correspondence in regard to-requests 
v- to London on these matters and it is felt with confidence 
that the Nigerian Government could not have done more both 
by correspondence and in interviews with the appropriate 
railway. ■
That these ..representations were virtually without 
success was particularly discouraging to this government 
in the/light of the certainty that everything that could - 
possibly be done locally .had been done, while a similar 
certainty regarding action in London did not seem warranted. .
..The attention of .the Mission is particularly invited, 
to the fact that for some reason that is obscure in Lagos ; ;
, but; appears to have passed almost without comment in London,' 
Nigeria*sfurgent need for locomotives was not even considered 
at- the meeting of.representatives of the Ministry of Supply 
and. the Locomotive Manufactures * Association in July 1945 
and no provision for these needs was included in the Manu­
factures’ 1946 programme.
Mien the gravity of this omission was stressed at the 
■ meeting, of the Commonwealth supply Council Railway Equipment. 
fOommitfee in November 1945? was noted as highly regrettable 
but irremediable. . • . •
The result of this most unfortunate incident was that 
an order for locomotives had. to be; placed in Canada and,
. taking the most favourable- view,of the prospects of delivery, 
they will not be'in operation.-before January 1947n# 1
If the Government could run into such difficulties because of bottle-
necks in the supply of capital-goods, the chances of private enterprise.,
. obtaining allocation would, be extremely narrow, if not impossible,, except
in exceptional, cdses. These exceptional cases will be considerd in the
1. Report of the-. Committee appointed to enquire into the Production and
Transport of vegetable oils and oilseeds in the West Africa colonies. 
HMSO, Col.211, 19479 appendix XV - being Memo, -submitted by the 
Nigerian Government. ‘ ■
next section. ’
Asked by,the Committee if his organisation had any schemes which 
were held up because of the lack of capital goods, Mr. Heyworth replied? 
"Undoubtedly, yes".'*' He.stated that certain schemes were held up 
because in the context of the state of the country (U.K.),then, it was "j 
not considered in the national interest to proceed with the. schemes.
There were also other schemes that were held up because "we just cannot\
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ; . ■  .
2
get a quart out of a pint pot". Mr.Heyworth did not specify what the.
schemes' were and which of them specifically related to Nigeria. In. . -y
; . ■ ' " ‘ ‘ , \ 
view of the obvious position of the United Africa group of companies as 1
j • ‘ ' V*
:the "commercial collossus of West Africa and the fact that the UAG Ltd. ' 
does more than 50 Peu cent of its West African business in Nigeria, it is j 
fair to assume that a substantial number of the schemes held up by the 
shortage of capital goods related to Nigeria.
However, even if.there had not been any shortage of capital goods, 
these projects woxild still not have been established before the end of 
1954? because the government would not have permitted them owing to its 
preference for peasant and cottage industries, up to 1952, and because 
of the government *s policy to postpone major decisions on industry 
pending the receipt of the projected World Bank Mission^as was discussed 
above. . ■
B + lblh > op.cit., p.101.
2. ibid.
IV. THE STERLING PROBLEM ___
It. was shown above that before the passing of the Aid to Pioneer 1
Industries Ordinance in 1952? Government policy was opposed to the 
establishment of “factory level industries" and that after 1952 it was 
reluctant to permit or decide on any major industrial project because
■ j
it was waiting for the report of the Mission of the World Bank. It was ^
also shown that during the same period the shortage of capital goods was
such that the Nigerian railway could not obtain the steel* allocation 
necessary to expand its capacity in order to evacuate groundnuts from the 
North to the South for shipment to the United Kingdom, and that accordingly 
it was extremely difficult for private investors to secure allocation of 
capital goods for their projects. However, in spite of the above, three 
large-scale industrial plants were established in Nigeria in 1949 1950*
These were the Nigerian Breweries Ltd., the Nigerian Tobacco Company Ltd., 
and the African Timber and Plywood Company Ltd. ^
"How was it possible for these plants to be established during \
this time ?" "What was there special in the factories to enable them to 
secure approval and obtain allocation of capital goods when the Nigerian 
Government failed to secure its own allocation to expand the capacity of 
the railway ?" The following section argues that while rising demand for 
the products of these factories made their establishment economically 
feasible,, the imperative needs of the sterling area singled them out for . 
special treatment and therefore made their establishment possible.
• No official., statement is available on the reasons for the apparent . 
fc^ception to. the policy or for the alio caption of materials for the factories 
The following deduction, is largely'from Mr. Heyworth1s evidence before the 
TJ.K. Select Committee on Estimates in .1948 and from an interpretation of 
the relevant trade figures for the products of the factories within the 
period. ' ' ■; . ' / •/■' ' ; • ■ n\'';/:-/ /... . . V./' ■■ '
Mr* Heyworth emphasised before the Select Committee in 1948 that ; \ * 
because of the shortage of. capital goods and. because of the U.K. balance 
• of payments position, "we have got to decide priorities, whether they are ' 
private. e^brprise. or Government , and' that means to say that priorities ■ 
must go first to'maintain the existing, production, because that is vital, 
and, .secondly, to new, productive development, in vie.w of the despers/fce 
balance of payments:, situation the country, is; in;... Some, of the; long-term . 
things will have, to wait, because we .might all be dead in the meantime. It 
is a question of, suivival and you have to put first things : first1!1 ./*"
The priority given to new.productive investment owing to the. U.K* s '• 
balance of payments position was- undei’standable.. . With the convertibility/; 
crisis over, in 1947,? official policy was -naturally, directed to finding 
ways and ;means ■ of -closing the dollar; gap' whi ch . had be come apparent’.. .* The • 
dollar deficit of the. Sterling Area was - reduced-from £600m in 19.47 
about, £29,0m. in. 1948* This represented a significant .achievement. Even 
then, .Marshall Aid waS’vitals-. it financed about 75. P.^ r cent of .U.K's"'; -/■ 
imports/from, the dollar area iii 1948/49 •’ Over the next few s?, the
Sterling Area; had. to regain^balance. /One method was to step up the export
1. Minutes of Evidence, B.P.lh 'Vol.8, 1948, pp.94, 100.' • ■
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drive to the dollar area5 another v/as to develop substitutes for dollar 
and non-sterling imports within the Empire* "Erom the United Kingdom's 
point of view, this was the chief reason fox* encouraging colonial economic 
development".'1'
This dollar constraint seems to have strongly influenced the
authorities to encourage the establishment of the three large manufacturing
plants under discussion during this time because of the large non-sterling
element in their products. Table 1.9 shows that before the establishment
of the breweries in 1949 > more than two thirds of Nigeria's imports of beer
came from Y/estern Europe. The 51 P©^ cent from 'others' in 1946 came largely
from the Belgian Congo. If this were added to the proportion from Y/estern
Europe, then Nigeria's non-sterling import of beer was 99 Pe^ cent in 1946
and about 95 Vex cent of her total imports in 1947- Thus in these two years,
only about 8 per cent of Nigeria's total imports of beer came from the United
Kingdom. The U.K's share soon recovered, however, and was 45 P6*1 cent in
1949* Even then the case is made that one of the principal reasons for
encouraging the establishment of this industry.at that time was the.overriding
necessity to reduce non-sterling expenditure. Otherwise the brewery vrould
not have been established. . This point was made by Mr. Heyworth: "we would .
not think much of our brewery if they [the authorities] did not say the
2brewery was the most important".
1. Colonial Development. Overseas Development Institute, London,.1964* 
p.48.
2* Ibid., p.100.
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Despite - local' production , the percentage of Nigeria's Deer imports
from .Western Europe, mainly Germany and the Netherlands, reached a new L 
pealc of 72 per cent in .1951* -In 1952? the Nigerian-Government -undertook?, 
in the interest of the sterling area, to include beer in the list;of 
-imports Nigeria would be willing to switch from non-sterling to sterling
■ . ' 1 -  , , 1 - ■'* ' :  ; > .  ' i ' : - . . /  . ■ . ' '.'■■■ ... v  - ■
area countries. "Unfortunately, Nigeria requires,larger type beer in . 
-bottles and cannot,, such'are climate and taste? make, do with draught ■ 
bitter. It looks as though it will be. necessary :to continue importing 
=' on a'-’ large scale - from the continent of Europe as Britain cannot provide' 
■^sufficient of the, kind required".. Imports from Western Europe 
continued during 1950/54 'to average.two-thirds; of Nigeria’s total beer 
yimports. Slightly less.than, the balance of one-third came from the,United
Kingdom during.that: time.
1.9-38.-and 1954 from the .United States."" The/high dollar content of these • 
imports is, shownby the- fact that in no year between 1938-1950 did that 
fall below 8 0  per-cent of Nigeria’s total unmanufactured tobacco' imports. '- ; 
Although the capacity of the Nigerian Tobacco Company was expanded in.
1950.apparently to stem this heavy, dollar import, it seems this only 
marginally affected the situation. During 1951~1954?' the U.S. imports 
averaged about 7 4  Per cent p.a. of Nigeria’s total imports of unmanufactured
Table 1 . 1 0  shows.Nigeria’s imports of unmanufactured tobacco between
tobacco
1. "Can Britain Supply the Goods ?" West Africa, June-14? 1952? p«547
,, . (article-by-the commercial editor
2. Ibid:-.,
.1
yo
%
and 10
T a b l e & 1 . 9 / t h e  value and quantity of beer and tobacco imports 
into Nigeria in 1938, 1945-1954* It will be seen that while the quantity 
•of beer imports increased from 461,000 imperial gallons in 1946 to 2*4^ 
gallons in 1949, when the brewery was established, the value rose by more 
than five times from £165,000 to £303,000 during the same period. By 
1954, beer imports had risen to £2.3m. One of the economic motives for 
establishing the brewery was therefore apparently the rapidly growing 
domestic demand for beer. To this would be added the savings in freight 
and handling charges which would have been incurred if all the beer were
imported. As Mr* Heyworth remarked! "obviously, it does not pay to take
• 1 
water across the world ... there is the high cost of freight and so on".
The same reasons explain the establishment of the Tobacco factory 
in 1949* The first cigarette factory was established at Oshogbo in 
Western Nigeria in 1933 by the Nigerian Tobacco Go.Ltd., but the cigarette 
had to be manufactured from imported tobacco as there was no local tobacco 
suitable for the, purpose. As local tobacco cultivation increased in 
quantity and quality, and as local demand increased, a second factory was 
established at Ibada{\,in; 1936. The sterling problem, the increasing local 
demand, and the strong consumer resistance to any attempt to change types 
in order to economise on. dollars necessitated the establishment of the 
larger and more up . to date factory on the site at Ibadan in 1949* The 
demand was,very largely for unmanufactured tobacco and the tobacco factories, 
through advances to farmers, stimulated local growing of tobacco to sub­
stitute for the imports. The continued rising imports of unmanufactured
1 • B . 3 ? . , on. ext •, p • 91 * ■
tobacco despite the establishment of the factory,:is shorn by the upward
trend'in the value of imports which amounted to about;. £2m. in 1954*'
•While price rises.may have contributed to the increase in the value of
imports, the.rise in. the quantity of imports during\195l/54 definitely
indicated continued expansion of domestic demand which' primarily motivated *
local manufacturing of cigarettes..
The interplay of .rising'demand and the dollar problem was most..
marked in the timber and plywood factory. When the importation of v/ood
from U.S.A. was severely restricted in,, the U.K. ■ after the War, Nigerian .
timber production was stimulated'as a-substitute, This was reflected in an.
shippers
increase in the number.of ships- in Nigeria from 5 in 1939 to about 300 in
1 • . • ' .
1951- To this external demand for.Nigerian timber was added the increase,
in local demand owing do the increase in construction activity in the -
country. It was against this background that the capacity of the African ,
■ Timber and Plywood factory, was expanded in 1950• Its adjoining sawmill,
.opened also in 1950, was "designed to.produce the greatest.attainable yield
from the log in .tlie form of saleable timber and has a greater capacity than
any other mill in Africa. 'The adjacent, .plywood factory-was equipped to : '
produce a high quality weatherproof hardwood including the renowned."eresta"
■ ■ . •  2 - - . ; ‘ ' ■ - •: '• ■ ■ . ■ •
product. The saving in freight and handling charges arising from shipping 
the timber rather- than the logs, was also an important consideration.in. the
5 -
establishment of the factory. , : . . , - , -
-1. "The Nigerian Timber Boom", West,Africa, Jan 2, 1952', p.105.
2* Overseas Economic Surveys; HiiSQ, 1957, p*122. . . .
3. It has been-estimated that a saving of 50fo in weight is'made when-timber
’" V  r a t h e r  than the I’og is exported. See. C. Leubiischer; The Processing- of. 
jtolonial -Saw Materials. HMS0, >1951, p.137
The Sterling' Problem&s Conclusions
The above section has tried to illustrate the exceptions made to 
the government'policy up to 1952 which opposed the establishment of j* 
factory level manufacturing. It showed that two reasons necessitated 
this exception* One is the need to economise on non-sterling expenditure; 
and the other is the rise,in the demand for the product of the factories.'. 
These two factors were, in fact, related!'• the rise in the demand led to 
large expenditure on these items; because this was mainly mon-sterling 
expenditure, the heed arose to economise on it by establishing or expanding 
factories to produce locally these goods which hitherto had been imported. .
If the existence of a large internal market had- been the overriding
consideration which necessitated the exceptions, then the textile projects
would have been established. The Algerian market for tobacco and. beer, ■'
as measured by the value of imports, during that period, never reached 1
per cent of total imports compared with 30 per cent assured by the market
for textile goods. As Table 1.8 shows,textile imports were the biggest .
single item In Nigeria's imports for many years, and accounted for between
a'quarter and third of total imports until local manufacturing began on a-
large scale after 1957“ Yet permission to establish foreign textile
factories were met with "a cool and over cautious approach", as the World* ,
Bank Mission found out. ' Even the singlet factory owned by the UAC Ltd. 
had to be’closed down in 1947. Although the UAC was unable to divulge ' , 
any information on the circumstances leading to the closure "because it 
is extremely confidential", it would be surprising if it had nothing to do
with the official opposition to factory-level-industries in the country 
at that time. . . . ’ .
In the absence.of further details, it is difficult to explain why 
textiles did not receive the same treatment as beer and tobacco-. Since 
oyer 90 P©** cent of the • textile imports came from the Sterling Area, there, 
was not the same compelling need to economise on non-sterling expenditure 
in the interest of the sterling area as there was in the case of beer,- 
tobacco, and timber and plywood which might have been imported froin ‘ 
outside the sterling area: in.the absence of local manufacture in Nigeria. 
Textile imports from the NIK. to Nigeria did.not constitute any drain on . 
sterling resources. Thus, it was the defence of sterling and not necessarily 
the existence of markets which necessitated exceptions to the policy 
against factory level industries -to permit the establishment of the brewery 
and the expansion in. the capacity of the tobacco and timber and plywood 
factories. Were it for the market alone, perhaps, textile manufacturing .. 
would have also been included in the exceptions.
SECTION TWO 
POLITICAL FACTORS
Political factors affected foreign private investment in Nigerian 
manufacturing during 1959/54 by creating uncertainties about the future J 
political status of Nigeria. The uncertainties arose principally from 
the militant nationalism which developed largely as a result of the return j 
of demobilised soldiers at the end of the Second World War. Most of 
these soldiers, having lived under different conditions and mixed with 
people from different countries, had acquired a national consciousness 
which made for, great political unrest on their return to Nigeria. This ■ ■ 
was manifested in the General Strike of.1945 as a result of■which the :
. goveininent granted a cost of living allowance. ^ It also led to the-.
disturbances;' which- resulted in the Iva Valley Shootings -.in. the Coal 
’■ city of - Enugu in Eastern; Nigeria ‘ aiid caused 'widespread. disturbances,
'/looting and;' destruction; of' property - throughout the .-major towns.. iii Eastern 
Nigeria,- Offices of,prominent foreign firms were attacked and much 
•damage was done to-property.^ : ; ; ' ; -
Some of' the./leaders -of"this political .agitation were Wery vocal' 
and in, some cases they-controlled the local ..press, and were we 1 1 versed in . 
.the-, art of-propaganda'.-/ /' The most prominent, and; from the foreign investor’ s 
point of. view, ...the. most dreaded; of these political’ leadei’s was' Nr. Nnaindi . 
Azikiwe..Nr. ’Azikiwe1 s'nationalism-was' considered such a threat that .
• Mrn Heyworth listed it .as the; third factor ..inhibiting- foreign investment by 
. in.'Nigeria-.- He described Dr'. :-A‘zikiwe-.as a man who was stirring up national 
' feelings and;his brand of politics as "Sik-ism", "which is a form of. ' .
; nationai'ismwvhich; says that all-white' faces;,, had better run away", ' ..-He 
’ -considered .that it- was "no use.starting up ah enterprise if this chap’ s
/icteas arb■;ghing/-tb''.pi';eyaii. ‘I mention it as an instance of -what I call " ;
• ' ■ ’ '-’ ' V  , ’ . - \  ’ • 3 ' -  ' ■' ’ ‘ ^  ’ . ' -
. "disturbed political conditions"..in Nigeria*. •. / \
One of the effects', of this., political agitation was rapid consti-: . . ..
; tutional, changes... .In, 1 9 4 6  the; constitution which had been- in .existence' . / • 
since 1925. was changed and a-new one was introduced, This provided for 
a central legislature for the. whole of. Nigeria/ and fox;, regional Houses:
■ 1. See Wo Tudor Navies'? Report of-the Enquiry into the Cost, of Living and
' < ■ •» . ’ ' rr'TT n L  < f n n n - « i m  i ■  1 n t m  i« r w  i it h  n ' ** m  i n  i i i1 T ~ ii i i n i i i i '   r  i * i i i — — —  .. • ■■■ — —  — v  ■ ■ ■ ,
• the Control of ■: the Cost of Living in the Colony and Protectorate of • 
Nigeria, Government'Printer,- Lagos». 1946.
, 2. : . ;The .Report of the -Commission of.-Inquiry, into the disorders in the : “
' - Eastern.’Provinces of Nigeria.- November 1949 ? BMSO,. col. 2^6, 1950, ■ p. 11.
'5“/. -: B.P.P, . op, cit.y p. 9.3. - / ■•
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/of Assembly, with, advisory, powers in ’ Eastern, Western ‘and: Northern ..Nigeria. 
The next 'constitution'which came.into effect in.1952, introduced ministerial 
. . . government for .-the .first' time,aiid gaye Nigerians'more say in. the. 
^administration; of the country. One of the iimnediate manifestations of. 
the 'exercise.' of this-power, v/aS the.passing, of the Aid to Pioneer. Industries 
•Ordinance in 1952 with retrospective ...effect from July 1951 • .'' As a result . 
of the constitutional conferences in London in 1955 and Lagosin 1954? £>- 
• new constitution came into' effect on 1 October :1954° ■ Phis: was the Federal
constitution which created the Nigerian Federal structure -with four, largely 
' autonomous and rival • regions and a . centre. It also made,, industry a. .
V concurrent - subject ' over which' the ; regions * arid • the. . centre had power to 
'legislate. ,.-1 ;■ , , • y .. , • ' ,/ '"' : .. -
These rapid'political changes caused uncertainties among some of 
' the prominent foreign investors as to'what-.’the future political status of 
Nigeria/would be. \ In his evidence before the .United Kingdom. Select . 
Committee on Estimates- in 1949V Mrv"'Heyworth .listed these uncertainties as 
the fourth factor .which inhibited-investment .in the colonies. "We have , .
. been working,so fast”? Mr. Heyworth. said,. "that people are bound to ask '. 
this' questiont :1 If. India has become independent yesterday, Ceylon today,:
■ (footnote' from jnevious- page) . • • ., ". .'
• .In 1900. the ’’Noi’thern1® and "Southern'! Protectorates of Nigeria -were •; 
■ ' created. \In‘19.14 thesetwo protectorates were merged-to . form . .
. "Nigeria”., Although a.Legislative Council was- created in 1925? it 
never'legislated for the. Northern. Proyince until the, 1949 Constitution.
■ \ came, into, effect in '1947* • • ' • ,
; . . ‘A - ; ' y i  9 b  ■’ ,
and Burma the. next day aftex*. and now Palestine, when is./Malaya going to be
■ * ’■ - ‘ ’ ■ • i . . . • /
handed over to somebody .else to run11 v. Admittedly, M m  Heyworth 
illustrated.his point -from the■ experiences in- the Fax’ East but the Select 
Committee was discussing colonial policy in general and West African 
; pi’oblems in pax’ticular. ; . His remarks were thex’efox’e apposite to Nigeria. ,- .*
• • Another indication- of .this coneerns-was given when Mr. , FvJ. I3edler, ■*. ; •
;. the Chairman of Unilever*,, addressed;the Royal Institute., for International, 
Affairs at Chatham House, in 1955 on/foreign investment in West Africa.
. Mr., Pedlex* saids fWe'1 so,-frequently have new constitutions, .new governments, I .
' pax’ties, , and, ministersthat it is - difficult to fix the.: state of affairs., at’ j 
any moment. ■ In- this /circumstance-,/ we shall hax'dly expect to find a .steady J 
settled attitude. towards 'foreign/investment. The last word is'not yet/ 
spokens we have yet-to see what happens when Africans hold full power”. ^ /■' * 
These expx*essions’ of • doubts about the; fxitixre political status of 
Nigeria no -doubt; 'influenced^the investors' evaluation of the investment 
climate in Nigexda between 1959/54• Their .effect, howeverwas to induce -' .
.: an attitude of "wait and see", before deciding on*investment. Even, if they . 
had. decided to invest, ;it 'is very doubtful if any investment -would have, 
materialised during 1959-54V.ih view of the. prohibitive .effects of Govern- -. 
‘/ment policy which were discussed above., , ; .
•.•If - B.P.P.vol.8,? 1948, p.92.. A, y',.7. . ' • / -
2. - J. Pedlerr Foreign Investment in West. Africa,- International Affairs,
’ • • ; Vol .31? 1955? P* 461. -Mr-. Heyworth -said that, although his (U.A.C.)
r’-"' . . company1 s'experience formed "the Solid x’ock" of his evidence, "the 
. - rest; of it Is. .common. knowledge' of what 'other (investors.) do".
y\
- SECTION .THREE'
0M  . FACTORS . ’ ' '
Government policy and political factors which'we discussed above
may be considered as factors exogenous to the Nigerian economy..; This
section .considers other factors which also affected foreign private
investment"during 1939-54• ■ These arose from the.nature of the Nigerian \
economy and were inadequate market-, inadequate raw materials, and lack- of V
technique. . ' ■ • . V.
Inadeq uate Marke t
Cement manufacture. illustrateSfi hdw inadequate market inhibited foreign J
' - . - ■ ■ ' ' !
. . -;
private investment in Nigerian manufacturing during the period. When.the j 
United Africa company investigated a project for cement manufacture in 
Nigeria’during 1941/44? it found, that Nigeria possessed the raw material,', 
clay, at Igumale in the North, and Nkalagu in the East\ and that she also 
possessed the power required for the process- at Oji in Eastern Nigeria*
But her domestic market, as measured-by the quantity of cement imports,
was found to be too small to support a minimum economic size for cement
■ ' . - ’ i
manufacture.of pieoprojec:t>was therefore abandoned.. - A project for the
.' ■ - - ' ' ' ■ 2 
manufacture of plastic bags was also abandoned for similar reasons.
Another illustration is. the processing of palm oil and palm. $ernel.
This was not undertaken because it was-found to be uneconomic owing to
high operating costs and lack of local demand for the processed products.
1. ‘United Africa Company Ltd? Statistical and Economic Review, Sept. 1959?
p. 28.
2. Ibid., p.32. '
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Explaining this before the U.K. Select Committee on Estimates in 1948?
■Mi? o' Heyworth said; "If you * do .oil milling of the palm kernels in West 
Africa instead of in Hull or Liverpool or London? you do not get anywhere 
at .All because■it is a more expensive operation there, because you have 
got to build a plant in a tropical country in the first place which costs 
a good deal more $-and, of course, the cost of your European supervision 
is very'much more. In addition.to that? there is no market for any of 
the residual products in the country so that there is no particular 
advantage in doing that. In fact we have done it, and we have lost a : 
quarter of a million pounds. That is only one case. If we thought it 
better:to do any of our processing jobs out there, we would certainly do 
so".1 : ' ' . ' ,/
■•■■■■ II' IWADEQ.UATE SAW M A T E R I A L S  
The Sack Industry in Nigeria
The history of this industry is interesting for two reasons. It 
is' an instance of a viable project for local manufacture based on imported 
rav; materials which was. later abandoned as uneconomic owing to a change in 
world prices of the raw material and of the finished product. It also 
illustrates the prospects, for a secondary industry based on local raw 
materials without an adequate system of production and collection of the 
raw materials which made it difficult to assure continuity and consistency 
of supplies where they had to derive from a very large number of small 
and independent producers.
.B«P«P« ? op.cit. , p.10J.
" Nigeria..-had been a large importer of sacks especially for her; 
principal export crops, such as cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, and palm kernel, j
Between 1947 an(i 1.954 he:r total expenditure.on the imports of jute and. !
' ' ■' l •
jute products amounted to nearly £13,,. an average of £1.5m,. p.a. In
1949 when jute prices.were high, and supplies to Nigeria became insufficient
and uncertain, the-Colonial Development Corporation and the Nigerian
Cotton and Cocoa Marketing Boards undertook to establish a twin factory
at Onitsha. in .Eastern’Nigeria for:, cotton spinning, and sack making-so as to I
have "an assured>and independent source of supply,of bags which would prove
of direct service in the marketing activities of the Boards". The
Nigerian Fibre .Indus tries Ltd., was formed in 1950 ly the CPC and the two
Boards for the project. The Cotton,and Coqoa. Marketing Boards.undei'took
to provide £ . 2 and £,6lm. respectively:.- The original intention was to ■
use Indian and Pakistani jute for the. sack factory, but the steep rise in
jute prices in 1950 ma,de it clear that a factory using imported jute would 
3  i
run at a loss. ; , . .
The-twin project was therefore'submitted for independent expert 
investigation in 1951* This took the form of a comprehensive investiga­
tion into costs, markets, and profitability possibilities of both schemes.
1.- Calculated ' from Nigerian .'Annual Reports.-fox’ the years
2. Nigerian Cocoa Marke ting Board,: Annual Report, 1952-55? P*15*
3* ■ CPC* s letter, The Cotton Marketing Board took up-the project and ■
. . the ICaduna Textiles Ltd was established in 1957 with'foreign 
. .participation. ■ . . ■
J
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It recommended that the sack factory .he re-planned and that the cotton 
spinning project be- dropped. ' .
A revised scheme was prepared for the sack factory. The objective 
this time was to use locally grown fibre. To this end the Nigerian 
Government instituted a production drive with the object of producing 
6,000 tons of fibre annually in Northern Nigeria. Despite the. incentive.
‘ of very high prices offered to the farmers, the result was disappointing 
in quantity and quality.^ By 1952 world jute prices had slumped and 
this brought a*new'element into the consideration, that is, the use, of 
imported .jute* Investigations showed, however, that it was then cheaper 
to import complete jute sacks' than to manufacture them locally. -■ The 
Colonial Development Corporation considered that the sack factory would 
not be financially viable. The two marketing Boards sought ah independent
advice and as a result agreed to abandon the scheme as its establishment -
• 2 
would only be on.a heavily subsidised basis.
In arriving at the above decision, the Cocoa Marketing Board, being
convinced of the value of such a project to the country, instructed its
executives to regard the issue as still alive an:1. and to make the necessary.
inquiries regarding the feasibility of .some modified-project-should
conditions in Nigeria become more favourable. A sack factory was
1, House of Representativess Debates 19549 P*l6. Statement by the 
Hon. No A, Nj oku, Minister of Commerce & Industries.
2. Ibid., appendix 17. ■ . ;
5° Nigerian Cocoa. Marketing Board, Annual-.Report, 1952-55» pp. 12-13*'
eventually established at Badagary in Western Nigeria, It started 
operation in 1966. ■ ■ ■. / - . .  '
:-v- V ' - / 5- LACK ON TECHNIQUE, ’  ^y ; .
■Hurricane Lanterns . ; ; y\ ' . ’ • , '
The manufacture of hurricane lanterns is an example of an industry ‘ 
where foreign, investment was hindered be 09-use of lack-of experience of 
precision ...engineering in, Nigeria. • •
. This industry was investigated by the United Africa Company in 1952*: 
.It found that -Nigeria imported/substantial volume^of:hurricane lanterns; 
annually, and that, although as electricity becomes more widely available' 
in Nigeria, the sales' potential of . hurricane lanterns Y/ou.ld bp reduced,■ - 
it was. likely to be some years'before this effect would be pronounced.
The. company found an opportunity of acquiring an existing plant'manu- . 
facturing hurricane lanterns in the U.K.' and transferring it to Nigeria. . 
The plant consisted- of a, large, number of small machines each requiring 
individual.operations - demanding a comparatively simple order of.skill.
But these machines had to be maintained to a very high standards a . 
breakdown-in one machine, could., jeopardise the whole production process.
,In the Uni ted Kingdom a machine or its part .that broke down-could easily
be repaired or replaced. ’ In .Nigeria,; however, local replacement, of.
: ,. ■ . 1 - ' - ■ ' ■■ ' . - -
parts was;often impossible.. : Two other favourable considerations in the
transfer were the saving in freight.'charges and the lower import .duty
that could be achieved by importing components rather than assembled
lanterns.’ ’' • . . , : .
1. The United ..Africa Co .Ltd. ' Statistical & Economic Reyigg, * P*
Detailed.calculations suggested that the transfer would be an 
economic1'proposition if the- locally ;mahufactured lanterns would capture 
the whole■of the Nigerian market,.displacing all imported lanterns and,, 
if local skills would be equal to the skills available in the. U.K. . It . 
was found that in Order;to .oust the imported'lanterns', it would probably ; 
be necessary tocut; prices- to an.-extent that would make the local ■ 
manufacture unprofitable. But the more important consideration'was ; 
that local.skills, particularly tool-roonv skills, ..were not available.^
The tool-setter,:; it;was stated, is' a .highly, skilied craftsman and. the 
key artisan in. the factory.. . ..:If Nigerians were to fill such'posts, which 
were' required to work to fine limits y.they would need to be'trained for;
• a Jong period in a .similar factory’in Europe. On balance therefore, it
was. decided .that the advantages of the. project were ..outweighed by these -.
- . ';-'i ■' ■-f. '■ . . V V ■ ' 2 ' . .'I ■
disadvantages and the project was .abandoned. . .
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FACTORS AFFECTING FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT, IN ...
NIGERIAN MANDFACTURING,1939/54* . ,
CONCLUSIONS ■
The factors which affected foreign private investment in Nigerian 
manufacturing during 1939/54 may be grouped under three, heading^: 
government policy, political factors, and other factors.
■ Other factors were inadequate market, for certain products, inadequate 
raw material for some manufactures,.and lack.of technique.- . The projects 
investigated and abandoned during the.period because of these factors 
were illustrated in the text. Political factors included uncertainties 
about Nigeria1s future political status and the' disturbed political ■
situation which followed the rise in militant nationalism on the return 
of ,the demobilised .soldiers after the.War. These'adversely affected the 
foreign investors’ assessment of-the investment climate in Nigeria during 
the period. .The concern which they expressed over these developments 
were illustrated, in the text. The’prospective investors must therefore 
have"adopted a "wait and see” attitude which implied a postponement of 
investment decision's. While these and other factors mentioned above were 
Important in limiting foreign investment in Nigerian manufacturing during 
1939/54? their effect must not be exaggerated. Indeed* if these factors 
had not prevailed, it is doubtful, if any- investment..would-have materialised 
or that the projects investigated and. abandoned would have been established 
at all. This is because of- the inhibitive effects of government policy.. '
This-policy adversely affected, foreign private investment in three 
ways. The first was through, statutory marketing of groundnuts between 
1942 and, 1954* This adversely affected the prospects of this industry 
through the ban.,;on local processing between 1942 and 1947 and through 
the bulk buying contract with the U.K. Ministry of Food v/hich preferred 
.unprocessed groundnuts to processed products and thereby limited the 
prospects for local processing* - The• contract also limited the export 
markets for Nigerian groundnut processed products since the Nigerian 
processors were.not allowed to sell; their products in,export markets 
other than the U.K. • The position, therefore, was like thiss the U.K. 
Ministry of Food preferred groundnuts in unprocessed form; but•if the 
Nigerian processors'1 processed any. at all, they were not allowed to sell 
in any export market other, than to the Ministry of Food who was reluctant 
to buy. the processed products. This reluctance was manifested through 
the exercise of the monopoly powers of the Groundnut Marketing Board.
The Board sold to the crushers . groimdnuts for local processing at prices, 
•higher than; the statutory producer prices, and bought the processed products 
from them for' export at a price which did not cover their full costs plus,, 
a reasonable margin.for profit. Finally in 1954 when the processor’s 
milling, capacity had reached.about 100,000 tons per annum, the amount of 
^groundnuts supplied to them for processing was reduced to 40,000 tons, 
thereby creating an excess capacity of 60,000 p.a. . To these restrictions 
which discouraged local processing by increasing processing costs was
added an export tax whicii, by taxing processing costs, discriminated 
against export of processed products in-favour of the maximum export of 
groundnuts in an unprocessed form. These restrictions not only created 
unfavourable environment for new entrants into the industry but also 
limited the‘prospects for expansion of the plants already established 
in the.-industry. ■
The second method-by which government policy adversely .affected, 
foreign private investment in manufacturing during the 1939/54 period 
.was through the adoption of an industrial strategy which preferred the • 
establishment of industrial plants'on a peasant and cottage basis rather- 
than on a factory-level basis. As foreign manufacturing had to be on a. 
factory, level basis,; the government, ..in pursuance, of’-its policy, used many 
devices to prevent.the establishment of foreign manufacturing. These 
methods were, listed, in the text'.
Exceptions were made* however, ..to the above policy - in the case of . 
the Nigerian Breweries,' 1949, the African Timber and Plywood Factory, 
and the Nigerian Tobacco Factory in 1950. These exceptions.were 
necessitated by the need to economise on non-sterling spending- in the 
interest of the- Sterling Area.
.Apart from'these exceptions, the'governments policy up to 1952 was , 
opposed to the establishment of factory level manufacturing plants.' It 
is therefore understandable that the.fiscal policy was geared towards,the 
provision of revenue.rather than to encourage the establishment of
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manufacturing. Wien the United Africa Company Ltd. requested to he 
granted some concessions'-to'enable it to establish a textile factory, 
these were refused on the grounds that they formed the sources of revenue 
which would not be sacrificed. ■ '
The 1951 Constitution which came into effect in 1952 introduced a 
ministerial government and offered Nigerian more say In policy making..
It seems the first manifestation of this inclusion of Nigerians in the 
Cabinet was the enactment of the Aid.to Pioneer Industries Ordinance.
This obviously changed the earlier policy against factory level manu­
facturing establishment by offering limited tax concessions to encourage 
the establishment‘of pioneer industries. Although this. Ordinance had ' 
a' retrospective effect from July, 195^ -> ^y '^ ie en(^  of 1954? ho industry . 
had been declared a, "pioneer’' industry and therefore" no company had 
benefited from the Ordinance. Indeed, the first, industry to be declared . 
pioneer was cotton, seed processing in September 1955®
This was because the Government,interpreted its provisions very 
narrowly? and at any rate, was unwilling .to take any positive decision-; 
on.the establishment of major industries because it was'waiting to receive 
the. report of ..the World Bank'Mission which visited Nigerian in 1955® The 
receipt of this report in September 1954 coincided with the introduction . 
of the 1954 Federal- Constitution. This created strong and largely :
autonomous and rival regions and made' industry a concurrent subject, over 
which the regions.and the centre could legislate. Accordingly, decisions 
on industry were further'postponed, until-'issues had clarified under the 
new constitution. ' ■
10?
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: FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT ;IN. NIGERIAN MANUFACTURING. - 1955-1965 : ^ • :
.INTRODUCTION' • V  q
-'The federal constitution in 1954 offered Nigerians the freedom to 
; develop their interest in the industrialisation of their country. The 
following statement illustrates this interest: "Industrialisation is on.
> everyone’s lips. , It has been given .a ‘place in the priority list second 
. only to increase in agricultural productivity. Nigerians want; it and 
IV expatriates promise help. ’ >tiBye^ ;\one-/.is-'.agreed- -that/: .this'.Is’-.-'a- world; , . = ■
where everything is more and- more being governed by developments in science :
: and technology. It is notbylmere va.ccident that the'most;.developed \ 
cobhtriesin; the world with :the highest standards ; of living* are the 
. ; industrialised ones. It is not surprising, either that the most .powerful;
countries are also the industrialised countries.;. The yearning of 
. ^industrialisation in Eastern Nigeria is therefore understandablen*^
At the ,IMade: in Nigeria1* exhibition in Lagos in 1958* the Federal . :
V Minister of Commerce and Industries, -Dr.. K.O. Mbadiwe, declared: ;f,The : v ; v 
; :: industrialisation of Nigeria is not a matter for the; future. It ‘is here:,
v.it is started already. My friends, I beg of you to; stop'talking about/ -
industrialisation 5 go and look what 'is. already being,; done1 • .;;;
; ; ;ly The Report of: Eastern Nigeria:Economic Mission. 1961. Official
‘ Document no.5* 1962, p.8.; ;V \ J  /
2. '1 Nigeria Trades With World: -Nigerian Trade Journal Jan/March.1965., ;
.The above two statements give an. indication of. the importance 
Nigeria attaches to industrialisation; the one defends the yearning for it 
the other insists that it had already started by, or before 1958* This 
chapter studies what industrialisation there was in Nigeria during .1955/65 
with particular: reference to the role of the private foreign investort. 
wftch'is mainly statistical and examines the number, sectoral distribution 
and amount of foreign private capital investment in manufacturing 
industries during the period.
t / ' s  v  F / - ; >  V  ' A  ; A " ' — . ' i o ?  = ....••
" fart one .-/v; ■* /A A : V . A :- v /
; ■ THE SECTORALDISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN; PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN 
i NIGERIAN.FiANIIPACTimiNG. 1955-1965 . /
: Number of Manufacturing Establishments ;
; Table 2•1 • shows the number and sectoral distribution of manufacturing 
plants established in Nigeria between 1952/57 &hd 1958/65 *1 It shows 
that 45! manufacturing plants commenced operations in Nigeria between 
: 1952; and 1963. . 295: or 65$ of these were established during 1958/63 and
156 o r . 35$ during 1952/57* ; \ Thus more industrial plants were, established 
or came into operation during 1958/63 than during 1952/57* There are two ■ 
explanations for this. . . ;
The small number of, establishments during 1952/57 illustrates the :: 
point made in the last chapter that no serious efforts at industrialisation 
.: in Nigeria were made.before the introduction of the 1954 federal . 
constitution. ; On the one hand, the period between 1954 and 1957 was 
occupied with many administrative and organisational problems which 
; followed the introduction of the new constitution* : During this transi- 
• tional period, therefore, not much, again, was done in the industrial 
field*; On the other hand, the period between 1958 and 1963 not only ; 
witnessed the achievement of self-rule in the'Regions, but also the 
attainment, of independence in i960. To the experience gained in the 
earlier years was, added the full impact of self-government and independence 
during this period* This, was reflected in more vigorous, measures to
1* , This covers the; ten. years between the introduction .of Ministerial
Government in;Nigeria and of Republican status in 1963* 1957,:which
dibides^wo periods into two halves, marked the attainment of inter*
; nal self government in the. East and the West*.
-V-V--V \ k/AVy;. ' /; ':.-y . -‘v 1. \:'A ■: :V* '■ 11U
J A attract foreign private investment and to stimulate industrialisation*r'
Thesemeasures trill• W^ discbssedfbelow;; th^y i are merely mentioned here to . 
explain why the number, of manufacturing plants; established during 1938/63. 
was.nearly double the:number; established during 1952/57* Table 2.1 shows 
that of all the plants established during 1952/63* those established during 
1958/63 varied between 70$ and 88$ in all the sectors except the machinery 
: y: and transport equipment, leather and; leather products, timber and
furniture sectors. Even then it is only in the machinery and transport 
equipment sector that the proportion fell below 55$* A
■ : Table 2.1.; does not distinguish between foreign plants and • :
; : indigenous plants; This distinction is attempted in Table 2*2.; but the 
following caution is necessary• . The source of the Table did not make 
; U the distinction; and I have used the two criteria I adopted to classify
;; the manufacturing plants in chapter One. The first is the size of
employment: I assumed that, with some exceptions, all plants employing ' 
more than 50 persons are foreign. The second criterion is the name of the 
establishment, since the outstanding foreign and indigenous plants during 
1939/54 were known. However the reliability that can be placed on these 
;:■■ criteria is less,during 1955/65 than during 1939/54 for two reasons.
■ :V The first is that there were considerably more industrial establish­
ments during the later than during the earlier period. : . For instance 
iheij were 955 during 1955/65 compared with 204 during 1939/54* Secondly, 
while there were no industrial partnerships between foreign and 
: : indigenous capital during 1939/54, partnership w^s the common mechanism of ,
foreign private investment in Nigerian manufacturing during 1955/65 and
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the proportion of ownership of individual projects is not published in 
all cases. . "Where such proportion is known, I have grouped as foreign 
any plant where the foreign interests contributed 50$ or inore of the paid . 
up capital and reserves^ and as indigenous where the reverse is the case. 
Plants grouped as foreign under this categorisation include the Tower . .; - 
;Aluminium (Nig.) Go and Guineas Factories in the West, and Williams and ;
. Williams (Nig.) Ltd/lfie Aba Textile Mills in.the Eastfactories grouped 
as indigenous include the West African Breweries Ltd in the West and Niger 
Gas Ltd in the East. Where, the proportions are unknown I included them as 
foreign. On the other hand, some plants,sueh. as the Independence ; 
Breweries Ltd, the ceramics and the glass factories in the last; are known 
to be wholly owned indigenous government establishments and have been 
similarly classified. Also classified as indigenous are all contractor- 
financed industrial projects which are generally owned 90$ by the 
government or public development corporation and 10$ by the foreign 
contractor/partner.
It is hoped that with above methods Table 2.2 represents a fairly 
. accurate tabulation of indigenous and foreign plants established during 
1955/65* The table is not comparable with Table 2*1. While the 
former was compiled from the 1965 industrial directory which contained a 
"comprehensive11 list of manufacturing establishments.existing in Nigeria 
in 1965, Table 2.1 was compiled from the 1963 industrial survey covering 
only 649 establishments. Moreover, the period covered in the two Tables 
differs. Unlike Table 2.1,Table 2.2. covers the periods between the 
introduction of the Federal constitution about early 1955 to Independence
in I960, and the; first five years of independence between 1961 and 1965*
In spite of these differences in coverage, however, the pattern 
which emerges in Table 2*2 resemble $ that in Table 2.1. ‘This is that more, 
industrial plants were established in the first five years of independence 
than in the 6 years between 1955 and I960. Table 2.2 shows that 955 
industrial plants were established during the decade,, • 1955/6* •" Out of 
these, 425 or 45$ were foreign. However, 70$ or 298 of these 425 foreign 
plants were established between I96I and 1965 and. 30$ or 227 established .
. in the 6 years 1955^960. This suggests that Independence attracted 
rather than deterred foreign private investors in Nigeria.
A breakdown of the foreign plants into sectors shows that their 
proportion is greatest in clay,; glass and cement products; metal products; . 
transport equipment and machinery5^ and; in miscellaneous, mainly plastic, 
sectors* In these sectors the foreign1 plants varied between 92$ and 73$* 
In textiles, leather and chemicals, the proportion of foreign plants 
exceeded 50$; only in two sectors, timber and food, is the proportion : 
low at 18$ and 26$ respectively. The foreign plants are heavily . 
concentrated in those sectors, clay, metals, chemicals and machinery,. 
requiring heavy capital outlays and specialised skill and kbat they 
predominate in all the sectors except in the food and timber sectors. 
Obviously in these two sectors, activities such as baking and sawmilling 
do not generally require heavy initial capital outlays or specialised skill
1. Moreover the proportion established in each sector between 1961/65 
between 50$ and 84$.
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The preponderance in number of indigenous plants in these sectors is thus 
understandable.
2. Foreign capital investment in Nigerian Manufacturing. 1955-1963
The above pattern is also illustrated in the capital investment of 
foreign private investors in Nigerian manufacturing as indicated in Table 
2*3* This analyses the sources of paid up capital of 649 industrial 
establishments in Nigeria. It shows that out of a total paid up capital of 
£t*56v8i* in these establishments the foreign private investor contributed 
£38.4m or 685$ of the total and indigenous public and private sources 
contributed £18m or 325$* The foreign private investor contributed the 
greatest proportions in the following sectors; machinery and transport 
equipment, 98$; chemicals, oils and paints, 93$; miscellaneous and metals, 
86$ and 80$ respectively. On the other hand, indigenous proportion is 
greatest in clay, cement, and glass products at 71$» This is due to the 
great importance which the Government attached to this sector and which 
therefore made it contribute substantially in order to make the establish­
ment of some of the cement plants possible;, that is why it contributed 
more than 50$ (£3*6m out of £6.7m) of the paid up capital in this sector.
In absolute figures, foreign paid up capital was biggest, £10m, in 
machinery and transport equipment; £^.3m in food beverages and tobacco, 
and lowest at £29.000 in the miscellaneous sector. The indigenous pre- 
dominance in the food sector in terras of. number of plants is not matched . 
by predominance in terms, of paid up capital. This is probably due to the 
overwhelming proportion of small bakery plants scattered all over the 
country.^
1. Peter Kilby found that capital requirement in the bakery industry 
ranges from £30 to £30,000 but that 39 of the 59 Nigerian bakery plants
P e t e ^ i i b y , ^ ^ ^  £500 each. See
ford Oniversily Press, 1965, pp.! 94 / 42? Industry, Stan-
The Regional breakdown of the paid up capital is available only for
1
the Eastern and the Western Regions and is shown in Tables 2,4 & 5* The
figures for the Eastern Region covered 124 Manufacturing establishments
in 1965 with a total paid up capital of £17*7m* of which £9*9^ or 56/0
came from foreign sources and £7.9*& or 44?& oame from indigenous sources.
More than 50$> (£4*8m) of the £9*9^ was contributed from foreign sources
in the food, beverages and tobacco sector, the next biggest foreign
component being £l*7m in the machinery and transport equipment, 97f° in
miscellaneous products, 95$5 an& in food, beverages and tobacco, 84$.
By 1963, there was no foreign investment in textiles, wearing apparel
2and footwear in the Eastern Region.
The figures for the Western Region (Table 2,5) covered 65 manufacturing 
establishments in 19^3 with a total paid up capital of £16*5m of which 
£llm or 67$ was accounted for by the foreign private investor. In absolute 
terms, foreign paid up capital was highest in food, beverages, and tobacco, 
£6.5m,. and in the leather and leather products sector, £lm. As a 
proportion of total paid up capital, foreign contribution was highest in 
chemicals, 945^ 5. food, beverages and tobacco, 9 2 and 89$ in metal products. 
In contrast to the-East,, foreign contribution is smallest in the machinery 
and transport equipment sector,
1, The Table was computed from the figures kindly made available by the
Ministries of Economic Planning in the East and the West. None was
available from the other regions. The Fed. Office of Stats, promises 
to publish the breakdown of its 1963 industrial survey in due course.
2. Since then two foreign textile mills have been established in the
Region, end, at Aba and the other at Quitshe.
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A comparison of Table 2.2 with Table g,3 shows that the predominance 
in the number of foreign plants is reflected in predominance of foreign 
paid up capital in all the sectors except in food, beverages and tobacco, 
timber and wood products, and clay, glass and cement products. Even in 
these sectors, the only exception to the national trend is in clay, glass 
and cement products where the dominance in terms of foreign plants is not 
matched by the predpminance of indigenous paid up capital owing to the 
fact that without substantial government contributions some of the cement 
plants would not have been established. In the food, beverages, tobacco 
products sector, indigenous predominance in terms of plants is not matched 
by predominance in terms of paid up capital owing to the very large numbers 
of small indigenous bakery plants in these sectors, and the big initial ; 
capital requirement in brewing and tobacco industries. On the other hand, 
indigenous predominance of plants in the wood and timber sector is 
reflected in predominance of indigenous paid up capital.
Tables 2.4 and 5 show that these national trends are largely maintained 
in the Regions, In both the East and the West, paid up capital is largely . 
foreign owned, following the national trend, in the food, beverages and 
tobacco sector where it was 84$ in the East, and 92$ in the West. Also . 
following the national trend, foreign paid up capital predominates in the 
leather and rubber products sector in both regions and is in a minority 
relationship in clays, glass and cement products, being 16$ in the East 
and 42$ in the West, Beyond these, however, divergences with the national 
trend occur. While. 9,7$. of the paid up capital in the machinery and 
transport equipment sector in the East was foreign owned, only 23$ of
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this sector was f oreign owned in the West; while the 28^ foreign minority 
interest in the metal sector in the East^ cohtrasts with 89$ foreign .; 
interest in this sector in the West• • /' :
Another indication, of the extent and distribution of foreign private 
investment in Nigerian manufacturing industry is shown in Tabie$2.6 and 2.7* 
These Tables summarise the results of the series of surveys conducted by 
the Central Bank of; Nigeria during ,1962/67f They differ from the analysis >. 
in Table 2.3 which sipmarised, the result of the 19^3 industrial survey . 
conducted by the Federal Office of Statistics. . While the later, survey 
related to 7^5 inahufacturing establishments; which employed ten or more ; 
people each, and having a minimum annual product value of £100,;the >
Central Bankfs survey, related to 533 large and medium-sized concerns; 
ohosen in 1965 from those registered or listed with the; Registry of . 
companies as having an authorised capital of £10,000 or more, part, or all 
of which were believed to be f oreign owned.3 While. 83$ of the establish­
ments surved by the. Federal Office ofStatistics in I963 responded, 62$ of the 
companies surveyed by the Central Bank in 1964 responded.
- Table 2,6 shows the total capital, investment in the manufacturing 
industries. Capital investment here consists of paid up capital, un­
remitted profits, increase in equity .holdings: and debentures,, commercial
"When the :.GBf s^surveys started in 19.62, only 388' companies were r.'-i
surveyed and ; 78$ response secured. :. The number' contEftted was increased 
■ to 481 in 1963 and the response t o the two surveys averaged 75$* -An 
: extrapolation procedure was then adopted to give ah estimate of the ^
, total private investment in the country. Commercial banks and 
insurance companies, omitted from the 1963 and I964 surveys, were ’ 
included in the 1965 surveys . . . .  ;
credits and other short term loans from overseas parent. or affiliate :- 
companies.^ It shoys 'that foreign * private capital investment in :
" Nigerian mahufac.turing increased from £38m in 1962 to £58m in 1964* The 
■ food, beverages aiid tobacco sector accounted for 44$ of the total in 1962*/ 
This proportion declined as other sectors increased and in 1964 ^was 32$* *
This declining trend is also witnessed: in .the textiles and in. the metal 
products sectors. On the other hand the most significant increase $
: recorded during the. period was in the chemicals, oil,, paints and petroleum 
product sector /which increased in proportion from 12$ in 1962 to 23$ in 
1964 due, chiefly, to the investment in oil refinery in that year.
'' Table 2.7 showw the distribution of net: fixed assets of foreign / 
manufacturing plants in Nigeria for the three years, I962-I964. it 
shows an increase from £39i» in 1962 to £47w in 1963 and £64m in 1964*
Agaifc, the concentration of foreign investment in. the food, beverages,; : : 
and tobacco sector is highlighted by the fact that this sector accounted 
for 42$ of total fixed investments in 1962, 40$ in 1963, ’and: 35$ in 1964*
This proportion declines as the investments in other sectors increase.
While the proportions in. the leather and rubber products, metal, products, .
/ machinery and;transport equipment, and teEtile sectors, remained fairly .
Constant over the period, increases were; recorded in timber, wood, and ;
. paper products, and in chemicals, oils, paints, and petroleum product
sectors. The latter sector in fact doubled from 9$ ih 19^2 to 18$ in 1964* 
Again this was largely due to the establishment in 1964 of the oil refinery 
which was commissioned in 1965*
1* Central Bank of Nigeria, Ecoh., & Fin. Review, June, 1966.
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. $ The picture that.emerges from the above analyses is one of tremendous 
advance in industrial development over .the period 1955-1965* ; As was ■ 
pointed out earlier, this development is most marked since 1958 and 
particularly since independence. Table 2.8, which shows the sectoral 
distribution of value added.by manufacturing. industries, 1 ends support .,
: to this view. It shows that while the total value added in all the
sectors increased from £7m in 1955 to about £llm in 19571 by 1963 it was;
.£55®» an increase of about 664$ during the period. While there were little ; 
increases in all: the sectors between 1955 . .and 1957» significant increases 
were recorded in all the sectors by 1 9 6 3 the biggest being 955$ in. 
machinery and transport equipment and over 800$ each in textiles and 
: leather products, sectors. Again the f00 d, b ever ages and tobacco industries 
.. dominate the scene, accounting for: 46$ of the total in 1955* and 38$ in .
: I965r In absolute terms, it increased by 528$ from £3m in 1955. to 
:£2lm in 1963* While the proportionate contribution from timber, wood and 
paper products, printing and furniture declined by more than half from 
23$ in 1955 to 11$ in I963, the proportionate contribution from the 
textiles, and machinery and transport equipment sectors increased from less 
v than 1$ in 1955 to 8$ and' 11$ respectively in 1963 5 also while the cement, 
dlay and glass products sectors contributed nothing in terms of.value added 
in 1955> ; by 1963, this eector accounted for about .7$ of the total value 
added. ~ '. .. •; ...
1. /; Federal Ministry of Information: Industrial: Development in Nigeria,
Lagos, 1964 p*l* v:.' .. : > .
2. The first cement factory began operation in 1957 and the first glass 
factory in-i960. , Rural pottery industries existed in 1955*
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It must be noted that the actual increase was greater in 19&3 since 
the 1965 figures were derived from the limited survey conducted by the 
Federal Office of Statistics while the 1955 and 1957 figures were 
derived from a more comprehensive study by Br.P.N* C. Okigbo* , Since 19&3>
however,. many new companies were established. In 1964 alone, 482 companies.
1 2
were registered, and 51$ in I965* Of the 482 companies registered
in; 1964, 42$ were in the commercial sector, 24$ in industry, 18$ in the 
service sector, and the remainder in the transport, mining and 
agricultural sectors. Within the industrial sector 9$ of the 114 
companies were in metal working, 11$ in; printing and publishing, 10$ 
in textiles, 11$ in ready made clothing and 5$ in rubber products.and 
miscellaneous chemical products. About 49$ of the registered capital 
of the 48I companies was in the manufacturing sector, 49$ in the 
commercial, 6$ in the service and the rest in the transport, agricultural 
and mining sectors. Within the .industrial sector, capital registration 
was distributed as to 45$ in textiles, 10$ in metal working,. 13$ in non 
-metallic minerals and 7$ in printing and publishing.
. The sectoral distribution of the 518 companies registered or 
formed in .1965 Is given in the following table 2.9.
1. : Federal Ministry of Information: Industrial Development in Nigeria
Lagos, 1964, P*l.
2. . jJigerian Trade Journal October/December. 1966, p^.l76. . * .
; V \ r V '  ^  : : ; gABLF 2.9 .  ^'.:;'t:,; A  X  X] X k ^  ^v '.' 'V i;i>"
" Sectoral ItistribUtiohof:Companies. Registered or Formed
. :/ 'V: / -':v - ‘ ih 1965 : ' : ..vVt.' ' -■/ ■.'
. / Sector .•"• •' 'Wo. - " : Registered Capital £000
; v-/ - Industrial •/?.: ;V ':V'.:.105': • • . v - . 7*200 : ;
r\;';:';M-\-.;'|igih^ ring':' ;v.: .. ’•. :'^ 10.--V: . 'A//Y.--;vt 0.125 - i,-
:/V. :; Commerce . V :v/- X-. : X\/:.259.;.; • ; . V ; 6,700
. Mis CellaneOUS ; ;V ' 145 •/ "X Xy” ’. 1*3Q0 : • ^  *; \
v x : X  X^Total - X X : : X v O  X:"' X.518 =;■ ' x; X %  X ;':v:X  15*325 : X ' *\:X'
: i ;X. Wot4sV (a) Transportation,’mining; and guarrying, agriaalture, forestry, "
; ;;. X.:.v.-X': V'; X ;hunting etc. X'.X X XX X X  ; • . XXv,'. ;' ; X  XXX- ^ -X ■ X  '-XX'’
. Source: Nigeria Trade Journal, October/Leo. 1966 p. 176. ■ ; XXX' X
Thus although the industrial sector accounted for 105 or 20$ of the ,
. XxXx-. 818 companies formed or ^ registered in 1965 > it accounted for:£7• 2m or 41$
; - ' of the registered capital. Textiles accounted for 19$ of this, metal X  
: working 14$> non-metallic minerals 10$, and'.printing 9$* With a total of 
; 22, printing, publishing and allied” industries accounted for the highest ; 
number of companies, followed by 17 in textiles, 13 in paper and paper 
products; 12 in wood Working; and the remaing 41 distributed amongst food : 
processing and other miscellaneous products.
Table 2.10 reveals further interesting information about industrial 
activities in Nigeria in 19^5 • X;'X'-. .
; Industrial Projects Planned, in 1965 .;
Stage of Planning -X ; W o A n n o u n c e d  Investment (£000).
l^der construction . \ ' v 28 V 27*472
Began operations ' 29 - 20.685 . ; 7
Wot yet constructed
but Committed - ; . 24■ ■ ■ ' ; : 29*022
Expansion pro jected for 1966 ; 7/ • 5.450 ' .
Total v ■ v-h :X-'- X ' 82.609 : X . W  X
Source; : Nigerian Trade'.Journal Oct/Dec. 1966.
: Thus a total of 88 prpjects.with an announced investment of about
£83m began operationsj were under construction or were committed in 
Nigeria:in 1965* The biggest of the 24 projects cpmmitted was the : ;
£18m. gas plant of the Couch Methane Ltd. to produce liquified natural 
gas in Eastern Nigeria. 5 of the 28 projects under constriction in 1965: 
were contractor-financed projects for a paper mill at'cFebba in the North,
9-textile, glass and a oement project in the Mid-West, a cement project 
in the East and a cocoa processing project in the West* These five 
projects accounted for about £16 m out of the £27m worth of projects under 
construction in 1965* Among the companies that actually began operations 
in 1965 were the Aba Textile Mills Ltd., Zamfara Textile Industries,
Textile Commodities (Kano) Ltd, the Modern Shoe'Industry, Owerri, and the 
Nigerian Petroleum Refining Ltd, Port Harcourt, two cement factories, 
cosmetics factories, three engineering concerns and a pottery factory.
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. Lest the above; recital prove misleading, it must be noted, that -
manufacturing industries' still aceoxmt for less than; 10$ of Nigeria1 s gross ( 
national product. .Moreover, most of the establishments are very small .
X indeed, being mostly one man business • or private limited companies. Table . 
2.11 shows, that out of the 649 reporting establishments in 1963, 188 or,
29$ were sole proprietorships, 233 or 36$ were private limited4 companies and 
, only 75 ox .12$ were partnerships, and 14$ or 88. were .limited public • ;
companies. /While sole proprietorships' top the list in food, beverages 
and tobacco (41 out ofJ109 ), end in timber, wood, paper printing and 
furniture (100 out of 109), private limited companies were the greatest 
: component in machinery and transport equipment. On the other hand, public 
limited companies were the greatest component in metals (14 out of 32) 
and in clay, glass and cement products (9 out of 24)*
The trend that emerges from the analysis suggests that sole pro- . 
prietorships predominate in industrial ventures requiring relatively 
small capital and simple skill,; such as in bakeries or sawmilling and 
furniture making.- As the required capital and skill increase, there is a 
. tendency towards other forms of business association. Contrary to
expectations, however, the movement is hot towards partnerships but towards 
private limited companies or public limited companies.. The table shows that 
partnerships are, in fact, rare. This is largely the result of a general 
aversion among Nigerians to form business associations among themselves 
owing to lack of capital and mutual trust • The rarity of - partnerships is 
also due to the insufficient advantages which this form of business
1* Sehatz and S.I. Edokpai,. ''Economic Attitudes of Nigerian Business**
Nigerian .Journal of Eoons & Social Studies. 1957. on-957-96ft. .'' ■
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association offers to. overcome the lack of confidence in forming business 
association outside the family* Liability in a partnership is joint and 
several for all the debts of the partnership, and it is unlimited; moreover 
the partnership cannot sue or be sued as an entity and it comes to an end 
with the death-of a partner* These limitations are largely overcome in 
a private limited company which is a legal entity; whieh can sue and.be sued 
and where liability is limited, and membership is limited to a maximum of 
50 with only one director. That this is/preferred in Nigeria to partner­
ships is illustrated by the fact that only 12$* or 75 of the '649 establish­
ments were partnerships against more than thrice this number, 255 or 5 ^  
which.were-limited private companies. The special appeal of the limited 
private company form of business in Nigeria as elwewhere, is that it 
generally leaves control within the f amily unit while securing most of 
.• the advantages of limited liability company.
Mother indication of the size of companies in Nigeria is given 
by the size of registered capital. This as shown in Table 2.12 for 518 
companies registered in Nigeria in 1965•
. Table 2*12
Registered Capital of 416 companies In 
Nigeria, / 1965* • .
Size of Registered Capital No. of Companies . jo of Total
Under £1,000 ; v .107 . 20*6
.':£i;000-£4,999 ' l62 31* 2 „ ' •
: : £5,ooo-£9,999 ‘ \ 60 11.6 V;-
£10,000-£24,999 68  ^ 15.5 .
£25,000-£49,999 27 5.1
^.fe5Q^<sbQ^99.‘99^  :;-''*1 '; / 17 S'- - •” /v0 ' . :
Y." - . £100,000 and over . - '. " 26 ; ' \.  ^ /•. 5* • V.
. Overseas Companies where total \ t • ■ YYYvY.Y Y^ ;
Y".'■ capital was insignificant 24 4*7 L
/ Associations with no registered . . -V- A
. and. stated capital .; • • Y' . 2? ' ■'.\'?Y.:-"."{A Y v,:'v- 5*1 ' v:'; '* Y ’-^ -YY
:Total ; --■■■■'- Y ■ Y. . ■ 5 1 8  100.0 ■
Y. Sources Nigerian Trade Journal. October/December; 4966. ; Y: Y-^?rY-Y'Y:-; Y ;Y
The Table .shows that about 21$  or 107 of the 518 companies had
registered capital of under £1,000 and 51$ or 162 had registered; capital ;
y. of between £1,000 and £5>00,0. ; Thus 52^  or 269 of the 518 companies
had registered capital of uhder . £5,000 and oniy $fo or 17 had registered
• Y capital of £100*000 and over. • Y..v ■ •; Yy Y- -• Y-Y Y
y The third ihdication ;6f the size of industrial companies in Mgeria y
Y is givenby the size of employment. ThiBisil lust rated in Table 2.15*
Y^/vY : : ■ Y' Table v 2.15:' ^  • : Y'Y Y Y Y Y -  : Y ' • ; ; ' Y,-. YY YvYY:.'
v; ■> Size of Employment of 649 Reporting Manufacturing ■ Y-..-. Y
; Y .. • 'V:‘Plants Vin Nigeria; Y 1963* ;Y • -:Y - Y V-- - Y'X Y v . YYYYY
J: No* of Employees■ . ■ No. of Establishments - °/o of Total
v 20-49Y '.V Y ■ Y;' Y Y v :Y' Y V.■Y . 176 YY' ‘ .YY : 27*2 YY■' ,Y^Y>
YY. • 50-99 y-Y.yy- Y YYY-YYYYYYyl06y.v Y :. y'-Y Y;V" : Y 16.5 Y-S.Y YY
Y-; Y 100-299 ■ Y ' • :;v; Y -.!-YY o: - -■:YY v,'110 >;■ V'YYYYY-YY:;■ yYYy V: 16.9 Y YY . V : '
;'rV '509r % 9v-;^ ^^
:;;:Vv;-';^ \;'5O0^ ,99/ - : v ^ - v r-.:^;V"'^ V :‘-'?!?0:v V-€v^
1000-over 4 0.6
.'v ; v Total '7‘ ■' ■ ;■: v ’ ..v?:v*:• 649 ;•;/' ■  ^ v i;W-';100.:; ^ v: v':
V V  ;-'- .iSoUrch;:;.Federai:^ ifice;:;Of ;;StatiisticsVvMdUstrial:!-§iinrey^  ^ ■■ V;?;v
Thus about 32$ of the 649 reporting establishments in 1965 employed 
between ,10-19 persons, and27$ employed between 20-49* :^n air 383 or 59$
of all the establishments employed under. 50 persons and only 4 or 0.6$ 
employed 1000 persons or over, .,; ■
Table 2.14 shows that the tinber,. wood and paper products, printing 
and furniture sector accounted for the biggest number of establishments 
in four employment categories - 10-19? 20-49 5 59-99? and 100-299* • This, 
is followed by the food, beverages and tobacco sector. This confirms the 
; analysis presented in Table 2.2 above that indigenous firms dominate : 
the number of establishments in these two sectors because of the small . 
capital and simple skill required to start operations in these sectors.
The Table shows that the number of foreign firms was the least in these •, 
two sectors.
Of the four establishments employing:1000 persons or over, two were 
in the textiles, wearing apparel and footwear and one each in the timber, 
wood and paper products, printing, and furniture; and leather products.
Foreign Private Investment in Nigerian Manufacturing. 1955-1965
: Summer jr..
Between 1955 and 1965 about 955 manufacturing plants employing ten 
persons or more began operation in Nigeria. 45$ or 425 of these were 
foreign owned. Of these, 298 or 70$ began operations between 1961 and 
1965. According to the 1963 industrial survey, 649 manufacturing plants 
had a total paid up capital of £56* 8m. of which £38*4» or 68$ came from
1. The machinery and transport equipment sector is influenced by a large 
number of small repair shops. See Table 2.1.
foreign private sources♦ The. foreign sector had the, major capital 
ownership in the following sectors: food,'beverages and tobacco; leather 
and:leather products; chemicals, paints, and petroleum products; metals;; 
machinery and transport equipment,: and miscellaneous industries such as 
plastics* Only in two sectors, timber and wood products, and clay, > 
glass and cement products did' Nigerians:have the majority of the paid up 
capital of 61$ and 71$ respectively.
- According to the. Central Bank Surveys, capital’ investment by 
foreign plants in Nigeriaincreased from' £58*4m in ,1962 to £58*5m in 1964* 
In both 1963 and 1964*. foreign capital investment in food, beverage, 
tobacco and in textiles and rubber industries together accounted for 
50*6$ and 44$ respectively of aggregate capital investment in all sectors 
Foreign private investment in fixed assets rose from £39m in 1962 to £64m
1964.! ■' 5$. V - ■: i-V Gy-..'V;;. ■ ;
' While manufacturing still accounts for less than 10$ of Nigeria1 s . 
gross domestic product, the overall picture that emerges from the above 
analysis is one of tremendous industrial advance, during, the period, 1955- 
1965* This was evident in the 664$ increase in value added by 
manufacturing industry between 1955 and 1963 and in the large number of 
companies that have been formed or had started business since 1963* In 
all these developments the foreign private investor played a key role*
In t he next two chapters, therefore,the main factors, which influenced 
the level and distribution of foreign; manufacturing investment in 
Nigeria during,the period will be considered* :
CHAPmi T H R E E  .
FACTORS ^FLUMPING FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN NIGERIAN •
. MNUFAGTURING. 1955-1965 
INTRODUCTION '
The factors which influenced foreign private investment in Nigerian 
manufacturing during 1955-1965 may conveniently be grouped under two. 
headings - Government policy and other factors. Other factors include 
the Nigerian market, profits,:raw materials, labour and redeployment 
policies of the established firms in Nigeria. These will be discussed 
in the next. chapter. In this chapter we discuss Government policy.
.Government Policy. 1955-1965 n .
One factor which so glaringly distinguished Nigeria's economic scene 
during 1955/65 from the period 1959/54 is the adoption of positive measures 
to stimulate economic development and to attract foreign investment to 
. Nigerian manufacturing. While government policy between 1959/52 preferred 
the development1 of cottage industries to establishing industries on a 
factory basis, during 1955-1965» while not neglecting cottage industries, 
government policy, preferred industrialising Nigeria through the establish­
ment of modem industries. While during 1952 and 1954 all positive deci- 
sions on industry in Nigeria was postponed pending the :s^ prjfct of the 
World Bank’s mission to Nigeria,, and the clarification of issues under the 
1954 federal constitution, these issues were clarified end resolved and the 
recommendations the World Bank lepor?nlargely implemented during 1955/65* 
While goverhment policy during 1959-1954 seriously objected to giving 
active support to the establishment of manufacturing industries, but merely 
concentrated in the provision of the basic essentials for the operation of
free private enterprise, during 1955-1965, while providing the basic 
infrastructure, there was active encouragement, and government participation 
in. the establishment of manufacturing industries in Nigeria. It is there­
fore necessary, before discussing how this policy influenced foreign private 
manufacturing investment during this period,,to indicate what actually was 
Government policy during 1955/65*
Unfortunately, there is no single source from which one can discover 
the full expression of. government policy\ and of all the measures adopted 
to stimulate economic growth and to attract foreign investment to
manufacturing industry in the country. This can be found scattered in
1the constitutions, in the various legislations, and in the Ministerial
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budget and other speeches in Parliament. Even then,government economic
policies and objectives are still in the process of formulation and it
cannot be said that they are already finalised. . Nevertheless it is to
the development plans since 1955 that one has to turn to gain a more.
comprehensive view of Nigeria’s policy objectives.
1. Such as the Pioneer Industries Ordinance, 1952, Industrial Development 
(Income Tax Relief Act, 1958;the Industrial Development, (import 
Duties Relieft) Act. 1957;the Customs Duties (Bumped and Subsidized 
GoodsT Act, 1958? the Customs (Drawback) Regulations. 1958; and the 
Income Tax (Amendment) Act. 1958.
2. See for.instance ’The Six Budget Speeches’ of the late Federal Minister 
of Finance. Chief ffeatus Sam Okotie Eboh. 1958-1963* and .subsequent and 
other regional government’s budget speeches.
5* Such as the joint statement by all the Nigerian Governments captioned: 
’’Opportunities for Overseas investment in the Federation of Nigeria1,* 
in the Nigeria Econ..Survey 1959* App.86; Statement of Policy proposed 
by the Federal Government on the stimulation of Industrial Development 
b.v affording Relief from Import Duties and Protection to Nigerian 
Industry” Sessional Paper No 101 1956; and the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria: Statement on Industrial Policy, Sessional Paper No.6 of 1964*
The 1955-1960 Development Programmes.
Comprehensive: planning atr the regional levels in Nigeria began in v. 
1955. In that year all the governments of the federation, including the 
: former Southern Cameroons, at the request. of the United Kingdom Government, 
prepared economic programmes, for the five year period,1955-1960. These 
programmes followed very closely the recommendations of the World, Bank 
Mission to Nigeria and are summarised in Table 3*1* for Nigeria excluding 
the former SouthernCameroons. :
The primary objective of these plans was the provision of the basic . 
services necessary for economic development and for a full operation of 
free private enterprise• This was clearly indicated in the Western 
Region’s plan: ”the plan concentrates attention on the provision of social 
overhead capital. The primary function of.Government is the provision 
of these public services without which individual effort and initiative 
would be futile - education and health services, water, electrical energy
1. Development planning,.of course, began, in 1946 with the *Ten Year Plan 
for Development and Welfare,11946-1956. It was subsequently found that 
ten years was too long a period for effective planning and the original 
plan was; revised and cut into two, resulting in a plan, for the period 
1946-51 and another for 1951-56* ^he coming into effect of the
. federal constitution in 1954 necessitated the regionalisation of the 
plan and hence the 1955-56 plan was curtailed to end after the fiscal 
year, 1954/55*
2. Comprehensive planning was not immediately possible after.the introduc-
, tion of the. new constitution in Oct. 1954 until the financial implies- :
tions of the new constitution on revenue allocation among the govern­
ments had been known; a. full study of the recommendations of the World 
Bank Mission Report submitted in Sept. 1954 and published in 1955 had 
been made;, and until the legislation extending the U.K. Commonwealth 
. Development and Welfare Act to I960 was passed early in 1955» it was not 
known , how much money would become available to the Nigerian Governments 
from this source on which the development plans would be based. Pending 
the clarification of these issues,. ’Interim Development Plans' were
/continued over/ /
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and. network of communications, without which private enterprise would not 
flourish. Public services are basic to the economic development; of av • 
country. They improve its physical equipment as well. as the skills and .•
; ■ the quality of: its people. If. they are inadequate or stagnant, agriculture 
cannot become sufficiently productive or factories operate successfully. • .
: That is why the Government of the Western Region makes 'the expansion of 
.: the education and health services its first object of policy”.^  Precisely ; 
the same objective was expressly stated or implied in the other development:v\ 
•/. . plans* •. y v;- V ■ /• .:!'/ '' V'v; / :/■;.
■ This emphasis on: the provision of .social overhead capital is "
iliustrated in the plan resource allocation* Table 5.1 shows that out of 
; a planned capital expenditure of £365*11 by: all the; Governments, £156m or
was devoted for those sectors which contribute directly to development / 
and £121m or 35$ W&s devoted to social overheads • However, this elassifi- 
' cation considerably understates the resource allocation for social overheads.
; There is no doubt that items 3 to 6 under the development sector - 
electricity, transport, communications, and water supplies - might
.reference 2 continued: .. • .
. passed by the Federal and Northern Region Government for 1955-56*
Backed by the £43m expected to be received f rom distribution of the 
y Marketing Board* s surplus reserves following. the regionalisation of . 
the Marketing Boards and/with a professional advice, from W.A. Lewis,, 
the Western Region Government launched a full scale five-year,develop- . 
: ment plan, 1955-1960, and thus was undeterred by the above consider- '5
at ions. The Eastern Region apparently followed suit but was forced 
to revise her 1955-1960 Development Programme in.1958 when she put 
, out the 1958-1962 plan. :.
1. Development of Western Region-of Nigeria 1955-1960,. Sess. Paper 4,
1956, page 11. V. :,■//■■■■ '
conceivably be classified under .the'social overhead sector. /When this 
is done, .the plan emphasis on social overheads will then be seen in its 
true perspective. for the inclusion of these' sectors would mean that 
£236m or 65$ of the total plan expenditure was alloted for social over- / 
heads, against £25m or 7$ fo£ primary production and £17m or -5$ for 
trade and industry. ;
; Within the separate governments, emphasis among the various sectors 
varied with constitutional responsibility and regional priorities. The 
Federal Government, with exclusive constitutional responsibility for .
. communications, was the only Government providing for this in the 
development .plan, having alloted £12m or 8$;of its plan expenditure for 
this. .All the governments, except the West, gave top priority to 
transport development• This sector accounted for 34$ of the federal . 
allocation, 24$ in the East and 22$ in the North, against only 4$ in the 
West. The topmost priority in the West was given to education which . v. 
accounted for 35$. of its allocation,, against 20$ in the East, 19$ in the 
North, and only 5$ fon the Federal. On the whole, following the official 
classification in the Table, the Federal Government allocated the highest: 
percentage to the development sector, 52$> followed by the East, 51$» the 
North, 45$ and the West 27$* . On the other hand the West’s allocation 
for social overheads was highest in proportion, 54$» iu absolute • 
terms, £56m, against 33$ in the East, 32$ in the North and 29$ in the 
Federal. However, following a reclassified^formula the regional . 
allocations for the social overheads were in fact greater than the Table 
shows being 7.1$ in;the East, 68$ in the Federal, 63$ in the West, and 
60$ in the North* .
• ;44/-With7the exceptioii of h^e;f;^s^, :none, of.:;the Governments fully y,444 
. :,V; .implemented their by 1960# For the West^ 1 out. of- a planned total ; ’
.. of: £104* 76m, actual expendi^re • during the quinquennium amounted to £98♦62m,
4,4' . the -shortfall being largely.due to savings in recurrent expenditure. The 4 ; y
programmes: which the I955-6O Development Plan contained were thus virtually,
\ fully implemented1 The primary reason forthe non fulfilment of all • :
44; ;:v the plaafmed prograjmnes of the other Governments was lack of executive v
44 capacity and difficulties; -in obtaining supplies .and equipment: from; overseas,
y A time lag - at . least six months, and in the early stages of the plan, more
4 than a year. - had to be aliowed between indent and delivery. ^ Moreover, 4'.
44.; : \ the Federal Government, as a result of annual reviews of its pi&n, had ; 5 4
decided about halfway through the plan period,.to project its programmes.^ 
to 1962. \  ... The other regions, except the Sest, . also undertook to extend '
• 4 their plan periods to 1962.^ : '44 4y 44. 4'.; 4.y4'4 ;y •
1. Federation of Nigeria2 National Development Plan. 19&2-66, p.269*
2* Ibid. page 205. ••: V • 44,  y  4'  ; • 4:; . 4 '  -4 -4-4
5* Sessional. Paper No.l X959 (Federal Legislature) 2 Third Progress Report
• y ; - . 4 on the Econ. Programme4 1955-60. para.3* 44
4* - The National Plan op.cit. The reasbn why the Western Region government 
. did not consider it necessary or desirable to extend the period of 
: its plan was that it 1found itself with adequate executive capacity
4 • .and financial resources to match its planned programmes. The 
4 : Government then launched a new five year plan, I96O-I965* : After two ;
years operation it was decided to adjust it to accord with the rest 4 
V 4 of the country and the plan was revised to extend from 1962-1968.
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The National Development Plan, 1962-68
It was against the above background that the National Plan, 1962-68^ 
was produced in 1962.\ The objective of the -National Plan was to• build on 
the achievements of the previous plans to speed up development. It was 
observed that the Nigerian economy during 195^-1960 grew at the rate:of 
3.9fo per annum. With this as a base, the National Plan was designed to 
achieve a growth rate of 45^  per annhm and. if possible to surpass this rate. 
This was to be achieved by investing 15$ of Slgeria*^ gross domestic . 
product annually and by raising per capita consumption by 1°/o over the 
; plan period. The Plan was seen as the first in /a series of three or four 
such plans by the end of which it was. hoped the Nigerian economy would ' ; 
achieve a "self-sustaining growth". To this end the Plan envisaged 
raising the domestic savings ratio from about 9*S^ of GDP in 1960-61 to 
about 15/ or more by 1975 * In order to sustain the bulk of the domestic 
investment envisaged. Other objectives of the Plan include the acceleration 
.of education of all kinds and at all levels with emphasis on the training ; 
of technical and managerial man power; the achievement of a modernised 
economy consistent, with the democratic, political, and social aspirations 
of the people and the maintenance of reasonable measure of stability 
through appropriate fiscal and monetary policies.
1. The 1962-68 Plan was christened * National1 or rather the "First National 
Development Plan" in . the sense that the previous plan, 1959-60, was not
1 national1 as: it was merely five different budgets of five governments 
which jealously guarded their rights and obligations under the new 
federal constitution. Although each of the 1955-60 programmes showed 
a much greater degree of integration and laid greater emphasis on 
economic considerations, than under the 1946-1956 plans, there was 
evidently much overlapping and wasted effort. No economic targets were 
. fixed for the country as a whole, and although the National Economic • 
Council was established in 1955 as. a forum for mutual discussion and
/continued over/
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Y - To achieve the above objectives, a total capital expenditure of :
£676.8111 was originally envisaged under the Plan. In the; light of sub- 
v' Sequent developments, this was revised to £828 # 9m« The breakdown of the Y . 
original and revised allocations are shown in Tables 5*2 and, Wfcile
the 1955-6O plans emphasised the provision of social overheads, the new 
Plan*s emphasis was;on "development **• Accordingly, a primary objective 
Y of the: plan was to shift resources more and more into the "development 
sector" as a basis for the desirable expansion of health, and educational 
!; facilities*. This new; emphasis was - most aptly .put in a policy statement *
’references 1 & 2 continued: Y:; .  ^ .Y\-
. co-operation among the governments, the programmes had already been 
formulated by that time* Moreover the YNEC met too infrequently, at 
times, once in a year, and the plans were executed in relative 
isolation one from the other5. and new projects were added or subtracted 
without regard to their implications for the nation as a whole#
,; . Although much useful work was nevertheless^ accomplished, the resulting
Y inefficiency and waste necessitated a plan, the"First National Plan" 
with a national outlook. This plan claims to have identified the Y-, 
mistakes of the earlier plans and to have made a major effort to 
ensure the possible maximum integration of all the governments* 
programme with fixed targets, deviations or modifications being made
. only after.a careful examination of their effects not only upon the 
. individual government * s programme but aIso; upon the"National Plan" 
as a whole. :Experience has, however, shown that the "National Plan" is 
no more, ’national* than the 1955*^ 60 plans# It has, in fact, been 
described as ’federated* rather t hah national, the collection of four 
different plans which are published in one book and called *A 
National Plan1*i The process of coordination has been described as not 
more than"one of keeping the; communication channels wide open .. . the 
national framework of. the plan in so far, as; it refers to planning in 
terms of gross changes in national product and of per capita incomes 
was.entirely a federal responsibility and.did not in fact, affect 
. regional planning# From the view point of the Regions, this national - 
: framework was merely a;translation into.generally accepted economic
terminology of regional plans and anticipated changes in output". See 
;; .■ "The Machinery: of Planning .in the Federation of Nigeria by E#0. Obayan,
Y . Y Nigerian Journal of Boohs, and Social Studies j4.ov.1962 pp.277*“281# See
also Frank J. Moore; "Development Planning in Eastern Nigeria". Journal 
of Local Government AdTiriTTf5 JU 13^1964 "fg 141# fe?*
Moore was one of the A#I.X). people who assisted in drafting the 
. Y*National Plan*. ■ •
2. The National. Plan op*cit*•*'pp.21-24. ;
Y ; - Y .  ^ VY i - i ^ ^ :Y:’;;- >;■;■ V Vy Y.;y:: --Vy^ 'V - - •■Y135yy:
by the Eastern; Region.; Government in 1961; "The time has come to apply.. . Y ,
; the .brake on the speed.with which social services are being provided. . - 
. Too much money is going into education, into the building, of hospitals 
Y and into local government. Instead of increasing the expenditure for 
. these services, money shouldYbe diverted for investment in productive 
Y , ventures which will produce the money for the. social services. In the 
developed countries, the level of social services reflects the level 
. of development., Here in Eastern Nigeria, expenditure on social services. ;Y 
deflects instead of reflecting the level of d e v e l o p m e n t : r
. A/comparison of. Tables 3* 2 with Table $.1 will show, how .this shift : 
away from the social overheads .to the development sector"was effected. . r ,
The National Plan allocated £482m or 71$ of thev £677m planned expenditure:
to' the development sector against 43$ under the; 1955-1960 plan. On the
other hand, expenditure on social overheads was. reduced from 33°/° of total Y
plan expenditure under the 1955-1960 plan to 21^ under the National Plan. Y.
This shift is also noticeable in the individual plans. The development ;
sector accounted for 72$ of plan expenditure -under the National, Plan 
.against 52$ in the 1955-60 plan for the Federal, 67fo against 45/° for the , 
North, 77$ aSuinst 51?^  for the East, and 66$ against 27$ for the West• On 
Y : the other hand, the percentage allocation for the social overheads decreased
Y from 20$ in the 1955-60 plan to 17$ in the National Plan for the Federal,
from 55$ to 50$ for the East; and the West ’ s from 54$ to 51$» while the
North’s remained at 52$ for each of the two plan periods.
1. The Recort of the Eastern Nigerian Econ. Mission 1961* Official
Document 5* 1962, p. 11. "y" . . , Y'
, . f. . If the development sector is taken to include only . primary xn:oduction, ’
;T- V trade jand industry,-ihatAisyif/eiectoici^ ■
•; and water supply are included in 'the social overhead sector, the
. following picture of resource allocation under, the two pIans emerges • y
y- ’y y  y  .table 3.4 y:.S- yy, ; V y y  /v:yy/'' V‘-y
^ ■ Reclassified Plan Resource .Allocation. 1953-60 v-y
. /  - y - r ^ y y y - y - '  & 1962-68y v '  ■ / ; . > : y ' \ - ° V y ■
■ Region Development Sector. Social Overhead Sector.. Others .
1955-60 1962-68 1955-60 1962-68 1955-60 62-68
‘V.’.'.V, ' ' f ■■■'■ ' ' M i ■ .' ■ ■■. P : : < / » yy.$'
Federal, 68.0 : a -  75.2 ;28.6 V : 11.2
East . V ; 12.9 ; - y y ; . :;i_-;39.i:.;y 't>:iyv-:
West - ;ViL7?°C: : -4^  * 4 63.1 .v>; 50.5 1 ::;i9.9- :■ 3.1
North,• : yi?. 7.;;?v' . :■ 66,0 ; v-:y;:;,25.5;;$yi.o'
All Nigeria V -1I.2 ; 26.9 64.8 : ';65.o::V:: . 24.0 7.8
Source; : Computed from tables and .‘S.*??*;.
' . Although for ail the governments the resource allocation for the 
, development sector was; increased from 11^under, the 1955-60 plan to 27$ 
under the 1962-68 plan, there was, in fact, no shift of resources away f rom 
, the social overhead sector whidh accounted f or '$*$> of total plan expenditure
ih both the 1955-60 and the 1962-68 plans* Resource shift took- place under
v Mother ;sectors!f which include general administration and financial 
' obligations* Total: resource allocation to these sectors was reduced from
V  ; 24/^ under the 1955-60 plan to .8$ under the 1962-68 plan.. This reduction,
occurred in all the plans. However, as Table 3*5 shows, under-alio cation 
to the general administration;,sector is .illustrated,by the. fact that within 
the first two years of the National Plan, all the governments, together, and
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the Federal Government ;in particular, spent 4'5$‘°£ the /total planned • •
expenditure for; this sector for the 6. years of the Plan. This indicates y>-. 
an overspending of 12$ in each; case* The corresponding percentages spent / 
in this sector during the first two years of. the Plan was 61$ in the East 
and 93$ in the North, thus showing an overspending of 28$ in the East 
and of 60$ in the North* Only in the West was expenditure in this sector 
below the plan estimate of 33$ during the period* At 13$, the West, in . 
fact^  recorded an underspending of 23$ in this sector..
The upshot of this analysis is that although there was a shift of 
resources to the development sector, this was not from the social overhead 
sector as the Plan stated, but apparently from the general administration . 
sector.^ Only in the East and the West was there reduction in the 
percentage allocation for the social overheads during the 1962-68 Plan.
-While the East increased its resource allocation from 13$ under the 1955-62 
plan to 58$ under the 1962-68 plan for the development sector, the proportion 
allotted to the, social overhead sector was. reduced from 71$; to 39$; for the 
West, it was reduced from 63$ to 51$ against an increase in the allocation 
for the development sector; from 17$ to ,46$* On the other, hand, while the 
Federal increased its development sector allocation from .3$ to 16$ and the 
North from 18$ to 33$ from the 1955-60 to the 1962-6,8 plan, the. Federal 
Plan, far from reducing the allocation to the social overhead,sector, in, 
fact, increased it. from 68$ .to 73$ and the. North from 60$ to 66$. ,
1. It might be argued that general administration, such as maintenance 
of law and ordervis also social overhead capital, but this does not 
detract from the, argument that there was no shift from social, over­
head expenditure in view of the overspehding in general administration.
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7 ’: •% \y- . Mot Plan which;is /not generally borne V
yyy;..: out -by / the facts is that: top;prio was; g iyen„t ,o: x^ rimary xiroductiony and -//.
> :  "trade Uhd industry*;;;^  The/Eastetn Plan put this very succiniiy: Mthe, new
;: :-v; programme ; :tinlike. the /previous programmes,: should emphasise investment in ■ y /.
:■;>/: /; the more; directly productive /sector Of. the economy ;. - agriculture and r- >..■ 4 . 1 
// ' A s ;industry.• .To give 'ex^eesibn■ to;this;/policy;,; and to translate it into 
;/V action^ priority has been accorded to: agriculture ^ industry* , and technical [
: \ / training. The first; priority. belongs to .agriculture y..the second is v /;
' /; / manufacturing and processing ihdUstries'M*^ It is: not clear, however,, what.
£.v; //the Plan meant by-priority. - ylf /;it is ip 'terms of sectors that promise .4: /y; 
the'maximum growth.rate, then the top priority given, to:,agriculture;: seems ■
tb be; misplaced since primary production generated /a relatively low/ growth =
;. rate• ■ in. the 1959 *s " Priority: would; have been given to the fastest- ■ /. / , :/ 
growing = sectors of the e conomy, while keeping primary production upon an ;
: even keel, unless it. can be shown that the planned Concentration on 
; primary product ion would result in the/ highest: growth rate of all the v 
sectors during or soon after the plan period., . ; 4/;>/. y . '/ /
/. /; V; It dbes seem, however, that by priority, the Plan meant , spending. / , ;
the most, money for the topmost ranked projects,: that is,- in terms of 
resource allocation. . This whs obviously/ implied in the Plan statement 
-that the two sectors, agriculture and industry, which have been/ accorded /,;
. top priority In the Plan will account for more than one quarter/ of the total 
. / plan expenditure over the period, against about 11$ under the 1955-60 plan. :
1. Ibid. pp.207-208.
2. 0. Aboyade: A General Critique of the Plan: Nigerian Journal of
/ Economics; and Social Studies, . July 1962. p.113.
Defined in terms of resource allocation, however, the Plan statement . 
of according topmost, priority to these two sectors is not substantiated by 
the facts as Tables 3*1 and 3*2 show. ,
Table 3*1 shows that the.biggest resource allocation went to the 
transport sector which absorbed 21$ or £144& of the £677m planned 
expenditure. This is followed by electricity which accounted f or 15$ 
of the/ plan expenditure. . Primary production, 14$, trade and industry 
13$», and education, 10$, merely ranked as the third, fourth, and fifth 
in priorities and not as the three topmost ranked .projects according 
to the Plan. ; - Only the. East maintained these priorities for primary 
production, 40$, trade and industry 17$;with transport and education - 
receiving the third priority at 12$ each of the Eastern plan's 
expenditure. The West gave topmost priority to trade and industry, 26$, 
primary production, 20$, and education, 13$, In both the Federal and . 
Northern plans, topmost priority went to transport. The second priority 
in the federal plan went -to electricity, 24$, while trade and Industry 
shared the third position with general administration, each receiving 
11$ of the plaii.b/e^ conl^o^he transport sector in the Northern plan was 
primary production, 23$, followed by education, 19$, and trade and 
industry,10$*
The conclusion from this analysis is that for all the plans put 
together, the plan statement that topmost priority was , given to primary 
production, trade and industry and education is not borne out by the facts 
These sectors instead occupied.the third, fourth and fifth priorities..
It is only in the Eastern plan that t opmost priority was given to them in
that order. -In the West, they received the-topmost priority., except that 
trade and industry preceded primary production* In the Northern plan, 
primary production received the second priority," edhcatioii;th®. third, and 
trade and industry the fourth. In the Federal plan, :trade and industry 
shared the third priority with general administration, :education the 
fourth and; primary production the seventh priority raking* v
.Table that only £151m or 22$ of the planned expenditure of
£677m was spent during the•;first two years of the pl'i=Qd,^ i9^ 2^ 1964i' These 
are i/the; only years for which progress reports on the .Planlliad/been * issued. 
£100m of this, or 22$ of the- planned development expenditure, -was spent 
in the, 'development' sector, against £28m in the social overheads and 
£22m in the general administration sector. - \&s;a percentage: of /planned 
expenditure for each sector, this represented .21$ for development, 20$ 
for,; social: overheads ;and:45$fO:c •••general: a^inlstration.' On a pro rata 
basis , / i  one sixth of the total, planned expenditure would hayeybeen:/sp^t 
each year, meaning; that for the first two years . of the plan, a third of; 
the totals^  plan expenditure, would have been expended. Gn this hypothesis, 
the plan recorded an over all underspending during-:its first two years / 
z of ;: operation, the underspending /being' about Underspending; inthe/
. development and social' overhead sectors;^  represente^l^/and^^. l 
respectively.;/ For the separate, plans, underspending was 13$ £ 0£--the 
,; F e d e r a l , o r  the North,. 7$ for the $asi,; and the highest, 16$ in the 
West. Thus, for; the deyeippirient sector,; only in. the East did spending 
; attempt to /approximate the planZestima'tek /The percentage underspending 
in the social;-overhead sector f pr .the regions is,11$for Federal,- 1 ^  ■ 
in the North, 14$/in the West l and 9$ in the East * Again theEast
recorded the least amount of underspending. ■ . 4/
The general^administration sector/bhowe/a different, picture.// While;/ 
/the plans as a whole recorded 12$; overspending in; this sector , during, the 
first; two years of the plan, , the North spent about . 93$, and the .East - 
61$ of the plan allocation for this sector. This! represents 60$ over- 
. spending in the North, and 28$ in the East,; Only the; West came off with 
20$ underspending in this sector. However, the general overspending .
•in this sector* supports the. contention above that there was an under /
; allocation for the general; admihistrat ion sector, and that therefore the 
acclaimed shift, away from social overheads is more apparent than real. :
The Significance of Government Economic Policy. . ■ •
Having discussed the Government * s economic policy in terms of the :
genera! development plans since 1955, it now remains to indicate the , 
significance of this policy in terms = of industrial development and the 
attraction of foreign private investment into industry. The analyses of 
the plans indicate the genuine efforts being made to develop the 
resources of the country, to:increase agricultural and;industrial 
production and to. effect a steady rise in per capita incomes and 
standard of living. The plans were development conscious s .the. 1955-60 
plans concentrated attention on the provision of the necessary infra­
structure!^ continued in the 1962-68 plan with greater emphasis
on development♦ This plan is seen.as the first in a series of three or 
four such plans to bring the economy to a stage of self-generatihg growth- 
Unlike the previous plans, the National Plan, despite its weaknesses, 
is the first true comprehensive effort at general equilibrium analysis 
based on a projected frame of national accounts and feasibility programmes.
■ ^4444: ' 4 4 % . ; ?  4 '■4/4 /■'■; $444444 : 4^  4 1 4 2 ^
. ; • $ ;- / zAndvthe long term growth prospects :envisaged:f or Nigeria/ in the; Plan$  4 ,/.4.
4 4; . were a powerful influence on foreign investors to invest in Nigeria* In .
$§4 ;4v4 a/shrvpy ,q f 6&4a^i&s /by Mr; A*Ny/ Ha%ui,thi^^ $  4:44';
mentioned 40 times; as a factor which influenced the firms’ choice of .
; 4 / 4^ :^. 44y 44yy// /4 : . ; 4 -..4. • : 4 •*.;•" ;'4/44:-
. : Industrial Policy /. 4/4 ■ . '4y 4- '4' ;4
4-:; Official .general economic policy as an influence' attracting foreign '4/4
. private, inyestors into manufacturing; industry in Nigeria becomes all the
more important when, it; is related to the/goverhment:1? industrial pol '
4 44// . • Because industry: is a .concurrent subject in .which the federal and
4 4 /4 /4 4 4. regional goyernments can legislate linder the federal constitution, 4 444;
4 /  . 4^; i^ policy of the various governments varied with each governments 44
4 4■: : constitutional responsibilities and regional emphasis.2 / Nevertheless,. 4 4/-
al1 the governments of the federation were agreed on encouraging the : 4 /
/ establishment of Industries which manufacture import substitutes, which
4employ: Nigeriah: labour and . provide opportunities for Nigerians to acquire ;
/ technical skill and managerial experience5 and which process Nigeria's
;•/: raw;materials and make maximum use, at least 45$>; of her/raw materials 4 44:
: and resources; In short, the industrial policy of all. the governments
4 : !• A;N4 Hakam: The Motivation to Invest and the: Locational Pattern; of 
Foreign PrivaterrIndustrial Investments in Nigeria? Nigerian Journal 
of Econs. and Social Studies.; March 1966 p. 53. .
/ 4 :2. There are, however certain things on which alone the Fed.’ Govt, can v ;V
/ , 44 legislate for the interest of; uniform!tyjthese include banking and 
currency exchanges, trade marks ^ company law.
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of the federation Uis to stimulate the establisKiment and growth of 
industries which .contribute both directly and materially to economic; 
growth and which enable Nigerians to4participate to an increasing extent 4;. 
in the ownership, direction, and management of Nigerian industry’1.^  All 
the governments regarded; industry;'-as \a means' to diversify the economy in y 
order to ensure a balanced economio growth and to enhance the country's 
balance of • payments position.
The above industrial policy is backed by a high priority ranking 
for trade and industry in the development plan as Tables 3*1 and 3*2 above 
show. • : In the 1955-60 plan, =. industry absorbed: 5$ of the total plan 
expenditure. In the 1962-68 Plan this proportion was raised to 13$.
Biirther more, an array of incentives and guarantees were provided to attract 
foreign private capital into Nigerian manufacturing; and these have been 
"very, effective for this purpose.... This operated. through maintaining a 
favourable economic environment for industriai. development through the 
provision of fiscal and financial incentives, - i’hs&hgh 
(l) Favourable Industrial Environment.
, A favourable environment was provided through growth prompting $ 
measures which operated through the development plans. These measures 
were directed towards the provision of the necessary services essential 
for the operation of a free enterprise economy. It also has been shown 
that the growth prospects presented by these plans, especially the 1962-68 
plan^  were a strong force in attracting foreign private investment into 
the country. - /. '•
1. Federation of Nigeria: Statement on Industrial Policy; Sessional 
Paper No.6, 1964 p.20.
2. Ibid.
4 4 ' 4;$z4 K  f ,4 V $.' 4;4/' 4 \$Hf 4^ -‘v  !■ '4 ' - $  - $  $ ’■' 4 ’ '/4" Vv 4 ^ 44'" 4 4  P  - M 4 4:4 $
■4 4 : Favoui'able Industrial environment/ was also maintained through/the ^ 4 4..
Z adoption of 4 a, clear .and consistent, policy towards foreign capital. Before/
. vy: 4.- 4 1955 there; was no such* policy. The World Bank Mission observed a good ;
44, 4 deal ;of confusion /or/ dilemma among Nigerians ..over/'their attitude towards
4 /foreign investment 4 . On the one hand * there: was a general agreement, on 
: ■4/ the need for such. investment5. on the other hand, however, /Nigerians; 4 •
<; y 4 ; / 4 feared, foreignyexploitation; and there were press hints in Nigeria about .' -
the iiitehtion to, expropriate foreign enterprises after independence.^
44/ . ; Frightened about these attitudes, and in. view of the demand for self- 4 4
:4 4.4 4 : government put forward by Nigerians during, the 1953-54 constitutional 4
4 : ,.v conferences, and the introduction of; t he federal: constitution in 1954#
:4 44;. most foreign investors adopted an attitude of Mwait and see” what . 4 4
r government policy towards foreign capital would be. . 4 / 4
4 / 4444 /TUe dangers of foreign expUt at ion should not be exaggerated. But,
as Professor V#a . Lewis pointed out in a report on the industrialisation 4
4 4  : : of the Gold Coast (now Ghana), ”Miatever the foreigner's faults may be, . 4
4 : 4 -  - the fact remains that the Gold Coast needs him moire than he needs the
4 Gold Coast ... .The Gold Coast cannot gain by creating an atmosphere .
towards foreign/capital which makes foreigners reluctant to invest in
■ 4. . . ; "■ , ■; ■/ 0 * '4.. , 4 4 :/4 4-4' '■ 4 . ” 4'  ’ ' ; ,
. the Gold Coast”. This remark also applies to Nigeria.' If, as the World
l; - . Economic Development of Nigeria, op.cit./ p.29. 4
/ 2; W.A. Lewis, 'Report bn the Industrialisation and the Gold Coast” .
;;:4 4 44.4 Accra, 1953* P*26* ••. 4 . : , .
Bank Mission pointed, out * Nigeria wants foreign capital, she must adopt 
a clear and consistently applied policy designed to encourage it. •/•.;/./
Accordingly, in. July, 195fe» the .following policy statement on foreign '
investment. was -jointly is sued by all the governments of . the federation • ^
”The Governments of t he Federat ion of Nigeria, of the Eastern, Northern, 
and Western Regions and of the Southern Cameroons, recognise that Nigeria 
will,, for many. years to come, need overseas capital and managerial and 
technological skills, if her resources are to be developed to the extent 
which the Governments, and the p'eople of Nigeria desire. They realise Z
that overseas investors will be reluctant, to lend their,capital unless /
they, can be assured that such investment, and the skilled overseas , .
personnel which may be necessary to make it successful, will be welcome.
The purpose of this statement is to give such an assurance”.2 \ 4V'
,4.On the thorny question of nationalisation, the statement continued: 4 
”Our Governments have no plaits for hatipnalising industry beyond the extent / 
to which public utilities are already nationalised, nor do they forsee any 4 
such proposals.arising• Nevertheless, they are anxious that there should 44.  
be no doubt in the minds of overseas entrepreneurs that Nigeria will 
provide adequate safeguards for the interests of investors* in the event 
of any industry being nationalised in the future• Should this occur then 
fair compensations assessed by independent arbitrators would be paid”.^
1. Substantially the same policy statement had been separately issued
, 4 by the Western, Eastern, and Northern Region Governments in 1955 and 1956
2. Opportunities for Overseas Investment in the Federation of Nigeris,
. reprinted in Economic Survey of Nigeria, 1959 > Govt• Printer,Lagos, .
App.8B. / '■ ' 4 4'. .4,-44
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This policy was reaffirmed. on many occasions and assurances given from, 
the very highest levels of . government$ Including th^ minister , that'
stress/ the role : Of i/private ’ehterprise vand restrict .hationalisation" to / $ 4  
public .utilities:^  it was reaffirmed,by one of the eighty-
eight members that approved the U.N. Resolution on .non-nationalisation, . 
expropriation or requisitioning of foreign property except on grounds of 
security, national interest, or public, utility, in which case there must .; 
be 1 appropriate .compensation 4; and both the Independence and the 
.Republican Constitutions provided ;’for;;Aadeguate't compensation ‘ in cases of 
compulsory; acquisition*/44/./: -_4- 4/ '4; 44'-''. 4.:4-.;; •'. :;4.'v-.;
: "While the"above assuranees are elegant on paper, in practice they do 
not mean much for the foreign investor because governments can be over- ; 
thrown and constitutions amended.' Additionally, therefore, the foreign 
investor is more interested in. the underlying political situation, on . , 
Whether the right to nationalise has been exercised,^and if so, how it: 
has been exercised, and on the poiioies and objectives of. political. 
parties and national leaders.4 ; On all these counts, Nigeria offered
1, See Abubakar Tafawa Balewai Nigeria Looks Ahead: Foreign.Affairs.
Vol. 131 1962; Federal Ministry of Information: f,No Nationalisation /
. \ in Nigeria,41961. : Chief Festus :Okotie Ebohi Parliamentary Debates, 4 
House of Representatives, March 21, 1964.
2. : The Independence.Constitution, i960 Section 30; The Republican
: z Constitution, 1963*Section 31 •: 4 r / ' -4. 4 ' ; 4
43* : Nigeria has4effected three nationalisations, since Independence -.air-. 
v; ;: lines, shipping and- external communications. In all cases evaluation of 
assets was m a d e  by third parties and the price duly paid; In the case 
4 of external communications only majority interest was acquired by the ;
. 4 Government. - 4 '. 4, .444 :. ■ 44 - : • '  ‘
4* Leader of opposition in the House also declared against nationalisation 
- 4 4 without adequqte compensation, see No Nationalisation. op.cit♦
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a favourable environment for the foreign investor*
Before the military disruption of 1966* Nigeria enjoyed a high,. 
reputation among foreign investing countries as far as political stability 
was concerned* Speaking in support of. the .1958/59 Appropriation Bill in 
the Federal House of Assembly in March, 1959* Mr L.C* Baldry, an ex­
patriate Special Banking Member, declared: "I wish to state publicly that 
X believe this present Federal Government is the most, stabilising influence 
in Nigeria today. I believe that it is doing and will continue to do. 
everything in its power to create just those, favourable conditions of . 
calmness, stability, and confidence11 necessary for foreign investment and 
economic development* This declaration from banking circles on the spot 
would, on its own^  alone, be a powerful influence on'foreign investors; 
but it was reinforced by another similar statement by a team of experts 
from the.Rockefeller Bros Funds in the course of their market studies 
in Nigeria. /.Reporting on the Possibilities for Cigar Leaf and Cigar 
Production in Nigeria, the team declared: "Climate: A stable and conser­
vative government has given Nigeria a reputation as having the best climate 
for foreign investment in. Africa. That political stability, implying 
safety of capital from arbitrary expropriation, has been a powerful factor 
influencing.the foreign investor1s choice of Nigeria over other countries 
is illustrated in Hakanfs study where this was mentioned 52 times by the 6$ 
firms he interviewed.
1, . : Parliamentary Debates: House of Representatives* March .1959 P*515*
2* . Rockefeller. Bros Funds: Report on the Possibilities of Cigar Leaf
and Cigar Production in Nigeria: TJ*S• Embas sy, A.I.B* sect ion, London 
code 3/22/00262. ■ " '
3* A.N. Hakam op.cit* p.54*
In addition to political stability aand security of foreign capitalr 
Nigeria also.pffered financial stability and the freedom of foreign investors 
to repatriate their .capitalor profits,-although it; was hoped that they . 
Jfould reinvest ;-at.2?eas0nable/percenWge of net prof its after.taxes^ in the 
same or other enterprises in Nigeria and. that only; a minimum proportion of 
capital 'and; prof it would need to be repatriated-*1;  ^In; factv of ficial policy 
in Nigeria, is -generally, .opposed to exchange or physical controls:; such as 
those thatexisted;in;the ;1950?S* >j'fe^ ressihg?,his. reluofance to re.impose - 
such controls ,•• the late Federal Minister; of Finance, . Chief Festus /Okoiie • 
Ehohu, in his ;.Mobilisation Budget, in; 19.62*. stated; that “there can be. no 
doubt' thaf; the p^gfessive :dismaritiing of;;our p^sical controls 
past few years,'; and.the(Jliberal policies: edopted towards fhb f ew controls 
which remain^h^evplayed a.rnegor role in confidence in our. morsbary 
stability- They have contributed to the creation; of a olimatev conducive 
to, the;hhahnelling of .dome'st.io.:aayihg^ -.into, -productiTO and to the
inflow of foreign capital into the public and private sections of the 
bcqhon^’lvVIfwould tpthrow away these hard-won; advantages -
Should^:balance ;pfe: payments ;press^es:,priae* it wiil 'therefore^he the policy ; 
of the Federai^ GbveriUrtent to-;.seek, to; contain them by "the more;flexible fiscal 
and monetary means; by:;selecfiveitariff/increases, the tempo *
of domestic ^ savings,. overall hudget policies and by the Vuse of the . monetary
VVv.V-A:, :;v ’I=• ‘i'vvIvl "I- ’
weapons, increasingly available to the Central Bank-
1. Statement on industrial Policy op-cit- p-2-
2. Six Budget. Speeches, of the Fed- Minister of Finance- op-cit- p-145«
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The above does, not mean that Nigeria had no: exchange, control 
regulations- ; In fact, under the Exchange/Control Act, 1962, the Minister ; 
of Finance^ had authority to institute controls over, all foreign-exchange 
. transactions, b oth sterling and non-sterling• ^ .But this . was regarded as.; 
a contingency measure, likened “to the fire extinguisher which the prudent 
/ man keeps in hisfactory. for use only in an e m e r g e n c y . The Finance ;
. '• - i.Minister ptated quite emphatically that .physical controls would be
.introduced only in the; lastr resort when all other measures have failed. .
:; Instead/of introducing new restrictions, he. aimed at liberalising those that:
; ; ; existed-- . • ''.®.:.' . . ./ ■ /Ir ' '\v./
Thus Nigeria had exchange.control regulations but they were in 
, reserve only to be used as a means of last resort . It would, indeed, be _
surprising if she had none, for they have been demonstrated, at least i// 
in the post-war European recovery program, ; to be. necessary concomitants . ; : //
. of economic growth; when scarce resources must be carefully husbanded and 
who large capital, formation.^ 'is required. "Of greater /interest to the ,
' ; investor than the power to impose-controls, which exists almost everywhere 
: "as v1 reservef legislation, Or thmi 'the . presence ,.of contfbls, are-the ; ;
factors, that may lead or have led to activation. Of standby statutes.; •'-■■v;
Are exchange- controls -looked Upon and used as monetary tools that help 
; to allocate resources? ; Have they been used as nlast-ditcli“ manouvres to 
rectify irresponsible fiscal action somewhere further up the line?. ' , : .
Before 1 962 this authority was .in respect of. non-sterling transactions
V-.V .• • . ; o n l y . . ; . ‘ / '. ■ ' •• ; ; ' ',•/'
; 2. Ibid. .■/'=;./•/', ;
ibid. \.V\. ; • ■ ■ ' V ' - V .  :.
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Is careful consideration given in the statements of government leaders 
and central banks,:to the nation’s foreign exchange position? Are 
development plans centred bn; wealth-producing capital-investment, oh 
;prestige items that do not produce wealth, or on social, programs (however 
desirable) -that require increasing - current' expenditure?1--
“Hgppily, Nigeria can be counted;among.• the* developing nations that / . > 
have demonstrated, a' high degree of fiscal responsibility* Its leaders, in . 
their statements and in the; 1962-6.8 Tiah, reflect .a maturity in this . . * ; 
:respect that might well be emulated by others. The power is there to 
impose controls>and .one cannot argue with the;wisdom and necessity of that* 
;;d?heoMllihgness5 tbimpose/them, if necessary, is a,ls6 there* But it has;
,i been made clear again; and again that control legislation will be brought 
out'of reserve bnly if other monetary measure; and self ^policing, on the 
part of Nigeriahs and .aliens: doing business there; fail*' * This f inancial 
: stability-and the;freedom .to convert currency readily was highly significant; 
’vin;;attracting, foreignprivate -investment into- Nigeria.; In the .Hakan survey» 
z itwas'm^ foreign investors: as a reason for choosing - ,
V Nigeria over other countries, such tas ;Ghana* ■' f
. •;{:;TheV.tbird>;f actor''-which helped: to; create the favourable industrial
environment was provision of industrial:,.estates•* The World Bank Mission, 
/found- in 1954;:thdt owing principally to the confused land laws in Nigeria, , ; 
the, foreign; investor would find it very difficult to acquire land for ..; / '
; f gbt'ory-•sites/;>and that even if he succeeded in acquiring ,land, he would -fV;'V
1. P*Q;; Prbfihli"Foreign llnterpriae in Nigeria* haws & PoliciesV University
of North Carolina Press, U.S.A. 1965iP*129* ; . ; :
,2. Ibid. ; ..' .i/'-':..,'* : - *'■/■- ■-;/;'
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be: very reluctant t.o; build a factory, himself because of uncertainties 
about Nigeria* s political future. The Mission pointed out that these 
difficulties were not restricted to the foreign investor; they also 
affected indigenuous investors, for:many desirable African industrial 
. enterprises were handicapped by scarcity of suitable building space to rent* 
It was. difficult, enough for the/small industrialist . to raise capital ibr . 
machinery and a working capital; if land had to be purchased and a 
factory built, the,total investment would often, prove prohibitive• , Tp 
remedy the situation the Mission strongly recommended the. development of :
: "industrial estates”* "Briefly, the, idea, is to provide modem factory 
facilities which can be rented, thus providing assistance to industry 
indirectly from government funds without the embarrassment and risk of 
loss which directvloans to entrepreneurs can so frequently cause”*^   ^ s
. The capital expenditure to implement the above recommendation, is . ;
*fShown in Tables: 5*6 and 3*7 which show the breakdown of 'the planned : V
industrial expenditure during the two. plan periods, 1955-60 and■' 1962-68*
More than £5. 2m has been spent' or ;bomitt'je‘d;Xpr\the provision of industrial, 
.estates in Lagos, East and West. Under the 1955-60 plan only.the 
■ Federal Government; provided for industrial estates and £0.08m was devoted 
for the Yaba:Industrial Estate * Under the 1962-68 Plan, the East and West 
provided for them in the plans; Ibut industrial estates were also established 
in the Worth, although no specific provision for t hem was shown in the 
, development plan* In all, about ,95.0; acres of industrial estates were
:. 1 * .- Economic Development of Nigeria*1 op*eft.=■ pp560-36l*
developed at Apapa, Ioora and Iganmu in the Federal Territory; over 2,100 
acres in the Worth at Kaduna, ;Kano, 2aria, Josllorih, Gusau and 
: Maiduguri; 4>100 acres in the East at Port Harcourt,* Enugu, Aba, Umuahia
, and many other places; 970 acres in the West at Ikeja, Mushin, Illupeju;
. • ; .. ■' \  • l ■ , ; - . - • '
\ and 700 acres in the 'Mid-Western Nigeria* ; These, estates were equipped:
with modern factory facilities, such as light, pipe borne water,
telephones, roads and, where possible, rail sidings. The scheme was
designed to stimulate industrial.development by overcoming, through
governmental powers of land acquisition, the difficulties encountered, by .
private investors in acquiring factory space. . Since the estates were
rented at less expensive rates .than if each industrialist had. provided .
them for himself, the scheme also helped to reduce industrial costs. .
J There is ho doubt that the industrial estate, scheme considerably
improved the industrial environment end attracted foreign investment
in port-oriented industries .in Lagos and Port Harcourt, or in market
oriented industries in Kano, Onitsha and Kaduna. ; But it would be; wrong \
to conclude that these industries were specifically attracted to Nigeria
because of the existence of the Industrial estates. While they no doubt
; facilitated these investments, industrial estates might rather be.regarded
as a powerful locational factor as will be shown in. tho-next chapter,
Chapter 5* :-;-V V . ■, ' • • \ . , •
The fourth factor which helped to create the’ favourable industrial 
environment is information.: The. infrastructure may be there; the country 
.' may be. potentially rich in resources ^ opportunities, for investment may
: 1. Fed. Ministry of Information, Lagos: Industrial Directory, 3rd ed.
. , 1965. P.54v ; ' -V-
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abound; and the environment may be favourable. But if the foreign 
investors do not know, or are not made aware of them, not. much will be V 
' achieved. This was the position in Nigeria for a long time. The World .
.: Bank Mission found dbhat .one . of . the;'great impediments to Nigeria’ s
*, development was ignorance of the country.1 s potential resources. : Owing
to the Mission * s recommendation, the Federal Institute of Industrial 
.: Research was established at Oshodi underthe 1955-60 development plan
at-a cost of £0.59Pm*; ..'lhe Eastern ,Hegioh;Government, also.^provided
. £057m for.industrial research during the period. ; These research projects ;
:; were designed.- to investigate the commercial properties of some of Nigeria*s.
, raw: materials' and to make their findings available: to the Government, and,, 
at a; cost, to prospective: investors. . ; ?:;v . .!• ; - .;••;
- , In additioh,Advisory Committees were set,up in the. various ministries 
; of commerce and industry to advise prospective investors,add the; = 
c.'; industries sections of the Ministry were empowered to ■undertake pilot;
industrial projects, and if feasible, to interest; foreign concerns in their 
.. commercial exploitation. Industries;established in;this way include the :
: Nigerian Canning Compaaiy, .1955V &ndtheNigeria;Marine/Und Hinginearing; .
. .Company. Ltd, i960. ; .These. were previously developed as pilot pro j ects : .
. by the Northern Ministry: of Trade and industry and were later transferred 
to; private companies; with -foreign participation for commercial : ; . -
V v e x p i o i t a t i ^ ^  ; v  - v ^  ; ;  ■'
■. As for the survey .of Nigeria* s resource potentials, the World Bank's
Mission report had already provided a blue print for. Nigeria * s future
deyelopi^ In f^ty ;the;^ Report; was ,t^vfirdi: attempti;at; u plan for, .
-, Nigeria sufficiently broad- to review; ndt only, all the services of ■ . :; ^
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Government but also to take into apcouirfc all likely available revenue : -
sources. yyThefpepdrt was. supplemented by; the Economic Survey of Nigeria.'! : ;
; published in 1959 by the National Economic Council "to; show the present
'• position and outlook of the national 'economy; and to' survey developments: . -Py
. in the ecohoray since the ehd of the War, to assist the co-ordination of y!
. governments1 [development plans and economic policies, and to serve as a; ■ ■
: •/ V guide to biisinessmen, b oth Nigeria and overseas.Besides , a team of :
the A.D* Little Company /attached to yfche;^ FederaTyMihistry of Commerce : ? yy; y. 
and Industry under the U.S.A.I.I). contract has made a survey, to; determine 
; ;. immediate investment .opportunities. - The list they produced includes . *'; •
: hundreds of items that possibly can prof it ably be manufactured in Nigeria,
v .such ass peahut butter,: shoes, clothing, storage batteries etc. The -. 1 ;>
.: ' Queen's visit to; Nigeria in 1956 had already placed Nigeria, on the world
: . ; map by atiiacting videVpublicity and; arousing great interest; abroad about- .
: ;Nigeria. . To f urther y^ bliiSis.e the country, its development plans and
; investment opportunities, the East in 1955, the West. in 1956, and the :
y.y... Federal Government and the East. again in 1961 undertook worldwide economic vy
;> : missions with -a view to attracting foreign investment to the country. " ,
y • It is beyond doubt that the various .measures outlined above V y. y: .:
; y yy ; y y immensely ; succeeded-in breaking the barriers of.■ignorahCeabroad about - yv :, . y 
y y Nigeria * s potentialities and investment opportunities. That such ignorance ;: 
;y yy-; existed is,not surprising; but its extent is amazing. For instance, i t /
y yy y ; ; 1. y ■ The Nigerian Handbook of Commerce &' .'Indus trie s, Fed. Min. of • Informa- ,y
; . .: - y •: tion, Lagos, 1962, p.51* y ■ y/v.- ■  ^y-y,y . ■.: y- .: ; y / •
was said that by 1954> the average .American's conception of Africa is 
not beyond such highly successful'motion pictures as the African Queen; ^
. .'■ / • ;; . ■ :■ ’ ■' i . • ■ ;
the SnOws of Kilimanjaro; King Solomons Mines etc. "I did not know", 
wrote Mr.Grove Patterson "that Nigeria has within its.borders practically 
all the minerals man needs from the ordinary coal to gold and uranium.
I did not1 know that already it has some great industries and offers an 
astonishing future for capital investment.
. Commenting on the achievements of the 1961 Economic Mission, the 
late Federal Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie Eboh^told the 
Federal House'of Assembly; "I . can say without any hesitation that the 
Mission succeeded in generating widespread interest in the many investment 
opportunities which exist in Nigeria. The Mission held discussions with . 
commercial and industrial interests in 'all.the countries visited. All of 
us in the Mission were surprised, by the ignorance which still exists 
overseas of investment, opportunities in Nigeria. We were.therefore at 
great pains during our journey to expand upon these opportunities, for 
investment...! feel sure that, as a; result of the Mission's work in the 
commercial and industrial fields, we may confidently expect a.great 
increase in the number and substance of foreign investors in Nigeria in
the near future...there is no doubt in my mind that the mission has
; ■ 3proved an unqualified success". -
1. G.U. Meniru: Africa-American Co-Operation. Libertarian Press New 
Jersey, 1954 PP • 12-14•. . . .
2. Ibid. Appreciation^/Grove Patterson, Editor-in Chief of Toledo 
Blade, Toledo, New Jersey.
3» Parliamentary Debates; Federal House of Representatives, 25th Aug.
1961 pp..63-64.
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On concrete achievements, the Western Nigeria Economic Mission
reported in 1956 that "during the Mission!s tour, negotiations were started
or concluded on'15'major industrial projects in its specific aims and
objects, the Mission achieved considerable success. It has helped to
widen considerably the sources of supply of technical and financial
assistance available to the Region. It has made known the Regionfs
economic aspirations and investment possibilities to the widest range
of interested parties, including not only industrialists and potential
technical partners, but also those organisations best placed to stimulate
1the flow of investment capital to the Region*11 
Industrial Environment: Conclusions
The above pages have attempted to give a picture of the type of 
environment in which foreign investors had t o operate in Nigeria between 
1955 and 1965- This favourable environment for industrial investment 
was created by official growth promoting infrastructural development plans 
supx^lemented by considered and calculated public pronouncements and 
economic missions to acquaint foreign investors with the immense potentials 
and investment opportunities in Nigeria and to boost their confidence in 
the political and financial stability of the country, Erom the foreign.
1. Report of Western Nigeria Econ. Mission, March-April, 1956, PP*7-8*
.investor’s point of view, "by far the most important single element in 
the industrial environment was the freedom to bring in and take out 
his capital and profits from1 Nigeria. In a lecture'- on - the Growth of ; .
West African industry given at a joint lunch meeting of the Royal African 
‘ Society and -the Royal; Commonwealth Society on June 2 19-66» by Sir Francis 
Turton Hart, K.B.E., Chairman. of Dorman Long (Ghana) Ltd, and Chairman 
of Dorman Long and Amalgamated Engineering, Ltd, Nigeria, and one, time 
member of;the Federal House of Representatives in Nigeria and President ,
, of Nigerian Chamber of Commerce for many years, I. asked him which of.
the government’s incentives matters most for the foreign investor.
/ Sir,Francis replied• "I do .not, think that one .individual one could be.
said to be the most important because it depends terribly on the type;
; of manufacturing. unit... But if I: was afeked to guess. I would eav - the ;
ability to; bring your money in and out is the most important thing to all
manufacturers and investors  ^. . The extent to which this: and other items 
in the industrial, environment contributed to- attracting foreign 
; manufacturing ••investment; into Nigeria during the period has ’been , ,
indicated in; the: text above.' 1 J
I,;-;'./ Sir Francis Turtoh-Hare: "The Growth of West. African Industry. -1
African Affairs Vol.65 Oct. I966. p.287.; Underlining mine.
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Tax and tariff Incentives
It was shov?n: In Chapter One that, although tax concessions became 
available from July 1951 under the Aid to pioneer Industries Ordinance 
of 1952, it proved to be an ineffective incentive to attract foreign 
investment. The reason was principally the Government’s narrow 
interpretation of the /Ordinance and . the postponement of positive 
industrial decisions pending the receipt of the report of the Mission 
of the Worlds Banki It was also due to the' limitations of the Ordinance 
which have been noted. It was because of these limitations that the 
World Bank Mission advised that the provisions in the Ordinance would 
have to be periodically reviewed* ' ;
Thie review was .undertaken' by a. Committee appointed in 1956* to 
"recommend to ;the Federal Government the general principles which should, 
govern the relief of local industries from payment;of customs duties 
on imported materials; a decision as to whether any particular local ;. 
industry should.be granted relief in respect of import duty on the 
raw materials.itiuses and/or protection in the form of an increase of 
import duty on equivalent finished goods manufactured abroad; and the 
method by which relief should be granted"* ^
The Committee reported that the Federal Government should take 
positive steps to stimulate .the.industrial development of Nigeria, in . 
particular through affording relief from import duties on materials
1 * Statement of Policy proposed by the Fed* Government on the Report by.
■ a Committee appointed to advise on the stimulation of Industrial 
. ; Development by affording Relief from Import Duties and the Protection 
: to Higerian Industry* Sessional Paper No.10 1956, p*l*
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essential to industry and ‘through he adoption of protective measures - 
. where necessary.- Assistance,', however, was not to be afforded indiscrimin­
ately but pnlyLtb- encourage.the development of the industries which;
.1 would be advantageous to Nigeria1 and which appeared 1 ikely to be able, 
to stand on their own feet eventually. , It stressed that the fundamental 
aim; of any assistance was to be to stimulate the growth of Nigerian 
■ industry by enablingittocompete;;onequal terms with comparable ,.
■ imported products or to;provide services at competitive prices.^
; i; The above recommendations, were substantially embodied in four Acts .
subsequently enacted by the Federal Government.' These werei The.' ; .
■- ;Industrial Development (income Tax) Belief. Act, ,1958? The Industrial 
Development. (Import Duties Relief) Act, : 1957» The Customs Duties. (Dumped 
and Subsidised Goods Act, 195®) s the Customs ^Drawback) Regulations, 19535 l 
and the Income Tax (Amendinent 3 Act 1958* -"I :'o : ? f •
: '• The object of the Ihdiistrial Development ■ (Income' Tax Relief) Act; was
;to extend and liberalise; the provisions of the Pioneer Industries ■ ; •
‘ ..Ordinance;of 1952 > the primary object of which was to encourage the 
deveIox)ment or establishment of such industries as the Government might , 
.from time to time consider to be beneficial- to Nigeria, and to which • : i 
; assistance would be in the public interest.. ■ It offered tax relief in the 
.first, place • for a period of two year’s to qualifying; companies, provided 
that a minimum/capital expenditure^ of £5/800 was ixicurred on fixed assets
1. Report of the Committee . to advise t he Fed. Govti on the stimulation of 
. IliQustrial- Development by affording Relief from .Import Duties and 
Protection to Nigerian Industry. Lagos 1956 pp. 1-2. 1 '/..V.
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before production commenced. If, by the end of the two years, the amount 
of:qualifying capital expenditure incurred amounted to £15*000, relief 
would be extended for a further two years; and, if. by the end of that 
.extended period, the total capital reached £50,000, another year would be 
added. A final year, making a total of five years In all, would be given 
if the qualifying capital expenditure reached £100,000 at the end of the. 
fourth year. .Losses would be carried forward and for each accounting year 
for which a loss was incurred, the tax relief period would be extended by 
the same period. The tax holiday extended to the shareholders of the 
pioneer company for profits earned during the tax relief; period whether 
distributed during, or after, the expiration of the period.
Even after the expiration of the tax holiday period, tax liabilities 
\. would, still be. kept low for the pioneer , company under the Income - Tax .
. .(Amendment) Act of 1956. This granted accelerated depreciation allowances
for all companies whether incorporated or not, and replaced and liberalised 
the original income tax act of 1952. Under the 1952 act., no deductions 
' were allowed for machinery, and annual deductions were at a rate of ■5 
V The new act granted initial deduction of 40$ on machinery and increased
the rate of annual deductions to 15$. On buildings of. all. types the
annual write-off is 10$; and on mines it is. based on the rate of . 
exhaustion of, the particular mineral deposits involved within a minimum ,
of 15$. ■ /' :v; V" ' : '
. By making relief from income tax possible during the early years 
. of the :publ‘iq ^companies /Engaged/- in pioneer; industries, the Income Tax , --I 
Relief Act was meant to attract foreign capital to Nigeria., Since losses
.could be carried forward up to a maximum period of ten years, it meant that
>"j : " $. ;V: ‘ '7'.' V l v -''/i6i;.V;
; a pioneer ccppanyv could; be in business over a period df-ten years; without
• V f  ; ; ; : payj^g; .any-taxes at all. ; It; was thus possible >to incur Initial losses: v
- '^ \WhiieAthe business,wab being builtUp,; andto postpone profits“to years ; ''■'/-.-V- 
when the the established.' business; Wouifcbe;; expected.;.to be high*
■ ^ fVThe significanceof:theincometax amendment act was that: it granted y ;
, -' companies a. much larger allowance,: to enable them to amortise their I
,;v vv; ; capital ‘assetsv.di«cing.ntheir • £o^ative';;years!,- ^ahd to; build up liquid;
" ^ ; reserves at: an :(eqrly ;date. ;, Again, ^absorbed 1^ carried1 ; : / ;
/ ; ; forward, for -as-long .as ten years.^  ^; \  
:  ^ f : ; These tax ■ concessions f acilitated the establishment of some • ■,
■ v . manufacturihg - indiistribsw ; 0?he incentive .to bepioneer ■ for; industries
wac;found -to .beparticularly:strong:;tG<pfLr:^the potential: foreign-investor 
toward Nigeria :frqm;;ahy"otherpossible; veh^  66
industries; had-.been declared;pioneer^under the - Pioneer;^Industries Ordinance ,
. as.: amended,?- 50 of them having been declared pioneer before the amendment 
in 19.58-. The; industries f or. which .the incentive bp; be .pioneer, : the first 
inf he field, was % important inducement, /^ex^ffts, blahkets, modem 
ceramics, ^ tarpaulin, paints-, fertilisers) and sugar.
1. . A;N. Hakam opvcit. • Of the 68 firms he surveyed,- the incentive :to be ,
pioneer was mentioned .28 times as a reasonfbr attracting them tp; ^  
Nigeria*
2• Fed. Ministry of Industries i Industrial Directory. Lagos, op.cit. 40-
Tariff Protection
. In the last chapter it was: shown, that,: althoughupon investigation* 
the .establishment of a modern textile industry: was found to be uneconomic, 
the United" Africa . Company Ltd was nevertheless; willing to proceed, with the 
project if the Government would grant some protection against foreign, 
•Competition*^ ;- ‘Eventually - this'- and another similar project were abandohed 
because of the absence of protective tariff.. Tariff protection for / 
Nigerian manufactures was not, .in fact, available until the passing of/ . 
the Industrial Development (import-Duties Relief) Act, 1957* and the / 
Customs Duties (Dumped and Subsidised Goods Act,) 195® and the Customs^ 
(Drawback) Regulations,.: 1958• \
Under, the Customs Ordinance No; 60 of 1958* imports of raw materials 
not available in Nigeria could enter Nigeria duty free. But under the. 
Industrial Development (import; Duty Relief) Act, 1958 repayment of: import 
duties became, available for materials,imported into Nigeria for use in the 
manufacture or processing of assembling goods or in the provision of 
services. To qualify for such a relief, an applicant had to satisfy the . 
Federal-Government that it was impossible to provide the goods or services 
at low enough prices to compete with the -Imported equivalent; or that the 
imported finished ariicleShave a lower proportion of import duty than the 
materials imported into Nigeria. The Government had also to be satisfied 
that any repayments to be made were to be in the overall economic advantage 
of Nigeria) having, regard to certain criteria.;
1. These include the special need for relief by the company,; the-cost of 
the relief to the economy; and the probable effectiveness of the.- 
proposed measure in encouraging, the development of the industry.
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>’ . '_The;.Customs‘•^ ties,\-(Duihped.' and;•Subsidised Goods) 1 Act; 1958,-. permitted, 
when necessarythe.Imposition;-.of -a. special; duty-on/.any'foreign' subsidised}X 
goods which were being dumped in Nigeria.1, . This. power was - to be sparingly : 
;exercisedyfpr jbefore \dping; spV."the/Government;.had to; be satisfied that ■ 
a material inpury.would be threatened, or caused, to a: potential or ; ;—  
established industry"' in Nigeria, by the entry of .such goods1 and that the . 
imposition of a special duty would; hot conflict with Nigeria1 s interhational 
obligation under the General, Agreement on Trade and Tariff, Further  ^'
.protections was .available;funder; bfe;:Customs(Drawback) Regulations,, 1958,///:; 
^uhderwhich: repayment ^  wouldbe' made inrfull for. re-exported;
goods provided ; they'were're-exported., in the; same condition; as. they were ••;. 
imported. Full import duty repayment was also available if materials 
were imported for. use in the manufacture of goods which were then exported; 
and on paper Imported, for use in the manufacture of educational goods 
where such goods .were;, supplied to recognised educational, establishments. 
Finally under the approved user scheme, approved manufacturers could be . 
permitted to import either duty free or at; a cohcessiohary rate of duty, . 
.certain materials specified in the :Qustoms .Tariff;f or a period not' : ; *
exceeding three years*;- : v : . r
It.is clear, therefore, from the above, that since 1958 Nigeria 
provided an array of protective tariff for her local manufactures, the : 
primary ob jective of which is to stimulate Industrial. development and to 
encourage-foreign private- "investment in Nigerian;;manufacturing by affording 
local protection against competition^^? mahufactured;^Imports. . But this , 
was rightly emphasised to be a. temporary protection.• The following '
government statement makes this clear. *U. .This weapon will be used with
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caution,. .The purpose of protection is not to provide undue profits for \
an indefinite period to the manufacturer at the expense of the consumer, 
nor will, the Government allovr a high, cost industrial economy to he , /,
.built up under the umbrella of .excessive protection, Nigerian products 
must be reasonably competitive with imported goods, not merely so as:to 
.. provide Nigerians with quality goods at fair prices, but also so that. ;
. Nigerian manufactures may compete effectively in, the markets of the world*
We do; not. visualise Nigerian industry as catering only for the domestic 
market, it will increasingly become the supplier of manufactured, goods 
throughout Africa, This it can only achieve if it remains efficient...v; V 
-The significance of Tariff Protection ■
' ■ / " The primary objective,pf tariff protection is; to protect.local// v ;
: mahufactures from foreign competition by bahhing or restricting the ., 
import of goods/similar^ to those locally manufactured so as; to enable; them 
; to gain a strong hold in the dbmestic market. Its efficacy . therefore .
• depends bn the size of the local market and the importance foreign t' \ v; b
manufacturers: attach to. maintaining or. gaining; entry-into that market.
: Generally, twd. classes of prospective investors areaffected by government 
tax and tariff concessions - those who .have long, exported manufactured ; 
/\\;/gobds/inv,.big quantities to the local market, and those who consider it 
/ essential^ to enter or gain a foothold in. that market. ;
•v./V; 1*. The Six. Budget^Speeches of ^the "Federal Minister:of Finance,o p . c i t t
■ ; pp.I4I-142♦ : v ■> ,/vV/'V‘ ';- v . ;‘V  XV:$ ;-'V.
To those who had long had big export business in. manufactures in
the local market, the effect of tariff protection has been described thus:
“Whatever  ^device is used, the effect of (tariff protection*) is to restrict
the import of the particular product into the country. . The company is
then faced with a problem. It has been exporting goods to the country
(from his own country) or possibly from a plant in another country; it
has built up a good market for the product; it is.making good profits.
Suddenly as a result of the government action, the product can no longer
enter the country anc^e sold**. nThe private manufacturer has (therefore)
to decide whether it is better for his product to.be manufactured near
the home of his customers, his traditional export market; can he
maintain his market by using existing manufacturing facilities and
skilled man power in this country; or must he take advantage of his
goodwill and know-how to set up a factory abroad? If he does not
manufacture his product overseas, some one else may* in which case he
1would be in competition with an indigenous manufacturer0, with the 
benefit of the protective tariff in his traditional export market.
For those investors who consider it necessary to gain a foothold 
in the Nigerian market, the tariff measures would pose an immediate 
policy decision. If they postponed investment, it might be too late to 
gain entry at a later date* In the meantime other competitors would 
set up, and, behind the local tariff walls, would make, it all the more 
difficult for others to get in at a future date. Whichever way.the
1. Barlow & Werneri Foreign Investment and Taxation; Prentice Hall 
1955 P.147*
prospective investor decides, it would depend on the importance of the
. domestic market, and,; of course, on the level of tariffs. Unless .the
tariffs are protective enough, he might feel he could, still compete by. 
taking advantages of economies of scale in iiis own country to manufacture " 
and sell in the domestic market. But if the tariffs are high enough and \ ;J 
the market is big, then he may decide to set up a manufacturing plant 
;; in the domestic market before it becomes too late. ‘
On the efficacy of tariff protection to achieve the above positive 
effect, it has been remarked that ’’there can be little doubt but that 
V. tariff relief- for goods which enter directly into manufacturing costs
is one of the most.effective methods of stimulating the growth of local : “•
■ industry. :;It is significant that the Federation of British industries /
/ regards the level. of customs duties to be. the most significant important .
:/ single legislative^ influence/upon the establishment of secondary industries.**,
. v  . ■ The, Nigeriaii tariff measures were very important; in attracting : f 
foreign investment to Nigeria iii,defence of established markets, and to 
gain entry into, the Nigerian market. These will be discussed in the 
■ V next chapter which deals with the importance of the Nigerian market
in .attracting fpreijgn.;private investment to Nigeria during 1955/65*
1. The Report of the Committee on the Stimulation of Industrial ;
Development by affording relief..;. op.cit. p 7. H.E. Hagan observed ; | 
a strong correlation between the anticipation of high protective 
! a duties ahd the decision' to: invest in some LatinsAmerican countries,
especially in those with relatively big domestic markets such as ; 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. c See ’’The Economic Juatlfl.catlon of ; .
! , protectlonismV, Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, ~:
Financial Incentives - .
Another method through which government, policy attracted foreign 
private investment to Nigerian manufacturing during 1955/65 was the . 
provision of financial incentives to stimulate industrial development« 
This Was necessitated by the shortage of indigenous private capital and 
the fact, that most, foreign investors made'Nigerian participation a . 
condition for some of their projects. The East -stated the case for 
these financial incentives; as follows 5v. !,In: view of the present dilemma \ 
(lack of capital and the, urgent demand for rapid economic development) of 
the Region,V it is .crystal clear that the ^Government must take the / 
initiative and play a prominent role* This can be done in many ways:. 
making emergency grants or loans to farmers, enlarging Credit facilities, 
to entrepreneurs, bolstering up business credit, strengthening .banks, •. 
stimulating private, investments) and participating vigorously in economic 
development’*.2 :: /V . ' ' ;
J it: was forthe; above; realsohs that a sum of .£11.6m was provided 
■under the 1955-60 plans arid £81m under the 1962-68 plan, as Tables. 5*6 
and/J.'T above, show. . These, sums were to be utilised in inviting technical 
partners to partbipate in establishing.industries of national iihportancei, 
and for the establishment of development banks, such;as the; Nigerian 
‘;-induCtrial-; ^Deteipi^entr Bank1 Ltd., the; industrial Fihancb. Company of ,
vli '/.The Fed. Republic of, Nigeria, National Development Plan op.cit. 185.
2. The Economic Rehabiliiatioh/bfEastern Nigeria Sessional^ Paper No. 6, 
1955, P*4*' ;  ‘
v.Easterh;'Nigeria htd*,andtheNorthern,Nigeria Investments Ltd. • -through V 
Which; the; government would participate directly or indirectly, in - 
industrial/projects:;; by seeking outVinvestment opportunities and, attracting 
.foreign investors; aiid by providing the Nigerian counterpart of the.
/■■bapitkl'^ .where the foreign investors, so^  desired. The Tables show that, to " :
attain these objectives^the Federal. Governmeht provided about £lm, the .
/North £2m,' and: the West;£8m under the .1955/60 plans;h In the 1962/68 Plan/ ;
/ the Federal. Government, provided nearly £42m, the East £llm, .and..the: West ^
£19m, and the North £9^ * :/'/-- .'\v/;/'/;/ /-'
:The eifectivehess. of the. .above techniqxie is illustrated by the ,.s- 
projects which it helped to establish. , They include^ the Nigerian dement 
factory, at Nkalagu in the East, the £14m oil; refinery, at .Port Harcourt, the *
Nigerian Sugar Company at Bacita and the Kaduna Textiles, also in the
North and a number of plants: in' the .West The list.; is not exhaustive.
The significance of partnerships lies in the fact that Nigerians desire .
/ it as a" source not oniy of capital- but also as a means of being trained., 
in modern industrial management and technology. ;At times too, Government 
; participation.is/the only means of getting the project established.^ The 
Nigerian Cement factory at Nkalagu clearly illustrates this point. Direct 
government participation was not originally contemplated inv.this project •;>/•;/ 
because it appeared that the necessary capital would be forthcoming almost 
entirely from normal commercial circles. The.situation changed, however,
; when, a ,leading cement manufacturer who had originally undertaken to provide;
: about 4C^ i,of the capital withdrew. This presented the Government with a , ,
1. The mechanics of the partnership1 abheme will be examined in ch.6.
difficult .decision to - make • :Xf; it; :refiiseA; pa^Ioipate; 6r;!.was only; 
willing to ;:paxi;ioipaie i t s e l f s m a l l  s c a l e :^ rpi}ect was bound 
to; flopor;be;^stpqned#:; ■;rjliiijd3roi;3Sei?; handy; it ;; j^^ to
inject public;!1 unds in an/untried; pro v;After Satisfactory enquiries,
however j : both the Federal and ;tbe Hegional Governments took, up a majority 
interest;-in .the pro ject^which came into ;productxon m  1957; as the ;
first cement factory in West Africa# . ~
An example of an industrial project attracted into -the country 
through;the initiative of the regional; government: isthe Eastern Nigeria 
Enamel factory, a £100,000‘project established in partnership with 
HongKong Chinese investors #.-.; The Eastern Nigeria Government found that 
Nigeria imported about £2#5^ worth of enamelware every year, from HongKohgV 
It therefore decidedtto interest-manufacturers in'HongKong in the * 
possibilities of ; manufacturing ;?.enamelwares > in /Eastern Nigeria and *,the 
consequent negotiations: resulted-in the establishment of the factory# 
Interestingly, once;in Nigeria,;the HongKong Chinese sported another 
investment opportunity in the manufacture of plastic shoes to be followed, 
by the manufacture of plastic household utensils, aid the £50,000 ,!2enith 
Plastic Industry Ltd” was established with the foreign partner holding 
QOfo interest and the Eastern Nigerian Government holding 2Q/o. Other 
examples of how government participation: helped to attract foreign private 
capital to establish projects which otherwise would’ not have been 
established will be given in Chapter 6#
T. Federal House"of Representatives l ilinisterial Statement bv; the Minister 
of Commerce & Industries^ : Marcfy^ V 1955* ^ 5
2. Report on the 4th Conference of Leading Personalities of Eastern 
'Nigeria Origin, 13-14 3)00,1963, Official Document No-28 of 1964,p#26#
Government Po Ticy: Conclusions -
. The above discussion has shown- that government policy played a very : 
important role; in attracting foreign:priyate investment in Nigerian 
manufacturing during. 1955/65.. This role was through the maintenance of : \ 
pplitical stability and the general freedom, allowed to investors to .bring. t 
in and take out their 'capital and profits, and the assurances given /;
. against • nationalisation1 without adequate compensation.; These measures' : 
singled 'Mgeria out as the safest plabe for foreigii investment in Africa,
; outside ; South Afric&yP ; .,/■-/ .-./ ■.//■-,' l'/"
..Secondly, the government, economic policy in; general; and industrial - 
. policy in particulary‘/as illustrated in the development plans ;and various;' v 
policy :statements * helped to present a favourable TinvestmenV climate , 
through-the provision of \the ^ necessary infrastructure, through, tax and 
other fiscal incentives, and thrpughrthe provision of industrial finance 
. Which made possibie;:the^vestablishment.-of'projectsVWhich otherwise would■; v
have been, uhrealistid* . 7; ■/'. / C/ ■/ . .„•//' '777'7
1 As a/result pf/the . a^ove measures,, government ; policy favourably1 
; influenced • foreig^^ to/.Nigerian^.mkmufac^
1955/65. This’contrasts "with'" the effect of governmentpolicy during , ,
•1959/54 when it was the main factor which inhibited foreign investment, 
as was shpwn in ^hapter .One... Government policy during. 1955/651 of course, 
had;its/negbtiVe  ^dspectd/^ I; Jbi/particular,; government policy limited/;/_ 
iforei^ ppivatd Investment through la^ of adequate/tfdasibility^studies £ /?// 
7and^  centralised: information,: radmihistrative delays,;regional rivalry,, and; 1;; 
'unsound. investments, These .will be/examinedrin the last. Chapter* 1. . /;///,
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; . CHAPTER FOUR 
OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING FOREIGN. PRIVATE IWESTMiJT IN NIGERIAN
mnpfacturing, 1955 - 1965.
INTRODUCTION
The last chapter examined how government policy.influenced the flow 
of foreign private investment in Nigerian manufacturing during 1955-65* 
Other factors which also influenced the Row during the period are the 
Nigerian market, raw materials, and redeployment. These are examined in 
this chapter*
1* The Nigerian Market
Addressing the mission of the Federation of British Industries in 
1961, the Minister of Commerce and Industries, Zanna Bukar Dipoharimaf 
stated that one of. Nigeria1s greatest, assets in attracting foreign 
private investment is her large and expanding market.'*' This claim is 
probably Based on Nigeria’s population of 55*6m (according to the 19&3 
census) which is.. 585^-of the population of all West Africa, and 19$ of 
that of all Africa, as Table 4*1 shows. Thus for every 5 Africans, one is 
a Nigerian, and for every two West Africans, one is a. Nigerian. Based on 
population alone, Nigeria would therefore be’considered the largest single 
market in Africa.
But population alone is not enough. A large population does not mean 
much as .an indication of the. siae of a market if the Gros*Domestic Product
1. Federation of British Industries, Nigeria: An Industriai Reconnaissance, 
P.44*
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is very small# On the other.hand, a small population of about 
with a big CDP cannot be considered a big market# Table 4*2 shows that, 
apart from South Africa and the United Arab Republic, Nigeria had the 
biggest CDP in Africa. Nigeria's GDP of j$3,890 in I963 was 45$ of the 
CDP of all the West African , countries in that year and 63$ of all East . j 
African oountries in i960. In terms of CDP, therefore, Nigeria has ' 
the biggest single domestic market in Africa outside the CAR and South
Africa*   ' '
;This market is also expanding. During the decade, 1950-1960, 
her population grew at a faster annual rate of 2*5$ compared with an 
average annual rate during 1958-64 of 2.3$ in the whole of Africa and 
1*7$ iu the world. While Nigeria's CDP grew by 4$ P*a. during 1950-1960, 
between 1955 and 1965, her total imports, exports, and Federal Government
revenue and expenditure each increased by more than 1 0 0 money supply 
by 86$ and the toimage pf goods handled by her ports by 220$.
Another indication of the growth of the Nigerian market is the 
rate of increase in non-food consumption expenditure compared with 
the rate of increase in fthe expenditure on food items# Generally, at 
low incomes^ people tend to spend a greater proportion of their incomes 
on food. As incomes rise, this, proportion tends to fall and the 
proportion spent on other items, such as manufactured consumer and capital 
goods, tends to rise, although the aggregate food expenditure would rise. 
The rate of increase in the proportion of non-food expenditure is therefore 
a good, indication of an expanding market for manufactured goods. By
1. Calculated, from Nigerian Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1964.
this measure, the Nigerian market is definitely expanding. During 1950" 
i960, expenditure oh non-food items rose faster than expenditure on food. 
While total consumers1 expenditure increased by during the decade, 
expenditure on non-food items increased by 92^ 5 and it was estimated to
■ ■ ' j. ' - . ■ 1 - '
increase by another 80fo be tween I960 and 1972. This would repre sent 
a per capita expenditure of between £8-£ll on non-food items by then.
11 Thus we expect a rapid growth in what we believe to be the major market
* " •• ■ 2 ; ' ' "
for the products of Nigerian industry”.
The consumption of certain key items, was also expanding. Nigerian 
textile consumption, for instance, doubled from 220m square yards in 
1949/51 to 460m square yards in 1959/60 and consumption per head from 
7*4 square yards to 15*4 square yards. During the same period, the
consumption of woven piece goods rose by QOfo from 211m square yards to
3 ■ 'V •
579^ square yeards. The consumption of beer and soft drinks rose from
£8.2m in 1957 to £10m in i960 and was estimated to increase by about
4C$> by 1967 and by QQ$> in 1972.^ Oement consumption increased from
535,000 tons in 1957 to 812,000 tons in i960 and the cement consumption
index from 100 to 148. Although cement consumption was estimated to grow
by about 4$ P*&• to a total of 1.12m tons in 1968, and to about l*3m^ ' tons
li The Industrial Potentialities of Northern Nigeria, Kaduna, 1965, p.55 
2; Ibid* p;
174
in 1972/ by the end of 1965, actual cement consumption was 1.138m tons. 
This is greater than the estimated consumption for 1968. It is thus 
obvious that the estimated consumption for 1972 would be considerably :, 
exceeded. . All these illustrate that the Nigerian market is hot only large, 
but is expanding.
The significance of this large and expanding market lies in the 
advantages of economies of scale which it confers to Nigeria. The large 
market 'will enable her to manufacture certain products more cheaply by 
producing them .in large quantities and thereby spreading the costs over 
a larger number of-units than would be possible in a small market. This / 
is,particularly important for such items as cement and steel, where the 
minimum economic size of. plant tends to be big. It has, for instance, 
been estimated that the manufacturing cost per ton of cement is $28*7 An 
a plant with an annual capacity of 50,000 tons; but if the capacity is 
increased to/1.8m tons p.a., the manufacturing cost per ton drops to , 
^13.9. Similarly while, the manufacturing cost per ton of steel for a 
steel plant with a ..Capacity of 50,000 tons per annum is estimated at 
$209, in a steel plant capacity of-. 1m tons p.a., the manufacturing cost 
per ton; drops to $12?. In the manufacture of products such as these, . 
therefore, a large market, such as Nigeria has, is obviously at an 
advantage over a small market.
However, three factors.have operated to limit Nigeria’s effective 
size as a single market. The first is her low per capita income which
1. United Nations: Economic Bulletin for Africa Vol IV,Jan.19^4,P»53-•
2. Ibid. The reduction in costs appears in all the major items on, 
the cost as the following Tablefcb'4& s s h o w . J t e # .  -
175
is among the lowest in the world. As Table 4*2 shows, Nigeria*s per 
capita GDP of j^ 71 in 19&3 was only about one third that of either Ghana 
or Ivory Coast, or Algeria, and about an eighth of that of Libjja. - Within 
Nigeria, per capita income is not uniform; it is greater in the South than 
in the North* With a higher ratio of population per square mile in the 
South than in the North, this means that not only the market but also the 
effective demand for most items is concentrated in the South.
The second factor is the great distances involved especially
between the South and the North and within the North. The North is about
700 miles away from the coast in Lagos and^ it costs more in railway
freight to transport some items from Lagos to Kano in the North than the
sea freight from Europe or North America to Lagos. These transport
limitations have tended to divide the Nigerian market for some items into,,
a "Northern*1 market, and a "Southern" market; and it is suggested that
where manufacturing is based .on imported raw materials, it would be
limited to the Northern market since the additional freight costs would
make the resulting product uncompetitive with a similar product
1
manufactured in the South. .
While physical barriers have thus subdivided the Nigerian market 
into two, the political structure, in effect, divided it into four 
separate markets. Nigeria is a federation made up of four strong and 
largely autonomous regions and a relatively weak centre. Constitutionally,
1. For a more, detailed discussion of these, factors, see the negt,chapter
on the location of manufacturing in Nigeria.
industry is a concurrent subject on which both the regions and the centre
can legislate. Although inter-regional trade is a federal subject,.the
North nevertheless, imposes a lOfo duty on all cotton "exported11 for use in
textile mills in Nigeria located outside the North. Besides, as the 1955
mission of the Federation of British industries found out, “the division
between the regions created great uncertainties for the future of trade
and industrial development. Should the Fast and the West seek to dominate
Nigeria, the North might demand complete separation and vice versa... In
examining industrial possibilities, the potential British investor would
therefore be wise to think in terms of relatively small units each drawing
its raw materials from, and supplying its finished products to, the
Region in which it operates* because of the possibility of rival plants
1
being established in other regions'1. - This is what, in fact, hgd happened.
While transport costs would, in any case, have necessitated the establish-
in
ment of separate cement plants in most of the regions,/such items as 
textiles where transport costs do not constitute a very high proportion of 
total Gosts, it would have been more economical to establish two or three 
large textile mills to serve the whole Nigerian market. However, by the 
end of 19^5* each region had at least a textile mill and there were 16 
integrated textile mills within the country.
It is thus seen that although Nigeria has a large and growing
1. Federation of British Industries: Report on a visit to Nigeria and the
Gold Coast. 1955* pp.4-10*
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internal market, its significance is limited by low per capita income
which is higher in the South than in the North, and by transport and
political considerations which, in effect, sub-divided the market into
four separate units. Thus, for some items, Nigeria would not be
reaping the full advantages of economies of scale which would have
accrued to her if she had.had an integrated market*
The effect of Nigeria*s market in attracting foreign 
manufacturing investment
Despite the above limitations, however, foreign investors regard
Nigeria’s market as. potentially larger than, any other market in Africa.
The market has therefore been a powerful factor in attracting foreign
private investment, to Nigerian manufacturing. 56 of the 68 firms
surveyed by A.H. Hakan in 1966 mentioned it as a factor which influenced
1 .
their choice of Nigeria over other countries. The prospects of exports 
to neighbouring African countries also influenced the foreign private 
investor’s choice of Nigeria. In this case,the advantages of her poten­
tially large 'internal .market were enhanced by her central geographical
location among smaller countries east, west, and north of Equatorial 
2
Africa. Foreign investors accordingly viewed Nigeria as a convenient
■ -. to
and economic, base from which to manufacture and supply/these other . 
smaller countries. Indeed, it was hoped that in the event of an African 
or West African Common market, Nigeria would become the "workshop" of 
. West Africa or indeed of all Africa.
1. A.H. Hakan, op.cit. p.53»
2*. Nigeria lies wholly within the,tropics, between the fourth and 14th 
parallels north of the Equator, and between the 2nd and 15th meridians 
east of Greenwich. On three sides, the west, the north and the east, 
Nigeria is bounded by French speaking Africa, Dahcmey in the West,
. the Cameroons in the East .and Nigeria in the North. a* ^
The above,point was made dear to the mission of the Federation of .
British Industries by the Federal Minister of Commerce and Industries
in 1961. He pointed .out that" investors should not look to Nigeria’s
market as restricted to the boundaries of. Nigeria alone. "With the
increasing awareness of the advantages of larger economic groupings ■*
which is emerging in the World today, the time may not be too far distant/
when the emergence of a West African.Customs Union becomes an established
fact. 33y this I do not mean to imply that any specific negotiations to - j
this end are either in progress or contemplated, but I think it,is true to
say that this is the way that men’s minds are moving. The consequences
of such an economic grouping.need no emphasis from1 me. One thing Is
especially clear and that is that Nigeria may well have the opportunity
of becoming the industrial centre of the whole of this part of Africa".
of
The FBI mission observed/this aspiration: "She speaks with a good deal of 
certainty about the prospects of establishing within ten years a West 
African Customs Union of which she would be a member. In sum we think 
that (she) means to surge forward with economic growth, and can succeed 
in doing so. We feel,sure that as this proceeds,, we shall see the 
cumulative consequences that have already been demonstrated in other 
countries". Other foreign investors stlso saw this as a strong possibility
4
and it influenced their choice of Nigeria over other countries.
-H Federation of British Industries: Nigeria. An Industrial Reconnaissance,
I96I p.44.
2. Ibid. p.5*
3. Ibid.
4. See: A.H. Hakan op.cit. p.53, and P.O. Proehl op.cit. p.126.
Nigeria^ was among 12 West African countries which early in May 1967 
signed a declaration to establish a West African Common Market.
■ - . , \ 179
While Nigeria’s large domestic market, her central geographical
location and the prospect of a West African Customs Union favourably
• : • ; . j.
influenced the choice of Nigeria over other countries, the immediate
decision to invest in Nigeria was due to the fear of losing their export.
market; ill Nigeria. The most important aspect that induced such a fear
was the various incentive laws and tariff restrictions: made by the
Nigerian government to encourage the manufacture of goods previously 1
imported to Nigeria. These measures were examined in the last chapter.
Their effect was to restrict the import of certain goods and to make them
uncompetitive with similar goods manufactured in Nigeria. These
restrictions presented the prospective foreign investors in Nigerian
manufacturing with atr immediate decision. This affected two classes, of -
prospective investors - those who had previously exported to Nigeria, and
those who wanted to get into the Nigerian market for the first time*
Those who wanted to get a foothold in the Nigerian market felt that
if they delayed the deoision to invest in local manufacturing in Nigeria, ,■
Nigerian government’s continued Restrictions on imports might make it:
difficult, if not impossible, for them to get in at a later date*
Moreover, a major competitor might get in. first and, protected by all
the government1 restrictions, would be better able to supply the Nigerian,
market. This factor was mentioned 5,8 times by the 68 firms surveyed by
1 p
Hakan and 15 times by the 26 manufacturing firms surveyed by R.S. May.
It concerns particularly, those international firms who, have a strategy of
1* Op.cit.
2. Op.cit.
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investing in key global areas and who saw, or were convinoed that Nigeria 
is a fkeyf area* Frequently mentioned reasons in this connection include 
the aim to expand sales into a new market otherwise difficult by just 
exporting, or to forestall a major competitor's move or possible move into 
the Nigerian market; or as a result of the parent company's strategy of 
investing in key global areas and convinced that Nigeria is a very 
important area, felt that it may be too late to gain entry profitably 
into the market if the decision were postponed too long.
For those prospective foreign private investors who had long 
exported to Nigeria, the restrictions imposed on.imports into the 
Nigerian; market and the incentives provided for local manufacturing 
threatened them with the prospect of losing their export market in 
Nigeria. They were therefore faced with an important and immediate 
decision. If they did not invest in local manufacturing in Nigeria 
other competitors would, and these would be protected behind tariff walls 
in Nigeria. Most of these prospective investors, therefore decided 
that rather than hese the Nigerian market for their exports, thus 
yielding to competitors, it would be better to utilise their good 
knowledge of Nigeria and its market and their past good commercial ■ 
relations to establish local manufacturing to safeguard their established 
market in Nigeria. The effect of this consideration in attracting 
foreign investment into Nigerian manufacturing is illustrated in the
fact that it was mentioned 60 times by the 68 firms surveyed by Hakan
■ 1 
as a main consideration in their choice of Nigeria over other countries.
1. Op.cit.
■J
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An additional motive is that by establishing local manufacturing they 
would also be able to export capital goods for the plants since these are 
hot yet manufactured in Nigeria. <.
, It is thus seen that foreign private investors have invested i5^ 
Nigerian manufacturing in order to defeat or jump Nigerian tariff \ 
restrictions by securing or maintaining a foothold in the Nigerian market* 
There is nothing new here: it has been the experience in many other 1 
; countries• As G. Wilson observed in the history of the Unilever, \
"foreign'tariffs had much to do with the changing character of the !
■ . ■ i
British export of capital about 1900. Britain had been exporting capital) 
for the best part of a century. But now British investment in commercial anc 
industrial manufactures began to grow as it had never done before" Of -
the firm itself, Wilson wrote: "The story of Lever’s European development
. * 2  ^
is largely concerned with attempts to defeat the tariff legislator". 3)t
' ’ ; ■ ' 1 ■ " ■ 
might, indeed, be equally said that the story of the expansion of foreign
private investment in Nigerian manufacturing is the story of attempts byj "
foreign investors to defeat the Nigerian tariff legislator*'
It is noteworthy that this reaction to gain a foothold or to
defend the established market in Nigeria did not become significant until
after Nigeria’s Independence in i960. For non British investors this was
understandable. As Table 4*5 shows, a large proportion of Nigeria’s
imports comes from the United Kingdom. In 1950 this proportion was 60J&;
1. , C. Wilson, The History of Unilever, London 1956, Vol.l p*99*
2* Ibid* p.192. .
182
by 1959 it was 455^ compared with 1 ®p/q from the. European Economic Community, 
1-1J& from Japan,:and only 47? from the United States* With such a small .. 
proportion of imports so thinly spread over so many countries, there was; 
in effect, no market for these countries to 1 defend1 in Nigeria. They :
could, of coursefhave invested to expand this tradei but* two factors,
limited the scope for such expansion in Nigeria before i960.
. The first was lack of adequate knowledge of the investment ; \
opportunities existing in Nigeria. Both the World Bank Mission to Nigeria 
in 1955 and the American Investment Mission in 1957 stressed this point.
As we pointed out in the last chapter, it was in .1955 'that the East and 
the West , sent out their investment missions to Europe, North America .and V 
Japan to make the investment opportunities in Nigeria known to prospective 
investors. This was later supplemented by a strong economic'mission sent  ^
out by the Eederal Government,, followed by many return missions, the 
first American economic mission to visit Nigeria being in 1957* All I
these missions helped to bring Nigeria’s potential investment opportunities
to the attention of potential foreign,non British investors. /
The second factor was the general:restrictions imposed on dealings 
with non-Sterling Area countries before 1959* in 195T* the Nigerian 
Government undertook to restrict the import of certain goods from non- 
sterling area countries in the interest of the Sterling Area. These 
included beer from. We stem Europe and textiles from Japan. On the other
1. See Chapter 1 p.
hand, as a part , of the ’'dollar1' policyf investment from the United States 
was notta be allowed unless the project would give a net earning or net 
saving of dollars' or was of such economic benefit to Nigeria as to justify 
the loss of the dollars involved; and it was found that no project existed 
'which would attract normal American investment and also be a net dollar 
earner or saver* As long as these restrictions obtained, it was difficult 
for investors from these countries to invest to defend or expand their 
markets in Nigeria* ^
It is thus seen that, owing to their small exports to Nigeria and' 
their.littlb contact with, and knowledge of Nigeria, and the general 
restrictions imposed in the interest of the Sterling Area, little foreign1 
private investment, came from non-Sterling Area countries before I960 to 
talee advantage of Nigeria’s potentially large and expanding market. By 
. i960, however, the position had begun to change* , Four incentive laws were 
passed in 1957/58 t;o attract foreign,private investment and encourage and 
protect local manufacturing. With the return to convertibility in 
January, 1959» the general restrictions placed on imports and investment 
from non-Sterling Area countries became .unnecessary and were removed or 
relaxed. Although import restrictions were imposed, from time to time 
(especially &n imports from Japan) they were specifically in the inheres' 
of Nigeria’s balance of payments and not necessarily that of the Sterling :, 
Area* The requirement that a project must be a net earner or saver .of 
dollars also became unnecessary and was also, abandoned and the overall
1. According to the Mineral Ordinance 194-6 non British Commonvrealth
investors would not, be licensed to prospect for mineral oil;in Nigeria. 
See^&Q p4j$J but it does not seem this applied also to industrial ' 
investors. :
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was
economic interest of Nigeria/substituted as a criterion for admitting 
investment from noh-Sterling Area coxuntries. All these facilitated 
business dealings;with these, countries, such that after Nigeria’s 
independence in I960, investors from these countries were able to emerge 
as active competitors to invest in Nigerian manufacturing not only to 
defend and expand their established markets but also to gain a foothold 
in the Nigerian market. As a result of these developments, the proportion 
. of Nigeria*s imports coming from the non-Sterling Area countries had 
expanded remarkably by the end of 1965* Although the U.K. was still the 
leading single supplier, her share of Nigeria*s imports had fallen from 
6Of0 in 1950 to 31$ 1965 and the share from the West European countries
risen to 32?/q9 that from the United States to 12?°.
Unlike the investors from the non-Sterling Area countries, the U.K. 
investors had much established market in Nigeria to defend or maintain. ^
1• ' ■ ' . . . \ 
In 195P Nigeria purchased 60fo of her imports from the U.K.; even as late ^
as i960, the proportion was still as high as 445^ * The FBI mission to \
■ ' . . r •. ' ■ !
Nigeria in 1955 had noted that the firm determination of the Nigerian I
. ‘ . . * 
governments to manufacture goods previously imported would at any rate i
threaten U.K.’s, export market to Nigeria. It found, however, that the ■ 1
greater threat was competition from,, other manufacturing countries to j
- . ■ "* ‘ /
■ . .. . . - . ;
establish manufacturing plants in.Nigeria. It specifically mentioned the /
. : ■ . f-vfrV
Germans as being particularly active and through price cutting had /
succeeded in snatching some contracts from British investors in Nigeria*. s
1. FBI Report of a visit to Nigeria and the Gold Coast 1955*
■ ' ■ ’ - - . v ‘V : ' 1 0 5
In 1957 the U.K. Trade Commissioner in Nigeria warned British industrialists 
and investors against neglecting the Nigerian market which should no longer 
be regarded as a traditional,market for their goods. He urged on them 
to build up, trade against the time when Nigeria would become independent 
and be more than ever wooed by the trading nations of the. world. Above all, 
he advised British manufacturersto keep abreast of industrial development ; 
in Nigeria; ’’otherwise they might one day wake up to find that some one, 
else has started an industry there that .they might well have established
or that their goods are henceforth virtually excluded from the Nigerian
X '■ ' ■ - - ’market”. Inspite of the FBI’s observation of active competition and
the Trade Commissioner1 s warning against potential.competition in the
Nigerian market, the U.K. manufacturers still did not take, any effective
action to ’defend1 their established market in Nigeria until three months
after independence, in January, 1961.
Three factors explain this apparent, inaction. The first was.
political. Although the mission of the FBI observed active foreign
competition,in the Nigerian market in 1955? i*t found the political
situation so uncertain and feared a: break down, of law and order, including
a breakdown of essential services following the introduction of the 1954
Federal constitution, that it advised prospective investors to suspend
investment decisions in Nigeria pending the clarification of the political.
situation in the country. As investment was to be long-term, the
mission’s caution was quite justifiable: and the political turmoil which >.
1. Overseas Econ. ;Surveys: Nigeria, 1957 and its review: West Africa" : ;. 
February 15, 1958 “TakingNotice of Nigeria”.
erupted in the open in Nigeria since 1966 certainly justifies the caution.
The second explanation is that until the restrictions on imports 
from, and. dealings with non-Sterling Area countries were removed by the 
return to convertibility in January 1959> the U.K. investors were
felt they Uould ignore any.threat of foreign competition in the market, 
despite the Trade Commissioner’s warning.
Thirdly, until the incentive laws were passed in 1957/58» there ^
. . ■ f *
were no active measures to encourage the local manufacture of goods 
previously imported and to protect them from foreign competition. The
general feeling among U.K. industrialists was therefore that the time ;■/
- 1
was not yet ripe to invest economically in Nigerian manufacturing. j
But other countries were actively campaigning to come to establish
industrial plants in the country, and, especially after Independence,
“Ministers with limited experience of these problems were now being
required to decide between the statements of established manufacturing
organisations and the claims for help by the newcomers. Perhaps
inevitably the Ministers, often against the advice of their expatriate
2
assistants, decided in favour of the newcomers. And one of the big U.K. 
firms had to complain that "To some extent, we have found ourselves in the 
familiar business dilemma of watching our competitors set themselves up
with the benefit of new procedures while we ourselves were handicapped by
. . . 3
attempts to fit the new into the put lines of the old”.
1. Sir Francis Turton Hart: "The Growth of West African Industry", African 
Affairs, October 1966, p.283*
obviously at an advantage in the Nigerian market. They probably therefore
2* Sir Francis Tur‘
3.. A.H. Smith, on.cit. p.iy/,.
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It is against the above background that' the strength and purpose of 
the 1961 mission of the Federation.of British Industries to Nigeria can 
be fully understood. Addressing the mission, the Nigerian Federal Minister 
of Economic Development, Hon. Waairi Ibrahim, expressed the general hope 
that the British industrialists would show as much interest and enthusiasm 
in establishing industries in Nigeria as U.S.A. and Western Germany. He 
then added: "here is one way* in which British industry, if it wishes, can j. 
make; a, lastihg and substantial contribution to the development of Nigeria, \ 
and I hope mv words will not fall upon deaf ears* We are committed to no J 
one and we shall examine all proposals strictly upon their merits".^  J 
. Replying, the leader of the FBI mission, Sir Norman Kippling, 
explained the object, of the mission which was to explore opportunities 
for British private investment in Nigeria* "We have come*1, he said, "to : 
see and to learn, but also, to understand your needs and your viewpoint; 
and to offer you an explanation of our own".
■! Sir Norman Kippling emphasised:that the 19&1 mission was the first 
- investment mission of its kind and that the British industry, as 
represented in the mission,,;wanted to make a genuine investment in Nigeria* s 
’future* "This is why we are here. In my fifteen years of experience with 
the F.B*I., this is a unique delegation. Trade missions there have been 
many, aiming principally:at increasing our exports, for Britain - far less
1* :FBi:.,gNigeria|V An, Industrial Reconnaissance op.cit* p.46. Underlining is 
mine
2. Ibid* p.48.
lOO
fortunate than Nigeria in her natural resources - is utterly dependent
on these. But I have known no other delegation concerned only with
investment - that is, with industrial development - nor any other
government which has visualised the idea of such a conference as we are
now inaugurating. I hope you will regard the strength of our delegation
1as evidence that we have found the idea a good one". The fears ahout
administrative breakdown and political instability expressed in 1955
were replaced in the 1961 report with great optimism for the future.
"You will understand", the mission assured the Nigerian Government, "that
this delegation would not be here if it had any fears of this sort in
Nigeria. The very definite statement which you made in your speech,
Mr. Minister, that the further nationalisation of industries plays no
part in your plans for the future was a very welcome one, for this is
fundamental. The promise of political stability in Nigeria is a starting
point, and from there the investor turns his attention to economic 
2prospects".
The FBI 1961 report might indeed be described as a turning point 
or landmark in British manufacturers* attitude towards establishing 
manufacturing, in Nigeria. Within two weeks of the return of the mission 
to the United Kingdom, a list of 21 projects, worth about £10m, was drawn 
up and seven of these were decided upon immediately. At a press 
conference immediately after, the leader of the mission, Sir Norman 
Kippling, emphasised that the list would be substantially longer after the
1. Ibid, pp.47-48.
2. Ibid, p.51.
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basic data oollected by the mission had been properly processed. The
projects immediately decided upon included a £2.5m textile plant in Eastern
Nigeria, a £2m Dunlop tyre factory, a £lm .Guinness brewery » said to be
the third factory in Guinnes^ 200 years history and the first overseas
1
factory to be so established - and a £lm Asbestos cement factory by
2
Turners and Bewwall. Besides, the mission made a number of feasibility 
studies and recommended that there was considerable scope for the 
expansion1 of textile factories, for the establishment of cocoa processing 
factories,5 a paper mill and paint works and pharmaceuticals.* It 
concluded by further emphasising the considerable. investment possibilities 
in the country, the uneomprehensive nature of its survey, and urged on 
other investors to conduct further and complementary surveys or feasibility 
studies.
Summing up, the mission considered that the Nigerian economy was 1
sound; that there was a genuine determination to develop; and that the \
resources for development were not lacking. Nigeria’s problems were \
those arising from thef,lack of Nigerian industrial, technical and.financialj 
experience and knowledge11 and it promised help to make these up.
1. The first factory was established in l^ ublih in 1759 and the second 
at Park Royal during the chairmanship .of the 2nd Earl of Iveagh, 
between 1927-1962.
2. Financial Times. March 2, 19&1.
3. A cocoa factory and a paper mill, and several paint works have'since 
been established.
4. FBI: Industrial Reconnaissance .op.cit.
How does one explain the contrasts between the 1955 and the 1961 ; 
reports of the mission of the Federation of British Industries? While 
the 1961 mission was highly optimistic about Nigeria’s prospects and 
recommended the establishment of many industrial projects, the 1955 mission 
was very1pessimistic and advised the suspension of projects because the 
time was not ripe for most of them and because of the uncertain political 
situation.
Recent events in Nigeria have justified the political fears 
expressed by the 1955 mission. In the same way, they have probably proved 
as unfounded^flp the optimism about political stability expressed by 
the I96I mission. This is because the 1955 mission based its fears on
the underlining political situation arising from the nature of the
federal constitution. By 196I this situation had not materially changed 
since the federal structure was the same in I96I as it was in 1955* What
had changed was Nigeria’s political status: by 1955 she was a colony; but
by I96I she was a sovereign state. It is probably this which explains 
the differing tones of the two missions. The 1955 mission could be 
outspoken on Nigeria’s political prospects. The 1961 mission was dealing 
with an independent state and could not have been expected to be as 
outspoken as the 1955 mission. There was probably much diplomacy in all 
the optimism about Nigeria’s political stability which the 1961 mission 
expressed.
The 1955 mission was also probably justified in advising post­
ponement of investment decisions on the ground that the time was not ripe 
for some of the projects. By 1955 there was no genuine determination to
develop the economy nor was there any active industrialisation policy 
nor effort to attract foreign investment; and incomes; were low.. By I96I 
all these had changed: there was a genuine determination to develop; 
incentive laws were in operation to encourage the local manufacture of 
goods previously imported and to protect these goods from undue foreign 
competition, and incomes were higher than in 1955* The time was therefore 
’’ripe" to invest in economic projects in 19&1 compared with the position, 
in 1955 and this explains why the 1955 mission advised on postponement . |
and the 1961 mission advised on immediate establishment of projects. j
"While the a&ove may be true, it does not explain why the 1961 mission !
■ - ‘ 1 
" J
came so soon, only three months, after Nigeria’s independence. This seems "
to be explained by the threat of foreign competition in the Nigerian
market which jfallowed or was expected to follow Nigeria’s independence. •
As long as Nigeria was a colony, and as long as the restrictions imposed j
in the interest of the Sterling Area on dealings with non-Sterling Area ;
countries lasted, the U.K. investors were in a favourable position on the \ i 
Nigerian market. This position obviously changed when the return to . .<
convertibility in January, 1959» made all formal restrictions in the 
interest of . the Sterling Area unnecessary, and independence in i960 left 
Nigeria free to negotiate trade and business freely with all the World. -■ ,
While the, threat of foreign competition in the Nigerian market could be ~
relatively safely ignored before independence, it would not be safe to 
do so after independence. If the U.K. investors did not invest in 
Nigeria to manufacture the goods they previously exported to Nigeria,  ^
other competitors would, and inside Nigeria’s tariff walls, these would be
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more competitive than similar goods imported. It is therefore safe tbv j 
conclude. that the strength and effect of' the 19&1 mission of the 
Federation of British Industries was to defend or protect their established 
markets in Nigeria against foreign competition. This was the central theme 
of the Mission. Commenting ,on the prospects of the Nigerian market, the 
Mission stated "in view.of its potential sise, no effort should be spared 
to take, advantage of the present situation (i.e. the Mission1s visit to 
Nigeria) to retain existing trade and expand business for the future11* It 
warned that British exporters must no longer take the Nigerian market for 
granted, "otherwise much of this favourable market may be lost". •
The.above discussions have illustrated how Nigeria's potentially 
large internal market, and the threat of foreign competition in the market r 
attracted foreign private investment to Nigerian manufacturing. Not all ../ 
the Investments, however, resulted from the threat of foreign competition. 
Some investment resulted from "a thoroughly convincing feasibility report 
or survey''. These include the Nigerian Aluminium Products Ltd, and the 
Turners Asbestos cement factory at Port Harcourt# Some investments, too, 
resulted from.mere expansion of local operations owing to the growth of the 
Nigerian market. 1 Such investments include Unilever's second soap factory 
at Aba", and the expansion of the capacity of such projects as the ICaduna : 
Textiles Ltd. and the Nkalagu cement factory. Foreign manufacturing 
investment has also resulted from the need to serve existing establishments* 
An illustration of such industrial linkage effect is the establishment of
1. The Report of the 4th Conference of . Leading Personalities of Eastern
. Nigerian Origin, op.cit. pp.17 mid 20*
the Niger Steel rolling mill at IMene, near Enugu, in 19639 to serve the 
needs of the existing and projected industries within the Nkalagu 
industrial vicinity.
Profits
Overriding all the motives for private investment is the profit 
motive. Indeed, in discussing all the^attractions, of the Nigerian market 
and the effect of foreign competition in the market, we were indirectly 
discussing how private foreign investors assessed and responded to the . 
profit opportunities in the Nigerian market. Surprisingly, profit 
motivation did not feature significantly in the two surveys by'Hakan
and May of the motives of foreign investors in Nigerian manufacturing;
. 1 . ' . ;
In fact, it was not mentioned in May's survey. ..According to Hakan,
"less mentioned motives for investment were that of profit rates being
: - 2 ' • . 
higher in Nigeria than at home". This does not mean that profits
were not the primary motive for the investors in Nigeria;otherwise
they .would then be mere charitable institutions, which they are not. As
the mission of the Federation of British Industries pointed out, "profit
is an indispensable motive for private investment, for the only
alternative to making profits is making losses, and that is the end of
3
the whole show". '■ *
The fact that profit was either not mentioned or was less 
mentioned in the motivation to invest, according to the above two 
surveys, was probably due to the nature of tile surveys. Hakan fs survey
1* Op»cit. pp.251-254. Profit on the supply of machinery which is in 
a different category was mentioned only three times.
2. Op.cit.
3. F.B.I. Nigeria: An Industrial Reconnaissance, op;cit. p.50. ’
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was based on ^interview* he had with 68 firms; and May’s survey was based , 
on “questionnairesn sent to 26 manufacturing firms* The results of these 
surveys would obviously depend on the nature of the questions asked. Some 
firms might not have considered it necessary to mention profit in the 
motivation to invest since this obviously occupies an overriding position 
in private motivatioi^ \js6
It would also depend on what type of profit one had in mind. Since 
investment is long-term, long-term rather than short-term profit is 
obviously more importantrfor no firm would ordinarily invest to earn large 
short-term profits if this would mean large and recurring losses later on.
On the other hand, firms would not invest in a country with favourable long­
term prospects if they must “undergo initial heavy losses.
Distinction should also be made between the profits of the subsi­
diaries and those of the group as a whole. “From a private giew point, 
firms contemplating overseas investment will primarily be concerned with 
the effect which such an investment has on the profitability and growth 
of the investing enterprise as a whole, not just that.of the foreign 
subsidiary or associate company in which the investment is made. The 
desire to'exploit new markets, safeguard imports, or gain access to new 
technical knowledge may be equally important motives influencing the
investing company and may make the export of capital worthwhile even if
1
the profits earned on it are small or even negative*1.
In view of the above, the extent to which firms would mention profit / 
as a motivation to invest would depend on whether it is profit of the group
1. J.H. Dunning: Does Foreign Investment Pay? Moorgate & Wall Street, 
Autumn, 1964, p.8*
as a whole or that of the subsidiary. While the profit of the subsidiary 
alone may not be the primary motivation7 because of the other
factors mentioned above, this does not mean that overall profit 
consideration was not the primary motive, 81$ of foreign private 
investment in Nigeria is. channelled through'subsidiaries and it may be 
that in the surveys conducted by Hakan. and May, “profit11 was not defined 
or specified* Since it is largely these subsidiaries that were 
“interviewed11 or Mquestioned11, they either did not mention profits at 
all or mentioned it less frequently if they understood profit to mean 
only the. profit of the subsidiaries. On the other hand, they must have 
ignored mentioning profit motivation at all since this was obvious. In 
either case, the result would, be that profit would be either not 
mentioned or less, frequently mentiohed .as the motivation to invest. It 
would then be. wrong to interpret this to mean that profit was not the 
overriding motivation*tsxXiwaasii.
Labour
Labour .generally.attracts industry for two different reasons: if 
labour costs represent a high percentage of the total cost of production 
and if relatively unskilled labour , can be utilised. Examples are the 
attraction of the textile industry to Japan and India or from New England 
to the American South. Secondly, if unusual 'skill Is required, an 
industry will tend to locate where that skill, which is usually rather 
immobile, is;available; examples are the production of optical goods in 
Rochester, or New York, watches in Switzerland or high grade steels in 
Sheffield.
.Nigeria is definitely short of skilled personnel and therefore one
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would not expect,to find the latter type of industry attracted to Nigeria
because of skill. But Nigeria has an abundanfce of unskilled men and, at
first sight*, it would be surprising that examples of low cost labour
orientation are not present in Nigeria at present* One reason for this is
that, compared with some other parts of the world, unskilled labour is
population
relatively scarce in Nigeria. Although there are local/concentrations,
especially in the South, where under - and unemployment is a problem,
the overall picture is one of scarcity compared with such countries as
India and .China* As Pedler pointed out, Nigeria, and indeed, Africa,
"is not an area of teeming masses numbered in hundreds of millions like .
India and China11. ^
The result of this relative scarcity is that wages for unskilled
2labour are substantially higher in Nigeria than in India. This is
probably one of the reasons why no industry has been attracted to Nigeria
3
on account of low wages for unskilled labour. To this is added the . 
traditional stigmatisation of the African worker as inefficient owing 
to "excessively high rates of absenteeism and turnover, lack of 
punctuality, and inefficiency, and inaptitude in the work place, natural 
indolence, inadaptability to continuous labour, lack of response to 
monetary reward and being unsuited to Western technology".^
1. F.J. Pedler: Foreign Investment in West Africa. International Affairs
Vol.51.1955» P*46l* /
2. International Labour Offices Yearbook of Labour Statistics, i960.
3. See B.S. May op.cit. pp.255-254* May writes: "One factor which was 
conspicuous by its absence among those inducing investment from over-' 
seas was "lowly labour costs", see also W.A. Hance: West African 
Industry An Analysis of Locational Orientation,School of International 
Affairs, Columbia University,Vol.15,1961.
4* Peter Kirby: African Labour Productivity Reconsidered. Economic Journal 
, June 1961, pp.274,291.
It seems, however, that the above is a "generalisation that 
discredits the author more than the Nigerian labourer* Nigerians take , 
readily to the mechanical trades and it is a fact that a Nigerian makes a
tractor last longer in service than an English farmer, xrorking more and much
1 ' . • "* ■ ' ' '• ‘ 
worse land". Moreover it has been emphatically .established that: the
African does not possess any inherent incapacities or attitudes which are
.detrimental to efficient production and that his willingness to work
. . . -: T .  - , ' ■ - 2 •
considerably ^ exceedsjhat of, labourers in developed economies. . Wells 
. and Warmington found that "it is possible with a Nigerian labour force 
to. achieve a degree of stability,as regards turnover and absenteeism that 
compares well with the experience of advanced countries. These instances . 
are the more significant in that they are taken from the Northern Region :
which is less advanced in industrialisation than are other parts of
... 3' •' ' ■
Nigeria".
There are, of. course, certain, facets of machine operations and 
maintenance which the African, because of his environmental background 
does not naturally adapt to. But training will cure this in course of
time. Peter Kilby concluded "In the final reckoning it is not. the
African labourer but his employers who must bear the sti*gma of imperfect
t 4 \  •
performance". •
1. The Times (London) Special Supplement on Nigeriafs Independence, 
Sept*29, I960, p.xix.
2. Peter Kilby, op.cit.
3* F.A. Wells As ¥.A. Warmington::-Studies in Industrialisation in Nigeria
& the Cameroons, OU£\1962, pp.!7“lS*
198
But it has Been shown that wage rates for unskilled workers are 
already high in Africa relative to other countries. - Training costs 
would obviously and inevitably not only add to operating costs but 
increase African labour costs relative to other countries* Thus, although 
compared with his counterpart in Europe,African labour may be cheap, this 
high cost of training, including the cost of low production rates in 
initial years due to enforced training on the job and the cost of 
supervision and administration due, presumably, both to the more intensive 
supervision required and the much higher cost of expatriate staff as 
compared with Europe, considerably outweighs the "cheapness"♦
It is thus to the above considerations of costs and productivity 
that one has to turn to explain the fact that no industry has been 
attracted to Nigeria so far because of abundant unskilled labour nor is 
one likely in the near future.
Raw Materials,
The most important group of industries in Nigeria today is that 
concerned with the primary processing of Nigerian raw materials. This is 
not surprising since about 9 9 of Nigeria1 s foreign exchange is derived 
from the export of agricultural and mineral raw materials and since the 
production of these staples usually requires at least some preliminary 
processing. Yet the presence of raw materials was mentioned only twice 
among the 26 firms whose motives to invest in Nigeria were surveyed by 
R.S. Hay and was not mentioned at all . by the 68 firms surveyed by Mr
p
Hakan* This does not mean that there are no foreign-owned raw material
1. Op.cit. p.252.
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processing plants in Nigeria. They abound*
Foreign investment has been attracted to process Nigerian raw,
materials as a result of initial investment in extractive operations.
Two examples illustrate this. One .is the £5•■5m Nigerian sugar company
at Bacita in the northern region and the other the'£9m oil refinery at
Port Harcourt in the eastern region.
The first foreign investment in sugar production in Nigeria was
made in 1958 by the. Bookers Sugar Company, when the first experimental
growing of sugar cane began at Bacita. As a result of these trials,
Bookers Sugar Company Ltd, the technical partner of the Nigerian Sugar
Syndicate, issued in June, 19.61, a feasibility report oh the commercial
production of white granulated sugar from cane grown on the Bacita
fadamas, a flat of. swampy, area lying on the south bank of the River
Niger. This report was accepted by the Syndicate and the Nigerian sugar
company was formed with an issued share capital of £l*5ni» half of which
was taken up by the Federal and Regional Govts, and the other half by
1
private foreign investors* ‘ Thus, as a result of initial investment 
in an extractive industry^ the processing investment resulted. At the 
end of April 1964, 6,400 acres of bush had been cleared and 2800 acres 
prepared and planted. Oane from 2,500 acres of the area planted were to 
be processed and the balance of 300 acres of cane .used for planting 
the rest of the cultivable area in the subsequent dry season.
1. Nigerian Sugar. Nigerian Trade Journal Yol.12 no*2, April/June,1964*
2. Ibid. ■
The Nigerian Oil Refinery :
This is another foreign manufacturing investment which resulted from 
an initial investment in the extractive industry. The story of oil in 
Nigeria dates back to 1937 when Shell-Df,Arcy Petroleum Development Co. 
started prospecting for oil in the country. In 1953 the company announced , 
that it encountered showings of oil associated, with a considerable volume 
of gas in Meat a, in the Opdbo Division of the Old Calabar Province. "The 
story of oil in Nigeria spread like wild fire".^ It took another five, years 
however, to prove that oil was available in Nigeria in commercial- quantity. 
By July 1963» nine oil fields had been established with a'total.cumulative : 
production of 69m barrels. In 1962, export of crude oil was valued at.
£16.5m; by December 1965, it had reached £68m to become Nigerians biggest .. 
single export accounting for 25*4$ of total exports.
The establishment of an oil refinery, followed the discovery of oil ,
- - ,;V;
in commercial quantities in Nigeria* The agreement to start the ; 1 -
construction of the refinery was signed in 1962. and the refinery was
commissioned towards the end of 1964 at a cost of £9m subscribed equally
by the Nigerian governments and Shell 33. B.
1, -Nigerian Trade Journal Vol.11.no.4 Oct./Dec. 19^3•
2. Nigerian Trade Journal Vol 14* No.2 April/June, 1965, P*71*
5* The first tanker to carry crude oil from Nigeria left Port.Harcourt for 
Rotterdam in Holland in February, 1958, with 9*000 :tons of oil. By
December 1965 crude oil shipment had reached 7* 2m valued £13m.
4. It was. agreed that after the refinery had been in operation for, some . 
time, 10$ each from the Governments1 share and 10$ of the Oil Companies 
share would be offered to the Nigerian, public at agreed times.
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While the oil refinery and the Nigerian Sugar Gompany illustrate
manufacturing, establishments which resulted from initial investment in
extractive industries, the cement factories all over Nigeria and the
textile factories in the North^are illustrations of manufacturing
investment .attracted to Nigeria by the presence of raw materials. Other
raw material oriented industries include-the palm oil and groundnut
East and
processing mills and tin smelting in th^North and cocoa processing in the 
West#
Indigenisation and Redeployment
Indigenisation is a process whereby the established foreign firms 
in distributive trade and road transport withdraw or are made to withdraw 
from these sectors and.are replaced by Nigerian operators. Redeployment 
is the reinvestment of the capital thus withdrawn in other sectors such as 
•department stores and manufacturing where, because of inadequate capital 
and technique, Nigerians are not yet able to operate effectively, These 
two processes have so affected the character of the established firms 
and foreign private investment in Nigerian manufacturing that it is 
necessary to sketch their evolution briefly.
The Evolution of Indigenisation and Redeployment.
Nigerians have been engaged on trade from very Early times; and the 
organisation of the Nigerian markets, the bargaining skill of the traders,
1. This excludes the textile factories in the East, West and Kid- .
West, The North produces about 9&fo of Nigeria* s cotton. Accordingly , 
these other.. textile factories in Southern Nigeria cannot be. classi- ■ 
fied as raw material oriented. - v , '
and the shrewdness of the woman retailer - the mammy trader - have always 
won admiration of many foreign visitors from the early 19th century* 
Historically this market orientation derives from the deep-rooted
'• ■ ■ J o
traditions of trade and barter which reach back over four centuries*
file average Nigerian trader today still possesses these characteristic*
qualities* Professor Bauer, for instance, observed in 1954 that the West
African entrepreneur-trader possessed “exceptional effort, foresight,
resourcefulness, thrift, and ability to perceive economic opportunity",^
and Mr Peter Kilby came to the same conclusion in a recent study of the
Nigerian bread industry.^ This exceptional enterprise, did not,however,
extend to all distribution, but was limited to retail trading; and it
did not extend to import or overseas trading. In fact before the Second
World War, very few Nigerians participated in overseas trade beyond the
distribution of imported goods on behalf of the expatriate importers,
or the collection of cash crops for„sale to these firms*
\ and
On the other hand^ theajigj post-war shortages of consumer goods
and the consequent rationing of import licences on the basis of past . 
performance during the war and the early post-war years cut off the few 
Nigerian importers and confirmed the established merchants in their 
monopoly of the import trade. It is stated that in 1949 Nigerians
1. The Report of the Committee to advise on Aid to African Businessmen; 
Government Printer, Lagos, 1959 P*54*
2. R* Manny: Nigeria as seen by Leo Africanus* 1526, Nigerian Magazine * 
August 1961 pp*189-191. ‘ " •
5. P.T* Bauer«- West; Afri ca Trade, p.50.
4* Peter Kilby: Africa enterprise: The Nigerian Bread "industry, Standford : 
University Press 1965 p*lll. A.H. Smith, the ;Chairman of the United
Africa Co.Ltd. has written In “Considerations Relating to Sound Private
Investment' in Commerce and Industry in West Africa that “you  ' ' .
/continued over/
accounted, for only 5$ of the country!s import trade and for 10fo in 1957 
while the expatriate firms controlled 9 5 and 9Of° in 3-949 and 1957 
respectively.^-
It is this expatriate dominance of the import and the distributive
trade which gave the first official impetus to indigenisation or to the
demand for it in this sector* All previous attempts to secure a bigger
2
share for Nigerians had little effect. In 1959 a Committee was set up 
to review the measures already taken; and to recommend future measures to 
be taken to assist African businessmen.
The Committee reported that owing to the defects of the colonial 
system, on independence, economic power in Nigeria remained with 
< foreigners. Because of his lack of capital, managerial experience and 
technical skill, the Nigerian competed on unequal terms with the 
foreigners who possessed these requisites. The committee considered this
reference 4 continued!
"dont need to go very far into the market here (in West Africa.) to 
realise how much competition is alive(for full citation see 
later p*27^ footnote.)
1* 0.* Olakanpo: Distributive Trade* A critique; Nigerian Journal of
Economics and Social Studies Yol 5 no 2 July 19&3 P*239«
2. These efforts include the formation of the Nigerian Association of 
Importers and Exporters In 1942 which secured a seat at the Supply 
Board and the abandonment of the principle of past performance for 
the principle of the ability to procure. In 1946 the Department of 
Commerce and Industries was created to accelerate the tempo of 
commerce and industry and to secure for Nigeria a larger share of the 
world trade and a larger share of the Nigerian trade for Nigerians* 
The Gommittee on Aid to African businessmen in .1959 found that the 
Department lacked adequate human ©nd physical resources to achieve 
the objectives set for it and which the country urgently needed.
. ' ' , . . ' ' 2 0 4 "  .
”a drastic disease” which required ”a drastic remedy” *
Part of the remedy it x e^commended was that Nigeria^ import trade 
should be reserved specifically for Nigerian importers where the imported 
goods are: necessaries in the domestic economy, such as second hand clothing. ,; 
and stockfish,;or where the capital involved is small. It also urged that 
retail trade and road transport be reserved for Nigerians and that where 
the capital involved is. big, the government should provide 51°/u and that 
Nigerians would be. allowed to buy up this share gradually as the money 
becomes available’.and urged on the Government to take all possible steps 
to . enforce this policy.-
In November, 19&1* the Minister of Economic Development, Eon.
Waziri Ibrahim issued a policy statement in the Federal House, of 
Representatives which read in part that “Economic development automatically 
increases the volume of distributive trade and transportation. Therefore, 
if Nigerians are,to benefit as much as possible from economic development 
projects in their country, they must control, among other things, the 
distributive trade, and the road transportation of goods in their country”.
H© therefore urged on the. expatriate firms who had hitherto controlled 
these sectors to start to withdraw. After making exceptions for depart­
mental stores, he stressed the inevitability of the measure with a plea 
that it was not meant to be, a hostile attitude to the expatriate firms. 
“These changes”, he said, “must come, and they will come* even though it is 
appreciated that many,of our friends will lose substantially during the 
period of changing,1 oyer from distributive trade and road transport to
investment in industries where their co-operation and full participation 
will always be required ... It is an honest opinion which should be
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accepted by all concerned without hesitation or excuses11. . ]
Three points have to be made about the above statement. First, 
the policy was formulated .without a study of the techniques and methods 
of distributive trade and road transport and the ability of Nigerians 
effectively and efficiently to replace the expatriates in the provision
of these services. The Minister definitely stated that no such study
; ' ' - < ?
had been made although he had commissioned one. The question then arises j
•'Is a background. of ignorance the best guide and time to adopt a policy j
which obviously has tremendous ramifications throughout the ecohomy1'? . j
Secondly, the policy did not take account of the magnitude of the. j
financial resources involved in distributive trade.and the obvious j■ ’ -l - " ‘ A I
inability of the ordinary Nigerian .trader to provide such huge sums# For. . :|
' i
all that has. been said of his trading skill, the average Nigerian entre- ;
preneur-trader depended on credit facilities from the expatriate importers j
since his limited financial strength and other characteristics make him j
tincreditworthy for any substantial financial assistance from the commercial 1
banks# In fact considerable proportions of produce buying in Nigeria j
had been financed by credit facilities from the expatriate firms, the 
proportions being about 7&fo for groundnut purchases, 85^ , of cocoa, 15f° 
of palm oil, and 2Qf° of palm kernels. These advances varied for periods ;
ranging from two weeks in the North to about/three or four weeks in the 
South. In the 1948-49 produce season, for instance, the United Africa 
Company Ltd granted such interest free advances, to the tune of about £2m*
1. Parliamentary Debates. Fed# House of Bepresentatives # Nov. 19&1 PP* 
200- 201. ' *
2. The United Africa Co#. Ltd., Statistical and Econ. Review Sept# 1949 p.H;
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Evidently at independence the. volume of such advances must have ;
.considerably increased. The policy statement did not consider that if 
the expatriates completely withdrew from this trade, ‘they would, in all 
probability, not; be willing to grant such advances again and alternative 
sources for this.capital were not discussed at all.
One of the results of this-policy was that, deprived of the normal
credit from the expatriate banks,; and with no capital of their own, the. 
indigenous traders who replaced the expatriate firms resorted to ^ the 
banking system. This strained the resources of the banks. Besides the
indigenous. -traders proved inadequate for the task. In 1966 the
? President of the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce^ Alhajji* S.L. Edtyhad to 
cdmplain that “in the commercial field, the withdrawal of the leading 
trading houses from retail distribution lias created a gap which is not 
being filled quickly enough by Nigerians. In particular the traditional 
wayside trading methods.are proving unsuitable for efficient distribution 
of the expanding products of local industry"
Thirdly, even if the capital was forthcoming, the indigenous 
Nigerian would still not effectively substitute for the expatriate 
middleman, at least in the short run^because of his lack of technique.
As Professor ¥*A* Lewis pointed out in his Report on Industrialisation and 
the Gold Coast, “African enterprise cannot be built^simply by lending 
Africans money. To lend money to entrepreneurs who lack managerial 
capacity is merely to throw it, down the drain. What the potential African
1. Commerce in Nigeria. Vol 8, 1966, p* 7 •
entrepreneurs lack is not primarily money, it is rather technical 
knowledge and experience of factory organisation." The policy statement 
assumed that the Nigerian trader*entrepreneur already had this skill * an - 
assumption apparently based on his celebrated skill as a trader. This, 
however, was wrong* For all that has been said of his skill, experience 
and response to economic opportunity, he remains a petty trader.
This pettiness may be illustrated from profit figures submitted by 
the Inland Revenue Department ito the Committee on Aid to African business­
men in 1959. They indicated that 4*000 African traders in Lagos had 
annual incomes of under £150 a. and that only, about 550 had incomes of ■ 
above £150 p.a. Out of 500 companies reported trading in Nigeria only 
160 had annual incomes of above £10.000, and the taxable profits for 
these amounted to £284*000. The Committee doubted whether the African 
share of. these profits exceeded 5^ i “and it is almost certain that there
are only a sprinkling, if at all, of African controlled companies with
' ■ ■ v • ' ■ ■ ‘ ■ : ' 2 • 
taxable profits sensibly higher than £10,000 a year." It is not clear
*  ' v ' * ' . i , ' . - ' *
from the ieport to which year these figures related; but it may be 
assumed that they were the latest available figures then, probably 1958 
figures, and that the figures might not have very materially changed by 
. I96I when the policy statement was made. On the1 further assumption that 
the figures were representative of the Nigerian trader entrepreneurs, the 
implicit lack of technique and of large business management implied in
1. Op.ext, p.12
2. Qp.cit. p.54*
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tlae petty trading character of the Nigerian becomes more readily obvious*
He retires a long training in business management. This is only just
beginning with the establishment of technical institutes and company
training, schemes. But a considerable time must elapse before enough
people with the requisite training can emerge. The 1hurry* to
indiginise seems to be misjudged.
Finally the policy statement vassumed that the withdrawn
resources would necessarily be redeployed into the ^politically
acceptable sectors,r, especially in manufacturing. Indigentsation no
redeployment
doubt encouraged into. industry but it also led to repatriation
of capitar from Nigeria.'*'
Redeployment.
While the policy of gradual withdrawal from distributive trade
was meant to apply to all expatriate firms, the chief target appeared
to be the Lebanese and Asian bu*ifte,ss men. The Committee on Aid to
African Businessmen was particularly bitter about them and appeared to
wish them expelled from Nigeria. According to the Committee: f,The
Syrian and the Lebanese function in the field of enterprise in which
the African is now efficient -textiles and motor transport. ... (but)
what has he to give to Nigeria^ He obviously is not prepared to share
managerial skill or technical, knowledge if he has it himself. His
business is a form of family partnership into which it is inconceivable
that the African will ever be admitted even at the lower level ... they
2
were called in to fill a gap and they have served their usefulness11.
1. For details see GhiA
2. The Report op.cit. pp.50-51•
Respite this political opposition,however, they were very reluctant to 
disengage themselves from general trading; hut such were the pressures, 
of late, that they were apparently forced to redeploy their resources 
into some form of manufacturing; and K. Chellarams is said to be the first, 
Indian trading-firm to be active in manufacturing, with interests in 
candles, cosmetics, and luggages. Others have helped to establish textile 
mills, eg. the Abd textile mills, and Mandilas Karabaris have an 
interest in the first iron and steel rolling mill in Nigeria. Mention 
must also be made of the groundnut processing mills discussed in chapter 
two-which were owned by Lebanese traders. Mr George Calii, the owner of the 
biggest mill also has a piggery and meat packing establishment in the 
country.
For the European expatriate trading firms, especially the bigger 
ones like the United Africa Company Ltd and John Holt & Co (Lpl) Ltd, 
redeployment has been a long accepted policy, although government policy 
accelerated the tempo. This-is illustrated principally with the 
experience of the United.Africa Co. Ltd. While this may not necessarily 
be the experiences of all,other expatriate trading firms, it is submitted 
that in view of the large scale operation of the UAC and of its territorial: 
spread in Tropical Africa, the group*s experiences with redeployment may 
be taken as a fair representation of what..is going on not only in Nigeria, 
but also in the rest of Tropical Africa.
Until comparatively recently, the United Africa Co. Ltd was
1* , Robert Ward: Industry in Nigeria: Mho are the'Investors, West Africa,, 
Jan 2,,1965, P»8* r
predominantly a group of trading companies, but with the changing life in 
Africa there came a change in policy. "There was a changeover from 
general merchandise importing and produce handling to specialist merchan- 
dising and industrial investment". l&plaining this change in policy 
in "Catching the wind of change", A.H. Smith declared: "The redeployment 
of the Companyfs capital, skills and. knowledge and staff in Africa made 
headlines there while it lasted and even now it is constantly.referred to 
by people at all levels. This undoubtedly is largely due to the immense 
impact such an operation had on the local community; but it is disquieting . 
that there is a tendency for it to be regarded, firstly as a once-for-all 
surgical recourse, and secondly, as unique to the present African 
situation.. Nothing could be further from the truth. Nhile it is unlikely 
that an operation on this scale would again have to be undertaken, we have 
learnt - perhaps the hard way - that every business undertaking, whatever
its nationality and whatever its activity, must be ready to redeploy itself,
3 ' -•
if it wants to continue making a profit". But what made this policy 
necessary in the first place? This question is important not only in . 1 
understanding the whole process of redeployment; but also because some 
of the answers usually advanced have not necessarily been correct.
One such answer seems to be suggested in Mr Newell's statement that 
the new policy was associated with the social needs of the Africans and
' 4
that the.UAC saw in this "an opportunity to conduct an ethical business".
IT This is fully documented in (a) A.H. Smith, Catching the wind of Change, 
Progress - The Unilever Quarterly - No.l, 1965; Cb) "Redeployment: An 
Aspect of Development in Tropical Africa, Statistical and Economic 
Review. UAC Ltd no 28 April, 1963; (o) Malcolm Newell: The Developers,
(d) J. Maitland Jones: "New Source of Strength", Unilver International,
U.A.C. the gentle giant faces facts in Africa,New Commonwealth Feb. 1966
Summer 1954* ^ie ^AC kindly supplied me reprints or copies of these 
articles. ■ ' • /« A n . //Refs.2-4 over/
While social and moral considerations no doubt do at times influence 
.private business decisions, they cannot be the over-riding factor. The 
UAO is not, a charitable organisation charged with dispensing benefits. It 
is rather' a profit making venture responsible to the shareholders and its 
workers, for its prosperity, markets, and technical development. To survive 
it must make profits. As Sir Leslie Rowan pointed out, "without profit 
or the expectation of profit investment will not be made, and without its 
realisation, investment will fail. This in no way absolves private enter­
prise from recognising its moral as well as its commercial and creative
obligations, or from seeking to render, service while it seeks profit”.
The profit motive and not any moral or social considerations is nearly
always the immediate or long-term over-riding determining factor in private
investment decisions.
, The.second reason is political. In the "wind of change" speech
/Mr A.H. Smith declared: "Some five years ago when African national
independence was no longer a vision but established fact, the Company (UAC)
realised that it was in an exposed position. Politically it was a
references £-4 continued:
2. Malcolm Newell op*cit.
3 • Mr Smith is the . Chairman of the UAC Ltd since 1955 and a director
of the Unilever since 1948*
4. M. Newell op.cit.
1. Investment and Development. Overseas Development Institute, 19&5> P • 6
? liabilityy not only so much, because it was omihipresent and omnipotent, 
but because it. was sip\',tcpnvenieht'; for/-some people to, stigmatise it as such* 
As the company occupied ah all-too-evident sector of African life, it 
could be, \and‘was being argued that it was hampering the just efforts of 
local people to control their own -affairs11.
Evidence of this political stigtoatisation abounds in the local press 
in public, speeches of leading politicians and in Parliamentary debates.
1.s fax. back as 1 949. Sir Francis :Ibiam, formerly the Governor of Eastern , 
Nigeria, . and now. the adviser ’to the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria 
Military Government , declared in-the Nigerian Legislative -Councils "We 
need big business^' Sir,, to help. us... .on condition that Nigeria benefits 
substantially and. xinmistakeably from such capitalistic undertakings. In 
the meantime, Sir, I do.affirm that Nigeria is getting the worst of big 
business. AH'these; big combines in Nigeria give me the headhehe*The 
United Africa Company Ltd and their subsidiaries have dominated and 
monopolised our trade for many years now, and between them and their 
combines, the Nigerian trader or business man has been completely dwarfed 
that1 his genuine fight to identify himself in the world of trade and 
commerce has been.difficult indeed and often times quite a failure".1 
In 1964, the Federal Minister of Economic Planning, Hon. Waairi Ibrahim,
sOd foreign firms in Nigeria of slowing down the country's economic ;
. 4 2 
development by engaging in.retail trading. At a conference on West
Africa held by the, Federal Trust for Education and Research, the former
,1. Nigerian Legislative Council Debates. 54d Session, 1949 > p.4^T*
2. Financial Times, London Feb. 1964.
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Economic Adviser to the Nigerian federal Government and formerly the 
Government's ambassador at Brussels, Dr P.N.O. Okigbo, was quoted as 
saying that the expatriate firms in West Africa were not encouraging 
manufacturing but had succeeded only in wiping out all their potential 
African successors "which was not an enviable record". It is not proposed 
to discuss the validity,of the above statements; they have been a merely 
quoted to illustrate the -political pressures which, seem to have necessitated 
the adoption by the expatriate firms of.the redeployment policy.
An illustration will show that political pressure actually 
influenced the redeployment policy. Addressing the students at the 
Business Administration class at Ghana University in i960, Mr A.H. Smith j 
stated that one of the cardinal principles of sound business management is, .? 
flexibility and the preparedness to. move with the times even if that /
means giving up part. of its activities. "I will, If I may, give you an ; |
example of this out.of our recent experience last year. The UAG took the j
initiative of handing over to Government the operation of its ferries j
in Ghana; more importantly, we also ceased trading in produce. I suppose j
that it is fair to say that we might'have dug our toes in and used our j
financial resources to make unduly large over-payments to cocoa farmers 
and thus squeeae out for a while some of the smaller produce buyers. !
But that would have been a short-term policy. Worse, it would have been 
unfair and hence inevitably a politically damaging one ... the answer for ;
us was not to roll back the tide of progress, but to aGcept the facts of
■' ' ' ‘ ' 2 
life and redeploy our skills and our money into new fields."
1. Financial Times. London, 12.3*64. - f , 1
2. A.H. Smith; Considerations Relating to Sound Private Invesifament in/
Commerce & Industry in West Africa - UAC Ltd reprint of article I
. appearirig; '±n the :Ghana^ade .Journal Jan.H960. ^
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While they materially influenced the redeployment policy, it is 
necessary to be certain what part political pressures actually played. 
While they hastened withdrawal from the politically unacceptable sectors, 
they certainLjwere not responsible for their reinvestment into other 
■sectors. Otherwise one vrould be accepting the thesis that the expatriate 
firms had no choice but to reinvest the withdrawn capital in the economy.
This argument was advanced by.Mr A.H* Hakan* "Particularly 
mentioned was redeployment from trade to industry ... For those invest­
ments, largely owned by expatriate trading firms, Europeans as-well as
Levantine, there was no choice involved. It was simply redeployment of 
1
resources". This Is difficult to accept. Economic activities have 
always involved open or overt choices between possible alternative 
.means of attaining given ends and it seems unrealistic that established 
private firms like those he surveyed would not have exercised this choice. 
The choice would have been difficult and unpalatable had there been no 
general freedom^ to repatriate their capital; but it would still have 
been made. In Nigeria, however, there is a general freedom to repatriate 
capital and profits, so that the firms had the choice of reinvesting
T-the withdrawn resources in Nigeria or repatriating them. Part of the / 
withdrawn capital was in fact repatriated in 1962 and 19&4 and part ^
reinvested within Nigeria. This clearly shows that the firms had and did 
exercise choice. The reinvestment was made because it was found economic 
to do so. This point was clearly made by Mr A.H. Smith in the wind of
1. Hakan, oo.cit, p.55*
change speech. "After we had redeployed our resources and the full 
extent of our actions had become apparent to outsiders, we had to face a 
lot of questions about why we had ceased apparently profitable activities. 
People were asking why we had sawn off the branch we were sitting on. The 
short answer is that the Company ceased its activities because it became 
quite obvious that very soon they, were not going to be profitable at all 
financially or sociallyv But let. it be clearly understood that before 
we sawed off the branch, we shifted our perch to another part of the tree" 
Such actions inevitably involved a choice.
The above discussion shows that redeployment policy was adopted not
because the UAC saw an opportunity to do "an ethical business"; while 
political measures no doubt aceelerated the withdrawal of capital from 
some sectors, they do not explain its reinvestment in other sectors 
because the investors had the choice to repatriate the capital. The 
decision.to reinvest some part of the capital was due to the change in 
the attitude of the firms towards manufacturing in Nigeria. This, in turn 
was due; to the. changes which took place , in the economy. •
Miss Margery Perham summarised the pre-war attitude of the
' A\ '■ L ' / : . 4 . 2 
expatriate merchants towards establishing industries in Nigeria. She
said they were-not.keen in processing Nigeria’s raw materials of in
establishing manufacturing industries for various reasons. They were ‘
primarily traders and therefore lacked the necessary industrial skill and
1. Op.cit. > , '
ed
2. Money,'Commerce & Banking in Nigeria. OUP, 194®> P• i.9•
technique. They feared that the manufacturing plant would be uneconomic 
owing to the prevailing low levels of income, and risks of slumps such as ' :
those of the 1-930s 'or due to crop failures. Mere importing of manufactured
goods and exporting raw materials would enable them to minimise, their 
potential losses in seuch eventualities. Finally they were under contractual 
obligations-with established manufacturers overseas to send them raw 
materials from Nigeria and to sell their manufactures in Nigeria and !
they did not consider it advisable to break this arrangement by engaging > j
in local manufactures. Miss Perham adduced no evidence to substantiate j
thqse reasons. ■ In view of what: subsequently happened, they seem to ' j
represent a reasonable interpretation of the pre-war attitude of the j
expatriate merchants towards local manufacturing in Nigeria. j
The changes .in the Nigerian economy which largely resulted from the, , |
effbcts, of the Second World War altered the above attitude. As was
pointed out in chapter' one, the enormous upsurge in the world * s demand
for Nigeria’s raw materials during and since the.war, and the release of -j
the large sterling balances accumulated during this period marked a
turning point in the Nigerian economy and in the outlook and character ,
of the expatriate.firms*. FroM markets in which, because of the thin
power v
spread of purchasing/that was available over subsistence incomes, only the 
general merchants were able to operate to advantage, they became markets 
to which new categories of competitors were attracted and in which new 
levels and varieties of demand emerged.
Moreover, the' -increase in government revenues and the increased 
earnings from exports-which resulted from the growth of the Nigerian 
economy facilitated considerable expenditure in goods and services and
helped to make practicable and economic projects which previously would 
have been unrealistic. As the governments increased their participation 
in the economy and provided many incentives, a new and powerful factor 
emerged in the overall economic invironment in which the merchant 
companies had to operate. As new sources of supply developed overseas, 
coupled with the government's active encouragement to manufacture the 
goods which previously were imported, and as Nigerians emerged as serious 
competitors in their traditional lines of business, such as produce 
marketing, the established expatriate firms found it necessary to withdraw 
from some lines of business and to concentrate and specialise in others. 
Although government policy accelerated this process, if the environment 
had not been favourable, that is,, if there had not developed alternative 
economic'opportunities, the firms would certainly have withdrawn from 
certain sectors to comply with goverhment policy, but they would have 
repatriated and not redeployed much of the capital, thus withdrawn.
Redeployment and Industrial Establishments
That redeployment has been proceeding for a long time but was
accelerated by political independence and government policy is illustrated
by the experience of the United Africa Company Ltd. Recognising the West
African's aptitude for retail trading, the UAC's merchandising policy
had been to shift emphasis gradually from retail to wholesale trading
and to leave the former for African traders. As a result the company's
1
retailing points fell from lj580 to 930 between 1939 and 1953- 1^ was,
1. The U.A.C. (Unilever Ltd): Annual Report. 1954 P*8*
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however, only a,year before Nigeria*s independence in i960, in the 1958/59
produce season, that it began a progressive withdrawal from buying cocoa
'■ 1 ' • - 
and palm produce; It will be remembered that it was in 1959 that the
report of the Committee on Aid to African business men was published* This
urged the government to take effective measures to reserve the distributive
trade for Nigerians. It seems the progressive withdrawal from cocoa and
palm produce buying which started in the.1958/59 produce season was in
anticipation of, and compliance with the government*s wishes.
The Company, however, did not withdraw from buying cotton and
groundnuts in Northern Nigeria until 1964 when the government stopped )
licensing foreign firms as produce buying agents. This is significant.
In Ghana the company withdrew from cocoa buying a year in advance of
the Ghana government's decision, to exclude all expatriate firms as buying
agents\from this sector. The company’s overall policy has been to oomply
with the government's known,policy: how soon it complies obviously 
0 A .
depends^how accurately it anticipates the government policy or how soon the
government makes the policy known. That the company did not completely
withdraw in Nigeria as licensed produce buying agents earlier than 1964
seems to'be due to the fact that although the report of the Committee on Aid
to African businessmen which urged government action to this effect was
published in 1959* the government apparently did not adopt it as a policy
until 1964* That the extent of the withdrawal depends on government policy
is illustrated in the fact the company still trades in those items such as
1. The UAC Ltd: Statistical and Economic Review No.28, April, 1965* pI4*
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hides anti skins and rubber .wfoich are not under the control of the 
Nigerian Marketing BoardVand therefore did not require licences. The 
-company has also withdraw from less specialised lines of general merchandi­
sing such as hardwares, provisions, and.petroleum distribution. Although 
this conforms with the general policy of the government, the company states 
that the withdrawal from these sectors was also due to the factihatoit no 
longer had any intrinsic advantages over other multiple competitors with 
less overhead costs in these sectors.
Part of the capital thus withdrawn was reinvested in department 
stores and in industrial establishments. The Company1s first department 
store in Nigeria was set up in Lagos in 194®* 'This is the well known 
Kingsway Stores. Since then two other similar stores have been 
established at Port Harcourt in Mas tern Nigeria and at Ibadan in the West. 
These stores cater for the special taste of those xd-th high incomes; and 
some of the.company*s manufactured products are sold in these stores.
In the, industrial field the reinvestment has been significant. By 
the end of 1966, the company had established 46 industrial projects and 
investigated and abandoned 77* The projects established include cement 
factories, textile plants, .a plastics factory, bicycle assemblies and: 
three.breweries. Other companies also adopted a similar policy and
established industrial projects. John Holt and Co Ltd. owns a perfumery,. 
a 1tannery,and three rubber processing factories. Paterson Zochonis has 
interests in a soap factory, a galvanising plant and apsints factory.
Two ITrench firms, the C.F.A.O., and S.c.O*A., have interests in a 
galvanising plant and a pre-stressed concrete factory*
Not all the above establishments, which are by no means comprehensive
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resulted, from redeployment. Six of the 46 projects established by the UAC 
Ltd were established before 1954*-: Eh© special reasons for establishing two 
of these, a breweryv a plywood and timber factory were detailed in chapter 
;one. rfhe remaining four were mainly bunk oil plants at Apapa and Port 
Harcourt for preserving vegetable oil, pending export. John Holts 
tannery, established on.an experimental basis in 195^  to preserve
hides and skins which the firm exported. Hone of these, pre-1954 industrial 
projects can therefore be attributed to redeployment policy.
Only projects, established after 1954 could be attributed to the 
redeployment ,policy. 4^ of the 46 projects established by"the UAC Ltd were 
undertaken between.1954 and 1966. It seems there is a correlation between 
Nigeria1s political advance, and the execution, of the redeployment policy. 
While there might have been some bunching of projects carried forward from 
the earlier period, it is not merely coincidental that 26 of the 40 
projects were established between the introduction of regional autonomy in* 
the 1954'constitution and independence in i960. Of the remaining 14 1
projects, 10 were established between 1964 and 1965* It will be recalled -j
“ i ■ ' ' ' ' " i
> 1
that it was in 1964 that the expatriate firms were officially asked to *
begin to withdraw from distributive trade to industrial establishments. The j
10 projects therefore seem to be in direct response to this policy. It ,
seems also that the 40 projects established between 1954 and i960 were in 
. direct, response to the incentive laws and other measures which the government: 
adopted to encourage the manufacture of goods previously imported and which, ■ 
as we argued earlier, threatened established markets in Nigeria and 
therefore invited defensive measures by the firms who had previously j 
exported to. Nigeria. We also argued that the U.K. investors generally
did not actively respond to this threat until after independence. It seems ]
that the United Africa Company Ltd was an exception. This is not strange. j
As a subsidiary of the Unilever group, the company was. merely following the
. ■ ■ ■ i
Unileres/sgSmeral policy of tariff jumping. .
The UAC stated that all the capital it invested in the projects was j
generated within Nigeria, that no fresh funds were involved and that much I
' ' " ‘ ’ ■ - 2
of it was withdrawn from other sectors. ,The following table shows the 1 
company!s capital expenditure between 1951 and 1961, the last date for 
which published figures are available. It shows that the cumulative capital j
expenditure on industry during (ihe decade amounted to 51*4^ of total j
capital expenditure] compared with 49?^  for commerce and ,13fo for transport.
Apart from 1959 and 1961 when it exceeded £lin, capital,, expenditure on |
industry averaged £0.5m annually over the decade compared with an annual 
average of about £lm for commerce. There is thus no support for the j
I' ’ ’ 1 
Statement in the "New- Source of Strength*1 that because of redeployment *
. . ‘ ' ' - , ‘ h 4-' * ‘ I
• * , •!
11 there has been a decline in the amount of capital employed by the UAC ,
Group in financing trade, and a marked increase in the amount of money
" ' ' ’ 3
invested in all the apparatus of industry**. On the contrary, the published :
figures so far show that capital expenditure on commerce has been increasing j
• : ' / ■ ' 1
since 1955 nnd averaged more than £lm per ahnum. between that year and 1961.
1. See above p. m
3:, .New Wall op.clt.
Private interview.
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■ Of course, the post l$)6l figures, when published, may well show a 
different picture.
Capital expenditure on industry is only one measure of the effect 
of redeployment in Nigerian manufacturing. By attracting foreign capital, 
redeployment helps to overcome the limitation which the shortage of capital 
imposes on Nigerian manufacturing.. It also helps to overcome the limitation 
on foreign investment in Nigerian manufacturing due to lack of adequate I
knowledge of Nigeria and her investment opportunities and the absence of well ,■
1
, . , ", f t
prepared feasibility, studies. With their long experience in and about |
Nigeria, the established expatriate firms have generally been better placed |
' - 'tL \ j t
to identify investment opportunities, and with their international J
connections have been better able to find and persuade foreign technical }
partners to exploit the project. Thus, through their redeployment policies, J
the firms do not only invest their own capital, in most cases they do it
■ ' . . • - ~  . ' j
in association with overseas partners who provide not only capital but j
also the technique. Additionally the established firms supply the J
knowledge of Nigeria and provide a liet work of distribution facilities to |
market the products in, and at times, outside Nigeria. J
This was made clear by'Mr A.H.Smith. He stated that generally the HAG j
• . ' -. ‘7 . ■ ' ' \1
develops industrial; projects in association with technical partners, generally] 
non-Unilever partners. “They are very often those with whom we already j
have some kind of prior business contact. The normal pattern is for the |
I
U.A.C. to contribute specialised knowledge of Africa and to play the part j
-  “  ■ .
of Eianaging agent, and for the technical partner(s) to offer the knowledge j
of the particular manufacturing process involved, for instance, textile 
spinning and weaving .... So far as possible, we follow the principle that !
all partners should contribute both money and some kind of specialised 
knowledge: we define ourselves as investing not just cash but skills in
our industries,: which differentiates us from the banking or finance
1 ' '' . ’ houses. In these ways, the redeployment policy of the established
foreign merchants' in Nigeria has not only attracted foreign private
capital but also foreign technique to Nigerian manufacturing*
' CHAPTER FIVE . V'V 7K  ,7 > :" /. r:':V.■„' 7 j- 
: - ■ ■'•;:? : : 4 THE: LOCATION OF FOREIGN MANHPACTHRING IN NIEERIA \ - ■'
' 7^ 7:.'-: 'v'; Introduction 7 . "*■ 7 ;,v . 77 7.7/7-'/ 7 7 , :7‘ 77?-
' This chapter, studies the location of foreign manufacturing establish-
ments in Nigeria* The main Tables on which the analysis is based are ’ ”
compiled -from tirosources* One is a written statement by: the Parliamentary7v77:; 77 
Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce Industries ih House ij
ofi Representatives in/March I964 ^out the mmfcer of i 
^ / established in Nigeria-Since her^  independence :in 1960.7 The second is the ; / |
Industrial Directory published by the Federal Ministry of Information* 7 7:J
: Unfortunately, none of these soiirces distinguished between foreign
7 and indigenous manufacturing establishments* I attempted, this distinction 7 ;7/77':|
in chapters 1 and 2 with two Criteria: ** the size of employment vand; the, name v 
of the establishment* These criteria are reasonably satisfactory for 
analysing the plants established during 1939/5^ because they were small 
,in number; the significant foreign plants were known; and there was no 
industrial partnership between indigenous and foreign private capital* The 
criteria are less satisfactory for analysing the plants established during 
1955/65 because of the great increase in the number of plants and because 7  ^
they were mostly established in partnership/with indigenous; and foreign 7 :; 7
: private capital, though I attempted to overcome this in chapter two by 
classifying as uindigenous1* any* plant where it is known that the majority 
of the paid up capital is contributed from indigenous sources and as
- "foreign^ * where the capital structure is not known and where it is known 
: that the,;B&jpfity of the c a p i t a l f r o m  foreign sources «
I have found the ahove * criteria iiiappropiiate for this vch^ter 
because, with a f ^  connected;with contractor - financed projeots, ■?
the investore have been left relatively free to choose sites for their ■;  ^ !
projects and they have been largely governed in this choice by economic V r J  {|
considerations* s--v .. /;;-Vr >•' ;::v /
'■ ■ ■ Because of the above considerations, no distinction has been ' m a d e ; j  
in this chapter between indigenous and foreign industrial establishments* :j
The chapter therefore examines the location of all manufacturing establish-  ^ !
ment s in Nigeria, indigenous as, well as foreign* This is not as serious a : v? I
limitation as it would appear at first:instance* Because-of lick of -:i
capital and technique, no manufacturing project of any significance has been :
; established;:in-;-Nigeria withoujlthe co-operation or participation of foreign ;
investors* Moreover, the foreign sector accounts for more than two-thirds v : |
■ ■■' of ^thb • ■paid.up:• capifal'• in;Nigerian manufsuturing*Thus although the loca-  ^i
: tion of alftiainf acftirih^^ it is
almost synonymous with the^ locationofforeign;manufacturing*. tHbi;  ^ :!
-v ; ^  ?sKbuljaVbe~;b^  •
' ,-.v The chapter is ‘divided into five 'sections*; Section one ,analyses the v 
location among the regions and: section two examines the factors responsible ; >
for this• The location. of the various industrial sectors, is examined in  ^ ; J
section three j1theIpcaf ion wi thin regions in: section four,.1 and ; the main V ;
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conclusions, are; sef down ^  y' :y /' yyy y:y..v y-M
v'o y:-’y y y ' ■ V-5'1'- 1 .yy~ : rSeotlonKOnb* y  ^ ,;y- yy'.,; •'?.'■■■'; yyi
■ -v;.yyy'' :-The RegionalLocatiori of ManufacturIng y;y-; ■yC,:
> V Table-?*! il Lustrates the location of mnufacturing establishments y 
y in Nigeria for the period 1960/64 ♦ It shows that; 244-i*^£ trial: plants were yV 
established during the peiiod ^and that;:29J? of. these plants were located in v
y v the: federalyTeimtory,^ 2yfoin theEast * and
;; ■ ,'6jf i n ; t h e : ;During the period, industrial projects were: established- ;
:/ at tjxe; rate p f ;5G; a -year* y Hcweverv: ih 1964>;alohe> ^ 14^ indusirial. companies j
were .registered: a n d i n  l965:* >Thusy a l t & u ^  .during 1960/65 206 : \ .!
, 219 !
iiianufacturiiig plants were established, during 19 64/6 5 ^companies were regis- i
:'yy tered* But the regional fereaidowh of these registrations^is not available* ; y  'j
y ,y> y  y y  yV, . Table One y / ■- -yyy -‘,\y '4, V •-^v^^yyyyy-y
- y Regional^distribution of Manufaoturing ; " y y y y  y'i'y y' y :'i
y- Establishments* I96Q-I964. : :'7 ’ yi'-V yy y,:yyyyy ’
Yesr v.“ Fed* Territory North East West Mid-West ;■Total
i960 yy;,■yy \i^2a"vy:/:-v'y''y^ .: :;:4:y,-, yy'-y.^y-1y'Ssi-
1961 yy:-:yVy • ’'-is'iyy;1 -■ y ' y ';7y.,.,y'"'v16y- .ylOyy y- v's-y 50
1962 12 ;; 15 17 "'y:'5 ;yyy 50
19.63 V;v 14 16 - yy; 8 . 14 v:‘;v3V - 55
I964 (March) ■
' 5 ■ 10 v . 10 12 1 38
71 :;y  yi^2: ■ V ■y 56 V 6l 244
^of-totalsy: -yy;'iT^ .''r 23*0 y 25.® ;■ 100
Source: Federal Barldamehtary iBebates.i, ■ ■.House of Representatives
y yoi 15 (b) ;i^ 64 p 1136. y yyy.y
Percentages - calculated from gif figures. Total wrongly yyy,;
. y  ^  the Debate cited. y y •;■ ;-y: \ y yyiy yyy"
y\ # " y , \ y . 'y*.'. ■ v. .yy. ‘
For maps see pp*577 and 578*
■;v
y / It is more meaningful, however, to analyse the location not just 
:yy:of;thp9e established /since Inde^ndence but of all manufacturing plants
employing ten or more; persons. This is: done in Table 5.2, which sets ;/ 
out the regional distribution of 1,016 manufacturing plants existing in I 
Nigeria !at the^: end: of 1965; ,It showsytllat the Federal Territory again 
leads, by accounting for 352 or 35$ of all the establishments, against 1'7$ 
in the West, 25$ in the East and 16$.in the North and 8$ in the Mid-West.
 ^ "yx"' y^y^- yyy Table 5 * 2 .v -y*; y y  y y y y  y y y  y yy yy - ’ ,;iy*yyy
Regional Distribution of all manufacturing .
Establishments existing at end 1965. :y.yy^yv&
Region ■ - 'yy'; ,'y No /v..: .■ ;y \'y yy.$-. of • yy ‘V:-""'"'y-v’?
;:y^ :V’y^ ='V;yVV 'yy sy-y ’ y yy’' yiiiyiv - y ' y ■• y^" ' ^ Total, y y y ■ y. ,;y \
, Fed. Territory 35? 34*6
vy  ”•y ^  "-west >. " y;>v;\,;y' , y y y  vr 170: . y : 5v ‘. ‘yir: ■•'-yy' y"
iyyyy" y ' y y M d ^ s t y  . .,yy-y- v y.yy76.y-:- '■. y y y y y y y y y y V y y y y y y : ;
.-•■vy; : y , Easty ; • ■'•••yy'yy : ;y y .y y y - >256^ ; y  yyyV,-:yyy-• 25.2 ;yy \yy'yyy "yy'y
•,yy;y\i Total South y-y-,. y :-"y-854:,- V < y  •' ' -y - : Vyy:
:"yyy.,y;, y,N6rth;y'-'y:^ -,y y y ;:^;^‘y y y ^ ^ ‘:.y y ‘ ^ 15.9 ■ -
y.'yyy^y' ."Total Nigeria - i,oi6 yy_, 'y;/y>;v'y‘i6o.oy:yy:-y, .'y y 'yy
Source j Computed from Fettefal^Mnistiy of informations Y
ryn;--.,.y v. yY y • y y ; - ' Y i h d u s t r i a i  pirectory l965• Y :.. Y ‘yv-y.
No meaningful comments oft the above regional distribution will, 
however, be worthwhile without analysing the relative sizes of the 
Regions ♦ This is shown in Table 5* 3 ♦ it shows that the North accounts
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or^over 79$ ^W  282,000 square miles of Nigeria1 s area d? 357^0° square V^ ;' 
x' milps^against about 8?^ in the East, 8$ in the West and 4/? in the Mid-West* ■ ; • |
The population of the North is also greater than that of the rest of the I
1 country; it ac counts for 5 3 *4$ of the total, against 22 *3$ in the East,
18*4$ in the West, 4*6$ in the Kid-West and 1*2$ in the Federal Territory* j
Table 5*5 j
* Population and Area distribution :inNigeria*:
Area ' fo of Popula­ Popula<
Region Sq* miles Total tion f > Total - per sq
',;S ,■ mile
East 29,484 8.1 12,395 420
West . . 30,454 8.4 10,266 18*4 337
Kid-West •;> 14,922 2,536 v 4*6 ; ■ 170
lagos Territory 27 ... • :V" 665 '7 1*2 : 24659
Total South 74,887 '^ 7 20*7 25,862 46*6 .
North 281,782 29,809 53*4 106
Total Nigeria 356,669 ’100*0 55,671 156
.,'v Sources Nigeria? Annual abstract of Statistics I964 pp 3 & 12*
■ percentages computed from figures * ;
A comparative summary of the above three Tables is shown in Table 4*4
 ^ It reveals a striking concentration of industrial plants in the South on the
one hand* and in the Federal Territory on the other* The North accounted
•: ..y;foronly 17$ Of the inariufact^  Opt swished between^ "
1964, and for only 16$ :of all manufacturing plants existing in Nigeria
in 1965*
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/vThissharplycontract s. tMtN:it^ only -21%
of :the land area and :47f°■:-of the population and^  ye'l?^ ,acb6hnted foi 8 5^>: of; 
the Industrial plant s .established between '1960 and 196 4 and for 64^ : of-., 
all the. roantdTapturi^  ^ sting..in Iflgeriaat:the;;ehct 011965* ,
Within the South,, the federal Territory^ having only 27 ; sc[nare miles of 
Iah$ area, and I 2f&r p$:j thepopulation,;!accounted for of the industrial 
piarits; established betv/een I960 and l964 ahd for 35/^  of all the- existing 
plant^ i^L't tbs Ohd vbf:;,I965’i-' ' Part two e^ ainines-;the Xrea&ons for th^ pattern 
■of-.industrial ^ distribution* ; "• -1 ■'] >.; I;! ;!"■ - . V - - ;;y V yyk!'■ ^  
’ v ' - ' J ! '  -  s ” - V / ^ V  !-•••■ •T a ‘b l e >^ » 4  r  V  ^ . v ’- v V  -■ ■. - K ;
Area* Population and In&usbries in Nigeria*
; v^Y, 3:965; • 1 • y~ - , . ; y /
: Region 1 . Area i<> y y ; yy /Industriesy *
;ylv r ! ; -/l: ' -• ! ■ ■ "y r;: vy I^pulation; V- 1960-64 ' ■ 1939-65
Southern Nigeria^ V'.22*4, v!: 25*0
V; r_\’ "* 1. ’*'•.
West .'25.0 16.7
: Mid-West. Y;VY /'Vj?y >'5.7 . 7.6
,< 5 Red* Territory;! ; y 29 .1 y y y :, Y 4 Y y
£>pb Total. South y;.-V: 20.7 ■•t.v Y . 46 *6 *:i'-vb2*8 i:’ 84.I
North : ! ; .17.2 y y Y - y Y ^ y
Total Nigeriay:! /;:y :i o o. % 100.0 • xco.o
Source;* fables 1-3•
Section Tiro,
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE REGIONAL LOCATION , - 
The first factor affecting industrial location in Nigeria is that 
there is no national location hoard to apportion industrial plants among the 
Regions* The Federal Government1 s policy is merely directed to providing the 
hecessaiy favourable environment for a free enterprise economy* Once an 
industrialist satisfies official requirements for immigration, visas, and 
registration, (if he seeks to he accorded pioneer privileges), he is free 
to locate or site his plant in any part, of the country* Even where the 
Governments participate with private investors to establish a plant, the J 
choice of location is generally left to the private investor* For instance, 
but of 49 industrial plants investigated in the Northern Region, the site of 
42 was selected by the sponsors-the private investors, and ^ by the Govern­
ment* These seven plants were established by the Government themselves • ^
If the private investor is thus free to choose a region to site his 
plant, he is more likely to choose the region where he would most economically 
manufacture and market his products* This does not mean that rational econ­
omic; considerations have always guided the choice of location: in the motor 
industry,Ford rs choice of Detroit because it was his home town, and 
Nuffield1s selection of Cowley because of his family associations have often 
been quoted*^ In Nigeria, the Nigerian Tobacco Company felt that to main­
tain goodwill with allythe regions, it was better to set up three plants one 
in each of the three major regions, although it was not economic to do so.4 
These, however * are exceptional cases* Survival of an enterprise and its 
parfitability often depend upon wkioh-oa? the original site has economic advan- ,
tages* On balance of costs and-benefits, the private investor has to site 
his plant where he thinks he can maximise his. earnings *
2* Based on ray, analysis if industries located in Northern Nigeria, as was
/■'/YYYY V 3*1
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'V-;> The second factor influencing industrial distribution between the 
South and the North is the economic advantages of the South over the 
North* On a “balance of c onsideratipnV, the private investors have f braid;
!; it y more advantageous to site their industries in the South rather than in
■ ■ y Yythe North# ■' These economic' consider&t ionsar e>. illustrated in Table 5• 5 r
< which analyses the reasons for locating 43 industrial plants in the North-
"y! ern Region* y Y^y;"; V-v.y'-y* t e y Y ’y : Y.y ,' Y 'Yy:; y Y y - y^;/ --yyy.
 ^ y -yY / K y yyi.yV.Y-Y'' Table 5*5
■ Analysis of Locational Factors of 45 Y
Y- - -^Yy YyY Yy;v;!;Y .yy : Firms in .Northern Nigeria y y y -> y y y;: :YYYy
yy y 1st FeE* 1966 y^y': y y :^ ;:-7 : .-Vy / y ^  y ^
;:.yy ReasonsYfor Locating* y YY^- ?:':yY  -y" ■ •, -Yy' Number of ytimeS mentioned
' y . 1* !"Market-. Y 'y y. yy y " 1 y ’.yY'-- Y;Y'; 'lYYYy y'Y' •' 35*0 yy.:
Yy,v 2, --Raw!Materials!'U ! y  !y!y:'Y'" v ; >:. -.y"';:25*0 •
Y ;!3*\ -Distiibutipn facilities yYy ■ ! ' E\ v'Y-y Y 'y^Yy^OiQ/^YYY y y y Y>y
■ ;.:YV4*;!:vWater'_andyP ’■ Yyyy';Yy y, ■ y ^ ; :,,y y Y Y - yY- yy-'* 7‘: 3U&P* ;;y '■ - v:‘ y v -;y
Y 5* Seat ybfyGc^ernment y y "‘y y y .- Y:-- Y 'V y -YY y.\Y'Y .. 4*0 Y., Yyy,-y'::‘
YY-; 6* Labour .Yy.  ^Y.,YYyy, Y.;- yy YyY;YyfY'Y yY yyY' -Yy- 'Yy
y 7 • : Govexhme^ of. ^ Y'y 'y yy Y', y ';YyyyYy Y’ CY;y ; "'yyY;
Total Frequency , 100*0
Source: Computed from schedule Is Established Industries >*Y Y.-
yy';.. supplied by the Ministy of Trade and Industly, Kaduaa*
(footnotes contd*) Yy :’y /yyY-Y yry -''Yyy, vY y 'y yYY.
2* supplied, by the^Ministry of Trade and';Indus't^Y Kaduna*; Y. ’y- y-;:yy/,
Y 3 * The United. Africa Co *Ltd* * Statistical and Econ. Review, Sept * 1959* n * 12 •
V :Y  4* : : A»N. Hakam*-op*cit«Y u*56* - , V-^y y 'y - yY;y /'y Y y  y  rYy; vYY'-YYy
zyd
The importance attached to market in selecting a site is illustrated 
by the fact that it was mentioned 35 times compared with proximity to raw 
materials, which was mentioned 25 times, availability of distribution 
facilities, 20 times, and of water and power, 12 times* The seat of 
Government and Government policy to disperse industries each was mentioned 
4 times* Labour was hot, mentioned at all* This confirms our statement in 
the previous chapter that no industry has been specifically attracted to 
Nigeria because of the availability of cheap unskilled labour•
7 ! Although these reasons relate to industries located in the Northern 
Region, they may be used to explain the regional location of industries 
throughoutNigeria for two reasons* They correspond to Professor Hancef s 
designation of West African Industry in terms of its locational YyYYY-—-■ 
orientationj5 and the priority given to markets and raw materials corres­
ponds to the ranking obtained by Mr Hakam from his interview of 68 finns 
operating in Nigeria* 6 In using them to explain the regional allocation 
of industries in Nigeria, wb shall omit items 5> 6, and seven: item 6, 
labour, because it is nil!; and items; 5 and 7 because ’ they affect more 
bitechoice of; location withihy a^  regiohYthan be^weou regions, which will be 
exajadned;'dh-secti6n!fbuf.*'''.^ / Yyy /YYy Y yYYYYYvYY/ 'Y/Y\;Y-y
5iY A*- Hance West African Industrys Ah Analysis of ideation Orientationy
! Journal Of Int eraation Aff ai rs, School of International Affairs* ; 
Columbia ITniversity* Vol 15 No* 1961* ' Y:. y-Yy Y Y/
6* A* N*. Hakam op cit* Y' - / - YYyY1/YYYY7y> y YYYY'Y 7/77'Y \u'y7; yy.YY'7
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Y y v Proximity to the Market*
Y / industrialists have given topmost priority to proximity to the 
market in selecting the region of their location for obvious reasons; it 
offers economies in production and distribution; and turnover of stocks 
tends to be more rapid - an important consideration in the case of perish­
able'goods* Proximity to the market is also very important for manufacturing 
if the product is made biilkier by manufactiiring, or if it is made more 
fragile or if ,it lb a service establishment• YJ;Yv Y:v.y'Y;y/,
In terms of the above considerations, Northern Nigeria is at a con­
siderable disadvantage relative to Southern Nigeria* This would appear 
strange in view of the fact that the North accounts for more than 33f° of 
the country'*s .populations this is so, Table 5*6* makes it clear
that the main. market is in the South* It shows that, though the North 
accounted for 5^#5^ of Nigeria fs national income in 1957/ the last year for 
which; regional/breakdown is/ available, she /accounted, foronly 29^ of 
total consumers' expenditure on non food items in that year * This compares 
unfavourably with; they Scnithv^which thbi^ it accounts for 47^ of the 
population, accounted for 7|$ of consumers1 expenditure on non food items 
in 1957 • The West accounted for 43$ and the East for; 27^* In concrete y 
terms, this implied a total consumer1 s expenditure of £4 per head per year 
in the North compared with ^ust imder £9 per -head per year in the East - 
and sli^itly more than £15 per head per year in the West*?
7* Industrial Potentialities of Northern Nigeria: GP Kaduna 1963 p 37*
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besides, per capita^ income in the North is the lowest in the Federation, 
at £25*6 against £25*9 in the East ahd £36*7 in the. West;; Y 4y y Y
The above considerations would not, however, have mattered too much 
were, the concentration of population in the North as thick as in the South; 
this , would have resulted in an overall buying power being greater in the 
North be cause of the greater^popi^at ion than in the South*:But the North 
is veiy sparcely populated* Table 5• 3>Y^o^thatythe North has 106 persons 
per square mile which is lower than the Nigerian average of 156, compared 
with 42O persons to the square mile in the•East, 337 in the West and I70 in 
:fhe>Mid-West*^3 ‘'/YyYyYyYyy yy ' Y , ' Y Y  ’ vyyw; Yy, yYYYyYy vYY/Y YY-'Y/Yyy Y
Table 5#6 y '■yYyy/
yYYYy*- ! ‘ RegionalYDistribution of Natiohal Income
y , \ Y /  y Y’ .Y'/.
! 0 ^  Canit^Ylxicome andY Oountaqr16 Expenditure on ? YY
Non Food items - 1957 at 1957 Faires*
Yyy Y Y y y /  ''-yy:.;' ;/Y: Y;,:-\ YY/y£m y.yYy;'Y Y.y.vy Y:\./ y Y"Y-,; ' . Y
Y;Y;.y, Item Yy Y- yy y Federation : ; _ Y-YY; North y Y.;• yyy West Y Y East Y y !;'■/
y.YY .y,,;^ Y--'- y Value ^ Value fo Value y-jj^ Value-Yyy °f0
National Income 938*7 100.0 474*0 50*5 242*2 25*8 200*9 21.4
P e rY C a p ita  Y yyyyyY .Y --yyy /V .Y y '/y y /yy ; ' ;yY yy ' y  ■ y ;Y y  YYyYyY, y  yY  'Y-Y ’ /
Income £ Y : Y-Y y Y2f7*6Y.YYy YY. Y'Y'25*:j6Y;Y YYvYyYy36*7 Y YY*v •' 25 *9 -: ■ ~
Coneuiners Ex- y-Y'yYYYyyYy' Y!Y''/Y y': YYyyyY'Y Y-YY y;.Y Y-'Y’Y •;
penditure Non
food item "243.0;A /iOO.Q 7O.5 29*0 ; 104*3 42*9 65*3 26.9
Source: B.yN*-,C;* Okigbd:Nigerian National: 1956-I957 '
■'Yy Y c’ 1 Percentage Ycaict&atedf^ v y y YY'Y
y;YY;Thus for Zeyery; brieZZpersd^ theY'sqtLare mileyinYthe .North,' there Y .Z 1
Y , 'are fouryih ltheyLast, threeih; the  ^W^Bt:'r:i-'Qpl- 'tyrp',\±xi the Mid-West, and; Y'^ Z'Y Y; 
y:; Y25>O00/ih the. Feaeral/,Territory * .While the most, densely populated area, in : ;Y 
. . the North is .Kano with 347 persons to the square miioj\’the- -most . thickly- 
y! Yy populated' area in the: Webt is^Ibadanywith 736 persons td;the square mile; Z.
and in the East, Annang andYQwerri have. i, 2ii persons and 1,071 persons. ; Y: Y 
respectively ;Zto/ the sqUaie./ mile* - It is these concentrations of population, : * , j 
greater; per -capital/income, and.Mggef buying power that gave the South anYY,; YY; 
economic-advantage /dvbr-the;^  therefore, %to;part> ;accounts for the Y
concentration of industrial establishments in the .South* y / ..:%Y; Y y / "/ i
Zy;; 2* Distribution Facilities.Y -v’Y' ’/■■■-’./ Y’- ’YY; y/YY.-y
Another factor in the explamtiph^is; the availability ofYgreOterY - Y . Y
distribution facilities/ in the. .Southsthahyinythe; North!a y Td,;an extentYthis/ Y ;Y;; y
.//. toy related tojyfche >: marfcet ,,f actorYdiscusspd;; above : theY.iharkety^y Yex-ist, the . i
y :y‘Y;;. goods/may be prdduced; but: if there are. no .facilities to make,, the goods : Y
yy y reach t ^  thenthe-productiph ;pio may come tb a halt. The ^ more, Y Y ; yy
; cuhcehtratedytheypbpulation,ythe YLbss is likely ^ to he the distributive, Y. y ; YyYYY 7} 
./ Y;y> : expence to; reach theYmarket* yItyIsZyBhusYobyious ythat;,theYspar^e; population. ZZ/ Y j 
yYy in; the North places her at an economic disadvantage over the South in y.y •'; YYyZyy/ 
Z ;y Y higherv dlstribiit ion, costs *Yy;Z y '‘Yy' \'ZvY'-/y; Yy.Y'.- YYyY; , ,’yy Zy . yAZZ/yy, ,Yy;Y
y Yy ; y * Inyaddition, Zthe /great/distance "between towns, in the North:is;mbre y^Z ; : yY y
Y yy/ ZprohbuncedYthan in theV South* y,As weZhave shbwh, Ythe; North; alohe occupies y ;Y 
ZYAy; Zfour-fxfths^of NigeriarsZland areayandZcbnrprises /hineYtimes the .size of; /Y.y ; ;:
Yy y; y either; the West or the East'* 7Besides ,y whiles the biggest province, by area, ' Y ; /
y Zyy :.:; yy ■y'/ • Y; -Y Y YZZ Y YZ y -'' ■ y Y • ,Y Yy ''-Yy YyZYY-'yYY „■ '• ,. • • ■.-y' ‘Yy undb Y-. Y YY- ' 'Y--‘■‘Yz'Z
;Y:Y //Yin.-the'fWeSt>/ib Oyo, with an area of 9>695 square miles,^in the East is ;/ Y Y;;
y  Z Y / 7 . .  - y -  y A A y  /  r y  v Y A Z  Y  v - r J a ^ A Y Z  I I
Ogoja, with an area of 3,876 square miles, the combined area of only two ;
Provinces in the Horth, Bornu, 40,584 square miles, and Sokoto, 36,477 
square miles, is greater at 77,061 square miles than the combined land area v 
of the whole South, which is 74*387 square miles# iii fact the area of each; :yu
of these two provinces is considerably greater/ihan:Aei^hef:^iiie; area ;bf/theYYy^YY
77YY7 East or the West, and more than double that .v‘'v'-YY;-../_/ ‘ 777;Y:.i
greater distances in iheYNarlhy&aA^^ obvious implications Zy
in terms of higher distribivtion costs both within the North itself, for 
*regional export«;V within the country, and for/'overseas''^ 'e^ ortsyZyYy.Y;, ’;Y;Y 
There are four types of distribution system in Nigeria: - /air*-Zrail, 
water, and road? but they are not all of equal reliability, flexibility^ Z ^ :Yy>-'a  
and cost# Air transport was found to be inadequate not only beeause of 
its cost, but also because its frequency and - /Y
routes is too low, resulting ip./unsatisfied demand;/and the type of air­
craft used is economically obsolete, thus tending to scareyaway, potential y, ? 
users.® Water transport is the cheapest of the other three forms of y 7 YY :/
transport at 1#7 pence per ton mile, compared with 2.2 pence per ton mile
for rail and 6 pence for road5 but it is limited in its use5 it carries Y/Y/
;/// only 6fo : of total freight traf fic in Nigeria ; and even this much is Yv/ 
z /,; Y,. restricted to the established navigable water ways which are themselves
v 8# Economic Co-ordination of Transport in Nigeria: Stanford Research ' /
Yy7Yy :.'^ -;'y iX h s titu te i'; l9 59 : p::-6 ' '7Z '/ / YYy/ yY/ y  . YY..y /'”■' Yy-.
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/ subject Zto the /seasonal /character of .the/’^ 7;er*^';* Y / a 7 = Y.Y / Z / / /
Y : Y / / Despite its higher cost per ton mile, road transport is more /; y ,
■ popularly Zused* It carries nearly two-thirds/of Nigeria1sZ total freight 
traffic and over■ 90% of the passenger traffic#7^ Here, however, the North 
is at a disadvantage relative'..toy the^  Soirbhyas/Table75*7* shows#’\£!f they A / // 7 j 
. . /Y 26,735road vehicles in Nigeria in 1963, the North owned the least, 6,120 , /A
// /;//'or722*9% of the total compared with 77*1% in theY3outh,yOf which Iqgos 7 7 • Yyi 
777/y owned29♦ 5%, East, 26 * 2|YandyWest 20*9%./ yY/7/Y'Yy ^ 77/7 Y./Y-a Y7/7 ■ Y.a/ - a  7 Z/a-/A ;
7 ; As Table 5*8 shows, road density in the North is the lowest in the / ; ! :
country. Against an overall Nigerian average, of /one mile road for evely Z Y
7 square miles of area, the North has only one mile of road to 13 square yYYYY'Y 
// miles ofterritory compared with one /to four /in the West, and one to two in 7/) 
.> Y r the East • ItZ has, in fact, been ,stated that the/road density in” the East and y 7/ 
z theTWest/is comparable to /that- in India and ZQeylpn;and:.;as-ythe" Table shows, Y-YAj 
it is twice that of other African territpries including Ghana and. Uganda. -
7 9 . /EvenZhere,7the Southyiis -atahTadvantagevy The /River Niger is navigable 7/7
A , / 7 /. all the/ year round only as far as ZOnitsha in the Eastern Region, some 7 7
/ 7 : A 2 W  miles from ^  CoastY/zjebbayin^ which .represents the extreme!.. //
77 7 . point reached by the Niger traffic is accessible only for some seven 7 / Z .7 7;
: i;-Y/months"/of the . YpieZRiyepYBen^ the coast to 77/ y
Z 77. „. Y U  for :67monthSydn7t^ _ YolaYand Garua, all in 7 yA y.
:Y// //the North^ for on3y/fourymonlh^  ^ the 4gear respectively.
10. Three factors' contributed to the rapid development of road transport,*
*>7 Zy Z.Y/y high/railway freights, increase in railway charges, and the desire 7 vZ 7/ 
-/ 7;y / ■ of the North to develop the 1 long road haulage1 as a third 7
-Ay ZZyY ./;. VZ-access-to/'-tbeysea^  ^a:-;;Y// -Y , 7/ZYZvZ'*'-//'!... 7 . ..7 YY./ * 77- - 7 7 YYY
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In spite of . the low road densityin the;North\Zrelativp:/tb the; South, nthe 
disparity is less, marked when related tq.Ypopdlation;' it becomes/even jess 
marked when aocpunt.Yis 7tafeen/;of*ythe ,!l,cw.er':71eyie'l of /economic development in 
the; North and the * lower7 traffic densities whichvthe 7rp‘ad's//haye/:tolhear1!/•?■*•
7 7 The-above seemsto-imply:;aperpetual disadvantage ^ in/road ; development
for the .North* • This point .was emphasised by the/Stanford Research, team, 
when it stated that • .the.lower ‘road/cle.nsity in the North ^ Id/not; a sufficient 
reason in itself f or/ an accelera,ted: ro^' pro^amnie >in that/region* * * i* w *to 
Ignore, actual / and potential traffic ■density; as . the/Zpriinary. zdbtprmiriant for 
road capital- expenditure would result in/a serious waste of Nigeria’ s/; .
;scarce investment resources * In terms /of/economic benefits derived .from 
tarred roads, it is preferable that traffic density' be theV/basic priority 
determinant of the hi$i\my/investment; pfograinme * ;/,,ThO;/higher quality,toad 
system/in Southern Nigeria/1 s appropriate and 'fprCjmany years / ahead it; Will 
be uneconomic to surface, the / same/ relative /proportion ofNorthern - Nigeria1 s 
road system, although the rising traffic density in the /Nortli will / 
necessitate major road^  iiiiproyementsn,i2 Tima:itYis.no^
possesses a superior advantage in this popular means' of transport but that 
there is no iimediate, prospect/ of the North catching.; up;7inithe.:>ineantime1, 
the poorer quality road 'in/the/.Nprth carries, potential. risks of more 7 
frequent vehicle; breakdowns andhi^er/and recurring.maintenance costs,
II* ;Industrial Potentlaiiti e s of Northern Nigeria* Minis try of Trade
; p 224;// ' <\,;7A //;-/ ^ Y/VrA/Zv 7. a > A/
12; Economic Co-ordination, of Transport: in/Nigeria; np ci_t p ;pp ,1414142
\ v a . . . . . . . . . . . V /. 259
.'/A and probably more accident toll, thus tending to increase the costs and 
- risks of operating in the North* ’ " . A '
The : railway* handles, about one -third of total freight traffic and 
/ : -less than-5% uf the passengor traffic* In the past, it /was the main .
: instrument through which much of; the country/was opened up; and in spite of
the availability of alternative.means of. transport, the continuing economic 
development of / the Northern Region !*is id a marked degree, dependent upon 
. • - the. maintenance of efficient' railway links with the, coastal ports11 .-^3 :
. \ . However, the railway is fast loosing grounds and its proportionate share 
1 . of the traffic is fast declining as alternative routes develop• .Moreover, ;
the; long distance from the; coast militates against, the ;North in this respect. .A 
For instance, from Nano in the North to. Yaba in the South is a distance of - .
about 'JOQ miles .and for some, items, railway freight between these two 
centres is higher than sea freight.from:Europe or North America. Table £^9 
illustrates this.
The Table shows that while all imports would bear the see, freights 
listed, those destined,for ICano would.-bear, the additional railway freight. 7
For such items as cement, salt, sugar and commercial vehicles,; the railway . - ./
freight constitutes a higher proportion of the value of the goods than the /
sea.freight. Naturally these proportions ape not/constant from year to 
year1, but. they are more likely to have increased than decreased and they . 
have obvious implicatiohs for manufacturing, in the North relative to the .
. South. : ,7 v; 7 : , a  A ' a A:-
One is that it weakens the competitive: position of industries 
located in the North relative to those located in the South when 
; 1*3. Industrial Potentialities of Northern Nigeria Kaduna 1963 p 219
•xii^ utactvirihg-^  is baeed ! on imported Z/raw materials'/for export Overseas * In 
suchoase s the; goods manufactured inAtb e North would bear; the -additional 
freight costs for the -imported raw materials j and the additional freight : 
tq.Yfhe;; sea if the/ mariufacturss are- for exports.# :As .Sir Alexander Gihhs 
and Partners,: economic consult art s: and- engmeerji'^observed in 1963! "wiien- 
ever imported raw materials are"predominantA'in';-'jibe •.manufacturijag process, 
the foregpihgyfreightA factors largely restrict menuf actures ih:Northerh Y 
Nigeria -'to;goods intended forlocal/Consumption;. ThusYNorthern Nigeria / ..A 
has - less Opportunity: than the other two - regions, to/produceimport /replace­
ments where the demand for; the . product; is. not / large enough to justify more 
than one or two .factories in the FederationJ 1 / ; :/;; /7 / ; y
Table
Alnland and A Ocean/' freight as/ a .percentage of /delivered cost . Z 
■ >  Y ‘ - /December 1956* Delivered Zcost Y  7lQQ% Z;. A /'/> /Ay yyy . 
aAA- , / Z / ICano milOsZ frqin ApapaY /A-,\v y' .77 ■ f. :;7y’YYA7
./ Item / A 7 Y  a >s -  *y / • Ocean f  reight' ' Yy/Z / / ’/ Inland^ Transport - A
;Z; :/•; y Ay,: y ■ Z.,y/,Z-:/"'A-- 7 •/. A7 Z %■ - ‘ ..-y ; A-:AAr'; ■:raii/'Zfreight'-‘% Aa A :
Cement y : : .:"/ / ” 77.7- . y Y y  23.6 y/ZAy.y■■■, 7 A= A-57 »X -Y ; • Y 7,
Flour ■ ’ ‘ ' 17.8 . 10.9 Y
Salt A: Z/y y,yZ ’A .7 ■■ >y y A 7 13 yAZ-YY 7 7 .. 7  ^AA:7NI;.2.Ay. .Z/A/: Y^Z,
/'Sugar y ;, 'Y-a.zY' A YYA; ■, Y A , ’ : A.y y. 7 8.2- ;y A:aA v A A/yy.yy ;Zi^*6 v;A7‘ Z A/Ay;
/Comercial ZiiiotoZr vehicles. ; ;yy ; :.y . 8*4 YA Z /-Z/Y:Y:Ar . 8>7 A Y
Gbixugated lroh SheetsZ; , /.A:A--Y . 4*6 / . .A7/yy AA..Z,: 6*9 Y ... y/7/,'
Cotton piece' goods Z: , 7 Ay ... .4.6 7.7 v:; 'Y Y-,. 2.2; ' :y.
Source: ,TJnited: Africa Company. Ltd: /Statistical and EcononTy review- / ,
' ANo# ,I9.'March; I957ivAP^ seZvi2*AZAi -:v7 ;-'-Ay: Ayv. iyyY/AAA,;^ .'j 7AyyAy-y-,-
 ^Thisbecomes /all. the more■ .eyi'deht'ywheii'AitAig recalled that Northern Nigeria,
7/ ^accounts for no more /than probably bboutone-third./of"the total Federal 
7 7 expenditure ;on non food /Items., .•. /The cost of fuel, \.power,v and the/.cost 
y > : of delivery of f inisZhedproducts tothe markets in Soi^hern Nigeria is 
/' /yAbikely:to'/be relativeiyhigh. A Consequently /it is tnlikely that such *
7 industries^.locatedin,Noitheih/Nigeria,.; will /beable to/capture a j
/ / ,/ significaht/ portion ;of the Federal market, wherev similar industries are ]
/ : : v already established in the other Regions In.mostcases industries based on 
Y; - imported raw rnsierials^  can only be set up in Northern Nigeria if thedemand A A A 
A A of ! the/Region/ i tself y just ifies such a//measure Y  cannot ■' : A/;|
economically . manufacture' to „■ sell in the SqutZherh- / that Y  f i b  7  A a . /  j
ZA A/Zbbances export^  to/hther/parts yof Africa /'aridoverseas A ■/ AY / : l
7A /A y^e;, liwiited • a But /it /has: been shoTO. that the/ pro spec tof Nigerlabecoming •
/A :; :!A’-the/;!Worl^ hopH: .'of. Africa/ in the evenfVpf aWest ^African /or/African Customs 7 /
Yy ; Union has been one of the ^ motivating factorsZ/for f oreign firms to elect 7 A /
to establish in Nigeria. It/ follows that /it is / in theASquth/./rather,ythan in i
a : 7 the: North /that; - they tilX, noitiail^Adhoose Y/®stablish ■feiryplants' because ■ Y i
A A . 14, Industrial Potentialities op, cit./ It must be stated; that the /long : / / / /Y/i
Ay distance from the boastycoiifersAthe/North :SpmeYjtteasure/of protection;A
■A v ZY.A against, competition from certain bulky goods manufacttired inSouthern ;a.aa y "/ 
A /, Nigeria since these, fOr -example,/cement and suit cases,Awill haye to
/ ;,y.1 / bear high / transport costs to - the Northern market. Moreover* /■ the high ;
.A;,/ a : delivery cost to und from the/North matters / less for products of high
■ / /a * ; /intrinsic: values in relation to the< cost of freighting them,./and/;in
Y/:/• a/7 ; ‘ / fact, /textiles, canned meat and shoes 'sell very well in the South, a 
/ ■ a/ Y 7//A. Despite. these, however ,Y the fact remains that investors do not look /
to the Nigerian market alone biit hope eventually to manufacturefor/ i
AY \ A, ’,, ; expprtYand./thev^ ebgr^ phical /advantage^Ofthe/ Sorith over . the North; A:; /
ZA-, remains a magnet/f/or investors to debate; their/ plant7'in Athe South.
y7Y'‘'7/7a' A y  A/Yy s;.;:Y y;y;yY4;7;Vy ■-■' ‘ “ 7 7YzYa 7/ ■ 7Yy7/7-Y/yyy' >;y/A/7;;yYY 242
- ,; of/South *s nearness. to the coast and the greater purchasing power: and 
better /distrihution facilities*-/there than in the North.
7 '-YY-y7Y/A -'7!; ; vA'AA'-Y-'-rA'-. A5'f-.Raw/Materials; ,Y yyAA., ZyYY'7.,Y-v •y. y/A'f/Ay./
. 7 7 Y  7,77 Indus trie s areZgenerally located near the source of raw materials 
A; A. /where pf oeessingA is necessary to make the product less Ypjerishablev or to :
YA 7 ;reduce; theysise or/WeightAof the Zproducf so ds tOAreduce the transport .
y. costs. Examples of thevfirst point include the canning of fish or meat, or 
ZZ: y YYthe' extractioh /of oil frpni/the/palm; f inaitf essential in
Z .■ ; .avoiding Za: too; high; free / fatty; acid content. Reduction in bulk fesuits from 
/ y the processing of meat,7ahdreduction inZ3wei^t frZom?prQcessihg/timber where 
A y A about 50% of the weight of the .log is reduced. : Weightreduatioualso 
77; / qcbursyfrom decorticatioh. of groundhuts*;ytlie ginning/ of cottoner from 
1 AAconcentraiiphof / /minerals •
;; y ;r Z7 In terms of the above consi&ratiOh, Aiik would appear at first that
// /: no Region in/Nigeria possessesYah bverwhelmihgZadvantage over, the others, ..
since each/-Region is Zay doiiiinant^ T/producer/Of /one orAmore Zagriculturalyor 
; Y / Y mine lal/raw material s’V.Y/ Table f .10 makes this clear. ■ ;/A dominant producer 
I : v means the producer of about . 80% of1 the. Nigerian output Of the product.: In 
VI - ■ /Y Z/fhis case the Nbrth is TfchO ydominahii/ producer;; of ycotton,. groundnuts/ chttle,
7 /77/ and hides aiid skins and the only producer of tin and; columbite.. The: -
YY /AMdAWestY is the/dominant "producer:of Yrubber and ;timbe/f; Z the ZEast is the,. 
y dominant producer of.palm kerne is and;palm/oil, .and of mineral; oi1Z and A 
yy/; natural.: gas, ;and. the possessor ofztheYputy/' mined /coalyin /West Africa ;y/and 
A y;/theYWest^ isythe doininahtyprodusefyof .cocOa ahdAcpir fibre;. /All the regions 
7 A produce b ^  sui tab le for the- tiles/and cement/;, manufacture ♦
v ‘ Yy .besides*: all - theyregibhs produce considerable: food crops for local A .;■; /Y :
7;/ consumption with the South producing more root crops arid the North more
A Ay cereal / crops. ATn gerteraiV theyNorth possesses,- more agricultural raw ;
A :; ^Materials and the/EasVymore mineral raw materials. Again> however, f A;
■y v processing ;ln the NorthAia limited; to the/Northern market ’ owing to the / A : ’7;
tbhi^ .trahspoit. costs/^  ihvblved;Yi^ long distarves which .also considerably .
/a; A / restrict the/Opportunities for processing1; for export* "The wide range of.
factor
Yyy,local raw: materials in NbrthernyNigeria: is a. favourabIe#vih/potential , ; ' Z
A; A; Y;7ihduatrial;develppmehtA. * 7A .butAas the/result of a; careful/‘study of 
v ■ ■ industries yin this- categoiy /tliat is, processing/ materials for export)
,: positive recojmendationZ for development is made only in /the. case pf hides ; y
A :■ and skins, where it isAcqbsideredy that the value of the export trade pan A :; /
A 7be//in^ rqVed/ by ‘better and ’ more/;extehsive use of tanninig in Northern Nigeria •; A;/ / 
/ instead, of selling the/ hides ALnthe raw sfate^  although the North /, 7
7/; Y POssbSsqsZ varied; local raw materials, the prospects for: processing them A;; a a a : 
for the export market are- not very bright:;"'whenAproeessihg is limited to7  ,c 7
77. /; the ;regionalmarket, the/South"possesses /advantage over the Nprth in haying" ?7 A
15. Industrial Potentialities /of /the Northern Nigeria /op cit p 59* 7
b 7 z z ;7j
a bigger market, higher per capita incomes, and better distribution 
facilities and this partly explains the investors1 general preference 
for the South to the North# 7a a a7Y'avA'' YYz 'Ay Z-Y//- Ya 7-7
7 7  4* Varying Regional incentives #
The overwhelming majority of company laws, such as company tax, V A y 
registration of companies and trade marks, incentive laws and immigration,
7  is under the control of the Federal Government that there is little scope 
for regional initiative through legislation# Nevertheless, the regions 
/ compete for foreign private investment through other ways, and these tend 
to illustrate the degree of aggressiveness of the regions in their efforts 
to attract investmentw For instance, after/the^introduction of the 
Federal constitution in 1954* the East in 1955 and the West;in 1956 sent 
; out economic missions to Europe and North America to attract private v yY 
investment and many more of such missions, and return missions have been 
undertaken since then# The North, on the other hand, did not send out any
16# In addition electricity costs higher in the North thm in the South#
In Kano it costs 2 Pgpce per unit compared with Id per unit at Aha and
A 5 Onitsha in the Eastful&X pence per unit in Lagos* 1 In the North part­
icularly , the cost of electricity is dominated by the high generation 
costs of the small diesel stations which a 
/ of A suj^ly arid by the s cat tered nature of the small undertakings which 
are characteristic of Northern Niger c#f * Industrial Potentialities
v / in/Noithe3ai Nigeria op cit p 207* Much hone is placed on the Kainji
Yy Daa)project to reduce costs of power in the North# But it has been
pointed out that. #,the commissioning of the Kain ji scheme will not 
result in any immediate or spectacular reduction in tariffs, although 
as time goes on such reductions will certainly be possible1 • The South, 
on the other hand, particularly the East, has its natural gas and coal 
which will certainly form the basis / for power oriented industries in 
.y7-the/ future * AE^eh is being/usedl^/ihdustriesVin the
z Eastern Region# The higher cost of electricity in the North no doubt 
reinforces the other factors already discussed and tends to shift the 7 7
7 a. ■ 7 . ■A bal ance in /favour; /of” / the. - South V- 7 7,77 Z a 7: 7'/7 ay/a 7/..//- - /-/A' / 7Z- . 7 /- -
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7 such mission until I964although, likev the other; re glons,ii established .
. a trade commission in London to acquaint'•,prospective investors with ,
; , information about Nigeria* It is z natural that :when investment resulting a a
zA.A ''ff.omysticii -missions.'/materialises-,; -it; is likely to. be sited in. the region-AY: 
Ay/,./ .which;canvassed • for it*1? a ' Aa A'aY a Y" A- -a/.-- Yy - - /V ;,a '■-'/■ ■ ■■:
A-a ■, YY . . /,/... / y/ Section Three Y YY'-Ya a' ...yy/';/;/ /,;;
- 777 Aa-'.YY; A - ■ f SECTORAL BWJ&DQ\m OF INDUSTRIAL LOCATION : YY; ' A Y  /
Y  -A Table ^ 5  illustrated the: four iminyqphBideratioh.i/which influenced
the investors .in their choice /of regions//in which to set their industrial 
■;• y plants * These factors also explained the concentration of industries/ in 7 
/ . the South compared;with the North. In this /section, /we: examine /the / ; A A-;
,-y a . specific,industries located in Nigeria because of the a/hove factors* v a^ a Y,
Since i however,' there, is so far no/power orientented/ indust^/ offaiy'r . 7
, a ,; significance' in Nigeria, and since distribution facilities are cldsely, 'Aa/;/;•;, 
/ related to the tiarket^■•.‘factor, we shallanalysethe industries in terms/of 77", 
7 ,/7two Ynajpr; factors, -Ymarket: and raw ' m a t e r i a l / ' aa aYA/A" /:
i 17 * The degree of assistance given by,;a; region to prospective investors in 
Y y .^securing:i^ igratipn--.qu6tasyand7;H's.ds„ or ■ ih/beihg-/accorded Jt;pioneer 
7 / statuSj generally .helps to. influence location/in/d/region. An . . y/a .
/ , illustratiqp ls./ the ./case;of Williams and Wllliams /sheet metal- 
: /y . y ; pro ject-/in.Port Haf court in the Bast. When the representative of y- : / vA aY
V A'.-y-. Williams and' Mlliams ar3U.ved inJ:^ Port. Harcourt ■^?; in late: : 1957/ahd y aA'/a > 7. a .//A 
,y: y hinted- that ;>another Zfifm.,wao interested inythe: pro jecf In anotherzy Y  A/ ///.//A 
A / // 'region",V'tii'e-7Easferhn'Minisfer -Commerce and Industries and-the 
yAy,\ yindustrialYBiigineer /flew tbylagos. t0ylodge;documents/for pioneer / /
'77a. /a Y - statusYahdZ/toyemphasize :toth<7Yeh i r a ^ t h e  urgen^and;,r ' a
// .' importance ;-of the'/project l/Even^ /established in a
/a the East* A . A A , A 7 ■ -.'/-•*•/■ a 7/./ /A' Yy' Aa'/a Y 77777/'a AAAy/.. /Y Ya:
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;Y:iV- 7 :7\ Market Q3?i^nte(f/lndustrie8*^ A a a Y7' a _77aa y Y^v ' ^
■\liS^ rKe.t'/oriented industries; account for about 50% Of manufacturing 
activity; in Nigeria, the other half being raw material oriented » •
Examples of market oriented indus trie s in Nigeria are food, beverages and 
tobacco,textiles and wearing apparel including footwear, clay, glass and 
cement products, metal/ products and machinery and transport.equipment.
aa Food and beverages offer examples of industries whose products 
become more perishable after manufacture and therefore have to be located 
as near to the market as possible#v Beer and carbonated beverages, on the 
other hand, offer additional substantial savings'in trcmspprty costs and 
the risk of breakages is reduced if they are manufacturied near the market : 
because the large quantity of water required in the manufacture makes the 
product' heavy in j r e l g h t  ^aud/therefore uostiyyto transport dyer long dis­
tances* Ayaiiability Of good quantities of water in the market area is 
therefore an additional locational factor* < To a large extent, these re­
quirements influenced the location of most of the food, beer and beverages 
factories in the country* Table 5*12 above shows that the South accounted 
for oyer 85% of consumers * expenditure on beer, of which 46% was in the West 
and 39% in the East* It is not therefore surprising that large breweries 
were established in the South,; ip lagqh,Y^a* a ^  Qnitsha*
These are pot only the centres of large concentrations of population j
18* Uftl»Sooial and Economic Council t Regional Symuosixam on Industrial 
Development in Africa - Paper presented by the Nigerian Delegation* 
Addis Ababa, I965 pp 2-5* l- a:A ,.Y /;Y7 Y Y Y  ;•AYYA.;.y / A 7 YYY’Y'.7
7 7 A YYYYYiYYYYY*■ Y’y;YY/A /A;Y. Y;Y A:' 7 A77 /■ , ; : AY/a 247 7/
they also have good quality water available for beer brewing. By 196O v."
these factories were supplying about a; third of Nigeria1s total: beer/con*? i
Z sumption,YYBeer'vahd. soft drinkf actori^ at Kano* /j
again/because Kaho is the most thickly populated area in the North, and at /
YKaduna because good quality water is available there and, as a railway junc- j
ZYZ:AA;tionAetween the East and the Northy Kadtiiia is an/ideal; distribution centre, ; Yj 
. The importance of the market in the location of food, beverages and Z- YY'YzY
tobacco factories is illustrated in Table 5*11 by the fact that about 80%
7 A/ of the plants in this sector is sited in the South, the Federal Territory 
, accounting for 34%* the East 29%, and the; West 15% compared wi th 20% in the 
ZY;ay Nortdb.7 Y vY a YaY- Y a ’YY; a Ya YY'a yYYYY. y/a Y'a " .Y/7,/‘a-’- ■' - .7 , YA.77 / A ■ A- YYYYyYY
Metal Products, .machinery and transport equipment 
Metal doors and window frames, desirable because of their freedom 
. Y from warping and from insect attack, are generally vexy bulky in relation to 
the space occupied by the metal strips and sheets of which they are made* The 
same is also true of metal drums. There is therefore usually a strong Y;
YY Y incentive to locate the factories. making these things near the market to 7 
economise on transport costs* Other plants in this category are motor 
and bicycle assembling* The chief argument for assembling these goods 
YYY ./locally -is almost invariably to save transport costs by packii^ ^
Y i ^ ^  In the space than a fully assembled product would occupy. Since 
A  - the /^erlulsYhhve therefore to be imported, espacially in the case of aY y 
YY.'' ^ohinexy and tranport equipment, the hihterland is at a disadvantage 7J"' 
relative to the coastal tc^ns in yiew; additicniai transport costs Y
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A  required if.’ the assembly/ or mqnufaciixrq/ wquid be ^  up -AZA-VA !
Yj country town. This-therefore is the/prihdip ZtheFederalA A  ZAA, a  Ah7;
7 ZTeiritbry alone accounted, for as/much as 59% °f Ythe establishmehts in the ;. / - ,
Y transport and ;machihei^Yequi^ent; sector,and for ;:Z'4I%-,:ihZthe metal/product 1/ A  ';/A/AZ 
.sector*// Lagos, ?• fegeria^s; principal portals in/the Federal; Territory; for YZ Z A
•; ; imported goods therefore *transport/;costs -/there are at a Mnimum relative jto : Y !
A  A  the other parts of Athe;;cb}hrbxyY It is.striki3^ZAow the concentration: in the YYy/Y/ -i
7 Ztransport Zand, mabhineiy equipment;/'sector/decreases, ;the'further..inland one j
Y; / precede; for instancethe\ West is /nearer’ to Lagos, and therefore tiaeSfthe j
./•V iiex$ bigger' concentration -,with 21%  and/the;Fast: nearer-; the coast than the
North YhadZI2%, against 9 %  for the North, /  The, North also at tract e d the i
:/7 least quota in. metaAprodYicts atYOhly 14%;agaihbt 24% in the. Bast, and ,21%
Y in the : West . This clearly illustrates/the .pqint -made;^ earlier; thaZt avhere ■ 
theYraanufacturir^/Yprocess is largely based onimporiedm^ the North
. is at a considerable disadvantages.. v /A/.;' a/v:A, A/ '■ ; A ’AZAA.
Y A  A ;a; 7 Raw Zi t^erlal: Oriented;liidustries. A  ;.-AAZ - 7 A  A A / A  A-
Z A- Yr Z /BxamplesYof raw materialoriented ^Industries in Nigeria are/'textiles’*- /, A; 7,77 
Y . timber, leather and leather products* -rubber ahd rubb^ products, Y YZ Z
chemicals, oils,7Zand: petroleum,^  ^clay and;cement /productsAAAy ‘ Z Y Y 7 A
A / y- As was /pointed out above, industries are/ attracted toZf avr material Z Z YY' ; Z Y, 
7. iZF, : manuPanturijig^t^ madeZ less ; perishableYZorAfausportZ costs v a. -AZ7
; Z/Z/are/:minimised1 by reducing its hulk or size*: TextileYZ^hufacijuring does/not 
seem to fit inti any of; this requirement because / transpbrt/ costs,, generally c 
A / form only Z a; small proportionof •: the delivered cost. However *''the; first,
Y/ modern foreign/fihancedYtextile plant,ln,Nigeria .was established in Northern
A -  / A C ' ' /  ■7 7<' : 2 a  ‘ ; ' ^ / :•■ 7 ' - A; : C C : *' A  249 . /
Nigeria in 1957 because the North accounts for more tharl, 98% of Nigeria’ e /;1
cotton output*22 Textile plants have also been established in all; the 
regions in Nigeria and by mid 1966 Nigeria had a total of 14 integrated !
textile mills*YZ Pne explanation for thisisthat textile manufacturing is A C
not nece ssarily raw material oriented* More important in siting the mills ;
C  has been A  the /a^ilabili^of W  abundant and guh^ Z
air conditioning, not, as is usual in the tropics, in order to dry the atmps- 7 
y < phere, but to stimulate the damp conditions prevailing in;Lancashire*«••*
A. unless the appropriate degree of humidity, is provided in the factoxy, the 
cotton m i l  spin and weave err»cticaliy.’’23 5Pable 5.11 shows, along 
with other wearing apparel, including footwear, thetextile iiidiistry could 
be better described as market as Well as raw material oriented than as purely 
Araw;ZZ material/orients is because the Federal Territorywhich does not Z Y ; ,:;
grow cotton but has the biggeasf concentration of demand in the country accounts 
Z for oyer 42% of the establishments in this sector, the North coming second
with 22%^agaihst 16% in the East, 14% in the West and ,4% in the Mid-West*
The savings in bulk and or - weight are particularly notable in the 
timber proces sing industries where processing often results in more than 
50% reduction in the weight of the timber* The biggest timber24 processing
22 * Nigerian Tradb Z Journal r Reprint SeriesZ entitled' ” Industrial Estate ■ 
July/September 1965 p 3* 77" ■' . ; ;'7-Z7Z'T :l! : y _ 7 Z 7 A A % --A  7 :; A . ^
; 23* : Nigerian Tra&eJournal October/December l957* - '
c 24* There were no wawn timber exports from Nigeria before the War; in 
Z.’:,.C7.-' 1965 2♦ 9m cubic feet of sawn timber was exported compared with l6*3m
Aa,,;.:;- -';'/cubic f eet - of ;5'logs*C 7;-7y':A 7;*’.7" -A; C C A  C  7:,-- 7vA:a  y C A  , 7 ■"*-
M b b  bb,, b b b  ■' ^  5 * : ^  r :: v  ^  '■ V  ^  ^  'l. ■ '
/-;:- mill 'ing&^er^ in the Mid-West which i s the dominant ;/Y'Mi :.ki
producer of timber 5 apart from two other ones at Ijora and Ijebu Ode 
:5:v/in ■ theV^st, all;)1ct!^^ are ve^rsjrallv j
.^-v^eatl^ rubber and rulber prodticts are definitely j
:< v- •■ raw material oriented* 'l?Jie^abieshows that the l\&d~West accounts for v.;‘'
■: \ 47$ of the establishments in this sector and the North for 2Q$* This is
because the Md^West is the dominantproducer of rubber and the^  North the 
dominant producer of hides and skins# In the chemicals, oils and paints ■ 
sector, including petroleum, the East, tops the list by accounting for 56$; C,
 ^; of the establishments against 24$ in the Federal Territory, 21^ in the ;
- V a n d '  $fo in the Mid-Weat♦ The coneeritration of-this 
sector in the East is because the East is the dominant producer of palm 
kernels and palm oil, and also of petroleum oil* In this connection, 
the establishnient of an oil refinery; is significant as it resulted from a 
contract between the Federal Government and Shell BP Petroleum Deyelopnent 
Compare of Nigeria,! ltd 11 that as soon: as the output of crude oil from the 
area held under Mining Lease amounts in the aggregate to 500*^0 tons per
with'';the"Ministerof;. Mine's and Power the \."j"
T economic feasibility of the erection of a refinery capable of suppling the
local requirements of motor gasoline and fuel oil^ provided the crude oil V ; v
is suitable for the p u r p o s e ."25 oii refinery, located in Port ;
Harcourt, and commissioned late >tn196*i,;;'laftherOfore- definitely raw 
material oriented• Other raw mtbrial oriented establishments include 
Vt- ^cement actories in all the regions, tim; smelting^ih-Jos :in Northern
;: v; , the Nigerian also in the; Northern : ;'Vt:
■< Nigeria* , ; ";V r.V
"b- ''.-vV j ' b-'*- ', " '; v’ . . ' • • • / . . Part Four* ^  - V-‘.' / 7 : - ; ;>y ■./•;_ „"■■' ;>' ■ -f
In selecting a site within a region, the same advantages Of proximity
to markets, and;raw materials, and availability of distribution facilities ■
or a combination of all, influence decisions* Additionally other factors 
come into play such as; the i^at^of Oovernnfent;, (and Government inf luence and ■ 
Goveinment.policy in the provision of industrial estate and infrastructure 
which affect the relative attractions of various centres within the region* / 4 
To analyse the effect of each of these factors in choosing a site within a 
region, we give below a further breakdovm of regional location;of industries 
: : C according to lhduBtrial sectors and in three principal. sites withineach
region* In each region, the regional capital, that is, the seat of govern-; 
meiit, and the .principal town or port are selected, while Mothers*' include 
all other sites in the region. These are shown in Table 5*13* ;•
■ i The influence";of the market is particularly strong in selecting;
.the Federal Territory, Kano in , the North, Port ’Harcourt;ln!the East, :
>' 25 * The Establishment of Oil Refinery in Nigeria: Sessional .Paper-.
I, ; 7 Federal N ^  77y . 1 \ ' ■ -v
252
and Ibadan in the West* The is that it has
all theyfaciHties :of a^Fe  ^capital: and. is the prinGipal port of the 
country f it is a primary distribution and market centre for Nigeria; and 
it is the^seat of the Feieral Government * Films, even where they establish 
in thh re^ons^^gehbfally^endeavour to maintcdn an off ice in lagos to - - y> 
facilitate port clearances and contact with the Federal i^thorities* y 
Besides, lagos and Fort Harcourt, the two largest ports in the country, have 
attractedymahyportbriehtbd^i^ as metalproducts, imchinery 7
and transport equipment (see Table ♦ Kano is the most thickly populated
area * in the North wi th a population of 547 persons t o a: square mile compared 
wdth the Rbgioha!- average of 10b -personsVper square, mile* It is an inter- 
national airy port -ahd attractstourists* fyItis nottfepi^fe^ surprising 
that about 47^: of all the 'industries located^ in ;the North is in Kano* V 
Similarly, Ibadan is the largest market in Western Nigeria with the highest^ 
population of 736 persons per square mile compared with the 537 average V 
•in the West* VA$b.in, because of the large market and;the attendant economies, 
in ' production^ in stock tuinover , and in distributi oh* Ibadan accounts f or 
about a third, 52*4$ of all the industries established in the Western 
Hegion* * j
In addition to the towns mentioned above, Kaduna has -been very 
significant as aii ideal distribution centre of finished goods by road and 
rail to all parts of the Federation because it is a railway junction 
between the North and: the East* Its popularity alsbyarises from the y .y 
presence of an adequate supply of good water required for such 7 I \
industries as brewing and textiles* It was, in fact, because of good
.7. 'V^ distribution facilities and .good: thatyKadtbia wbs selected -’77'777
for the first modernyand they largest'textile plant in West'Africa - the yJ yf.
y.77 /  Kaduna •Textiles7£td~ established ^ in- 1957 * -7. During the ;last\ seven years, V ’ ' 7 ;y  ■
/7:/>  ^ythis has frpni: a unit .of: 16,000 /spindles and. 2S8/looms to a :• 7 7
gianf/coniplex of .TlPrObo7Spindles7and; IVIGQ;looms ■Producing: ^ i^y&x&s of 
: cotton piece;goods per annum, Five more textiles mills:have since been 
7 established at Kaduna and 0ther fa ctories; there include/ steel products,7 
■ 7 : '• 'furnltdre . '-s'tatidheiy, reinforced/concrete; goods, beer; andmineral^  w a t e r 17 
77 ;;/4: 7^e/iSlute of raw materials,, is/sffon^ ^^  f°r' // ;>- ; t ; 7
; groundnut processing,. and for, the processing of hides andskins, since . 7 ;7 7 ,/y 
y, 7/ /:it-is the centre of/cattle and;groiindnut production in the North* / / 7 7 ^
7 y/y ^iinilariy Sapele in-ytHe/.Hid^ West'^  accchnith;/for 15 of the/51 plahts/for 7 iy; y /" ;
/yyy ■ rubber,: proce ssingj; ahdTPaniny'the capital/for 7E2f because /these- are the y;
77/7.; ybominahty.prodi^ ingycehtres/fpr/rubber'i 74‘;K'7//y;7-y7 7y7 •' - y/: -' ^/y/ 7 7'7 7:7/7yy 7:-
/- ;7 //The regional/capitai or /seeut of Governmeht plays animportant. part 7?; : /:
/; ;/;:yin attracting stichyindustriesy asypaints,;:;printingapd stationery, not 
, 7/ i;cnly/becauLse of , the ymarkbt to facilities,^ /but also in 7
77 - ordefto.be able bo ;hegp.tiate; dontracts directly with the headquarters
,7 7 -or Rogiohal; Governments * In this respect,7 Table 4**13 shows a large /
/ concent rati onof timber, /Wood - and paper products ^ printing and' furniture, ■>../: /
; establishments'^ih/LagOa, and in Port Harcourt in the East , / / /: ; / / 4 /'
7 ,r yy/What;7 however,yds striking/in; the/choice /of a /site .withina region / 7
is that there is, /in fact, few/alternative/ sites available within each .
• region, Ihis introdiiced/the greatest single factor in choice df sites ,
/ within regions - that of Government influence, ;'-.This^ ihfluence is: exerted /,
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throughVth§-cofficlai, desire;' disperse.' industries over wider areas \ : 77
. :7 ■within/the region, /through^hie provision: of industrial:' estates, arid through ; ' |
: Government participation in establishing ‘industrial .plants, . ; 7-'7> 7j
77 / :77Ail7thO •^ Regional/ G(r^ erhi!^ hts7 express the desire: to; spread industries 7" 7 7/y| 
. to as many part^ -of7tfre7 region as bossihle-and while no undue pressures- are7 ^
V 7 7 , generally brought to bear upon /prospeotive investors, some of the long; y 77 /// 
7^ :7;7 e^t^lished firmsylife©/;theybhited;Africa Company; to Tobacco/ ^  . ;i
,7 Company, liave adopted a policy of trying'- to meet this expressed/wishej? for ' 7 - - ■ y 
goodwill reasons *: Mention" has ?-alr.eady been made of; the /establishment; of 
tobacco factories in each of ..the^ .three-:;mihfregi'ohs7''by> the.vNigerian 'Tobacco 
Co vy Ltd. Another example, is the, select ion of Zaria by the United Africa 
Company Ltd for its bicycle assembly and toilet factories f!to suit the ■ 7 
(XJ.AvC *) administrative set up and to accord with .Government1 s - policy/for 
the dispersal of industry"*^ /7'7 7 - " 71\ ;\f r/7 / 7
Government influence-..is also; exefted/ throu^; the, provision of / * -/ 7.:
■77-7 v7'7177..,
industrial estates . As we pointed .out /in chapter of the main 7 7: *
deterrents/tofforeign, investment/in :the> ctoitry had beep the higi cost and 7. 77 
/ the difficulty of acquiring-industrial sites, The World Bank Mission 7 - ' 7/7
7;7/ / re commended 7the N^igerian7Goyernme2it7e^; to 7 use /their/power / of compulsory 77
. land ecquisitipn tp/pxpvide: industrial/areashnd;estates/with modern 7 7 .7 777
• - amenities such as .water,; powers, railw^Ksiding^/©W^v suitable for the /:7777 7 7
26, Theysaine^reaspn. wae/alao ;g;iye^ of liorin
for its tobacco factoryv it; v/ill be peen/that/since bicycle assembly 
depends heavily onimported/raw mterial, the additional internal 
freight from the cpast mayprobably/make the Zaria site, at the ,7 // 7 ’.
extxbme /Hpfthvappear uneconomic*,through goodwill reasons outweigh
erection of industries* Industrial/a^ in Apapa and: Yaba in
Lagos; at Kaduna Kant, Jos, Ilorin, Gusau, Maiduguri and Zaria in the' North; ^7// 
7/7/'at Pcri/pircQurt,7^a*;;^^ the :East^ and to
Mushih in the West, and some are planned in; the new Mid-West region# The 7/7 ; 7//
Regional Governments; generally take into considerations: such items as the 
proximity to: large markets and the availability ^distribution facilities in 
establishing industrial estates* - The shortage of capital and the few places 
v within the regions where these facilities are available limit the number of 77
industrial" eafcattowhichKcanbemotoecpnon&cal^p^ • •
tp-the/estates^with the 
7 most facilities • Although industrial estates have been provided in many
places within the regions, those sited at the re^Pnal capitals,; principal .
/ 7/' port, or town have tended to enhance the ”pull" of these areas as centres of ,, ■/
77 industrial concentration because they possess bigger markets and better /
distribution facilities• Accordingly, there is a greater concentration of 
.//:. indiistries in these areas than in other places within the regions* 7 This is ;7/7/■ 7:7* 
clear from Table 5*13* In^the./North, for instance,; aboto 47$/ofthe into 
establishments is located at Kano, 14* 2$ at Kaduna, and only 38*9$ at other; 
places# When it is recalled that Kano and Kaduna constitute an insignificant 
proportion of the area of the vast North, the extent of the concentration 7,; 
of industrialestablishments in these two places becomes: mre faring* 
same remark also applies to other regions* In the West, for instance, 22*4$ 
of all the Industrial establishments is located at Ikeja, 32*4$ at Ibadan ^
and 45*3$ iu other places within the Reg^bh* In the MidTWpst the ■■prppQ?tipjis:;\:;\-I7; i 
are 31 ♦ 6$ in Benin, the regional capital, 39*5$ in Sapele, the principal 77/7
//town*v,fliP4 only 28*9^ In the East 27$ of all the 7 : 7
A^ . esta^lrshmehtb is at tort/Harcburt, 14*8$ at Ehugu,7 
'■">/ and 58*2$ in other parts of the East* In terms of these ff^uree,^it does j
seem that industrial location is more dispersed in the East than in the-/ - !
7. { West, and more dispersed, in the South 'as a whole thah/Ah the North* In I
7 7:4 fact, apart from the ^ Midwest Region, the North has the lowest proportion i
of industries located in places other than the regional capital or the 7
'■ principal town• This proportion is 38*9$ compared with 45*3$ in the West, 7
and 58*2$ in the East*. V ; ;7/ ;7- :
In view of the attractions of the principal town or the regional 
capital, /'it/cah^bnly/be/-expected that these places will continue to 
attract more industries until comparable Aa°iiities are developed in 
alternative places« This, in fact, is already happening in the Federal 7
r Territory* The mainland accounts for /about 65$ of all theindustfies estab- 
/ lished in the Federal Territo2^7iNoweyer,7foiIowIng congestibn/and high priwes 
7; of land in the mainland, the Yaba Estates developed and, like those in 
Port Harcourt, they have attracted many port - oriented industries such as 
flour-milling, warehousing, automobile assembly and bulk storage* The / 7 
Government states that thereishc^v^ industrial space available
/7 on the Apapa estate*^» This has led to cohgestion^and competition for
7;2I* ^/Nigerian, Trade Journal Vol* 13 July/September, 1965* 777/7, 7 7 - 7 "77/;
7:; the available * factory Apace/and .„tt> sharp practices , and firms have 7 ■ - / •.
been moving to other places such as Ikeja, with comparable facilities* j
:// Ba^mfpoihts/oul^ ^  .7-7-7 7 777
77;/i7:j^/bad';deals,;:i1i connection with the legal aspect of land in Apapf; and that
one firm at Ike ja had to move there for he acquired a freehold, in Apapa
only to have to surrender it on legal grounds at a considerable loss in
- . ..  28 \ ,-;7'7 :7.\/7'V 7/ ■ . ■ . ,/7.-: 77;/ //77:
money and in time♦ ■ 77-;^  >777 "/ ’/.-/.7'// ./v//
777-^ 7>;-v^/;/;/.;4oYe3^tot^i3^iuencev-'also-.affectS: the choice of a sit© within a *: ///7; J*
region where the Government owns an overwhelming proportion of the business •
This is more common with contractor - financed projects where the regional
Government or public corporation provides about 90$ of the cApital/and the / , ;i
7 foreign contractor supplies' 10$ plus the necessary machinery and/equipment ///■ 7 ;v
/;7i^er7opnt^ctor finance arrangement* Because the Government provided :. 
such a large proportion and because the foreign partner is more interested 
7 in the sale of his machinery, the Government is left free to choose a site 7
7;. 7/ for' the;'^ro3ect•/; The siting of Jebba mill makes this clear* 7 ■ ‘7/’:
The Jebba paper mill was constructed at a cost of £2* 3% 90$ of which/ . 7
! was contributed by the Nigerian Governments and 10$ by a West German firm, 7
which also supplied the machinery under contractor finance 7//}^
/ arrangement, The factory was designed to, produce writing and printing 777: 77/
papers, envelops, card-Tboards, corrugated boards, exercise books, cartons and
28* A* H* Hakam Op cit p 58* 7'77; / 7 /'77 7;"77/7..7 • ///./777'i7;-77777/77
b r' b  ' C ';b  7 7 ; / ,  ■7 .,;/: 7:7 : V ; /_ ■' ’ 7 . . ::* >';■*' ;7 . 7 -; , /■ '. 7 _ 258
,7: • /boxes^  ahd ./initially: all/ the/raw/'.materials had to be imported . The/mill is 
7// located at Jebba in Northern Nigeria* This site’ is neither near, the source 7.77
7 . of the raw materials for the mil A-npr-near A'ts7terkets ••: -The ’••mill ’• is based 7
7/7 on: raw materials imported’from Scand^ntoia/and, the main/markef -for the; f, - 7
- > products is7in the South;-/Lagos# /Yet/the ‘.mill As. sited in Jebba which is //;/
; abotft 250 miles/away Arbm /Lagos which hot only is the/port from/where the :
7; raw -mterials would; be imported but also the/main market for the manufactured / /
7 products#7 This means that7bhe:raw,'materials’*.M11*.'inciir the additional / ’77/7 
greight/cost/from Lagos fo/Jebba; and /the finished product will, similarly; ,/7 ■ •
/:/ incur/the- cost; bapktovLagos, itsmarket// ..// / // 7 .^/ "/■■ v;///; //.7 7': 7- /
77. :/7/!'';The/A6pIsioh ’to establish a paper; mill in Nigeria was taken in 19 6 3 i
7. after'/a" feasibility: report by a West German consultancy/firm; but the 7/ . 7 7
/ economic soundness of the project would/.certainly have been improved if 7'/,.v/': 
;// the; mill had toen/bit ed/nearer. Lagos^ thus avoiding the Northwards. . 7 / 77 :;// /
"7 j ffeinting of wood pulp/and china.clay. and/the Southwards haul of the 7 7/ 7.7"- 7 
finished products# It is not, i*1 fact, ;:cleaf why the Jebba site was; 7'7;77/7/
7selected: it is certainly not Justified; on purely economic grounds; and it 7 7/ /
; 7 may be7 that the /employment prospects of the mill/ (between 5QQ-6o6/Nigerianb) "77 7 7;
; /influencedthb /Federal Government, in which the North is a^senior partner,7 7 7/7^7 
/7 / 10 decide on; the Jebba. site#/ ;--/, ;;/7 7 / . \ 7 / / 7/:;:‘V.-.,/ ■ / 7  ; ''-:/7/.7/7r-';:v
? 7/ 7 : /Another instance:ofpolitical/pressures/leading;/to /uneconomic.Aiting / 7: / / /:• /
;7 / / of industries is/theCement/.Company/of Northern Nigeria/Ltd#;/ Following, a -////fy" ; 
•7 // //full; stolofi’onsibility surVey into. the^/possibility of establishing a .cement , 7/77/7 
7/ 7.wbrks;A^7Northern Nigeria, carried.out: by Stanley/Engineering'Compaq ltd, - /7/'v/
7 7; an/Americdh/consultancy‘/firm,7several interested industrialists were 7 / //
minvited by the Northern Nigeria Ministry of Trade and Industry, to submit : 
offers. Three firms replied and theirofferswere imder appraisal in late 
1961 and eqrly 1962• V: "It transpired, however, that an agreement to set up 
a cement works at Sokoto in the North; had; been/sighed by the Minister of / 
Economic Planning in Germany with one of the throe firms r Messrs Perrostaal 
A.G*, on 21st’ Deceniber1961 *V Nbithern^Nigeria Devsdc^entofficials ex-; 7 
pressed disquiet that no technical report was produced until the 21st April, 
1962, and even then no financial projection or feasibility report had been 
s u b m i t t e d * " ? ? ;/;■A/y/.-V--,7/-77//C4-/7,;//■ b’v //;7 ;/ 7//■;7vy/774:>7/ /’’A;
It is clear from the above that although the feasibility report 
justified the establishment of a cement works in Northern Nigeria,, the 
decision to site the factory at Sokoto was not based On any feasibility 
study at all* When one was later conducted, it was found that good, quan­
tities of lime stone adequate for the establifchmtot of cement; works in the 
North exist at Sokoto,/Lokoja, and Ashaka5 but unfortunately none of the 
three deposits is closer tban72?G miles to the main Northern market, which 
is in the Kano-Kaduna. area and that a thorough search in that area has met 
with no supcess• ^  The problem, therefore, turned to Astudy; of comparative 
costs of production and delivery in the three areas* This was found to be 
£4* 12* Od in Sokoto, £4* 3• Od in Lokoqa, and £4* 18. Od at Ashaka*^la 
The result was that>. "on the basis of serving the Kaduna
30* AMite/Papfer;^oh the Military Government^Puiicy fdr the Reorganisation 
of the Northern Nigeria Corporation Kaduna. 1966 p 21*
31* Industrial Potentialities of Northern Nigeria op cit pp 125*
31a* ibid p 127*
area alone, the Lokoja site would have an advantage over the other twp.1^
■V have already however, the decision to site the factory at ^A/77y7
_-^©exi taken before this study of site was made ai^ with-7 
out any technical report produced. /
The question then iss Why was Sokoto so selected? The answer Is - , / / 7 / / 7 7 ’7^ 
definitely, political pressures engendered in this case by economic metooism#
/> 7 Cen^ xit factories had already been established at Nkalagu in the East, and 4 : 
at Ewekore in the West, and the North did not want to be left without one.
In deed it need not have been established at all, based on purely economic 
considerations, because it was found that a cement factory in the North 
would be a high cost one relative to that in the South, especially the" 1
East, owing to lower fuel costs and higher output levels; and "available y 
.7: dftta lead to the conclusion that production costs in Eastern Nigeria are at - /: 7
least £3~£4 less than they would be at a Northern plant.1133 put "the
Sardauna of Sokoto had, in many public statements, promised his people;a 
cement mill.**54 This is the main expiamtioh for siting the factoiy at 
Sokoto, prior studiesiof possible altexviative and moAe economic:
7^ :7/4sitds*/7./744 7:/77/7v7747u/77':. 7/7 ■•■7 - / ; 7 v//..7/
/Reporting on the project, a correspondent in West Africa statedi 
.// /"I fto mies/beyond Sokoto in the far Nor^x^ast/ofc Northern Nigeria, / / , V
home of the Sardauna, the Late Premier, you will come across the . ;. //
’7 impressive buildings of a vast cement works. But the works are silentf
/■ /7732* Ibid. 7 /7 . .  / / . . •  / ; ;7 , :/ 7  , ; ' / - /4:-. 447 A :/ 7 7 t , / / ■ 7 /s-; V4' /. /  ;" //V  7 / . . /  ’ ; \  4 * / 4' ■•/
33. Ibid pl29 ' 7/4 7///;/
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7 ‘7/3fiere:tob; no; workers,/ a handful/of/ Germto Aqchhxcians .a^ ait hew// / 7. 4 / / / ; /, 
; /- /iriAicLinery/fo; to A, yeaA/ago, /fora/brief /iAnie, the plant had worked; ,
7 77 :y but it was/found: that the local limestone' was too "wetnrfor. the^ 'machinery,: /
: - whi c h/ had / been ^ b r o ugh t across the 7 Sahara. At; great expence" b  : / 7 7'//
./ // / , The aboye two examples, the: Paper,Mill at; Jebba, andv the/ Pemenh/works 
at Sokoto are only iwo examples -td; allustratbi' -how * politicalpressures.^ye 
•^ \///;ied'-../to''.uneconomic7choipe/of^  Iccation,-for/plants.: "The examples; are/both/. J
; 7 /from the'/Nprtheto'Riegl  ^ /ecpnbmi'c,‘^e-toolism:;ls4/pp'ipft6n througbopt/the--j
v/ / 7/lfederation-and/this/has led-/tb/'duplioatibn/bf plants: in such industries4as: / ■ / // 7
: /: //v'cemehtv^beer/^textiles //f lour m  and/:tyres. Although/ the /; 7;
.;/7: Nigerian ,marRet; is potentially; toge,:; deitand for some items* is nbt/ i5nl^: / /// i
7; 7 : sufficient4^ ^ 7tp justify/the erection of .too many plants in one industiy. 7 7 7 /I
/// / Besides7 -Acbhom me^obrism carriesithe: dangers of splitting the. market-7//; //V7/ 
; into tiny* and uneconomic sectors1. ;Nigeria /hastremendous economic poteh-7;
7/ //,tials;her problems/ arp’/pplrtical hot1 economic* She "is faced with the ; , / 7
7 4 /. pfbblem bf/:establisMhg4pribrities/in/a ;pbliticar context. Should. natural 7/7 7 /
7 gas be further develqpedfA if ;Sc, even/more /coalmhers will/be thrown out, • 77 
, , " of work/ /Should Asabh’s; lignite be used by the new steel mill? If so,
7/.; :pplitical promises madei,h Ahugu vfill not be .met. Should the iron and steel 
7/7/. mill fbe erected in/the/Aa®t? / If/ so,^ppiitical pledges’ of the/ Sardauna/s 7 
: / /yN. Goyerhment will not /be/discharged* v And so /on’/.^ bpf the "right" political/ / , ;/
; 7 / solution^ can4be7fctodf and- if/priori ties can/be \ well/established and • / "; ‘7/■•>, 74
:/'>-/35r.'/7Rpli^c.s/-ih/Dbyeippinehti/'We Afri'ca ^ November 19 1966/p/I315.7 , / ■ ‘7 7//i
. 36. Alan Sbkbiski/pp/cit/p'v557:/4 77 ./■/7 ■ 7; / 7 ,, , ,74 7/7. 74///■ / ;-7 '■'77
/ 7 V v': " A' : ' " : 7 4 -3'77.7~; .7 4 7-Y -7 7 7*"1 -" '•;' -7 . ,262 ' 3 g7
" 'reasonably adhered to, there is no doubt that Nigeria will- be able, to/*7- 7. 7. 773
7 / r launch into asustained; economic growth in no "distant1 date * In -the, meantime, C: /;
; dt is difficult - to;{say ..whether all the industrial establishments so far ;/ •//
7/ established/ftutherYindustrialisationY and hence the economic, development, , 7 
.-■-;/// of the country*,/ Certainly the Sokoto .CementTforks so far, does not * * ; //
y 4 .  ■/, v ;'7 ‘ . .Part Five/ / / ■ , ■ •, 7 -v.; '3 7'4 / 37
73;-7 ’7;7/77 -7'$ :7 -' 7 7c :Q4N C LU S:I 0 N.S4. ■ - ; ■ 7; / ' ; ■ 4 -/ ■' 7/ -;, v. /
7'7 YTto iPcatioh of .manufacturing inTNigeria is concentrated4 in the South* 7
/ /Although .the4North accounts; for; about fonr/fifths of the.land area and: . a v h
/ ./ 3 more/Zbhan 53$ 7of the population, "it only .accounted for; 17$ of 'the industrial4 : / :7|
7/77' plants established; between i960 and March iI964? tol for' about 16$ of/all • 7 7
3/7 //existing Bianufacturihg.piahts . in Nigeria in 1965^ . Alhis4 compares unfavourably ; ;7
7 /7 /bpthvyith; the; ••South,' as; a; whole,/ and with! the East and the .West separately. 7. / 
;7/7 YAlthough the South accounts for :about, a: fifth of:Niferia*.s land area, and 7 7 
77 febout 47$ of/the population,/ it accounted for 83$ of the.Manufacturing 7 7 / . :/
3/7;.: plants established between-*I960'--'and March-;I9p4>, and/ for 84$ of all existing •"‘./.A;; y.,; 
;77// manufacturing establishnieiits in Nigeria in 1965* 77 / 7 = . . 7 4 7/; 3 ;
7/77 .; / //The main reasoi^ - for/this concentration/in the South however*; is the -^y 7;7 
4 7 /North1^/ long;distance/from the;cbast^ /its; sparse population, , its, lower level 7 7
/ of economic development and therefore lOwer per capita^  income, the long; /.’4
33 distances between ipwhs/inthe : North ,7ahd/its inadequate distribution ,7 /7 ;/
,; facilities relative 7tc ‘the'J3puthy//The3South,.. on the other hand, has 7 :7 777/
; advantages, of/pioximity to/ the coastyto raw materials and to markets, and. /./ 3
' - therefore, lias be11er access to external, markets than the North* Further, ; f ;7 .1
7;77;3fhe; South/S7market;la/Logger ,4 it4 is more thickly populated; it has greater . 7./ ■
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per capita income, and better distribution facilities♦ All these confer 
on the $outh more economic advantages over the North; and although the 
North has more varied agri cultural raw materials, their pro ces sing is 
restricted to the relatively smaller market in the 'North. The South, on 
the other hand, can also process for export because of its geographical 
advantages of nearness to the sea ain&to the raw materials and markets. 
Becuase of these advantages, and because the prospect of Nigeria becoming 
the "workship" of Africa in the event of an African, or West African 
Common Market has been a strong inf luence on investors * choice of Nigeria 
as a key global area, they have generally preferred the South to the North 
for economic reasons. 4 • ••:'
Wiihin the regions, industrial location is concentrated in the 
regional capitals , and principal port or town. This is more marked in the 
North than, in the South, and more in the West than in the East . While over 
61$ of all industrial establishments is in the North and is concentrated in 
the principal town, Kano, with 47$y and in the regional capital, Kaduna, with 
14$; only 41*8$ of the industries sited in the East is located in Port 
Harcourt, with 27$, and at Enugu, the regioxial capital, with 14*8$* In the 
West, the proportion is 54*8$, with Ikeja accounting for 22*4$ and Ibadan, V 
the regional capital, 52.4$* In the Mid-West, the proportion is even higher 
at 71*1$ in the regional capital, .<■ Benin, and principal town, Sapele. On 
the whole, while the East has 58 *2$ of its industries located outside its 
principal town and regional capital, the corresponding proportion is 58.9$ 
in the North;/45*5$'in,;the West, and 28*9$ in the Mid-West• 4
The reasons for this concentration within the regions are similar to
•77 7y/_7y . • /7y •’ 4y4 7'/ V  7\y-:"; y ■ ’ 377. 7 ’ y 7.. ' ...,y. ,, ‘ 7 7 ’7 4 264
7 the reasons: for concentration in the South, as compared/with the Norths - /;..3
;7Vthe/availability of large'markets, higher incomes, and;better distribution :7-y y/7 
facilities within /the/principal toto and regional capital than exist outside 7 7 
77;-7 these areas. The provision of industrial estates within these areas also- 7 7'. /'7/7 
7• 437"enhances their attractions relative to/the other parts of the?regions even , 7 7 y: 
t /though industrial estates were also provided, in some of/them. 7 This explains 7 
7 ? the/dominance of the Federal Territory in niany port: oriented and market4- ... ?: 4 7
7 Yoriehted industriesvas ^ able 1J showed # ' 7; ■■f-.y ? _. '47 7y_ _ y .377/7737.'
/,./ Aggr essive campaigns for, and the degree/ of assistance and parti- /7;7/7y7/
/•V -Y cipation offered tq.prospective investors, by the various governments also 77 347 ‘ 
7 to/, playdd some park in attracting industries to the: respective regions. The 
77 : y Regidhal Goveihments’ expressed/wishyfco/disperse industries; helped to . / 7 3
73 ' pefsuafe/some, large7 firms like the United Africa C03 Ltd and the Nigerian7 3  //?; 
7/ Tobacco Company Ltd to site some, industries at what appears to be iTheconomic ,3/737/ 
/.4 locations' in the North for goodwill purposes * Finally; political pressures / 3/
4 and,'regional4rme-toprism resulted in the//establishment of second and third :
.. 7 plants of an industry in Some/regions 7 and at least^two cases in the TKorth / 7 7 3
// led to7chosing uneconomic sites for a paper mill and a cement works. .V7yy77..:
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CHAPTER SIX
THE MECHANISM OF FOREIGN PRIVATE tWESnmT IK 
3 NIGERIAN MANUFACTURING * .
Introduction ' y7 .
The foreign private. investor in Nigerian manufacturing can invest 
either in pro jects which he wholly owns himself or jointly with Nigerian
private or public capital* Investment in wholly foreign owned projects
■7' ■ =-■ ' y . '' 'V'y'/y- ..
by private foreign, investors wad the common practice up to^early 1950s•
Since the late 1956s, however, partnership with Nigerian capita! has
become very popular because Nigerians want it and some, foreign investors
make it a condition for their. pro jects . This chapter examines this
machanism of foreign investment. It is divided into five sections* 7
Section one examines the evolution of the partnership principle and section
two its mechanics* It*actual or potential benefits to the foreign investor
and to Nigeria are examined in section three; and its significance in
section four* , - 4 '
Section One*
The Evolution of the Partnership Principle *
When the mission of the Federation of British Industries visited
Nigeria in 195 5> and found that Nigerians wanted and, in deed, made
indigenous participation a condition for admitting foreign capital, it
reported that, "we should regard such arrangement with apprehension" *^.i
During the F.B.I.^s I96I mission,. Nigeiians wanted to/know if it still
1* Federation of British Industries i. Report of the Mission to Nigeria 
and the Gold Coast* 1955 P 59* ^
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opposed joilit ventures with Nigeriansy /We told them that we were not- 
resistant to Nigerian, participate ■•/■In genera!.'United 'Kingdom .investors 
would welcome. Nigerian /private/ or institutional , investmeht in their7/4/ • 
industries"•2
777/ Tiiuh/while.' the -FBI/did not; favom^Nigrito ptotici^tidn in 19557 it 
had radically:/changed: to. favourihg it,/ofat least said so# What brought 
about this /change?. ' This/ig partly/ ih4„ response, to the. changein general 
world .opinion towards the under-developed, countries. : The FBI report, makes 
this clear *; "They talk of tha. winds change/which have b lown ever more7 
| strongly from Africa/ and Asia and from Latin America^ and even Australia, 
but they have hot' ended in. those cototries; : They have blownyacross; the 
seas:and.,have b een felt tpo - in /Britain , / bringing about hew relationships 
between bid countries and new, blowing. av/ay many .cobwebs of traditidnai 
thought: and. attitude * We, too, have: changed" *5 It /would -be wrong,' though, 
to attribute the whole change;/inattitude^ ;fe tois; political of :
; change" * V Behind it lies: •fimdtoeht4^ $ie®oh®^9IMtosons. which are partly 
. paternalistic, and partly due -to the’^ attehdant benefits h£ local participa­
tion. 7'73 ./ /;■'■■/-7,'- .; - /.-73777 3'7 7 ,7;3 7 /7 7/. ; v /-:/; 7/; 77'-/, 7/7/'//
7 ; The pat emali si tic reasonifs,duetothe change of opinion in the 
developed countries on hOYf best to help thetoddr^deve 1 oped'"c.ouhtries >to 
speed up their economic development- After.;the succ’essfui:application 
“.of >the /Marshall Aid/programme /to: resucitate the war stricken economies
2*44 F.B.l. Nigeria :to4Indus^trial/Eecdnnalssance, l96l ip 54. : 
5- ibid P 48 7 'AY//-; 7 -■ ■ ‘7- 7;. 7 7 7:.4 ; /' V; "7 ;• /;:3:;A: /
* . ■ I I M l  M i l l  1 • t , H ... ' . ! 5 ’ . , ' ■: ' * “
■7-/V , . ■ y. / ; 7/Y;/,;- . ,7■;.7 /:.^ 3 7-/ 3,">. 7''7 ; - - 267
of Western Europe at the end of the. Second World War, 4 it was felt the 
. same technique could "be successfully applied in the under-developed 
countries# This aroused great optimism, and led to a great emphasis on aid ■ 
to these countries during the 19507s • 1961  ^however, this optimism had. '■
disappeared and yielded to disillusionment*5 ; 7
Part of the reason for the disillusion was the realisation that 
. injection of capital to the developing countries was of little help unless 
corresponding technical aid was given#/ Though this was given, it was 
regarded as another temporary measure to tide over the period while in­
digenous technicians were being trained 5 hut the result was very disappoin­
ting and the resixlting disillusion led to a rethinking of how best to 
acheive the ob jective of accelerating the 'economic development of the develop- 1 < 
. ing countries. ■-//• 77-.. 7 ..:7----" 7 7 77,7 77, ...7 ' • .. ■ •' :
The results of this rethinking seem to be embodied or expressed in 
the Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly passed on 19th 
December, 1961, designating the 1966*8 as a .^Development Decade" and 
urging on member states to "create conditions.in which the national 
incomes of the developing countries not only will be increasing by 5$ 
yearly by 1978 but will also continue to expand at that annual rate
: - 4# For. instance, within 2-^  years after the U.S. had spent 15,000m dollars
•4 or about 4$ of her national income under the Marshall Plan scheme,
4 Indus trial production in Europe . rose by: 48$ and agriculture by 20$ more 
."7’ 4 than their best ore-war years. See A~.K. Caincross.-Factors in
JinnbnmT cs Development | London. I96I p 16. . ; f
5* -Disillusion on Aid: Barclays Bank Ltd,? Overseas Review Sept* 1966 p*l* . .
'v'; • V4 ' 7 7;7: /7'; : / / . 7 / - 268 I
thereafter• "6 Resolution further urged on member states to pursue 
policies that will lead to an increase in the flow of development resources, 
r public and private, to developing countries on mutually acceptable terms;
/and to adopt measures which will stimulate the flow of private investment 
for the economic development of the developing countries • Finally it 
urged the Secretary General to make proposals to achieve aiid accelerate 
sound self-sustaining economic development in the less developed countries 
through industrialisation, . diversification,, and the development of highly
productive agriculture #7 3 / - . . .
This last requirement was crucial, for only through it could there be 
reasonable hopes of achieving a self-sustaining economy* The snag, however, 
was that conventional aid is: ill/suited;to this task. Accordirigly^  emphasis 
: / was shif ted to® the role of private capital, without which /external aid 
"is doomed to be a costly palliative of indefinite duration*"9
,But this shift in emphasis coincided with Jhe emergence of self rule
6* United Nations Development Decade: Proposals for Action* U*N>: Dept of 
Economics and Social Affairs, New York, 1962 p 45*
7* Ibid p 46* -
.. 8# For this shift in emphasis see Emilio G * Collado i: Economic Development
through Private Enterprise: Foreign Affairs. July 1965; Sir Jack ;
7 Campbell: The Role of big business in the new -nations: Investment and
Development 0»D*I* London 1965 P 177* ; William Clerk:3Governments
not-Enough: Investment and Development 0*D*I. at p* 16* ~ ” ■
9* This was the finding, of the -advisory Committee on Private Enterprise / 
and Foreign Aid set up by the U * S • Government • quoted in n Safeguarding
qpfivate: Foreign Investment11 Barclays Bank ■ Ltd, Overseas. Review 
/ / ' /  November 19^5* P*l* 7 - 7' ' /- /  7 ,7 . ' .
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and ultimate independence. in the developing/bbtobiibs* Ihis^introduced4 /> 
-a new element into, the situation; •>-and?for/bbyxbus/reasons;4>,oth' the foreign 
private investors ;and the/developing countries looked at f oreign investment 
with some -suspicion.: '73-'737; 4'4 /7't -"v/Y/T ' 7 7 7 3  7;/ 7/.; ?,7-3 73
- The foreign private investors^ feared. a M  still/ffer^the pdfeihilii^' / v 
of nationalisation and expropriation withbut/adequate/ compensation,the 
prpspeci of loss from; ?/ar/ or rbvolution, unfair or discriminatory;'treat7 
mbiit by' the host goveriiment. which, though, falling short of. outright. v 1 . 
exprqpriation, would nevertheless constitute a. real undei^ining of ex-
'YiWhiie- welcoming foieigh capital, and/the' expertise 
which it brings, the developing; cpuhtries, on the other hand, feared that
their highly prised //independence V: might/be comprqmisod4with economiq . / . /
■ "4'74 7‘.:- 3/77 v' ,// 37 7 ■. .73- “7,3; r/f:. 3.3. 333 -73 ' '';3 foreign /
/domination or,/"neocolonialism". They therefore seemed to; regard^capital : •,
as a Trojan Horse 3■ In. Nigeria, this mutual :suspicion/of, or ambivalent 7'
;attitude/toforeign?capital was/expressed in a. statement/oh: foreign .// 3.
capital; by the Premier of .Western Nigeria, /Chief ;Gbafemi Awolowo,? early 3
in7l955.i x because of historical and empirical circuiiistances which 1 need 7
/not propound; in this address, ; there are (suspicibns both on the part /of 3the
Tunder-developed countries which desire, foreign ca,pitalv arid bn/ the-part/of!
the foreign investors themselves * Onthe/eve of / selfgovernment, 7 we, are /
atoious to be free fromforeigneconomic/patronageahd,. exploitation/ On
the pther hand, the foreign investor, having at/the /back: of his mind the ..
10V Other risks include deyaluati on of the host country’ s/currency, and 
• /. exchange control^  restrictihg 'or, entirely/preventing/expatriation- of '
'■'/• ;37- p r b f i t s / a n d 4dividends * 7  Y . " 7 / '3  - . 7 7 7 7 i ;;" /7  7 47 ; / V /3 7 /  / :v 47 7 :v 7 3 *
3,7/f 3 :.//■ v7/' Y 4 7';;v 4 ■ 7 ; / 7 ; 7  3 '/‘-"Y Y ; 4 : ' V 4 270
lesson/learnt at/great expence in; some other countries, n e w l y Y  7 7
attained to freedom/ wants to make siure that there are safeguards against 3 /
// ; / political control which is not always /.conductive’; -to business efficiency^
/ 7 ; , g^ inst^  ^.discrimination in the;-4mattor ? of/taxes, and against possible . 3
4 4, :exprbpriation 6r4co^iscati6hr of/his capital*!lll . ; ; 3 ; 3
4 ///YCoiit^on? the developing/countries’ fear of ^ economic domination, •
3 Y3-3 Arthur Gaitskell stafed, that ;i it is :a resentment which ;#d should 'be 7 Y 7 :
3 ; : / perfectly able to understand, be cause, under infinitely/le ss subordinate
3 circumstances 3 Canadians, French, and British Kaire felt'it against American^ j/yY/ 
-73; iwestn^nt ; ato within 'our-.-ownnations^ .'/materially backward areas, ; 3 3 . : 7 Y-'Yj 
particularly with /dii ferent- racial;' complexes asY for...instance, in/Quebec 7 / 7, 7*
3 //.' within Canaday/have,;bften felt it against their/more prosperous/, 4 7 J- ;;/Y Y
Y . / Y r /cbMpatripts?^ ?iAnd/:Barbara. WardYpoinbs,; out that "if we thirdi of what Y
"Y 44 , -General'-Be Gaulle. has/fo;.:say about American;
; v4 /■ developed French economy,. it is: perhaps4 easier to imaginewhat/readtoons ; Y 
/.;/ ./must f e in. a - country4 IikeSNi'geria;‘swhereV • oh/a; recent estimate, the 3 .; / ;
; 4 Ministers ;were confronted with the fact .that. 75$ of the industrial sector.//
37 ; ; might eh’d/’-up''/to^  They had to conclude; that j valuable’ ;Y . YY/
4 / .As the invfetmeht'WOiXld be,4 imchltothey wanted/it and; ready as they were 4 Y;
/ to give. ;eveiy'kind .of -tariff and/liaxe. concessions to acquire it,/ politically
/ .; YY 4II* 7Western 'Nigeria; Production Development FOard Annual Report1955-56Wb  v ":/”v 7';4''/y';'/-$:ya444:, y- yayyy-
/-; 12. 4 Investment and --Devei'ppment OBI op cit p 59
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they Could not afford any: to<^ /J4isp^portibn*'*^?4// / /
Justifying'the/'Foreignvinvestor's suspicion, Sir Jock Campbell 
pointed out, that "the ^ daunting weight of their economic problems makes it 
inevitable :thht many of the /new regimes, will fe/dirigistlJY .there/willbe , 
much state control, planning and yparticipation in Industrial enterprise*" 14 
He; was convinced, however, that "the flow of foreign private capital to 
the less developed countries would increase greatly* if .the, private, 
investor could he/persuafed to that in many. of these .
countries / his investment may be threatened by expropriation without fair 
compensation, or by other arbitrary action by the host government. 15 This 
assurance would not be forthcoming unless/the/ receivingscountry has /some/'//: 
assurance that its political freedom would not be threatened by economic 
domination* It was realised that as long as this mutual suspicion con- / Y 
tinued, not much could be achieved* A xvay must be found, therefore, to r
resolve the impasse* ,\.YYYY/447: ' Y Y ; '7Y// ■,, / ’,7- Y7Y v' Y/4 • Y-:_ f- Y
3 One of the methods devi sed was for the developing coiUitries b 0 give 
guarantees against arbitrary expropriation without adequate compensation• 
Such guarantees as were g Lven by Nigeria were discussed in chapter #&^?*
In some developed countries, like Western Germany, Japan and the 
United States, schemeswere devisedasafurther insurance against non­
economic risks of investment in the developing countries, such as exchange
13* Barbara Ward: Peter Bauer: Two views on Aid to Developing Countries 
. Occasional papers/No* 94 Institute of EconcSi^^ 19 6 6 p 2 3* :
14* Investment and. Development GDI op cit p 15* ;/> : :/
15* Ibid pp 32-33. . '"";\;Y:'Y;YY /Y;4/; Y '  47 ’/ -Y ///- Yy ?:YY-Y:
Y ' Y / Y r Y  ; :7 ;: : ■ 7  * Y - ‘v V y ' V - 3  Y 7 ; /  f - V  ' ■ ■■ ' 272
: : restrictions and natipmlisation without-adequate’ ■ cpmgehsation*.3 ..These'. 7 Y Y : ;>
Yl 7/ 4 national/ schemes4 were'/.' however^ limited in/at least two .respects. First,
simple, .insurance plans; for investment;tend -to be no more than disaster 4
3, ...insurance* what is required is a,method of preventing disaster* Secondly,
. 3 the schemes: were^  and are/one; sided: they'■‘•protect only the foreign investor; /^
/ -^ they do hot /allay/the. fears of/the.;develOpihg countries, nor do they 7..,-, 7/7
7.3 guarantee/that the investment /would/be. -of /the right "mix1* .conducive /to/ 3 / Y
; Y aY'j tfeirYecoi^ .developmentv^ . Romeo Horton, President of the / , Y r /
7^r;/7?.Bank/bf /Liberia, one© told.a; group of foreign industrialists!' "Bo not - / Y; Y. Y 
3// forget that/ ih<AffidaY‘/ too*/Save'--reasons- ;tobe fearful ahd suspicious / j / / 
Y of you. Let us/never forgetthat we, too, need certain guarantees from you*.,/ 73
, Y Y : Tlixs to as pit gxiarahtees and assurances is a two-way • street*.,,./The-..peoples v/ 7 
/ . 7/ ill Africa have had>;and; are/still .haying unholy experiences with members4 . : / / 
/:•• of.theY-'free. enterprise system-wifh members of capitalism, and therefore 
/,. 7 Y they are justified/in/beingfearful/and in requiring certain guarantees ;7-7/ 37--A// 
Y/'/7'5 frpm youn-.^ ,^' , /r 7 • •< /// Y74'//,.„777 ■ /YY^; . Y  .-'7/Y7- • Y7 . /feY^/v///
Political, arid-/investment ^ guarantees, because they are ex-post //
/ 3/ remedied,/and/becauae they are one/sided, have thus failed to allay/the '73/
V suspicions which /existYbetween the ^ foreigti investor arid ; the recipient / Y ■ 7/ /
/developing counts^ y. ://One can go on for ever justifying,the basis for this ;7/■ 7 /
7 suspicion, but it all adds :Up to the fact that as a result of its exis- 7 7 /7
;/ tence the "developing economies are being deprived of an essential element 7
v / .16; ■ y What -'Kind of /Welcome Awaits Private; Cap!tal?* Amerlcan Economic 7
/ Y /Y // /Y  Y  Report/Mar 7 / 7 .: 7 V3 / / - / _ /  • /3 . 77:.« v y ’ .7 7 / 7 , 7 7 3
y Y37y;7YyY,3 73- /,/y3-Y7;///Y /-/// 7 g y ;, 3/!Y'4-7477y 7737''y;;:■ Y7;;$//y;-34Y7 > Y ;. / Y  275
Y y 4 of successfulgrowtharid we in the West are tumble to achieve"that rapid 7
/ growth;in world trade on which our long-term prosperitydepeM Y 7
? disadvantages of; festripti^ ihvestmeto/iirthe developing countries are 7 /
greater for the poor cpitories, but/they are considerable enough for; the 
rich."17 The difficultiesof the/foreign investor are undersiandably great 7 -Y
enough ^ d  are; real deterrents. "Yet what a challenge to the question of ; ;7 7
ultimate purpose in the Western world, and what a risk if we offer no up
to date economic philosophy4to meet it. the red end of .the spectrummag 
seem better than :nothii^i^®Yry477/ ' Y- ;Y A;-7‘Y7 7 Y ; ' y 7* . ;-vYY- Y 7" ’47-'/"s:
■ The search for -the up to date economic philosophy led to the adoption Y 
of what feas been variously called the fitting ihfeppi»acb^:7(0i:''the: filling?* 74 77 
: in-policy.^ Briefly this means - that neither the foreign? investors nor y.Y
y the developing countries should insist that their own contention is right/y 7 , 7
and eveiy body else1s wrong. Each would rather adapt policies to accomodate 
v4 the view of the other hfclf-way: there would haya to be a 1 synthesis1 of 7 4
4:Y7Y7 view>to break the impasse of mutual suspicion. y :,/
, 17. Investment and Development Q.D.1. op cit p 12.  ' -33.  YY7-/YY/ /Yy-Yy.-j
y y  ;.i8»:''4tothOT;/GaitiBfeell:*-‘ Investment and Development op.cit pp 56-57♦
Y 4 .yy 19. Ibid p 47* /;"7777;.- 7/ 7 /?-/ Yy:'" y7:77; y/Y'Y:- vy :YY-/-Y:Y-. 7"-.' 7/ 7; Y  y.y: 3-Yy/
20. Ibid* /■ v Y Y'7. ’"‘-'‘YY ‘ Y4y - Yy/-- 4 . y;y.' ‘ .-Y.. 3 fY 477Y77^77/Y;
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, "One.form which this synthesis took, was the adoption of , joint
ventures <$£.. partnership with indigenous capital *. This r was/ expected 
to1 resolve the mutual suspicion^  hy giying^  the indigenous people a feeling 
of belonging that the; project in-.question is as . much , their show as it is 
of the outsiders!. It v/ould also offer the expatriate partner some feeling; 
of securityby being politically acceptable* We discuss below the : , /
mechanics of.this joint ventures before discussing its/advantages, in 
detail*  ^ ' . V'*'/' ; "//-
■; ' SECTION TWO* ■ 'V-.;. •:/' :
' • ; • . THE Iv'IBCHAIilCS Off LOCAL PARTICIPATION* : " . • ’W /-V/
// ' Three questions spring to mind in. discussing the .mechanics of local 
participation*. J With ..whom' ; does the :f oreign private investor enter into / 
partnership?/ Having chosen the partner, what are the terms 7^ /Whpi/holds 
the majority; interest; in the partnership and who ;controlsthe5management?; 
These questions are important, for; on them depend very much the/success / 
or failure of the joint venture* They are discussed in tliis section.
21. Other forms of the adaptation process' include the foreign investors;,
voffer of -equity shares, local registration of his company, prom®tion
: j;. of 1 ocal people in.management, withdrawing from branches of activity-:
; which are/ politically provocative or competitive/ with the local \ /. 
people and their redeployment; into the' politically'- acceptable sectors; 
patronising local contractors, local banks and local industxy, ,
recognition/of-trade xmions, establishment of joint consultative .
;//: committees, utilisation of /local raw/ materials and ■ complete refusal •
/ to participate';in local politics,. See F, J* PedleiJ/■ The Encouragement 
r and Protection of Investmdnt/in Developing countries, HritSish •
 ^ *7- ^ ------- r n-^H'T “ ■ • ~~ -------  .. . ■ , !---------------------------- — Trr--7~“ --------—.... . ^ -1. I--------------- — -T -r III I IIIII ■!!■ ! -----------  1- 1—(- ■
. ‘Institute of International and Compamtive lav/ Quarterly* vSupplementary
// /Series Ho* 31,19^2pp 73“74a :See also articles by Arthur tvaitS,ke 11,v 
: William Clerk, and .Sir1dock: Campbell in Investment and Hevelopment*'
: O./D.I. 1965. /; "///'v '-■■';//• V; / / ;/
J
v-,i d V  ,■.•■/'• '■•'V: ■ 1« The Choice • of " a Partner. v';\ v r. > :y dp'\ ■*. - d;-
:• P ;; ; In a; survey; of- British '.private'''investment in East Africa, it wasv*i--1,/ ;:/
V ; vp found that..generaJl^ British investors prefer indigenous private investors ■
: as partners, rather: than the public’-: development^ Agencies and that only . , ! ’ ;
i : ; .  as a; last result do they like to go into partnership,„with the Governments. ; ; : ]
i r ' Ih ifigeriay public; development agencies, such'as; the development : ' •
PiP :corporations,- are. almost synoiiymous with theGovernments since they i : v; ; ;; 1
; > operste With funds provided:, by, and carry out theigeneral, policy of 5; e : P/:
" Governments. The choice facing the^  .foreign'private investor ;ih Nigeria V p d'/PU
is therefore between indigenous private" investors or the .Government.: f , /ph’t y
t:; . The. ob jection to Governments- as; partners stems partly from an , ■ ■ -
; : ideological view - of what should: be’ the proper role of governments in v;
y ? > development . iThe,:traditional^vieW: is that it should be confined to the : . ‘ PPPy,
: provision of •iiiomaecessai^^:lnfrestructure add environment for the ; . - . 1 t ;ij
. operation of: freejenterprise. i-This,'vof -cdurse,’assumes that .private- ; : f i
V e3aterprise, will^be forthcoming to exploit available business" opportunity. ■ ; : .d;
. 'h i in,Higerials present. circximstances,^  and:in;deed, in most under- . /
IV ', developed, countries/ thip is“unrealieiiic as; far as industry, is- concerned. tv:v
The, reasons are obvious. By definition, under-developed countries are y
p P poor y; and the; resulting low per capital# incomes: lindt domestic savings - : v ^
:s / ‘ ahd'ience: the size of individual accipiulations; available for investment. ; :
: This, however,; does not.mean that savings dornot exist at: all, for, ;in ,;v't
?4 British Private Xnvestmeht:.in,.Easd.l_Afr_ica O.D.I. J - , V
; 1965 p 20.  ^ - y:vV/ P y  t"' ’dtv;-
many under-developed countries, the amount of capital available for 
: investment nis often/surprisinglyand inexplicably large*M?5: The problem
iis,that such savings as/exist are usually held in forms not generally ,
- available for productive investment. - in; driblets, in hoards, or invested - 
in real estate., ;To this is added the lack,of exprience and industrial : i v 
: tradition.and the that many manufacturing enterprises, require bigger t >
s P initial -capital Investment than the, ordinary indigenous private investor; i '>
;can; afford.. y ■ 1 '■
V Thus a strategy of .development which confines; the. Governmentr s role ; r 1 
in industry, to; the,provision of the necessary infrastructure will not '
"•.*be;:adbquate: .'or effective in Nigeria simply because there is no private
: sector available to exploit, the resultant Economic, opportunities. ,fIn -
. the circumstahces-ft,; commented the .World Bank’s report; on -Nigeria1 s. pros-V ;,
pects for developmentj ,Tindustrial growth will be slow and Government 
assistance will not be fully effective^*...... therefore the Government
can hnd will'have to; encourage and.supplement African industrial initia-- 
'tive» • ' The lack of adequate indigenous capital, therefore, makes it 
."easier-vto understand why African political leaders on the fhreshhold 
1 for the first time of independent development, incline to a socialist .
concept of society. The state represents at once a defence against foreign ;
, economic dominationan instrument (and. at first, the only instrument) with
- , ; W. ^amond: Development Banks. Baltimore 195?. ; ■
2*f. The Economic Development of Nigeria IBRD op cit pp 25 & 352
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. capita! arid^ personnel to; develop^an alternative locally-owned and 
managed economy, and’ a watch dog over development to .obviate any small 
. local clique conering the benefits'!,^ 
i'// ;, Here again,; .if development must/-proceed,; in deed, if the accepted
principle of partnership'with indigenous capital is to'be realistic , there ,
\:'/, must; be a "synthesis!* of views. The result was the acceptance of . .:
. Government participation1 o n " a r  e vo 1 ving;fun d basis*' whereby thegovernment 
' Uselis;-to: the; generallpublic; iis/ shares;in /the equitytof ^fche concerns: as . . .
soon as the indigenous public to-buy them become available', The money 
; thus released: is then used *to. found; br participate ;rn other; industrial I
■ ; v ventures. - By thus "rolling'’ over its limited capital, in addition to main- i
1 taining favourable economic -environment, ;;the;;;Government-’b/role ;in industrial 
: development -Would be.immense; This isthe;approach; adopted;In Nigeria,
; ; where ; locai^p^ticipaiibnl^ partnership.-.with'/the Government
' or v/ith .a; publicv development agency. - / - I j
; ; ’ ; ■ /Nigerians prefer ais^partners/ those^foreign investor^;who ;can enable .
1 v - t h e m  realise the benefits\they'expect; fromtiie as sociation.. ' y •. _ .-h
,, : ■ These are capital and technique . Broadly there are tvjo types of • -
. investors ih ligeiia - Europeans, including Canadians: and Americans, and 
 ^ honilhAropeans, -principally -Asians-and Lebanese . When the Advisory :
/ / Committee on Aid;to African business;men;considered these; twO: Classes of 
/// expatriate, investors for^  partnership in 195?» it:- concluded; thatthe; Syrians I
'/ 'and ,;the.Viieb^ es^ /did-/npt;Jqualify!; • Ai'though/'.they:• had,the':capital*,the':’‘
2$. Investment .and Development op cit v bo . : '
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C©Miti,ee. doubted if they had aiiy; superIqr technique to '•the'/.Afrioan^ ‘. 
sihce; they engaged -in trading :in the fie3:ds- in , which the African was most 
qualified v At any ra|e/ the Conimittee ‘concluded,/ bve*i if they had any / , 
such ‘technique/" '’-ttiey/would not .be-/prepared' to- transmit’ it to the African, 
because .they maintained a closed family partnership in which no.M stranger" 
would be admitted. "The case of; the European, expatriate'1/; the committee 
said, }) is/ different/ He has/not only the. capital/ but also managerial 
and/technical "skill;to import .to/;Nigeria. It is really to him that • 
Nigeria/must look for; partnership which' can truly be, of /mutual'.-benefit1>26.
In] conclusion/ it.' will''.-be-; s.edn that while; the Nigerian prefers the' ; 
European Expatratb investor/ as va partner because he: has/ the attributes / 
he. desires, the latter)s -first'^ preference5i s,,an indigenous private , /
investor./, Because .this has .inadequate;::resources, he accents partnership ;/* 
with the Government as a: last, alternative/ ; To do - otherwise would have " 
made the accepted principle ; of partnership with indigenous- capital; un^ - 
realistic-.local^  participation is/therefore almost 'tantamount to 
Goyeihmenb partnership. ;,.,/ ’./. '” ■. -;.■./ /-■/,. •' ’ ' ^
%•■/;./■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ • / B. Terms of Partnerships ‘1 ■
■ •■: / Problems: of "Management Gontrol. ■ ■ „-///^ V • ’• ! : r ■
,r\ ■/ /:v . v ; ■ Introduction. ';; ;//-;r:^' ■ / ■.;/
/ Partnership in business is good only /if it does hot1 reduce the , 
‘efficiency or profitahility/ofthe company, orv the quality of the- /
26. /Report of the,Mvisory Conmiittee on Aid to, African Business men
/ • ’■Iln^iiII !■            — ------------“----------------------- - — ““    ........  1 ‘    ■  
op
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'■//product; ;qr/seryipe\to/ the^  consumef * /This bp a/large extent/ /; :
/ ; . / /on/the‘terms of ■f he partner ship i / The greatest problem here is that of : -%/j
// •////management oontrol* ^Naturally neither^ si& ^ ouid .want to be trbated/as v-wi;
/■ / ; an inferior partner :in;the business. Orx the one^  hand,/the: foreign partner/ :// // 
;/;//;• fears that- if he^ roohcedqs;-Qodt•f614 t%the'. indigenous partner, (which in i ; - 
; . _ ; /  / .■;  Nigeria, is the Government? /unbusinessilikb: decisions: may be; f  orced; upon; " / ' ■  \  / j  
/,; him/ on the/other;hand*;the indigenous partner fears that- if the ;;/" /
/ // expatriatesi‘partnerhas-the/control^profit/considerations. wouldbe his *
/ :.;:// over-ridingconcern and thaf/this/would;ignore; ,sdeiai/knd political/con-* //, *'■
///i sideiations. - A 50 s 5Q ;arrangement on the - other; hand * has the- advantage / / ■
:// : -/ that neither side dominates; but, then, the risks of ■ deadlock/are great */ / /  ^ j
Let us assume, for instance,/that; each partner ;has very birongideas;on , ;//> / /
; / ,/ ;' hovp. the business should be. run. The■ resul ting impossible or impracticable j
? v ;ibf^atioh :woul^ operating' under divided control and/;, ; ; I
..^ rndxed/tlp/ channels' of cbmmdhd./ Such af^ wiil/neyer win :a war!/ The :///;/
; advantage s and disadvantages of eight, other /variants of, partnership - 1 / /
arrangement are illustrated in the TableM It, all adds up, to this; there / /
- can be no one solution applicable to all situations./ synthesis of views 
t aiti-interestscome :ihtb; playfor/any arrangement^ >/,. ///; ./'
• Partnership ,Structure in Nigeria./ : / /
// : /;/The;;aboye;disbussion assumes, of course/ that both parties; to the / : /
'jointv'.venture-have relatively equal resources, c a p i t a l , t e c h n i q u e ,  '//-//' 
and management*: / Thas ihhot the case :in ;Nigeria;where one of the- / / /// ■/•■;:/
/ /■ ’ expressed motives for seeking .partnership -jrith/'expatriate' business is /; /■/ •,
/to acquire manageriai technique and, expert!se *- What therefore has evolved
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'‘•/is"’that<-:naturally, 'where-.the project is predominantly foreign owned, the / / ;X7;'
. foreign partner7 retains management 7resp‘oni3i& • he- [also- retains it in , . ; / /!
/ the initial stages,-even\.wherev. the project;is eqtellyiowned or predominantly:' /c; ;/ 
Nigerian ownedj withan^undertaking7;bd:fra,in ihdigonous pepple: to take over I ; : 
management ,af tettiyS.pmetime» The s mission emphasised' -retaining management;;' : :?
/ 7•■//';mderiexpatriato control when it visited Nigeria in 196l.: ''We saidV that*all.•//.'- "/ 
7/ ; ; ■ IT;K/ industrial investors wouldibe/insistenfc on/refainingCmanageinent contiol, : \; •
A' and'probably7 most would wish to retain financial cpntrdi,;'Afhere /are/ already?:
;/ i'beil':vknown--.--casesv-where the>Ia(tfer;hias- not been pressed* r; The Federal and , /
. Regional Governments:all stated that they ;were entirely open.to .discuss anyv / /
financial structure which represented a real partnership betv'/ebn Nigerian ; 7 , 
i  ' /; /and expatriate partioipants^*?-7/.-:'.////^ / \r;.tA.c ...■/■;■ ; 's  7 ;7 7^s*':’■■'/ ■•/'■ 7- ’ ■;7//'/:
- It is therefore, interesting to examind7 the partnership. - structure j which . ; : . 7
has finally emerged from the ^discussions-1 \ih^Nigeria v ;,Bnfprb^ .p.
••v A/; /formation is only available for the v East /and tneWyept. .;/This;/ieysuMnari-sed •*.; 7s ;.
in Tables&*2 and 5* Table •^*•2-'.summarises-'the',structure ih‘-.Western Nigeria / ; 7;
s for .1.6 joint - ventures ^  in ihich/the. GcyOrnment; participated Where capital 7/ 7/ 7 
/7 7. holding is listed as ’others1 without specifying whether, it; is an~ expatriate. /
7 ; :A : or indigenous holding, I have assumed that,, it is Jexpatriatelybeld/ e.g. by 7/7  ^-A* 
A? ;.:/-foreign7-public institutioncuoh/as/the/Commonwealthf hevelcpment Corporation. y7 
' . 7. The calculation is made from a lisf/seht/to mie. Tby thefes$em^igeT±&
Ministry of Economic Planning, v fct represents^the/pdsi/tion on 31stTDec.I?64*7 ;/7 ,
27. FBI: Nigeria, An IndustrialrRecomaissahce/op p. -34* 7” , ■. /;7/ \,
281
Proje ots in farther ship aa at 3IrI2-64 * 7
■-b\ -;A‘ v Wes tern, Nigeria*. T' / /AA//;, . :  .:•
Name- of - firm / /Authorised Capital 
. ; . .£000 ■
6 *21^ . .69
Proportihate Ownership
’- a " ^ / a -/;:/;/
Foreign Nigeria-/,
I WesfvAfrfcah vBrewbrips" •, - /A/ 1,000.0, ;. : 30 7, 70
2*. GuihneS (Nigeria);ltd’ . 7//A ;/ I,HI.O' 7 ' 7> , ^0 . r-A.. 7 10
:3> Premier/Tobacco Lfd A: a / ;//;/ '■•A/7;:50.35!7" /■'-a/v 125777;; ;-.,4 75
4’. Nigerian Textiles Mills Ltd : A//- 500.0 A ';A75a su ■77; 25
tjy VPiio Plofects/Lid/ f/’= yAA. ////■■' ;A;;;250-ia's;c; / V-; .  85 ■• “A. 15
6 * The Caxton Press (W. A) Ltd / A/A ?;A': ;7200.p77 7; 7:707'/; : 30
7 *, 7;Buniop/(Nig)/ihdustfiQS7btd7 / ; 1,500.0 ; 7 7 77;'"/ 72 A, ' 17 7 28
8* Askar, of /(Ni^/Ltd; / ■/'■//' / '■ 4 77 7/50*07/7/-,/'-./A'* :■ 40 ;/ 7 ’ 60
9>/Sigerian, Mos'lfctq 7 & / G l a s s / / 7: - ;/'• 85*6 . ■.■■•>/.- » : -7 . 65 7 55
10. Asbestos; Cement ;Prpdrxcts Ltd , 7 < . 1,000*0 ■ 65 A- 35
il/7PrerSffest7-Ltd" //- ’ ' .7A s '/'-'■'■ "'7 723.0-7; A'•a-a "780/;,A-:.:/.A 20
12./Grittal Hope/XNig) : ltd . ;7 7 .A':; 16040 77- 7,„ 7;,a E 7 7 23
J3.i industrial' Enterprises' ’./Nig/ Ltd / - 52.74 ■ ’ 67 7 49
14 • Tower AlminumA (Nig) Ltd -' ; ; 165.0 77-77. "7 782-7/7■■ 18
15. Nipoi Ltd 7; : . ,/ - 1 *■i 7? / 50 ; 7- A ■ 50
Source s Computed’: f rom ; a list, sent to. toe; hy the/"•Western -Nigeria' Minisfxy of 7 -
777?/'/:' '/ Economic*Planhing*'.'•/,, . A/7 '■■ / 4//: h /a /-' A//./- ■ /7ua ;,~
Obviously; the structure is not immutabXel/i^ this in mind
••in/interpretings the-7trends-;.shqwn-::in the fables*/; , 7;7/
A/$abie two > shows that,cut/of: the 16/Ventures,,Niger^iani.ma^ority ;capital 
holding7ds;/only 'thfeev7that/50; 50- arrangement exists only in one, .and7that 
foreign ma jprity capitai; holding accounts for .the remaining: 12 /ventures /, ; 
foreign toajqrity holding in;the se 12> venture , range s from 6?^ tp: as much' as; 
9 0 ^ ; 7 A  / . .  • /  • ; V X  A - 7 - ;  : 1 - 7  ■ .
Table - three summarises the .position/at , the end cf:;;I?b5/fpf 14 , joint , 
.yentures ^ Eastern; Nigeria. 7,The caicuiatloh excludes, those f if ms where .; ;
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.the • '-relative.capital'. holdingsare riot 'specified* One "factor -that will have /
//. /toZ-fe/'borne/ ih/mind: in,reading thetrend in the Eastern Hegion is that the 1 
v Governmeht invests through it/s principal';industrial,.bank - the Finance ; ;:
• Company of pastern Nigeria.,Ltd*. This finance >company/is owned equally;by/ *•
' .the; Eastern Nigerian Government and the; CoMioiawealth Bevelopment .Corporationw :; 
It .was-not stated in the souree of the table whether the capital contributed 
, bythe -Government through.thid ihsfiWtipn/inciudesVthe $Qfa foreign owner- ;/;/: 
/ / ship of this Finance./company . / If it does , then the indigenpus,v:proportipn / 
of/the capitalvhplding as/s^own in the table, is accordingly over stated.
% Witli these observationsat,/the background, the picture that emerges from 
/the table is;that .indigenous j^jorityholding accbmits for:4 of the 14 ,. /.'
./ joint; ventures/ fifty-fifty arra^emeht for one, and foreign: rimjqrity ; : ;,•/ / ' 
/;;/ holding for 9 •/ •* bnlike the' West, /foreign majority holding varied from 5lfo 
. , / (We s t ,6^) to,. 80$> .(West \§P%) .* It would appear *from. -these - tables that the 
/■ : foreign partner/controls a higher percent of the -joint-. ventures /in the West,
///./than In the/East. /This becomes ali? the/more /plausible/if vit .is "remembered ,
/ , that table-t\vo ,1s more; comprehensive than table three as ./the.- former includes //;
<; / indigenous,private subscript ions in, the Nigerian ratios Which the latter,
■■/•:'A / -7 / /A ' / ;  ■// :-"’/ / - ' A  //• / '  •:/' v 7 /7 >  / A  , ; . / ’ :-!/ - / - made : _ - / / ■ / / /  / .>■•- .  " A • V / 7
-// table three, didnot.While much need nbfc be^f this comparison, it is
necessaryto: state that the urge/ for ..greater indigenous/ 'control. or, owner-., /
ship/seemfrtb^  Toegreaferin in the East than in the West ; that the FBI . mission /
found in I96I ‘that the:;East insists;that nitimate cohtrol and - ovmership;;
WQuId/hdye?to be/transfered to;indigenous. hands for 'projects/established ;
, in ^the East,2%andl;that fin,jointly owned/compahies in; the East)
the -Heads/of/agreement vahd,/'article's« of Association frequently set out. the
-• A^ 'Vtiining'^ aM.tHe conditions under which the Government: orthe foreign investor^ 
/will; .dispose of their holdings to: the. Nigerian pub lie" ;2%;Thir§e' comments 
; may be inade on the above analysis* The first is that'• the./Nigerian
Goverimehts; do not?., insist; on:Nigerian majority holdingin/joint-ventures *
. / Indeedy except for/pioneer companies. 'where indigenous owner ship/of; at least 
. /' 10fo of the shares in the equity is a condition,. the Governinents do not =■■
, insist -on "Ni^rianAparto '/a/qbh&itibji/ for'.foreign investorsto: set
;•/. '‘'up/ijtoufabturin'g; in/Ni^ria;. ;As/the Eastern Region Government/pointed/out, . ■
/ ■/// the posit ion. is that foreign capital/is. to 7be;,weico^d'preferably;" in/partner- ’ 
•v / ship with Nigerian capitai*; the poftion :aiioted to ^Nigerians  ^'being/taken up 
by the Government if the Nigerian private investors are not forthcoming, but 
/ : even /without local/p&'tlci^tidn^provided' that such/f ofeign^investorb offer 
. a .phasejLprogfaniiBe ;of ihtroducihg/idcal-capital.?? /// 1,/ /; / - A / /■ :/// , //
. A Ion insistence: on /Nigerianmajority' holding repfesehts/a , reversal of 
the position in the/Wept/7and;,;tlie/:East;:dn7 the ndd-i?5GVs,/Early in 1955*
7/ . Chief/Obafenii Awolowoy /the Premier /bf / the/ Western Regibh, ;ln/a policy/state-
menf de claredihat: a new ;enterpf i sbt ^ WesternTKigerie,. • w6ui<b' have
toarrange for/51^ of/the■capital to be /Iigeriah owhed.v This attracted so 
; mucli. mifavourable coimne2its In local and foreign pres s that the Premier/ /.
/ reversed the position/byyStdting that.. each business vent.Ure.-v/buld • be con-.
:/ . sidered;on its own merits• uThe impression seems to continue to linger ///
r, /; , in per thin' circle s". 4 he/ stated*. " that we, in the / %  stern Region do not favour
; ; : / 28. /Report/of the, 4fhf Cohferehce7bf:, leading ^personalities/pfEastern Nigeria
■ / / /-./A —  origin op cit/p' 8;* /;/;:'//'vS/>'v '"/ :/;//'/ ; ; ' ‘ :/.; ■'/;// _//;/■"■■■'-,>■ ;//-//' 7
' ///./■■29*>■/ibid*.;:,"/a/--.;;"■//.• / ' /-/v/;N;i_/./:;///.:// ,//'/7 / v/ '. . , / : - : ■-//////-//'/
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the, admission of foreign .capital; and that I, in particular, have .an,:':, -v. 
exaggerated idea of our wealth in this Region* Nothing would he further 7/
7/ from-^ the /-truth•. ,1 am! sufficiently^informedto appreciate; that one of the 
questions;which always/bedevils any.negotiation for foreign capital is.....
: the ratios of: capital participat ioii as be twe en themselve s and, ourselves • ,/ A 
I/(y experience is that misunderstanding^^ £^£mis-rex>resentatiqn always easily / 
arise when ratio of capital participation is discussed in the abstract. No 
s e If -governing person or countpy, nbt even an under ^’developed countiy - 
would like to be treated as. ah inferior in any joint venture♦ But the 
issues become clearer and each party is able to see much mare objectively , A 
the /^sition^whichhe ppoupies when discussion on ratio of/capital partici-
pation is related to a specific business^^bgositiqn.; /Each specific bus­
iness venture will be. considered on its merits^ and/the ratio "would be fixed 
,by?-a^ reemient; botwe.eh/us;;and;'-thb/pa^ 'ici'uiar/foreigir investor concerned
It is thusseen that the Western j Region Government originally made ;V'. ";f 
Nigerian ma j or i ty holding a condition for new enterprises in Western Nigeria* 
A/Men/this policybacI^iredVvit was7 .quietly modified* In' the Eastern Region, 
the Premier, hr AN* Azikiwe,^  declafed/ih;i?55 ihat niuchas the country heeded 
f oreigncapitai^^ ‘'on the basispf e q u a l i t y . T h e  implication
/ of this ,statement will7 be. analysed: later* ; It is enough to■: state here ; that ' 
it implied that it was conditional for new enterprises in the East to settle 
r for a 5Q;: 5Q ;basis with NIgerian capital. This policy was nqt modified/until
30. WNDC. ; A n n u a l ^ .. l955-56 :p ll* ; -v a S ' . V ;! A:
31. Economic Rehabiliatibn of Eastern Nigeria op/ cit p J,
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A  .//A;/ ' ... /. ./■>// ' A ,;///.
The second comment is that .the Nigerian Government^do /not 7 /-*/' j
ordinarily wish to. invest in industrial pro jects except when-this is very 
/necessary to cai 1;forth the7 accompanying.foreigncapitalpr where the : -
> project/is of national/sighificaricev- such as thC^oil.refinery. -The . r, A
fClibm^ /industrial/policy :m ^  "The industrial ■.,/•A/?
- : poiicy{. of the Government-is/to encourage private/enterprise in ail industrial I 
•.sectors'.. /Only/ in certain' chses /does^ the- Government; or its agencies/ part- *=/.. \ 
v ticipate . //There ' is no rigid?ihsistehbe on local /partiQipation/hut: the .,//'- /: I
;7 Government /may -Wish to /share'in the/financing of/pertain/large; enterprises; r ,.:,//!
// v ^  ^/specxa.1 ica^ iioe ;iio/Ablae :piibX±c^  Likewise^;Vfinancial ,  ^ ; A // : |
A / '^ assistance/in;the^initiationtuacl financing of ah/iMustry,7 either hy wCy, of :/ / j 
/A; / / / loan or direct/investment* may be given by the ^Goyediment/.where /sufficient; A : -7vj
7;/; ■’ * private capital is hot. availab 1 e,/. but here; again /the.aim/ isto/ supplement
A A/ / Pfeiyate enterprise /and/ not,/bp ii^pldceAit4 The Government /considers/ that A ; ;
. / /; industrial-development; is essentially s. field of ehdeavooiA for private , A / *
A/ .//A:7/enterprise andvthat/iMe/iuncti the Government is to ’provide the 7'-;-A//;; j
7/ ; essential facilities/as: thn^basis7 upon/^ic establish /;
:.,7:/ //; industries, / ■'^ Qwing-io lack/qf /chpital/in/the: indigenous /private sectore, / v ;/ / : - 
;/,. /.:;. the Government may ,/ippear//tq/have/greater interest in7the /establislmneixf of : //
// : A industries:^by/direct: participation than/might7 otkerwlse iaave been’thought / 7 :
/»-•// necessary. . This/ shquld^nbt/bex interpreted as a movement away from free. /
/ / /  / / / q n t ® ^  ./, /A /7 .  / / .  A / /A.AvA^/AVAA; v  /  \  V  / u /  p  / / _ \  -..-v / / / " A /
32. Industrial Directory,/1965 -dp Aclt/ii/// .A-,-/ A; . A//.//a//: ' /V \-A A
;/./■ • The extent of; the Nigerian’ Governments industrial investment is
■/.:. illustrated,, in Table ,$*4. .-J/hile?the-ratip, of foreign private investment to 
A : . total industrial investment; isA68 for the whole Nigeria,, 56 for the East 
and 67 for7the West,./the^  corresponding'■ratios, for the, Government are,. 22 for 
■ both the whole of /Nigeria and" the West; and 35 f°r the/ East*; 7 Thus for. every
/one, popnd the Nigerian Governments invested /in;Indus tiy,/the foreign private , 
A;7 /investor contributed about, three poitnds for the; whole Nigeria7 and the West 
■ Aa •//and’Tabout. thirty shillings in/the East, Three interpretations may be ■- 7 
--A/ : :advanced for the higher;public. capital involvement/ in;/industry in the-East 
, than in the ;whole Nigeria put together■ and/in the /West, A /;-?/!7 .v//;;/Av:;
7 // ; First, it may be the Eastern Region's Goveriment insistence on
equality;in joint ventures, upto i960, and on ultimate control since then 
militated against: the 7-region's/at tract ions for’ fpref^vpirivate capital.
As will: be .shown^  in fhe ne^ ct isection,. this may have been so up to i960 but 
/ hot; since 1960i The; second explanation may be/the point/ previously made,
A A . . that is (:the possibility that/the Eastern  ^fatio is ;^ over^ sthtbd'•by7;the/•/'..;
/ .. . inclusion pf some foieign capital/in view /ofthe: bwnersMp by; thp; CDC
: of the Eastern Region's/Indusf rial/Einance Company which is the/region1 s
A 7 main investment agency/ The; thiid explanation is; more plausible,: it is
that /because of lovfer per capita income*-’in/the;''-Eastl;/than/in the West,
=private7':ind'ivi;dualAacb\tmiatiphsJare probably greatefALh^;thp . West; than in 
/; 7 : A the East, In deed, until, the recent ’611/ and/ gas discoveries,, the Eastern 
Region/was -regarded; as7the /poorest member of the Nigerian EedemtiOn* . ,
, . This relative poverty /might /..have worked against; the East and favouredthe
./•>;. ’A West’ espebialiy/d^iihg' the cocoa .boom of the 195014. This will be discussed
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.able lhh
Eor elfin,-;. Government.: and Private Xrive stmenf 
In Nigerian Manuf acturlug, 19&3 »
. ii^ ii k h i  m i  i i M r t T n  i p i  i w i i  i m i i i m i i w h  iiw  i ■Ji tii i' i i" h nrrrf [t h w h i i b i h w i -m — rl— r-* " — r - L • ■»
Investing Body All Nigeria , East ./'/? • West; • - 7 ‘ • •v
. r " • \ v -h>* Amt • ■ - ' ■ fo. ' ///.XXAmfh/^  y : , Amt . //;
/X'/ XX/'‘ -/■ v’7’ ' ‘ .:2//;2y/yfm'r-^ t-.:^ V',7 ■■ " ! ///1 ,* •* ‘ K ‘* i■ “ ' '7' J-t ' ^
foreign Private,; 58.4 55-5 - : ll.Q- '4 66.7
/Public (Govt) v -a2;4f/:'- • 22.0' 6,2 -■ 35-0/ 21*3
Private (Nig) ■ 5-e 9*9 12.0
Totals 56.4 j;/ldb,i6-(V' 1/ 8/h .d00,0;r;7";y..,l^ V5v.:7-/"'' '100.0
■ ' - Sourcer Ohapteri ^ w ,;t ^  „ ■ : : ■
more fully: In the ■ next section;;:-Its!/re l^eyaha  ^hereiis V that in.; the* .circums­
tance of the East, if any progress: at: all had to he made|/ ;they;pubiic ■sector., 
had to assume a greater responsihiiity since becausehof:the lorn per capita 
incomes, Indigenous private-rnveetors could hai*diy^^ e.iexpeCted -ijh\'dO;mUcli«, 
As 'table §*4 shows, indigenous^'private'• industrials i ^  ,-the’lov/es't-
in the East ■- either; relative to Nigeria, as a whole*;/ or relative to the  ^ i 
Western Region;"• While-the^validityi.qof^.these^dhteii^retEtibi^'-is^limite^ "by • 
/the - fact that the figures 011 \diich ffcibi^  rela.ter t a/orily / one' * 'year,
‘ they probably more:/accurately indicate the ;'trend\\pf/;what-^ act^ ll^ ;:‘has 
^happened up to 1965,than what is likely totbe'pthe/-future’- position. / /-;/..
:/X ••"•'.The’ third comment. on the analysis of the financial structurO of \ -
partnership;.with; foreign Investors in NigeriaV derives/principally from h ;/■ 
fable $.2 ';11;;will/te s een that in seyen of the eleven companies in which 
the;:foreign/investors;;hald: the. majprif West .this holding
yarxed/.betw^ In deed, ' only two were in the/70!s, three • y: /'?
: V v X :> x v X :v ' X ‘:h ;  X - r  Y - x ’X  X ; " v : ' ■ ‘ X  X \ X  - 2 8 8
X  between 8$fa and 85^ a**d one It will he remembered that one of the / v X]
conditions to qualify for 1 pioneer1 privileges is that at; least 10^ of the :
7; V ; equity capital of the company must be held by Nigerians, The high percentage |
; i v of foreign majority holding ’in theVWest seeins to indicate that although ■ ;' ; >]
willing [to ihyest^, the foreign investors probably were reluctant to admit / J
indigenous capital in theWest beyond the minimum required to qualify for 
. pioneer privileges. On the other hand it could be a ref lection on the 
bargainning strength of the Regional Government, or both* If this does 
indicate a trend for the couhtiy, the remedy might be to raise the minimum 
p>' , statutorily required for' Nigerian parficipation• ;XX .X-: r.' '/■ ■ Y ‘X X X  X X X
■X.-^  other handy; dne of the foreign majority holding*
2 ; : exceeded; andonly thre^/were up.:tb; In these cases, Y however j there
; ■ kwas a definite provision for a phaseisale of the foreign investor1 s shares
to the NigCrian public, and, at least in two cases where the foreign ;;
/ partners: are HongKong Chinese, it was specifically provided that the foreign 
investor, dither/on requestX pr after;ten yearsx should s to the Government
; , such of his shares as will bring the.; Nigerian Government holding up to 60%
X \ \ . X -  o f : ; . i h e X i o i a l / j h o i d ^  V X X  X X X  ' X X X k X X  - X X - ; - ' X X ‘ '-•••. - X  X - X X : . /
X 'Finally, it is worth mentioning that the foreign partner is always
■>; : X entrusted^  with the management; of the concern during the early years, with
a. picvisidh that ] S i g 0 T i ^ be r a ^ d ^
to take over as soon as possible* No specific peiiod of tutulege is X  
X X ;/ \. stated in the rest of Nigeria. In the; East the period varies between three :
to five years* This period could be too short for more complex operations
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■XXX-”v;X-W SECTION THREE Y X  :-'xXX;;X'x X X y-X ■ ■ -X^ '' ’V>X x
V X X X X 'X :X  ;./■ -, Y V BENEFITS QFIO  ^  / ■ ^XXX' XYX/ /X'
A. Benefits to the foreign investor 
X;'X- r X’ XX-- ', 1* Goodwill X/ X yX - ' X Y X_.Y: X X ' ' X X
Prom the fqreign investors1 point of view, one of ’the advantages of 
local participation is political acceptability and goodwill of the Nigerian 
X Governments * , In view of what we d x scus sed above about mutual suspicions ? X- Y Y
y'kX between the foreign investor and the receiving countries, this is a very
: y important advantage. This advantage was stressed by the Chairman of the Yy Y
bnited Afriba Company (Nigeria). Ltd in his .hew Yyearmessage to- Nigerians in 
1966 thust "The TJ.A.C. Group of Companies continues to enter into partner­
ship with the Federal and Regional Nigerian .Governments and with companies, : 
having technical know-how, and in this way, we are both /stimulating Nigeria1 s 
economy and engendering goodwi 11 for our enterprise. The onus is for us to 
become ever more closely integrated to the local economy as a whole, aligned 
XX/ with its development and contributing to its advance. We draw on our V 2
overseas parentage and our international connections but day by Bay we are
XX;X Ystfehghterii]0 '6i^YrpotSY^ X X X  /XXyY''■■yX1' Xy XXyy 7 /
X X  x X X x X X v X x X ‘-ayX'y. X-' 2. Y Pioneer Industries yY:YY,J Y XX y . X X X X ,  X yXX
Goodwill is not sought for its own sake, however, but for the economic
X  advantageswhich f ollowifrom iti /One' of those^  ia thaty in man^ local
jX/participatioh; Is the oiily way to get a foothold in the countiy; such as those 
. seeking pioneer, privileges Accordingly this has been a great incentive for 
Y the foreign investor to seek local participation or for the old established
;,X 55. Link- - Magazine of the NAC Group in Nigeria Y61. 1 Ho; 10 Dec. 1965" P 3 Y
firms to offer at least 1 Ofo of their shares to the Nigerian public to
qualify for pioneer status. This is probably the reason why onlylG$ of
the £lm Guiness factory ;- Guineas first overseas factory in three centuries - •
is held by Nigerians. /fonte,/howeyer"'offer"moreXhan t h i ^  |
probably, not to give the Impression of being motivated solely by the
attendant pioneer benefits* This seems to be these companies (Table 2)
where not more than 20$ or 15$ of the equity capital is/ indigenously owned*
5* Supply of Contact Men .
Another.economic benefit of local;participation to the foreign investor 
is the supply of local intermediaries or contact men* These are cast in a 
number of roles, the most important of which is that of coping with offical- 
dom* There is so much to be done on so many levels, from obtaining 
licences and favourable interpretations of regulation andprocedures in the 
Federaland Regional capitals.to expediting goods through congested ports / 
and getting hold of a couple of railway wagons, that any access to 
Governmental authority is itself an important ’factor of production * * These 
services could, of course, equally be performed by 1 contractors*^who 
■ partners in the company; but this would be rather more costly, and at any 
rate, is likely to breed more suspicion. and hence be politically damaging*
On the other hand, local partners with local knowledge and able to get into 
■ , places where the foreigner canhbtY^e/adi^f^ly. we 11? placed to procure this
. . valuable factor of! production,, especially if the .board inciudes government
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' ; officials, or influential ,politicals*, and ex-senior civil servants.^ ' .
Y/Y -Y y X ; Y Y ,  :4*X Obtaining Contracts ■ X X .. . ;• - X  \ V.
The fourth benefit to the’foreign .partner of. association with in^v •
Xkx. digenous capital is the possibility of winning more government contracts
■ , than, would otherwise be possible. : This, is very important where, the govern- ,
. ment or,its agency is a large consumer of the product, e*g. stationery, or
a large employer, e*g. of contractors. Two/ illustrations make ’this clear*
. , The first is the.Northern Construction Company Ltd, a £150,000.
•X Yy. 4-0$) X'k'k - ; Y ; . : ' X • : -/ X  Y X; Y ,--Y;- ;X ;Y l Y
project owned^y the Northern Nigeria .peyeloprnent^ YCorpbratipn, ;^^ and / X, :
. 30% each by two British,firms, ;who,.sought the participation of the Northern 
: ; Nigeria Development Corporation because it:was hoped that government in­
fluence would be used to obtain government contracts*?^ , X ;;.Y X.x 
. X The second illustration is the case of two construction companies in ■
X Western Nigeria. - These/were owned. 40^ by Israeli firms and , 60%, bykthe; v
Western Nigeria Development Corporation* The partnership agreement expressly 
 ^.XXprovided that the W*,N*0*0/would ’’do its best to ensure that the activities
34. Other "contactM roles for local partners readily suggest themselves*
The supply of--/lacai materials.is usually best handled by local people: Y 
;v X sales ,and publicity require, local knowledge; labour relations equally .
X’Y X • Y X so* In deed, there seems to be a tendency towards a fairly rigid 
■ , Y • Y functional specialisation in which the Nigerian partner deals with the 
Y:,.t Y ylocal,, items listed, and the foreign partner deals with the technical
Y;, ?’ operations, management., foreign supplies,; and finance* The division is
YYY/ / ; not immutable. it, depends to / some extent on the proportional commit- 
Y-Y . ment on each side and on the terms of the partnership* As. a rough 
. approximationhowever, it. holds* Y . -
YY k;35 • A White Paper on Military Government' Policy for the ReorganisationYof
the Northern Nigeria Development Corporation* Kaduna 1966' pp 20-21 x  \y
i
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of the companies shall benefit from knowledge of local conditions kX 
and local sources of supply andfrom privileges affordedto local:con- 
tractors'* ♦ The W *N .D • C • was also expected to procure a let ter of /intent 
from the Western Nigeria Government -stating; that the majority of works not 
undertaken directly by the Government would be assigned to the companies 
by "negotiated contracts." When some contracts were awarded almost 
immediately after signing the agreement, the chairman of the two companies, 
who also was the chairman of the WNDC, complained that the work assigned to 
the companies was insufficient and therefore called upon ihe Government to 
honour its sicLe of the agreement• Thereafter, the Government "guaranteed1* 
a £3°ra contract to the two companies for the period 1960-1965* This was 
to be implemented by negotiated contracts for which no open tender would 
be invited.^ yThus nbtkohly were the companies gtmianteed;/^ work X 
over a period of 6 years, thereby facilitating long-range planning, they 
would not compete in the open for this work. The danger here is a X 
possible inefficiency /resulting; from the absence of competition,^and^the 
government is very likely to pay inflated prices for these;contracts.
'XyY YYxX ; ?..5* Machine Selling k X v^XXXy k 7 ; 7-
Increased facility for machine selling is another advantage of local 
partnership forkther/foreign private inybetOiX ; Allkihdubtrialventures X 
involve imports of plant and equipment and since these are not manufactured 
in Nigeria at present , they have to . be/imported,. It is natural that in the
36* Report of the Coker; Coi^ iX: pf1 Inquiry op eft Vol. 11 pp 32-34*
jfcint ventures, the foreign partner, with his overseas connections, would y'X Y 
be.required to purchase these equipments. vyX:; - - ■ ''"VXXyXXy XXV.
There /is, however, a special category of partnership where the , i ; ‘
foreign partner fs motive is primarily to sell machinery- and equipment.
This is the contractor-financed pro j e c t or suppliers credit type of 
partnership. This will be more fully discussed in the. next sectibn. It 
-X; is sufficient here to point out that the foreign partner in this type of 
partnership does not usually insist nor even desire majority control of 
capital and management. Where possible, he does not have any share in -X?'.A 
: : : the equity holding. Invariab^ howeveiyhe take s a token intere St of 
; * about 10$, and the Government or its agency contributes about 90$. ■ ;
.Y- Haying taken upthe ’token1 interest, he. then Undertakes to supply the X, ; k
X X  mac^iheiy: and equi^ Enent^ YahdY toconstifet ;the.■ factory against a FedcralX - XX Y X 
Government guarantee that/the;contract pid.ce-W o u l d ■ X'.XXk'XXX. 
yV X vX x X'XXx . 6. Hedge Againsfc.Risks♦ " Y :y :'-rXXX -:X'Y XY-X
Local participation- is alsp .considered by theXforbignp^ XX • XyX
hedge against some political risks, such as arbi tr ary expropr i at ion wi thout Y Y/j
adequate compensation, and/asYa/Meahs bf/pibsely identif^ng himself with .-xxXX 
the local people and giving them a sense of 'belonging1 and a feeling that it Y:-X>Y 
is as much their ownshowas that of outsiders. "No longer1’ said Mr, A.H.
>, .. Smith, the YB-lanager of the IJ.A.C; Ltd, ”do they have to stand by and watch manyX j 
X;X' of the rewards from manufacturing processes/ remaining /overseas' but can see. them YY 
spread nore equitably in their own countries."37 Besides, local participation
■ X Yjy;# , Pxogress - The YOhilever Quarteiyy I963 p/196« ;Y .
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enables foreign investors to finance expaitision and-to avoid assuming full 
capital risks when a new product is being tested in the market* 
k ,  : X  BENEFITS OF LOCAL PARTICIPATION TO NIGERIA 
We pointed out above that.because of the relative shortage of 
private indigenous capital in Nigeria, - Nigerian, Governments and; public 
agencies have assumed a greater role kin providing industrial finance*
It. is obviops, however, that. whatever succesX this . measure may- have, it 
can only bring forth enough capital for a limited industrial growth. "If 
Nigeria wants a faster rate of development!1, the World Bank Mission advised, 
"it will have, to make full use of foreign capital, and of the managerial 
and technological skills that accompany It".38 These are the principal 
benefits . which Nigeria expects to derive 'from joint ventures with foreign 
private investors* k X, X : X X . Y ;'~--
,Y. -k-k 1* CAPITAL k .-■■■-■ Y / . '
Y k Local participation tends, to;give a.greater sense of security to 
foreign private capital,by making it politically acceptable and by 
associating Nigerians with/the country*3 industrial development* The re- Y 
suiting goodwill and public relation advantages on both sides, in turn, tend 
to give the foreign investors more incentive to invest * This is.; partly the 
reason why some foreign investors make such participation a condition for 
their projects* Local participation has therefore proved an effective way 
,of attracting foreign capital* In deed, other things being equal, it seems 
that yfoat the foreign firms want is only a token participation, in most 
cases, for them to invest. A giance at Table 6*2 and 6*3, particularly 
the former, shows, that, only in exceptional cases,.has local participation
38. Econ Dev. of Nigeria IBRD 1955 p 353# ,
taken majority interest * , This may, be illustrated from Table §*4 above 
which shows, that for every £1 provided locally in the whole Nigeria and the 
West, the/’foreign inve stor contributed £3, and for every one pound provided 
locally in the East, the foreign investor provided thirty, shillings . It 
must however, be stressed that although very important, local participation 
is only one of the many factors which attracted foreign capital in Nigeria, 
as chapters three and four above showed.V
. 2♦ ■ Establishing New Industries 
Besides attracting’ foreign capital,. local participation has proved 
to be the only way most industries of national interest could be started 
in the first place. Examples are the Nigerian Cement factory at Nkalagu 
and the Kaduna Textiles Ltd, discussed in chapter three. Another example is 
the Nigeria Sugar Company Ltd at Bacitain the North.
The company was incorporated in October I96I, with an equity capital 
of £1.5m and a loan capital of £2.25m>. of which £1.5m was to be raised in 
the London Money Market - as a sterling loan. Following a subsequent worse­
ning of market conditions in the London Money Market,. the merchant bankers 
who had undertaken to raise the debenture stock advised that this would not 
. be possible until the market .situation improved. This , tended to jeopardise 
the whole project as the subscribers'of the equity capital refused to 
honour their commitments without being sure that the corresponding loan 
capital would,be raised. ; , . .
Explaining the above situation in the Federal House of Representatives 
. the Federal Minister, of Commerce and Industry, Zanna the Hon. Bukar 
Bipcharima, declared in April 19.62, that "however, we were assured that the
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; intrinsic merits/ of the -Bapi ta; pro ject were such ;that, when , conditions;, in
, /the Money 'Market" improved, 'there :,tybul.d • be' :a -Very/ good chbnb$k'‘pf diposihg' of 
v k * most" of the debenture loan stock oh the/ London Money Market and. that if the
;/ / : Federal Government‘“were-/to:indicate-its supportkfor this project by under- 
/.writing the tiplaced protion of this;debenture, not only:would":the: prospect 
;; • of placing the remainder on. the iohdoh-Money :iferket;be/substantially :
■;  ^improved, but also the remaining loan and equity capital would be more- readily -
/: fofthcoming. In the circumstances^ that-the Federal Government .
' • should; agree/to subscribe for up to £1.5rik of the debenture, loan stock as X:
/"short-term.bridgihg---bperati'6nu since it will carry, ah attractiverate, of k/
: interest and should be readily- saleable When^  the company is* operating and X ,
/ market: conditions/ improve /In order that/; the activities / at Baeita may // /
. kk proceeds while the permanent/ Capitalis /beihg raisedvXthe Government /also; rX/ XXX 
k : /^ agreed;: to. provide#? a £250,000 guarantee to enable, the; companyto obtain; over-:;
- draft ‘ facilities from a Cpimiiei’ciai bank,;"the guarantee/ to lapse /as soon as; the X 
7 /;/ shares had been allotted* In reaching these decisions j .we were influenced. /
not,only by the national importance of the project but also by the,realisation 
k / that/had the Federal Government appeared reiuctant to give such assistance,
;; if mght: have cast doubts on the attitude of the Government to thispro ject,
' k a.nd therefore/ prejudiced/the chances, of sucess of the whole; financial ;.‘■Xk/■; ;
k operation"This,\therefore, is another/clear case where Government ‘k;
/ / participation was the only, condition making possible the// establishment of ,
39. Fed. House of Assembly Debates, 18 April, 1962 pp 1990-1999* ;■'
of an industrial project of national importance*
. - \ 3*. Technique* ' -
■ . Technique or know-how, is another benefit which Nigeria gets or hopes ■
to get through partnership with foreign investors. This is a less tangible
asset to evallate than capital * It can be technical laiow-how, as in -fete
brewing or textile spinning; it can be management . knbv^ -how, or simply
foreign connections - how. and where to get certain things done with the
; \ minimum of fuss arid waste and sq on* it is, hov/ever, a; very real asset and
/ lack of it has been,and, still is a serious bottleneck in Nigeria’s development
Through his wide, overseas connections and knowledge, the foreign
partners can and do supply Nigeria with this vital1 factor of production. The .
Sheet Metal, and Glass Project in Eastern Nigeria illustrates this. This
project was planned in 1956 by the Eastern Nigeria Government as a wholly
owned.government project; It was to be run by a technical expert. By 1957
about £10,000 lmd been spent, on the factory building and on plant and
machinery with a further. commitmentr of £7,500f-kY-Howeverthe technician to
run the project cpuld not be found despite extensive advertisements in
Europe and North America. "It .-.therefore became clear that a new approach
to the project was imperative.”4Q The 'decision to own the,project completely
was abandoned and several British firms were approached for; partnership so
that "the ,technical staff difficulties would automatically disappear”.4^
The resulting project, established In I960 apd o\wipdk51$ by Williams. and k
Williams Ltd of Cheshire, England, and 49$ bykthe Eastern Nigeria Government,
.was managed by the former ?dio also undertook, to train Nigerians both in .
the Nigerian factory - and in the U.K. to take over eventually*.., The technical»•' 
To. Eastern Nigeria'i Dept of Heavy Industries, Annual RenorA 51st March ,
1958 p 1. .41* ibid.
'XxCt ""xf Xk$ y^'^ -$;'v;x -Yy ■ $  Vk X; V?;/298 -/
YvX' staff diffulties tlierefore aufomatically/disappearM,/ . ; . X
xkkY XX -;k.l-Y y/X — y-X ■ YQyk;XXXk4*X. Nigeriahisation* / x. $kkXXkk kv;XkX., - y '■ ‘ - ;.-w .
X'Y: , ; Partr>ership : witli f oreigh investors is also expected to ; assist the 
;y .XX.. governments to speed up their M^ policy.-1 All the governments
r of the Federation/are committed: to this -policy;tMchXis jdesigned to promote : 17
k X Niger lobO/toiim ! ppSlYtxonskin ^ ori er ta ’ acquaint ;%em
. with the 3^ ceSsaiy/;Skili*.Y / It is thought .that'pressuresY could he, more' ; 
effectively ^ut onfCOHipames in which Nigoria%, /particularly the government,
Xk;"y//participated*,/kYto\exa.i#le\:of;fthe application of: such is the caseXof
/ ./ , the: Northern Constrpciion /Company libjTt/X Y&@nxit was .decided' to double the 
kk ; XisSued a3idY^dd-up capital of //this/: concern / 'thd: Board/Yof/dxrectors of / tbs v ,/
: 7 X, NIO)C,/the: governmentYpartner^^^ resolyedYnot; to subscrihe its quota X X
y/X ; because/ of the:slowness /of kldxo kcoi^anyXipXim^^ - v ,
/policy; k This aroused a concern amon^ the other partners who held 60$ of th/e /:
/ y X bqhityYipterest: urgent efforts were: made/to impl emeni tlie northernisation . X y. : Y 
JX Ypqlicy; /ahi the^ Xthekpaymeiit / of itsXstibscriptioh pf/£30,0Q0*4? y -;X.
X’ -X, X-XXT "' It is tokbe: enpphasibedXthat this type of pressiire^  if hurriedly and 
x, X; he cJtlossly; applied J could be/very ruinous /hot only/to the/ particulai; project/ . > X y .
X / Y’bhtv^soXto t^ economy;;/otherwise Xitf-could be potentkinst rumeht
/fork bringing abp/utr rapid ^ igeriahisaiipn* ; The danger, is That it is likely kk ; kv / 
kk ' to vbe misused ;ih a/country where; politicians.; vie\/ iMustrial pro jectS,/ or/ih. / kk Xk / 
Y X-deed^anyXeatabli^ as ahneans/ktb/p^ and'services efficiently
XyyX but; -as. a iiayeh £orYparty; supporters; / It /is more /dangerous- where- .qualified
A;. k42v Y A/ Whl/te;kPaperkoh; the: Milltaiy/:Government Pojdcy f of tlie Rdorganisetion ■
Xt/V.-V'■■“> ' bhe; M  *< • ,
skilled; men are/ either, ini short supply: or notavailahle at all. It was . 
found,1 for: instance, that; although: the ;Mort3|e'rn Nigeriarferketing Board, = 
handles/ some $60m Worth :of produce eyeiy yeary not a single member of the 
staff "ppssesses^^%dequate ;inanagerral;training and not a single member is. 
;qUalifiM':;itpv occupy his. post'*' ;and that "irrevocable: losses on a fantastic 
/scale11/ have/been made/by^ the-a board bwing /toktheXexecutiyes1 incompetence 
"and possible dishonesty” 43 if fBuch a:.situation can/be found in an insti­
tution second, in importance only to/thekGoyernmeht /xn.the/Region,-At then-- -VX 
becomes easier;/t'o/’ima^he/Xthe/ position in other. leSser; instutions, And when 
it//, is/ remembered ; that i t is the Marketing/.Board yt- through i t s; agent, the 
Northern /Nigerxo /DovelopmenfCorporation,/ which has applied the pressure for - 
rapidV-implementation■•of*t^ .’policyf'-vthen.-thb/ inefficiency I
of /the fnorthernised,,; posts, kahd/the respiting ruin loss to. the 
Nigerianeconomy can abetter, be^  imagihedk/than /described* ■ ./
,cipati6nV
/XfXk . XrtX-X /-X/'- ".X.f -k/Y / Y X Sxmimary,/. ,/' -kX: tW.,< '"/X.; . •  k v;:/i
‘ /jipcalk'participatibn/;*br/ partners!^ foreign investors has benefits
both: tpXNigerians/ and to''the; /f ore igh/ investor * . By: affording- greater security 
• t,q-fbr0-ign/int,est6rs, ''it-Xhei^ morb capital-''t.b.gNigeria*. .It. also
helps/ to Xqsfabli^^ « which; otherwise would hot* be established• It
■ affords Xffigerians.-- access kip foreigncontacts and Imow-how and an opportunity
43* A XWhitek.Paper, on the Northern Nigeria Military Government's Policy for
■ ; : /: • the Oomprehehslve Review/ of the / Bast / Operations. and Methods of . the
Northern Nigeria Marketing/ Board, .government l?rinter , Kaduna.
h t f *  n ^ n r i ,  [i|- i | , io * i . i i , i ri|r " i h i  /Tl-iia n — n  in n m in ■  i H im w r ~ r W r T w  m i n i *  m r r r T r i , —  i _ *
,v-h'.>■to'ucqnireitq&hhic^ sld:ll. jj facilitates government: .; .'• -/> ::
• h ; ^ p!jre8sri^ 8/.$&"  ^ key v posts'-ihroUgh training. on::the;',- .1}
■ / ;i. >hv h  ... ;■ ’ h
\ .; .*■}To the: ^ patriaite, investors ^vl^ bai/^ -participaiion^ 'ls sometimes 'the ; * :’,
’: . only/waytto^ get>‘intottheicptintxy, acceptable,'' ,:
■ genders goodwill and public relations benefits. and acts , as a means of the 
ipreign "i-ny^ st.Q^ itisi^ - seehito ]lm- indentify >himself, with the country ‘ sldeve- 
lopment. ; , ' -vii;/'■■„■/'v: '1 ii.i; : ’ -.V. ;v ' .ifi/
>> ; '1 'v Ih both the Mgeiians anditHelex|^ ^^  ^ jis;a. sonroe of
■ strength which: ilncreases::the/ total -available;’*resdnrces and extends the
.catchment,area; for-funds .ilust^ as’:indiyidiiai:;?Sayiii^ si may amount to, littleV i 
; \ hiit collectively can aehleyelarge proportions^! so; partnership vath; world •>;
: . ■ wide; institutiws^canv^d5;do . result inj vast> schemes *; It plays a leading role:
i ; in . Wigeriu! s drive;for jrapid; industrialisation*: ;It,isy-"however,: a- double ^ >•
,; - edged weapon which could he 'significantly inhibitive of .industrial^ and in
:..! deed, ; of development 'effort if ;improperly used ♦ ; In the next -section,!we •. "* 
consider thisaspect.; of,local::p>artipipation^hy'^xarQining ltd :,significance*.'
;; ; V ' :; V - v - ^ V ^  .
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LOCAL PARliCXPATIOM.
IhtrodUc t ion *
The significancevof^lqca^^partici^tion,:can he examined; initwbl wey s ,.;• 
One is. the nature of vthe partnership;. this: is, done, inithe ^second part of ; 
"this. se qti oh. The’other is by analysing the. .perfprmanc'es of "thedifferent 
governments in,vthi^veffort. This is ddne-:ih this part ofv thisv-seotion. !. ■
The Nigerian Governments’ Partnership with . .
foreign Private Investors, 1953-1965»
A* The Federal Government*. . -
Table £*5 sets out the industrial projects in which the Federal 
Government participated between 1955-1965, In all they are 12 with a total 
capital.commitment of which the Federal Government contributed ®5#43m in 
equity capital and £3.1m in loan or debenture capital* ■ With the/exception 
of the Nkalagu cement factory, all the, projects in which the Federal, Govern­
ment had debenture or loan capital, and three of* the 12 pro jects in which./- 
it has equity capital are located in the North, compared with three in the' 
East, two, in the West and-two in the,Federal,Territory. Capital commitment 
is also heaviest in the Northern based prdjects^ being ;£4»2m^compared with;, ^
£2.15m in the East, and £*07m in the West. Only seven of the 12 projects 
could be said to be Federally inspired or initiated. /These are/ the paper, 
and flour mills, the- cement factory :af Nkalagu in the/East, the Oil refinery/ 
also in the East,, the' •Spgar--;'refinerythe' Nigerian Fermentation industries,/ 
and the/ Security and.Minting works, These were considered to be of wider 
national significance as ”leading industries’’. The remaining five projects: , 
owed! their establishment principally to/regional initiatives, /
The Federal Government noted in its progress report that "it must be 
admitted that more could have been accomplished but f Or. the. various hand- 
;icaps such as administrative, bottlenecks from staff shortages and the.slow "
, speed at which feasibility studies can be accomplished in couii^ies like^^^ 
Nigeria* The Federal Government attaches the: greatest importano^to^such: 
thorough pre-investment investigation^ ;in order, to ensure/that limited public
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//'. ./-funds" QTOi hot/invested:in/prb jecis;:which:"a^  profitable*1 *44 ■;. / :; : ; ; ‘
1 : ,..:;:/^ //-ExSei*ie4ob -shows/thatthese.laudable !^,sermons,, ha^ not always been,, V 
.//: observed. It is definitely true that the absence of, or delay in pre-., / /!
// paring feasibility;^studies in Nigeria has limited: investment, ‘ But the 'iron /,,,;
/; and steel.. project ^ : the;£ejabifiility.;.study of which >was /lon^ .-'-.prepared,, .-has not
been , establishedi This. suggests/that'thereis ;moie toitthap the prepara- /
- tion of feasibility sfudy *: .Again what could be a greater waste of scarce /
resources, then the/decision tcMebtablis^^ mills when : :
*rpre-ihvestment inyestigationn recommended; that only -one mill would be// :
. , : economic in Nigeria! s ; p r e s , ' ■' g/V/'-’•/ •// ■ ' it. ■//, //'
/ B» The';Regional Governments, ■/..■. 1; ./- ^ .//■/.;/ ,/ //I'-
>1! It .-is'better,; to discuss^"the legional partnerships /in'..two /time V i
/periods* .1955ri9^V/^nd/196l-1965•. The former date corresponds to the 
/-/19 5 60/plahperi od// and/ the -latter- cover s/a part /of the,present ':pl:a n \ ;
period. ■■".///'"//V/’• /./;//>’ ' ■ ''•'//■// ./■-'■/-- ■' '
! / - / ; /During; the ffirst-: period, 1955-1960,/only the' %esfernRegion Government
, : achieved very/substantial results in the partnership prbcesswith the , /
•/ establishment of ll mshufactxiring projects with a total share capital: of //
; /' ^»99m /|i,6)*//Govermehi/;cpim^ /
/./ out bf which £0.999m had/actually been disbursed: b 31st 'March/ i960 • /  //■/,/ '.
,/: ;; The; industrialjectSvinclude plastics,/textiles cement, and aluminium*
Complete information is not available for the Northern Region*/. It / / 
^appear*; /only '..two /partnership.'projects were "established /... /
44• Nat* Plan; Progress: Report, op:cit 74*
be tw een  1955 and 1 9 5 7 * /’ These a re :- th e  /N ig e r ia n  C anning-G o* b th ,  ’ e s ta b lis h e d -  
i n  1955 i n  p a r tn e rs h ip ; jw i'th ,/IJ . i t ; / in te re s ts , / 'a h d ;v  the.- Ivadpna T e x t i le s . ,  L t d , ; 
e s ta b lis h e d  i n  1 9 § 7 . i/a ls o ;w i t h  f l> K . 5 i n t e r e s t s /  in /1 9 5 G : "the N o r th e rn  /  
N ig e r ia  In v e s tm e n ts  l t d ,  w as ' ih r m e d / ih ‘ p d ^ tn e n s h ip .'w ith /lth e /iC D C ./to ip rp m ^  
and f in a n c e  i n d u s t r i a l1 p ro  je c t s .  . I t ,  does; seem however, t h a t  th e  p e r io d  to  
i 960 was used fo r / ^ d M n a is ' t r a t iv  o rg a n iS a tio h s^ ‘ :ahd^ p re - in v e s tm e n t i n v e s t - / /  
ig a t io n s * I t  m ust be. s p e c i f ie d  > t h a t  v/e , a re--here-' concerned  / w i t h  p r o je c ts  
i n  w h ich  lo c a l  c a p i t a l  ;p a r t id ip a te d :* ; ’; /W h o lly  o n n e d i'fd re ig n  p r o je c ts  were ; 
o f  cou rse  e s ta b lis h e d , 'tw o /o f^ C w h ic ii were, th e  JCJAC B re w e r ie s ,. and/ th e  : . • 
N ig e r ia n  Tobacco f a c to r y  a t  2a ,r ia .  V ' / / / . / / ' / /  
I n  th e  E a s te rn .R e g io n y  o n : ih e ;  o th e r  h a n d , 'th e  p o s it io n :w a s  m ost' ; /
d is a p p o in t in g ,  > :fo fV b e tw e e n !§ 55t a n d k ^ ' i i ^  p r o je c t
was e s ta b lis h e d * ;  . Th is - was; th e  sh e e t; m e ta l. and g la s s  p ro  j e c t  w h ic h  w a s ; /  
e s ta b lis h e d .;a s  ! # i i i i M s , ;-ahdcT f l i i l i a i ^ / .1960' , T h is  i s  - 'S trange ,, 
e s p e c ia l ly :  v iie n  i t  i s  s ta te d ■; t h a t  "E a s te rn  N ig e r ia  has I 6hg s to o d  o i i t  / 1  
'.afcoiig,. N ig e r ia n ' ‘Reg^ohe- f p p t h e : r a p id i t y  o f  i t s  i n d u s t r i a l  ■‘-"esparisipn1! *4-5/ -  
T h is  b b c o M e s /c le a re r ,/h o w e v e r^ /w h e n  i t  i s  r e a l is e d  ;that"^ Biuch o f / t h e  so. /  
c a l le d  a n d p s t r ia l is a t l - o n  i n  th e  R eg io n  to o k  p la c e  : s in c e v a f t e r  Independence *.
;T h is / w i l l . : ; b e ; ih d ic a t e d / la t e r / :  i n / m e a r i ^ ^ i ^ e . *  I t .  i s , / f a i r  to  s ta te  th a t .  V- 
t h e - f a c t ,  t h a t  - o n ly / o n e - ^ r t n e r s h ip  v e n tu re  was /e s ta b l is h e d  between- 1955- :  
1 9 6 0 ? does n o t ’ m e a n i h a t - t h e r e w e r e n o m Q d
in  th e  r e g io n  d ia ? in g ^  i s  ta r /h a c b /b s  1 0 5 , th e /E a h te m  .Region
.G cyern ifent ^  e p o l ic y  /s ta te m e n t / th a t  ' ^ Ixh  th e /p a a t  12/ n in th s   ^ /
.45 . New Thinking in Eastern Nigeria* .West Africa 2^1)eeember, 1965/,
arrangements have been completed or are in the final//stagesSqfvnegotia-/; / ./ Z:■'/•■ 
/ ; /: tion for "the establishment in>■0 e  ZHegibh/of. industries having- a capital : , / /
/ : -value totalling 0phty six million;pOunds/^^ One of these was the/£4•2m/ /■ ■//
f.j/:; / Jtolagu come0/]0bject/e^ this
; / was not'd; regional1 buha federal government initiative ahd could not thex’e-. /
// /: ; fore be attributable/ solelyto the Eastern Region Government/effort s.: The / / ■'// 
■/• //v- ot%r/iMu0rial/pr00ts ;i%>10ed :thp le and tine mine at/Abakalikl / ; "f-//:/ 
/;■;/ . - ; ye/htuf^ (Nigj/hth/brewery at Aba,/ "'■/-//
t/t/fand-the^'Nigerian-' Tohacc^-factbry at zkort/Sarp&^ bpth-ihs'tablibhe'd in 1956*
"■//’./ /Thesev were not partnership pro jects, /however* :;They;were .rather/pdf t/of . /■/- ,:,./■/
the ’goodwill1. projects in pursuance of thevpolicy of establishing/ projects ;/; 
//.////ih/'eacb/region - adopted ^ fthese-inld; established’ f if ms:, in/the: cbmtry/dfter //:/ " 
!/ ///the'^introduction^of/stro^:re^Onalisml in the/104 Fedbhal constitution* - / :^/
/ 'V/ SiQiilar projeGts' were established in-the North/and the/West, and*[co l^d not :///
/ " be s,ttributable: to. tndepehdent efforts of these regions. 1 ; ' ./ / ; ///
;// / .// /.yin the 1955. policy ;sta;fcement//the/,Eastern:Region/Government declared / i f. 
///. thaf^/thevMinistry of Goimnerce^and/Industries/baa/draim ^  for ■//:/ //
/ / ■/; further industries with - a total capital valuer-of /about ;£2m/’which it is , ;Z 
■•/. //!:p^pbSed/t d/ihtroduce^/as early; as -possible*/ Thbse/included a textile: ■//' /
/// .factory, - 'a;modef3f :ceramaic0?br^^ ;and pulb manufacture, a '
/ // // canhihg: factoay /combined with a fig ;pr6duc‘t;i6n Acheme and/ joinery and light / /
" // metal manufacture* By 196Gsome, of/these/were/ sMli" in the negotiating '/•;/ :///;
, ■ process j none had. come: into existence., /and some,; like the, paper and pulp /
'// ;■ 46//; Eastern 'Nlgfefiaf; Policy :.f or/‘'Industrial 'Development,/ Sessional
manufacture, have not even been established yet* •••• \ .
It. is seen tliat while the Western Region admirably succeeded and 
the North, managed: to set up at least two partnership, projects, the 
Eastern Region failed to secure any partnership during the period ,1955- 
i960, except one in I960,; So abject was the failure that the Eastern 
Nigeria Minister, of Commerce.and Industries made an open apologetic, state­
ment* flf, a tinies,.’1 he said,: T,no; immediate re suits fare apparent,, it. is 
not because the Ministry ;is not/giving of-its best, pspr that its. efforts 
do/not-bear fruits,.but rather because the essential preliminary work of v 
investigation, negotiation,.and research must heeds take time. Like all. 
new and under-developed countries, we are vezy short of-indigenous capital 
and technical, know-how, and ,‘so, must look .overseas for these industrialisation 
essentials in competition with other countries and governments in equal ?
need. The Ministry is relentlessly grappling with its difficult task (of 
attracting foreign investors) with realism, optimism and; an encouraging 
measure of succe ss which,I hope the■next tannual report will . bear out" #47 
The next annual report for 1958-59 only .said that "the period 1958-59 was 
preparatory to major events that lid ahead; you will see a glimpse of 
the shape of things. to coMe-written boldly ;on manufacturing industries 
as,- ushered in by my .visit to Europe" .49 The report mentioned a glass
. 47* Eastern Nigeria: Ministry of. Commerce and Industry* Annual Report 
'1957"58 Forward; by, the Ministez;- Hon. J. -N. Nwodo .. : . .
49* Ditto, 19 50*59* Annual Report. 1958-59 .P 3*
f .-project-a"dement, ” and;- an/aliimiiiiim factory/which were /’expected to go-into , / /'■- 
/ / production early in I96I*1. The glass factory was/eventually established^ as /' ;’//
: /  a wholly owned government project jZandZ at/a]^ :rate, the. f act remains/that/';;ZZ;/Z./;ki
/ v . by i960, only one/partnershipJpfbject/was latmched .by Zbhe government,: ari:i/;//\/h 
V this ;only;in i960* / / - Z'Z1' 1 - Z'/■ . Z // '/■' '"v ;,-/'' .. ZZ ":
•/ - /; 'What was responsible for the success; in the West, the; apparenb ZZ Z Z Z Z:
failure- inthe North, . and the utter failure ‘in the. East?; First with the 
Northi Ap^t-from "thq physical andZnatural/MsadvaZntages; of the North /
: discussed in the last chapter, the/apparent failure there may be explained
by differences in industrial policy Zand strategy Zand in odt loolc of the 
people as compared with the South*:; While the South, imiiiediately; after, the 
; Z introduction of theA;1954/Federal constitxrbibn^ adopted a policy which; r / Z/ZvZ/;
; : emphasised the/need .for/rapid industrialisation; to bring about "a balanced ; //:;b,/v
/ economy*’ through the establishment < of : light/and heavy industries*5° the * / /ZZ1
North stuck to the pre-19 54 industrial policy,./ as was enunciated by * / a// -
X * /V"*. E* Smiththe Development Secretary, .in 1945 > which preferred "the // Z; /
. development of cottage industries!1 *51 Aq foreign industrial projects had ; ‘ // 
to:be on a factory level rather than on a cottage level, it is, understandable / 
twhyy unlike/theZEast And the West, no .really serious attempt Zwas/made to / ‘ /Z > /, 
attract foreign/partners Z through sending but economic missions* /, in fact *;//
// *•// the ''North /did. «• -not .v sZen^ .Zout asny/foreign economic; or investment mission until :/*/ /
, 1964,. although like the South, it established a commercial Section in / '/ //
Z L; 50* . See Eastern Nigaria Development FrogTanime, 1958-62, Official Doc No 2
. - • n w n  mt iiiuBimi* 11 ■ h it h i i n  f c u n H i^lkilfcH M i m i M M U  I ■m a n  » n  iV t i^iiim ii*t  i ■ n rwiiT* f  - • - ■ *  "T, : r  n  n » «  i mmmm w n m a M g ^ — . . . m i  i nnpi •
. v - 1959, and Western Nigeria Development 1 lan MSI-SO, p- 27 '•
51* , Social and Economic Progress in the Northern Regioii, .GP-X9'55.: , .
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; London for the convenience of /prospective; investors./ ■-? Aswill/be shown
..presently, the foreign economic missions sent by/fche South* particularly / a 
, / the West,■' led tomaryhparfchers^ iiivestors*/ ; T: / ; Z/v\
'// ; ;/ ; As tp/the/ differencei in Z hfctiiude/between/the ^  South, the /
‘ / .Late. Premier, of. Northern . Nigeria l0Quwill/Zsee/that'/wS; "were'bever
; •^ ili-tsnt-, national;^ were. We were sure /that /in Godisgood time
/wo wouldZget;; the-/ pbwer,: The: British had ,promisedZ tMs/fre we
/ were content /to., rest; bin/these promises!* Describing these /hhiiian;'..character- 
/isiics of. the .North, ,Mr;Stanliope /Tliite, : once an expatriate Assistant/
; / Director of Conmierce/sbd/Industries in the North^ /wfp'^ e,/ih''.1950 ^ haf '^ in the 
/ >.r;commercial; sph^rb 0 tife'-people of Ilorin and Kebba/(In the North)approximate’ 
///, the/Yofuba/(ihv the; _^st0: elsewhere the chief fradef/is the ubiquitous 
Hausa, who is known from, the Atlanticto the Bed Sea and from Tunis and 
//; Tripoli'-to theBigh0qfZBenih*//fet, traders, as he is, in comparison with 
/,.: ,mhhy of /thb'Uybuld; be traders of/the Eastern and Western Regions, * he is 
/ // /retiring and se0^effacing* Zff takes little,:.for any school boy or Cook1 s 
> mate/in; those areas to .invest Zin .printed note ,Zpa^fabearing; some such 
. -; -glorious•;titie/;ias;-*1'theidlu-Obode’'.People's. Import and/Export Agency! and then
52* .Ahmadii Bello, ivjy'-life ./ ;doe s/;hot:.meanZ'-tfef'\the/«N'orth
■ Z /. was hot Z: warned, against her/letl^rgic/attitude* / Addressing I tSeZNorthei^ 
House/of/Assembly ^  1040tWzlt/;0^ Bfyah ,/// a;
/ Sherwood-Smith warned .that "on almostAevery occasion on. which I; have"
■■-/ ' ;■ spokent oyou0 , . I Nave emphasised. that; one Z:of ’ihe/mbsiim«.:
v: , pprtahtZ,; if -notZ the; /most/ importdht/pro ject:bn which/this CpvernmentZis 
/; / . / engaged/ is warZ;tp;banishZ i^c^ance/ and; speed anlig0enment */;> v. *Tp you,
: .'■;; I say again, /war" ■ against/ ignpranp^e/means ;"war"; ;in:'every sense other
; than that of violence * It is essential: that simple folk;. Should /learn
///;■' the true nature‘ of /Idtevworidzin/wiiichAt^^ '-will/ //;
•v contlnue relehtlessly. Let those persons, .small as; well as great, who 
>:/ :;/ have not read/the /signs of the times takeheed to,, doso.beforeit la /
/ /too late,r*: / /////Au /./ ///AZa //;/ Vyy a./a ;/■;/■/_./■•■■■ A/--, /:;■/;/■'/, ;• A/Ay
: : //: / /capital off shillings applyifor of-Swiss, watches •; ;a !
1x1 the-,North the great traders of Kano* do not even bother with the printed j
/- note; paper, and -though Wealth0enou^^ with, at any rate the/Ay j
A asmaller/expatriate ;firmsf/pfeferrto ahiry- on.as;they have: done in the: past#
} A ;Thev.work.of; a commercial officer elsewhere is ,/, in - the first place, to ;,A■/ i 
- a.; separate the sheep from: the; gbats j;Ain "the/North,' ,,it will: be to get both sheep ] 
: and goats to come forwardbefore. diyislohZ. can;be, considered1’ • ^  When .all
:• /."these,,..considerations are addedZ to, the; geographical disadvantages discussed in 
;/ chapter efLy. the failure of;;t^  Government to attract •
: A expatriate partnership during 1955-1960 in relation to ther Sputh,; and • in 
■ :/ "z// particular the/West, 'becomesAmuch-easier ;f0tnderst ■‘/•■"‘/'■/l -AA//'//aZ'AA///aa; -
v ■ .. ‘ A I f  differehces/: intpol’icy, \strategyy and outlook explain the apparent 
; iv failure of the partneislii^scheme/in the North, / how does one A explain the;
A .success in' theY{est Zand:/the-•■■complete.-- failure /in the/East? Both regions 
A a . adopted a * progressive !/ industrial policy/ and / emphasised : the need for rapid
A / . Industria.lisa;bion zthrot^ iiAthe. . establishment/of"Tight and .heavy- industries.
in/order, to Secure;;/a balanced economic growth* / Compared with the- North, ..both 
, , a f egibns /al so had a ’ progressive ’ outlook and : virtually r;eqmilhgbP^a^hi;q.al 
A / advantages of proximity to/the.^ sea and Of^ cbhcentratibh bf^ populationy >and.
' A each was the/dominant;:p^  ' a ^ lc u l t ib ? a l - v r a w material^ //cocoa A in
/’a - A.v the 'West and palm produce /in the. East j and f inally both regions /sent but.
A , economic ;/iiiissions to / attract funds /and seek /participationqffofeign private
a . ; 53 • The. Department of Commerce and, industries s its role in the Northern
. ' RogibnAand suggested A projects /Government/ Printer, a ICad/uha j 1951 P 2.
investors,/air/ industrial projects* Z-A/'K-,../yt ■ y  y ’ A
The above considerations were quiite: tiue f but a/ clpser examination. 
explaihs Athe iroiiy. First , although both regions sent./oht economic missions , 
/the,-'EahtV/i%;X9_55 /aud the West 'in 1956, the West werit -'--with a .carefully pre- ; ! 
pared/ deVbiopment plan setting out priorities and /strategies which "caused 
Xe^l'f^ypurable' .comments- wherever the, .mission went" f and as a result of which 
’‘negotiations were starte^orZpphcludeh on i5/'mhjor;industrial projects", ;'y A 
including/bpicks / and/'^ tileoyA ceM©pt ./add; tyre ..re1treading,
fihnithra,pl)a.dtxcs.J^d;Atex Region1 ez/mission, Z on the vv
other hand, , left Nigeria without shy.-development;• pian..;’ahd-.‘from the report ; ' 
of ;the mission, it can be seen.that the pzu mary objective ofZ the;mission 
;wahzto;ZgpZAbb st should;be|develbped i^ Region and: how y-
it a should Abe, developed • Far ^ Sbm/being/ani^ was, in
factj :.-aresearch trij)* The -following- extract frpm1 the report of the, mission \ 
makes this clear* , " :-.-A';. a  ^ ; V Z
y y  ZAl^ hhsmitti-ngZ the report to the Governor of Eastern .Nigeria,; Sir; a : — 
ciemenbAFleaSZ^AtheAEastern RegibhzPremidr, Dr A • ‘iiaikiwe;, z/ahd':-zthe •/I&tfe i .} A A 
ALA;P. ,0jukwu,ydio/headed the mission declaredjiVweAhave; the:;honour to tran- a 
smit thp ARepprt; of: the; Fcbnomie;;Mission. v ./.* *A* (which) contains our; obsery, . 
vations On various; factors .which influence  ^the .course of economic develops , 
mentZpf; the Eastern, Region,;: as,.required m  ourytermsi • of reference, together 
’withApirc recpMBendations,, fopthe /consideration ■ of the Government• We have 
taken the liberty to include Za ;special Chapter:; .on General Findings, which ,
54* ’zZ;The Report : of the .Westerh Nigeria Economic Mission, March“AprilAl956 z 
,rZ a A , Govprnmehb PrintefV Ibadan 1956 pp 5-8*
-AM" a > \Ay; .MAh;"- //<A;/vA ' •!''"-A0 /zA^'/AA;;, ‘ ‘ ■' A;" : -A.
vA A ctorrbal-ris our Mews on a number Of sub jects which affect the./economy of the A -
A,;; Z; Region; and wehopeyfhat you j^ili be dispensed to accept it in the spirit :A ; -
>' A A ; in; which it; wasZ/writtenl,*5^ •-.•Thus',v :while. the Western,Nigeria's mssioh went A’i . ’ / 
A. > ;tp campaign.'foie f^oreign capital,, the Eastern mission went out to studyv : A A
ZA;A;: ;/fact0a in the/ economic:development1 of thevrogion. ; WhatAis more atrange, ; . */ y/j
; -. A A A' however, is not that itdid hot; go with any/development;plan but that the : - :A; Z
ZA; .;\v\ /A.plan drawn on,,the;return Z6T the mission, made And mention/of industrialisation A ' yi
- : / I::. nor/ allotted any funds. f or. industry *y It /is npZ wonder,- therefore j that the : ;Z: v y ; j 
A Ay- A Western mission yielded.much iminediate dividends* , f Z Z - ; -y;y y  Z : . |
: A ; . / TheK attitudeAof ;fhe Regions to 0reign'Zpapitai;.,als6*.differed;*; -BothA,/
zA,A; ;a1 acknowledged the need for foreign capital and technique but- they differed „ ■ :Z
;;Z ‘ - , ^  the terms of admission* The- WestAhad -wanted indigenous mjority holding : A t
A-ZZz: . of any hew,/ pro jects t as a condition for admitting foreign capital; but this; a; ]
;;yZ - approach yasz/qhickly: modified when .it; backfired and the principle of e a c h \ ! 
/ZA: , ;,.casey/being OonsldCre^L ;-on its own merits instituted* -The Eastern Premier, on A'yy
;AA/A / AZ’. the hand^insisted that such arrangement "must be on the basis of equality" .A. 1-y \
!'-'Ay;AAA' cli^A^t /specify whether it is equality of’/capital; subscription/: or of A /
A^"‘‘A. fmanagement.''/ylf-it'/meant; both, then-this "ran counter, to the general;insistence ”y* -j 
Z| A/a n of foreignAihyestors, to retain control ofZmhagemeht evein/where thb/ Z 1 /A/y A
Z AZA y AEqAioMiM of capital//may be conceded to the indigenous partners-an; insis- A
. a:’^Z':-tehce: justified by the obvious lack of management1 technique: in/the country* A A
y/AA v ^  any rate, the Eastern: policy; or condition, which1 was not changed until A A A:
A - /. A there was / a change: in Premiership in Athe/Regi bn after 1959, was Arathef y ‘ a Z A Z
A / a 55 * ZEcohomic /Rehabilitation- of Eastern. Nigeria p or t of Economic : z a/;
A ; Z A- A: Mission to Europe andZAmerica Sessional>PaoervN6*/:6 v!955* Z / A Za
'  v - y  —  ----- '— 1—i— mry**-— -1 ■ — - y y —i r  ; i  i~tfT~rm>nTwni*»r r~r~r~nrT inii ittw ih  —  ■[■iinnrmnmn iiiwn prnnnnnTi irr wimmi ■■■! imih w  iw hw *i]p( h ie —ii* t  ■ ■ ■ iiw iip » * i^ i .h ip u jf j i r i  r  m '
0 A y ;  ' ^;A.: : ; ‘- y'V.- ' ’ ~ '"V : ',, 3 1 1
AY/; rigid and compared unfay our ably with theyf lexibie approach in the West* / It A
v is : interesting At o note that alt hough/the East insisted*A It /did- not get the A v,
y  A ^ qnalttyAof /holdings in theAo^y/partner ship/project established during the A/
, - - period; It had therefore to reconcile itself/tALthA4 0  hoidingYthe foreign A: :
A : ; partner -holding; 51^ /andmanagement control :^;. A , A A ""/-.!.-AAzy;"y;A:
/A/A;YaY''A'.A A;: Theie;traaAalso a!difference inAthe relative, v/eaith of the East and
the;'West,i/with per -capita income'jgreatbrAin the later than in the former*/ ; t /
The:early/post-war years and much of the 1950f s were boom years in cocoa .
prices*A:; Because the West is the dominant cocoaproducer In the country, ; 'l; ‘
when the reserves accumulated by the Commodity Marketing Boards, Cocoa, / :y ;
groundnut, cot ton, and palnrAproducef wereA shared/-among the regions on the / A A; A*
YAY y basis pj/ * derivation! , f oll.owing the regionaliSatibn of 'the Marketing A/ Ay ; z A
/Ay A Vy Bpard SystemAihAl954! ^ eA^btern:.Region got;:hlm6etAas much as, the East; a n d z
A AA ’./> the Northput together*/ as fable fe*7Ashows*A :ft^ h/Aa reserve of about £43®
, • : //A AtbAbegin/the development processypomparedMth fllmAin the / East,, and £33® Y  Ay Y.
y Au A; , in theZNofth, the:%estobviously had a better start, financially V: than;the A Y  A
A : Ar ■: rest of / the, pptihiryi-: .it wasA paitlyAbecausy AEasternAfiegiohA's' share,. v - A b• A
in this distributionv and because.Aof the poor Zprpspects for/ palm produce A
. prices/ {the/East| ■ being:the/0minant producer of A palm produce ) compared with Zi/A.y .
A/ A A bopit Zih/i the bop prices: in the/ 190's that the Eastern Region was / Y>j
A A/!/ , generally A regarded hs * the poorest /member of the^Nigerian Federation*; With' ■ A j
A A / ^  ^this/&ckground,; it^  becomep A easrerAto understand the title of theA report A A 'A
/ of the Eastern NigefianAEconomic Mission; dfZ1955^  which -is "The EconoMc, ; YZ A : A;
A4 , / Rehabilytat I on of Eastern Nigeria"and / thef ac t : that/ the primary 'objective ; A !
Aof the mission was tostudy abroad the development prospects of Eastern' A . ■
.ANIgeria* A; The ,pointip makeAis that, as' they/ are/hpt. -philanthropists, ; • ; : A. y //
Nigerian Commodity Marketing Boards: Reserve Distribution 
To Regional Marketing Boards, 1954 +
A £000 ;v'
Marketing Board East North West Total
Cocoa 176.1 135.5 32,625.1 32,936.7
Palm Produce: ,11,248.4 484*5 , 10,199.0 21,931.9
Groundnut 39.6 24,722.6 ~ 24,762.2
Cotton 7.509.2 ' ■; 73.0 7,562.2
Totals 11,464.1 52,651.8 42,897.1 87,015i0
■ ■ . 'rsr » ■ ’ . .ri"r...TT— grata t-g-s-m
Notes: + The transfers of the sums due were not made at the 
same time; it took several years for the last 
payments to, be made. ; A *'
Sourced G. K. Helleiner, The Fiscal Role of the Marketing .
. .Boards in Nigerian/Economic Development,/1947-61. 
v vp 586 Economid Journal, Vol LXXIV.
foreign investors were hot prepared to salvage or frehabilitate * an
apparently poor region. / ;
A On the other hand,, the bigger financial reserves of the Western
Region,, and their favourable future prospects, were a confidence booster
for / the Western Region Government • It enabled the government. to /pursue
a fairly independent economic policy. This is reflected in the size of
her 1955-60 Development; Plan. Prepared with the assistance, of Professor
W. A. Lewis, it budgeted for a total expenditure of about £105m compared
■ with £89® for the North, and £5m for the East’s original plan. Even: the .
East1 s revised plan expenditure, in 1958 at £25m, was only about 25/£ of
the Western budgeted expenditure. While the West allotted 7^ or £7*5® of
her total, expenditure for trade and industry, the original/plan for the
A /A / East /made no shell .allpcatibpat/. alzYwhile the//revised’ plan allot ted only - 
FA’/ 'F0*7®AA(see; /Table^  10 Ghapter;^2./);A zAffixs'AdxspaMtyZys explained hy/the fact 
. z that the 1955~1960 Development/Plans were prepared at the.-; request A of the 
Colonia! Secretary ahdApereZ, depends /on the allocations from Z
;Z:y : : the ConMonvfealth. Development and Welfare'-: Grants * / ‘Both the: size and - :
contents of. the plans;/therefore ^ depended; 9h Sow/much:.eech/Region expected 
Y..- to get from the,■ CD&W Funds and what projects .such funds could finance*
: A : Extra .expenditure, and projects beyond, the CD&WF-a allocations•:therefore
. depended on eachregiohtsz access to/Othef f\mdV*/ : The; West andthe North y 
: /zMtirhi^er/reserves add. good /prospects/for/ybiihz/pric^ (for
: ; zt^ AZWest,) ;apd ;^ ouhdhuts,: and^cplunibite0for/ theANorth)v /budgeted for extra 
z/.F A it/eiaa whilev the /EastAwi/fh the - smallesf/reserves and veiy poor 0r6spects for 
, •«" palm/ produce/prices, /confined its original; 1955-60 plan:/expenditure to the 
/ ferants from the Cp&Y/ Funds arid to the ,.ProjectsAfinahceable/by such grants*. Z: 
This was /clearly statejf in thezpian:; A?the^  thpmo, of :fhe//new plan should be: •
; the' development of . the*purdl .areas, the Zii%bbve^ supplies
; Z and Ofp?oads and bridges ♦. • • w t h e s e  zaure. nsrff ;the^ /sort of A/expenditure ; zZ A
314
which would be likely td qiialify fordol63aial^ Deyelo^e^. aM^W^fare; ^;
 ^ ^  ef fort s concentrated on rehabilitating the region and
with; no provision for industristl development^ added to the. hleak fufurev 
; ' ' for the only coiiuiiodity-palm produce - wh ich accounted for more than 90$ . 
of her foreig?i exchange and reserves, it, is easy to tmderstand- or 1 
, .appreciate the failure inthe East toattract; expatriate partnership, ;'
/ G except; brie* during \ V v . \ - ■' . - ^r:vvr:;^ \‘r-;
V 56* Eastern Nigeria: Outline of Development Plan, 1955-1960* ::
-' >Sessional"Paper No* 4,; 1956*
37* Another fact or in the; expiration could; be the personality of the •
\ B^reiiiiei; • of;Vthe Eastern Dr* Azikiwe, and the
C , ‘ = :S S®l^ly^:^hlitical^ihst^iH^ in;the};re^  1?60.:.>.;I)r.-Azikiwe
was the most -outspokr^m^^r^lst^leader-in^ &igeria^3toihg this 
■ ; period, and with^ a chain: of :he^p^ was also^ the'niost dreaded
" by expatriate iriv-estors arid firms*vSeec one for some of their > -
r eactionSfa^inst eDr-Zikrs atrbr^ nationalism* The origins of relative 
= political inst^ility- inC the.'Eadd datedhack, t o i$5 3 * '-Tlfe NCNG^p “
? v; :; led by Dr Zik, had won the emotiontoVthe %steinfHpuaefOf Assembly; in
; ; - 1952♦ T ■ However ibefore the House met in 1953> roost of the foruba members
4 . had crossed oyer to i t o n ^ A c t i o n  Group; Party* /led by C M
Obafemi’ >Awolowo* v^An in-lighting. ensured within the NCNC parjfcy; another 
> • . - , crisis followed in the Eastern House .of Assembly where the party, led ; - - J;
;,y. byPrpf essorEyOIta,/ was in power. In theevent, the Eyo Ita Govern­
ment was swept aWay,! and'a^ newf^ goyeiiiinentt ' headed lay Dr Zik. took over*
, ;Ih^ fijghting'! continued - and crisis after ciisis ^fpllowed*; . .They led first ’
to the Ikpea'j&i Commission of Inquiry in 1956 as a result of which the '-//
. ' Finance.Minister, the iate lvlazi Mbonu Ojike, resigned; then to the :V" >
V ' P o s t e r  Suttcin' GOinmissionf of Inqiaiiy, H^ijvVih,I9565V into of
. the Preinier, Dr Zik, in connection with the- investment of public money G ;
. into his bank, the African Continental Bank ltd; and finally to the
 ^“Zik Must Go* crisis of 1958~59 organised by a section; of the ruling !
/ sHCNC?pari^*Zik/didgp in 19^ to. bepome: tl^ " Governor ■
r .^ ’W 'general ;of .Higpria>,J. after - the 1^59v?bd^ai:E^
stated that, despite ail" these" crises,iheNCNC neverlost its control 
v v- of^the Regional-Governments b u t { / i f ; o n  
foreign, investor*s minds, especially V tihen it. is added to. the other 
^ahdicaps^mentioi^d above *• 5Moreover ,^ %Lth^
leaders, it is doubtful if much or adequate attention was paid to 
 ^ economic policy and development#
, Regional - Partnerships * 19 61-19 65.
Complete details' .of regional; partnerships’, for /the years,, i9 61-65--are 
not available • From such inf orination .as is available, it does seem that 
/the position was reversed among the fegypns, with greater successes being 
achieved in the East and .the iHorth than in the Wes t, Between I96I and 
, 1963 over 16 partnership- projects were established in the Eastern Region*
: These coyer such .industries as. f lour, mllingy . enameiware ; production, > 
textiles, furniture, plastics, tyre retreading and manufactures, knd
asbestosyand concrete cement production - (see f able; £ * 3 ) * . . In the Northern
i y- - xih'i$66y';V‘ ' v • • '■ i : y '■/- ' •
. Region, a Committee apppinted^by the Military Governnient ,nto enquire into
the affairs of the Northern Nigeria Development Corporation over the last 
three years'* - found- that the Northern, Re^bn-;’!Gover3lment',,• .'through the. NNDC, 
entered’ into, 27 .partnership schemes within the period covered-by the 
Committee * s investigation*58 Similar progress does:not. appear to have been 
made in'-.•the. Western Region..during the first twoyears, of ..the 1962-68 . 
Development Plan• Although extensions' were. made, -to the capacity of some 
existing industries such as the- West .African /Portland Cement^and a galva­
nising and iron sheet production commenced in I964, it was' stated' that the 
oyerall performance of the .planned. programme, uwas not particularly en­
couraging1* yy-.y- y ;  ^y:y ■ ; y ■ yi.
58. A.‘ White paper on the Military Government Policy for; the Reorgani-
satation, of the Northern Nigeria Development Corporation (G-P Na'duna 
- 1966 pp I.;..;-: y y  .J-. ,iy ", ' ,•;/ ,V . -y" . - y / ;
59*l National Plans Progress Report op clt' 168-169* :; \ ■: ; y:;
y  The low performance in-the'-West was;^attributed principally to !,a 
/ shortage of funds,l,w it was also stated that "the post-plan Akintola
Government (showed) little concern with economic policy."®^ '.tPhe .greater 
number of partnership, projects; establishedin the East and the North must 
y y hav-e been due to.the making up of the leeway of the earlier. years* The East 
V ; / however^ had brighter economic prospects since, the; discovery -of oil and gas 
. ■ in commercial (^ antitles;. in; the Region* . There was also a change of Govern-y;
ment in 1959* -Thesetwo events are significant* The first tu3med the East , ,
- from* heing' regarded^as the poorest member of the Federation to being'pbben- y 
tially they richest region* and; the second ushered - in a government more dedi- 
■y cated to economic policy and de velopment than the former* .One of the irame- v:
. ; diate effects of this change of-goyernmehf was'the modification of the terms 
. bn which foreign private investment was to be admitted into the region*3 Part­
nership with the government or any other indigenous body was no longer to
60* Ibid* ' ■ , "v i "'y.. / ;:\v .y;■ Yy'y:-
6l* R*. H* Green* Four African Development Plans *• The: Journal of Modem 7.: -
: ; African Studies No* 2 A\i^st, ii965 P '2547f oot .note 2* The y
Western Region had her oto.lot of political instability and’ in-fighting - y  
f br leadership* Tbds erupted in the Coker ComiMssion of ^Inquiry^1962 j ‘ y ,
. which^  discred^dfche r^ihg/^A.ctibiid^rcu^ in the Region, and
, inYi&eyd^ Assembly, A'hew Goverment-; :;;y-i
formed by a breakaway party from the Action Group and headed by the 
former Deputy Leader of the Action took over from the interim : V ■
'I administration* ;PoliticaI ;thuggary. ran riot: following allegations of 
yY. Following; rumours
yyy < y , v bhat";the;A^ be used ghell the troubles; the attempted bpup Yy
yy-'y/y^  y-v".’v of January 15, I966 ushered Nigeria into the present debacle* •
be;a/ condition'-.if'7ihe; fore ign;invest or /did not. want it *,62 while the y 
former insistence; on 'tequalItyH ; by'* the/former;^oyerhmeiit; • was modified to 7 ; 
a preference ''where,;the^  overseas, investor is- agreeable, that , there should 
be some degree. of Nigerian participation in cases . of large investments in 
basic industries or .where the foreign ihyestor regards this participation-.as , 
an- insurance against idskl*7;The/ realism;^  ofYthis hew approach, as contrasted 7 Y; 
with theyrigld. and /unreal is tic Mhs " equalityt( by the f ormer ' \
Government, needs no; elaboration* Moreover,in the .hew government,,a policy 7-7'7 
IFwhich'! /wlafces'^  tpYsee;' industries investigated ,and ’developed*1,,^ . which let -7 
things' happen,;whenVthey,.pleased, gave;way; to a policy "to- initiate greater 
iiidustriM hctiviiies”*^ 4 It was;in;facty stated bhab/hr^Okpara's regime -;;Y/7' 
waspa:regime-'.in. &j-hyo^yf$r, progressy^;-.?be ,chdnge in fortune due to oil, yy ; 
and ;the change, in strategy ahd^ bhtliusiasjii' jfor/.deyeippment’;-due to the change . V
7 Y 77‘in Government,obviously ’must; hayeyrbacted; vesy fhvppirabiy in the foreign ; Y;;
7;.jv^ VGg °f /the"Region; and-hence in the
: ■'yy;upsiirgeMh-.partnership^ventui^s^In the;-re^ ionV.;^ vY;;%;;;;;,7;^.. ; =7 .. -7;
Y i. ; 77 62• Investment Possibilities In .Eastern Nigeria,. Government Printer -y
' .^yyyEnu^ y;';;7;7:/-7 • ■ 77 ■ 77'--- - .7V;
; 7 63. ;Eastern Nigeria Bevelonment Programme; 1958-IQ62 v Official Document -
‘Y/C.;v:7:^'V- 7 '■hby 2 y/;7;-//\-7'" '"7 ! 7/V;.( ;y;y ;7 -• 7 7-\- 7./ '7- 7777
; 7 ;  7 ,64* 7 - /B a h a r i lM lth e j i a  Ecbhbm ic M s s io n ^  ;1 9 6 l O f f i c i a l  Doeu- 7 /  7 ;
V '*■ -777;? 77 y7menb No*: 5.1962 p.;2* , /;//7: ;vy;.\ 7y;/vy. : 7 -7 / ■ ■ 7 • ' /
7 : 0 ;  7 '7  Eastern Nigeria Development 7 :
Corporation, Enugu, 19.65 P 3 * 7777/7 : y. y. - 7 /'
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1* The Significance of Bobal Parflcipatipn* - 7  v y : : >
- - 77 ' 2. Foreign Private investment Nuaranteefe by the Government* Y: 7 ; 7 . /
, PWWP<*WfcawU!t?*tBlCT*ftlWNW»N*— —***—*— ir—111 ■ i 1 1 *i WiHH fWUfci i l W i i l w n«r
Y.Yy 7 7 ' j/ Nbne of;the partnership pro jectsYbetween the;®^rian;Governments and: 7
foreign private investors in Nigeria 'before ‘ 196QYinvolved, the governments y 'Yyf " 
■ 7/ in any obligation to repay the/f oreigxrpartner fhatpari of ;the capital ;and yy 
,7/7 yyinterest Ne :coM towards Yt^ ofythe" planty machinery, - and ■ ■ y
, : •'*/ other /equipment7f or the,.pro ject * Y Barring/compulso^^ ,
hdequateyco^ensation, Aether t he would recover;rt; depended on the* success y Yy
7 or failure/ of the project. ’ Pince 1961, however,(a new form of partnership / 7
was; additionallyY evolved; in which /the government guarantees to repay they Y
foreign/par.tnefy within a specified/periodj the capital;, and interest he : 
y contributed ■towardsf the ; pur chase of the/ equipment for the,project • This yY 1 
, ;7 y. Yl'guafahte^ private investmentyi& , drscussed; inyiNis ; section*^ .7 y
yY ;'v v ‘;y y7 its; mechanics is as follows. /A foreign invesioryor a 'group ofyin- 
s Y Y vestorsforms a Nigerian public company wpthyoneyof the Nigerian governments 
y7 ; for.public corporations.7/ The Nigerian partner subscribes ythe controlling 
7: y yyinterest, and the foreign partner takes fup ;a minority holding, in addition 7
; J7Yyyf /to, supplying the machihery'aoad equipment for /the project. The Nigerian y 
7 7 / FederalYQovernmeht then/guarantees; to repay the cost' - of; thev machinery and 7/ 
equipment, /including the; interest, within afspecifled period;, if the Nigerian* 
partner/f ails toYmake;(the.'payments..'as! they fall due. For a protptype ,
7 . company, the/eqtiity,capital may be £300j0Q0 of which the Nigerian; part her 77
, contributesY£27P jObO//and, the; foreign ..partner /£3PiGWlrihyadditip£; to y; .7.7.7 
yyfy/ s sirpplyiiig machinery an«i//equipment posting about £l>7m* . The Federal /Governmenty 
then , guarantees to repay ; this £1v7® bver the ‘ agreed period, which may be 7 '7/Y;
. V77 - ,,, -,7 yu/ 777 y ;y,,Y7. 7.7 Y 7  7, ;i.7 ;; 73.7 ’ ■ 7 77^ 7 77- , . ; ;■ 7 ; y- 319 *
7,6, yCnrs, plus the interest of,7say, 8$ p.a.:,Y if the Ifigerieh. paltrier fails tp,: 
meet the'.payments;, as''-they: fall due# . 7.77,, Y.^ y /, -..YYY' 7777.7 v'7'y-\YY'y 'y;7'
, >Y The5 commi tment Undertaken by* the Federal- Government Yin- this; way- 7 v 7;
resembles the commitment s : under • contractor finance * Y- J* Simpson defined 7 7
contractor: finance as, a/process- whereby theYGoverhmentJ of a oountry engages; / 
v“ a contractor onYa: cap!tal project with clauses written ;into the^  agreement Y VY
Y which, arrange \ for;*, deferred payments, to theY contractor over a number ..of years
Y 1 rather than as large surapYduring the, time7that the project is being under-:;; Y 
taken'5'-*;y\-7;The. difference between .this and guhr^teed private investment is * Y;
777 Y that while the; conMitnientYunder ponti^ is;actual! the commitment
under the former is. contingent onYthe Nigerian partner failing’ to; meet the'*; y / 
payments as%they.fall due*: This differehce ;iS'"immaterial!Y.however," since Y; , 
the Nigerian partner i.aY/aiiYthe .government^/guaranteed foreign private f  7
investment; in NigeriaYhas always /been the government itself or a public ; Y - Y ; 
corporation. Thus ft is^  the goyerriinent.iwhich, enters into the partnership., ; ;.
, and at the same time guara.ntees -bhe repaynient of the cost' and interest ; ; ;
77,7 contributed, by theY for eign partner-towards Y the pi’irchase of the plant; and T 
- ;Y'V;’ equipments or the; project.77 Y 7. : ' ,-Y/;7 y 7 Y  y  ' 7 ; .777 ' y .777
. Another difference, is that under contractor finance, the .capital Y ;
7. - project is for iifsastruetto?e, w;hile under guaranteed private, investment, 7 7
7 ; it is for industrial; establishment* ; ttile-the'f^rastructlire, pro'jee$s;':may 7;
7 - ; indirectly contribute towards the servicing of the debt! a ; successful .private 7
7, guranteed investment mey contributeYdirectly - to servicing .the debt, either 7 
; 7 by saving foreign exchange;through the local rnanUfactuTe ;;pf goods prftviouslyY ^
66* J• V » SimpsdhV Development Finances - A Qomment on. Sierra; Leone, - Journal
, ’ *  " " ^ .......................  "   1 1 I ------------------r rrv n ir n iin-i------------r m iT ' i r n iB i w i k n  r ta iiM iT m n - ii h i n m id  n rri r 11« n nrn i
\ 7 of Development Stitdies, Januaiy’,Yl967. 7 ; 7 ;y .7 Y; ;v 7
■■■•V ;::: ; y 7 ^  J " " —  . - :y : - 7 7  ; 5 2 0 7 ’ J
*7\'y/ ;/i ;7i^b^Sd^7^;,:h57; increasing foreign ..exchange';earnings' through the production 
/•.7>v of-'gbods7for;;e^bit*:Y;;7rY77'-:\.;Y^-'*/ '^YY'Yy7;/-7' 7.:/:.. 7 ; 7-7 ." '7.77' ■
7:777..Y-Y/Y'.7" 7 D ^  the/ National Develo^ent Plan, I962 -
:; : 1968, the Nigerian Governments negotiated 38 11 contractor”; projects involving -
'7:0^  repay^nt/ connnitmehts of £ During the same 7
period! the Federal Government guaranteed or agreed to guarantee 17 pri~. .
7 7 /; vate investment pro jects involving a total^  COmniitment of £21* 5m. Table 6.8
7 listsi thiese^ Tprbjects which inblude textilescement, shoe and glass manu- 77:
7 facturing* One private guranteed investments announced since then is the " Y 77
:Y 7 Nigerian Cocoa Products Ltd, a cocoa proeessing factory costing £1*852m 777
and owned 85$ by the Western Nigeria Development Corporation and 15$ by a 
West German interest# The following section examines the characteristics 
7 '' and implicatipns of this form of partnership#^ 8
y cfaaraoteristies of Contractor Finance #7 
One ofI the /c^ ;of^  contractor7fihajaceis:Aat it apparently Y
has ali the adyantages bf a genuine partnership, as discussed above# The 
7 77 foreign partner cpntractor conducts the 1 feasibility1, studyof the project
and thereby helps to bridge an important gap where the lack of feasibility 
studies has been a bottleneck in development • He also undertakes to provide 
technical management, act as economic consultants, and train indigenous 
‘77:‘ . personnel. In this way, he satisfies one of the indigenous requirements for
5 67* The National Plan* 1962/68 s Progress Report p* 22 & Table 1*19«
68. Because the financial commitment is same, "contractor finance” is used
in the discussion, though it must be borne in sMnd Tfchat idiat is meant 7 7
77 is foreign private indue trial inve s tment guaranteed by the Federal
Government
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sbehih^'/i^^nership- - with foreign/investors.i He/brings to, the project the 7-, 
weight or benefit of his overseas connections and thereby facilitates the 
purchase of the relative iequipmOM Uhd/t^ 7Y77:
foreign exchange* / This is made ali the mpre easier because of the goverh- 
mentsvguarantees and the fact that the: equipment may be supplied and Y v 
. financed from his; own group in his home country.. By this process, the 
foreign partner executes ;a project lockv stock and barrel from: the ,pre- Y- 
investment study to the production stage* He will_therefore be considered 
■ a/poy^rfhl'inf lubnce von/g^ ing^ /Fbirtli'v to fiactoriesY which otherwi se would 
not have seen the light of day*
'Y ,/yY:7'iinpthefVfch^ the foreign partner does not insist
on haying majority ownership of; the project or in-retaining management. 
control, / YHe y^uid! in fact! yaht no own-any 'interest in the equity 
,shaiecapital -of'.tl&iprosect;- Aere/1^ is hot possible, he settles for 7 
a''token11' interest!: YThis. contrast^ the general insist,ende of foreign 
investors on equity and m^agemeht control* As Tables Jand ;4 above show, ; 
Y- only rarely did the Nigerian Governments negotiate majority ownership; 
even then, management ^r the -f orbigh partner. The contrast with
contractor financed projects is significant in view of the mutual sus­
picions bety^een governments and foreign invest or s which were di scussed in
Y'-y^Y/Y 77/777: 7’: .Y;7y7 -*YY-^ S'Y^ v^ yy^ ^^ Y'T^  ■", : YY.7Y7 . ' Y,;" , ,,..7"' Y7A 777
Y ..; signs of economic.; ,
7Y;/v .7 .domination or;neocoXbnialismrVtHroug^ foreign partner1 s ' non-insistence *.; 
yYY- : ; GN Equity and -management: control, contractor finance strongly ‘appeals: to; ;
/emotional7&esire of ^oyerments .for,-^ ownership or; control.1 7*-- Y- ; Y Y
Y 77; ,;/;;: -It is, not therefore surprising that Nigeria welcomed contractor Y V
- YY‘^lE&nc©/ as one of the.mechanisms for achieving her iMustrial, objective♦ Y
7 Y^r/Yr Nigeria is not ,alonOT in this regard. A, recent; World Bank study found that 7 
: the use of contractor finance has grovm. rapidly within the last fifteen
Y; 7 7 years and* that at /the end of ,1965 total outstahdisag ihdebtedriess of the "
7Y7-7' > , developing Oouhtries; on account of credits/raider guarantees 7vas nearly ., , Y;7
7 7; : Y JY]piiiipn dollars, or/anYestimated; one-Sixth: of; the total external ' , 'Y 7
777 77 -7 indebtedness of such countries 5 that they paid more than 1*4 billion Y' 77
■777- : dollars out of a/totalVdebt7charges of 4*3 billion dollars in/1965? and
7 that about 9Q$ of* .the /flow of guaranteed export credits to. developing 7 7
Y; .  ^/countries is estimated to. come fromYWestern Europe and Japan, the balance YYY
7Y 7  ^ ;:of=, Aome 10$‘/coking;from the Bnited States^/ The bulk of such debts, the ;■ 7 
77- . ' study fiuds,7was concentrated1 in teii coTUitries - Argentina, Brazil, /Ghana,: 
v:YY' .YKOfed,•,Mexico, Nigeria, ;Peruj the/United, Arab and Yugoslavia*^9 ‘ 7 7
YY ■ 7 7 ■'The YLimitatidns; of Coutra.ctor Finance. '
7 „ -, , ,/v Biit contractor finance- has serious limitations as a/mechanism for ; . 77 7
; -stimulating ihdustria!i; development. ‘ -:.Tliis;isvdue to; its- 'higher costs,, the s
7 7 absence of.,common.'interests ' be.tiiifeen--,the/.-partners and the resulting 7.7:
7 : 7 ,69'.' Suppliers! YGredits from'industrialised to Developing,Countries:: A
7 Y ;y Study-by theYStaff of"the-World7Bank,;/IBIlD-Jan. 20 1967 -PP 712-13*"7-
; / Y Y  - Y v 7 7 , * ■  - 7 '  v* " Y ^ t Y  Y l / Y  7 7 : K  . 323
inefficiency*, and .the short- maturity structure of such investments# . ' •
One "of. the limitations of contractor finance is that the .period­
ic '//within which7'repaymentis\expected to he completed is /too’' short# As
v/ Tahle; ^ *8 ' shows, the dm^ation of contractor ihvestmeht, that i’s, the period 
Y-wi thi'ft• which_’repayment'"is';fo/beu completed;/under ‘‘the. guarantee;;is as short
7 . ■ as four years in the case of the moderhYshoe industry. in Owferri and as ; Y7
long as llYyears in the ' case of /the Calahar cenient fact ory, Only in the 
Y ^ twoYhotelYpro jects^  ;intdiich the CDC Is' interested isthe durafi dh as1 • 7 :
long as 21 y e a r s # *7This!^however,'-is ■ exceptional, and at aryrate, : it is 7 ■ 7;
v yYputside the mmiufacturing .eecfpir, with-which we are; interested# For the , Y :
rest, the duration, varied /between 4^ years and 8 years, only in one case 7  / ■ : - 
• 7 is it 9 years, and 10 years i’n:.t'wb' cases'* V'&^the'whole, the average 7 / 7/7\7’
‘■•^ maturity; structure’Yof7’contf gctof /financed;.projects in Nigeria would7be-\.Y .7 
7 about'-6:.; years#'7V7«Y ;.,^Y Y./y77- ,77. ■■.77-77'■■■■■'■ 7;7/ ’ -77 ’Y" ; '7 7 7>/
: V One of the effects ofYthie, short period is that if the .project is y.-YY; 7777
';7 entitled; to tax "and', other :.concesaions, for, instance y as a pioneer; 
company’, the heavy payments hecessaiy ,to Complete the whole repayments / 
over'the - short period' would nullify;part ’dryail/of the beneficial effects..
7 of the tax and other cpnceesions* No;:pi3bIishedYliCt ofYcompanies 7 Y;v.
enjoying taxYand other concessionsYisYayaiiableY YHowever /all the projects 7777.7 
which have been contractor financed/inNigeria'" faliYwithin-the industries’ .
. which- have Ybeen declared .pioneer and. since the companies are Nigerian 7 7 Y 
;: / registered publicncompanies^with at?ieast:7I0$' of the. .equity - Nigerian.-\y- 7-77 
owned, : they/ probably all were accorded; pioneer privileges of I,tax and :;7 
YctherYhbiidays.Y YThere is actually ho/reason to;doubt that this is so, ’
y/ <• ,>yf0rr as, the; G/A.TiTY study group'' obseinf&d/bf’•:the:":Nigeriah;;.bbehe*,: t’a’-'- 7 / ;
7 , potentially powerful instrument of policy, the grant of; 11 pionder . status1
7' ' Y,. - is -being used' wastef ully ♦ . . Almost any f irm/can obtain .privilege at present
77 ; ; • .with .the resultyth^^ .ftbyerni^ oufyvfevenue/but,
7 , . more important ,y&X^ •'••f.6rma|iye.Yihfluence ph. industrial structure”
7 Yt ; fheC;goyernmen;by /course, expected fo/f bregp/revenue wh^Ygr^iting
• pioneer; and; other;incentivesY. - These "’privileges are,, extended mpto/ten
■ "7. - years1 on the; 'understanding /that:;the/.ihdustrial invebtment/would; be ’:
■: 7/ ; longterm and that! by "ihaiitime,the;project would haveYcdhsolidated -through
VV'YY ploughing/bae^ amortisation /of; ba$iial /as: td;be able to
/ ' stand on itself*/ It-hai , howevery, been shp^ yn above that the average;
period. within ;-wiiich;lrepaymehtY bf-,.?principaliahd interest on. contractor
7 ' 7/; financed projectsYin/Nigeriaiis ;6.years/■:even- if.we/nsspme/t^ ten
/ ' . ■ yeaTs./( the extreme. * case ^ 1/if/, is /obvious that the; effect of the; annual 7/
repayments of interest/ and principal1 is to cancel or,nullify tlid; advantage
of the -. grace.'. period/Yin^ by tax and other concession, /for/while
■ , ; /the contractor financed pro ject&; would not .be'paying taxes .and;are; exempt
from import duties pn N,soifle of- its/ imports;, it may/be .making even //.
/ greater. payments .’overseas for ;ihtCrest/and-principal.Y /-Thus,what the ///
7 . ; project; gains in theiimings ; it loses in/ihe; rounds* / ’ / /
/ . / .Moreover, .theseYrepayments arejmore cosfiy than' cpnventipnal loans.
- YTable/fe*8; shows .that the; rate of/interest payable "under, these -'guaranteed
1 loans; ranges ;f rom;-3$. to .. 8$ with ah average of about- .8$; This is c onsiderably
/ / " ; 70* : ProgTaimiie f or. IDxpansipn of - Internations;! Trade: Trade-of -Developing
: ;/ . iCounfin/esY:vilThe First Six-YearYPlan of Nigeria, GoA.T.T * Geneva.1966
; ^  7P 17 foot note* 7 7;: : 7 7 7. tz/YY.'Y ////"Y^ v/- /7/;/:/'//--/Y.-s'’--7 7/
higher than the rate of interest on conventional or soft loans ^  For 
-instance* in 12^4, about., 5.3!$ Of total loans to the:miderrdeveloped countries 
were at interest rates, of y/o and under, 20?Aat between yf>\ arid ■■-55$, and only 
Zfo of the total loans incurred, interest rate of 6fo and over.7^ Compared 
with soft loans, therefore.,' suppliers1 credit is a more costly mechanism' 
for develdpmenty - both in terms of loan, maturities and of interest .payments*.
These costs must also, be related not merely to the quoted rate of
. but v ■ ' s- ' 1 ■- "
interest also to the nature of some of the contracts and the method of
calculating the: rate of interest* There is no published information on
these, aspects of ;contractdr finance in Nigeria*. -It is however, known
that; most of the contracts are negotiated father than open tender con- ;
tracts* .This carries the dangers of price rigging’ and at once creates .. ;
. vested interest in contractor financed projects* As .was pointed out above*;,.
the foreign partner generally conducts the feasibility study of the;pro ject,
costs.it, and presents it -to the Government*;: In-contrast to;the selective
processes of competitive tendering viiich should give some idea of the
competitive price, there is; a very serious danger that this foreign
partner may successfully persuade the government hot to consider alternative
methods or;to,consult.other contractors• .At;least, in two projects in
Western Nigeria, it was. specifically provided in the contract that contract
awards would be by negotiation and that in that case no open tender would
71* The distinction between the classes of loan lies in their maturity.*
Conti’actor finance-is usually between 3 to ten years, conventional , . 
. rldans from 15 to 25 years and'soft loans from JO td 40 years*. : .
72 * UN. International Flow of Long-term Capital and Official Donations 
1961-65 p 19.
be invited from any other contractor. The result has often been that 
the actual1 price or cost of the project is considerably higher than the 
quoted price. . This was the case with the, Sokoto cement works in Nigeria 
where a committee foimd that Mthe eventual cost of the project was, con­
siderably more than the original estimate”;73 . -
Through the process of negotiation, vested interests are created.and \ 
there is a danger that enthusiastic .contractors will persuade the Govern- 1 
ment to undertake projects as a result of their persuasive negotiations - 
rather than on the general economic needs of the -- country •. ;The result is 
likely to be hidden costs and distortion of priorities of the Development d 
Plan in favour of contractor projects even "though they rank lowest in the 
development programme.. This, has been the-case in Nigeria where ”contractor 
finance arrangements, because of the xside attractions and, vested.interests’ 
involved lead to gross distortions through the promotion of projects 
which would otherwise have^been rated low down the accepted scale, of 
■ priorities” .74 - ' ■ ' ■:.■ ■ f '
Another serious consideration is the method of calculating the 
interest payments and more importantly, the date from which repayment ■
; would begin. Hereagain theie.. is no published information for Nigeria. It 
has, however, been'observed that one of the main points about these.con-' 
tractor ”investors” is that they do not wait for the project to pay before 
:they take their profits or demand their: payment s. If it is assumed that
73* A White. Paper on,the Military Government Policy for the Reorganisation 
. 74* National. Plan, 1962-68 Progress ReporT p, 19*
.75* West Africa. March 26, 1966. p 341* 1
repayment of interest and'principal dates from the moment the con­
tract is signed, then it is possible that interest c &  paid to the^  i ; 
contractor even before the capital is committed to the pro ject and the ; 
government would then be paying interest, in the early years, on money 
; ; that it has not yet .’borrowed1 • This is very likely to happen because.
many ministers from the developing countries seem to be 1 hypnotised1 by \ 
offer :,v ' /; ■ .V Iv-' ■ - ^
 ^I r / any/of a credit on whatever terms and either through ignorance or sheer ' f i
v v ; ; coirxjptipn doJnot hesistate to commit their.governments to such ’credits1
f ; when a careful or perhaps an expert study of the terms would have advised 
% • - otherwisey?^ The Sokoto cement pro ject again illustrates this* While the
Northern Nigeria;DevelopmentCorporation officlals; were; consideriaig three : 
offers for the project in late 1961 arid early 1962, it happened that the < r v '
. I. Minister-of Economic Plaiming had in fact concluded an sigreement for the
project with a West German^  firm dta?ing th^  ^ s visit to Germany
on 21st December, 1961* The official s expressed concern that no tech- - 
y ■ nical report was produced until then no finan­
cial projeetion or feasibility report had been submitted ♦ Although the ; ’ ; 
contract was signed in I96I and the guarantee givenf or ten years, by A
the end of 1966 the project had not commenced production* • The contract y -
•,.provided .for' repayment of interest and principal, andvthe*...#i. •.•*•••
76* This situation can aidse where the terms of the contract are such that 
on signing, the Government issues a series of promissory notes which 1 
are dated as redeemable on various future dates,, thus giving the 
ws .wrong impression that the money has actually been borrowed*
I Government must obviously have made these payments f br~;iiv^ 
years before;the pro jepf ietarts;. production! ! *  c - v ;,y / : / . /  '■ T'-i'-v/:’-1-
.V.. v This increases the country*sbalance of payments burderi because the
; : projects do not, in. fact, start productiori^before repayments fall due and
therefore do;riot generate foreign /exchange, through export promotion”or import 
substitution to service: the debts. ^There:is the;additional:impairment of the 
, ; v country1 O ’ability .-to, sttracfojh^ loans* Put of Nigerian1 &  ex-
'terhai/debt /repayment- schedule of £85.2m for . the years 1964/65 to 1970/71, 
o /: ; contractor finance, apart; from guaranteed .private investment , .accounted for ; ;
£38m or ^  In 1965 contractor, finanbb in Nigeria; represented 2C$:of total f. 
• ;';outstanding:''exterrial-\inde and its service payments, constituted 5J>%
of total debt service;;pa^ehts.,/^is illustrates:^the heavy burden contractor / 
finance placesonthe balance ;0f payments^/; Comparative figuresfor other ,
* couritfies are shown in Table £.9*
I: ■/.;=■ A-lthough the 53p ereentageofservice/paytnents on/Suppliers* credits ;■
to total service^payments in. Nigeria, I is lowerthan/the90% in/Korea/And 
60^-in ‘Brazii: aiid Iqberia nevertheless Consrderably
- thantheV percentageinother countries suchas the U,.A.^ *ywith; ^ j^and-/ 25% 
in Chile andis-"a/cause'for alarm.: This /alarm^ has^ iri fact^^ 
pressed by the Nigerian Governments ’’contractor finance, obligations and 
suppliers* credits' .td the public sectbrfof the"fegerianteconomy have now \ 
reached an alarming,::scale:’particularly as the: Regional Governmentyappear 
v V recently/to be^fdllbwing the foot steps of the Federal Government just when 
., the latter is trying to curtail its/activities: in: this direction. The
77* Progress Report op cit p 18*
■ / >-■ ■ . . V - . . 329 r
" Federal Government is fully aware of the serious implications of this method 
•\ of. .finance' and. unless something is done/quicklyY.on a ;nhtional level .to ;coia- 
taih this type of foreign exchange obligation, the future development of the 
Nigerian.economy imy be seriously prejudiced1**^ . ; : /■/■:
. / The need for = such urgent actions becomes all the jaore imperative when 
another .characteristic of contactor finance, is examined. A genuine part­
nership requires/bhe existence oi^conmion interests, which is to produce - 
goods'and services profitably for both, sides* This is,riot so in contractor 
finance because of the divergence of interests between the partners'* •;. While 
the , receiving government -is ' anxiousto' develop its economy asquickly as 
possible, tie foreign contractor'partner is interested in sellingb’his
. machinery and in trie resulting conmission. ;nThe? absence of planning, and V  /
the natural desire of* governments .themselves' to operate or participate in, w 
new industries, * •.... gives/an opportunity to the foreigner who, while • ; ; /
, claiming that he is anxious to assist industrialisation in Africa, really / !
/. wants to sell machineryjy. . . . arid even this he sells on terms which, though ' / ,
./impatient politicians too often fall for them, are in trie/long run very • 
v,,. oner pus Triis interest in machine selling1 is probably' the*/prinoipal, '■if.-/* -fv
. not the only reason, for the contractor partner1 s non insistence on retain- . y ;;
ing majority holding and control of the project." In deed,: hevis prepared :y ?•/: ;
to; 'invest*, in wholly owned indigenous project if it,.is possible^ As in the 
case of glass and ceramaics factories in Eastern Nigeria^ where this is riot r . 
78. ibid*' / - r ■■ -. /■ . ■ ( . ...-/.yv'
. ■ ;72* "Industiy: off the/Ground11 West Africa 2i2th-Decv 19&4 p 1585
possible,;, he takesupa,|token1 interest-of about. ,10^ in the equity of the 
. pro ject* This is. normal 'with‘ neg,rly.v-s$£'-contffiptor-firiaiiced •.■industrial*
. projects in Nigeria*; It" is however/possible that since the. contractor 
conducts, the feasibility 'studyland' •.costs/ '.the. project/without^
, checks - of open tender //since; /negotiated*) Jhe would /hdve-
, included this;,10^6 iri; tHe contract price, in any/ event, If i,;the; pro jectv fails if
, lie ' falls back on the /Government guarantee and ”fake*the next available;
I plane back; ■ his :cpuntry:; before, looking/for /his "next victim, an other ^deve­
loping/ country anxious to industrial!se yery^t rapidly. ;He;-;would have taken / 
no ; risk, lost nothing but /gained/Cyerythirig.at the expence of the, Nigerian 
t a x p a y e r ” * ^  'r/ :// \ ' 1 / - ■ /  :‘h / : - / O - / /  / ; - / - ■ . / ■ ' . //;7-\
' -i;;.' Commenting on foreign private investment inpNigeria/jp.-pri P.- N , C..
rOkigfcQ, the/ former / e.cpnomic; adviper to the /Federal, Government. of. N i g e r ! •: 
, urged that; a distinction should be /made . between the real investor and . ;
 ^mere/”vendors of equipment /vdio/ tiy/to//seduce eveiybody' with -commissiohs 
A -without 'regaid/ to/ the viability of the/ ehterprises f pr which the machinery
: is soldn*Ul!^ >in.19.63 , -tlie/Northern-^  Mgeria -Ministry- of Trade and Industry * ■:
reported that "After Independence/ in. I960 ..Nigeria, became the target of in- 
-tensive/.sales /campaign byforeign: manufacturers: of machine^r./ ..Many k e  
and varied weie the /schemes/ submitt e.d .but/ strict scrutiny -/disclosed that in / 
most casesVtheir acceptance would/have/ saddled Nigeria; with unprofitable* ;
.enterprises or :useless machihery1 .^/ -V \\ ^ v  • ';///;-,/" :/.-_ :/n
80* Nat ./Flan .Prbgress Report op: cit; p .-21* • '"/ . V; . 1
/• - 81# / .Financial Times 12th Marchy 1964* A I-. _// _///'./. ./
82. Industrial -Potentialities of NcurtherniNi^ G. F ICadurxav . 1963p 13.
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It must be emphasised that most of these contractor projects are 
preceded by'a feasibility study .1 However, as the World Bank study pointed 
.out, "undertakings, of .dubious merit .were encouraged by vj.rtue of the fact /
■7. that feasibility studies for them, carried out by the suppliers themselves,
may not have been thorough.....credits were extended, as a result, with
little regard to the economic soundness of the project or the suitability of 
7'V'. the terms and.their effects on total indebtedness, nor on the technical •
. ; quality Of the p r o j e c t ,  An illustration of the unreliability of some of
. / these so called.feasibility studies and of the interest of the contractors in
. their commission rather than in the economic development of the country is
: Mr 2ohn Morley’s pro jected £20m deal with Dr Banda of Malawi. When :
Mr Morely, an English man, heard about Br Banda's decision to build a new ■ / •’
town, he quickly prepared a "plan" and presented it to Dr Banda, and under­
took to provide the £20m credit . But all: that Mr Morley. "wanted (apart from 
7% interest) was the right to allot contracts for the new development, worth 
.: , some £2-^ m in commission plus brokerages commissions."®4 turned out,
however, to be that MrMorley's "models of the new capital" was, in fact, ■
. parts .of "Swiss Cottage and of an Old-folkfs home in Sevenoaks......*lf the
deal had actually gone through, *lts British promoters might have made £3.%
, and Malavd- could have been brought to the verge of b a n k r u p t c y . j n some
'• cases, of course, as in the case of the Sokoto cement works, the contract is
• 7 Suppliers’ Credits from Industrialised to Dev, countries IBKD op cit7-
v  . 7. Pp" 16-19* - • 7 7 : / • 7 ’ 7: ' \• V / - 7 7 /V •'*' ' I '■ 7 ' . 7 ' . ."-7 . ,7/ -7 //
84. Sunday Times 12th June, 1966. '
;-7 85* Ibid. . 7 7^ g' - .
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signed without any Tf’easihility study, or, as in the oase; of the . Jebba: paper . 7,71 
mill, the .project is located without regard either to the source of raw - 7;.
, materials or to .themarlcet for / the’ finished, product, ad though, the siting was . 
based on; a ’feasibility.?/report*/^  ■'. /':7-" -7 / ' . :/•*.' '-r ‘ - . • . - ;
' • -7 .. y Contractor .Finance; //7 / ■■/;:;■ .-;/.• • ■
7. . 7,/" :/7v;'77"/' Conclusions 7... 77 7 > '77.•/’■Y-,..-/7. -,-7.■/ . . . 77f/\77; 7
. The following statement summarises the main limitations of contractor
7 finance., "1965 proved in /some-.v.^ ayo7a''4isapppiriting;_year.for the C.D.C.in1-;. 7; '7 . 7;
West Africa so far as new business .was concerned. The business methods of ; 
many overseas promoters of pro jects operating / in the.area were not such as, 
in the C'.DwC.'s opinion would lead to/the establishment, of sound undertakings, 
and, unfortunately, in recent/years these methods Imve often enjoyed enough 
; 7 silccess to' damage the chances; of adoption of more honestly conceived schemes *
There wi 11 be heavy liabilities. to: be met; over, the next few years in respect 
of /government guarant eed short-term /loans/ f or<: expensive miachinery incorporated 
in projects not necessarily well adapted to local conditions and unbacked.by 
the professional / management and long-term financial investment which is 7 
essential for the establishment of a successful industrial operation in //, 
developing, comitries1 7/ . 7. 7 7 . -
■ 7 / The question tlien; arisesr "in yiew7of the/above, disadvantages of 7; 7 7 ; ; ; 7
■ contractor finance or ; suppliers’' credits, why did Nigeria embaric upon• such
/mechanism for, financing her development1?? Put in another way, "Why- has 77 ; /'/ .
.suppliers1 credit recorded the-60% growth between 1958 and 1965, according tb 
World. Bank study”?/.The answer- to this , question can be found in the / / , ■ f.
86. C *D.C.: Ahmial Report 1965 p 103• 7 7 / 7 . .7
S ’ v ; : ' * /: 7-- /r.;'353: "'.
conditions obtaining in both the developed and the developing countries, :7 7 
of/which,Nigeria is one# <7.7//./ "7 'v" J7:',7 - 7/7 7 7/77/77//;:
From the side of the/ /developing countries the factors responsible for 
the.-:.growth/in;' the/rise5 -pf/icoh^ • the desire for.rapid
, economic development; and the inadequacy of soft and convehtional loans or 
private investment, lack of y&i scrimination by the country1 s experts, and in 
7'//777:;7  ^ the case of: Nigeria specifically, regional, competition. o'7-7 7/-777;
:7'7-''.;7/7777- A major reason for the extensive resort to^  suppliers1 credits has 
/// 7 / been the emergence of independence and the positive drive in the national :
economic/policies of Ab^blbpii^ In earlier decades, major under-
7 ^  takings in these countries were largely confined to public /utilities and 7 
-,7/ 7 infrastructure • In Nigeria, for instance, the emphasis of the /development
plans between 1946 and 1962 was the development of infrastructure* The 19 62-
7/>/.;, ; 1968 plan, on the other hand9 emphasised agriculture and industrialisation 7 - 77 77.7^
7 7 7 forivdiiehthe cori^nt$^ finance have: not/be$n7availab^ 7/7
7/7/,.;-.' inadequate* '.. -77/7'777/7 77- 7/ / ,<;77- 7^:7/ .'../v77.77y ^  7, 77.7 7 7 ./‘ -. 7,7777777
77 -7 7 .7 Moreover* iritefimtibnal^iristitutibim^ confined la/i^ely to v' 77./
7 -the finaribing of infrastructure* aESveix/when it wab available* for iridustiyri 7 7
77 . in many cases it could not be obtained because the project to-he’financed777:7 77 7
was poorly prepared®7 or was of low economic priority* As the Y/orld Bank study / 
777 noted,/even the extension of/, institutional; le at a later stage into the
v 87* For/instance the/Ci/D*p* /stated /that/about ^  projects f ;
7 7 / 7 /' •/ pht7f^ 7f ihahcing in Fasteih/Jfc^ri^ because 7 // :
7 7 77 7 they were poorly prepared* In one case which/ showed some promise, they
had to advise and assist in reforipuiation and the project was eventually 
77 financed through its subsidiary, the Finance/Cow,/of Eastern Nigeria/ Ltd*
Source: Private Interview* 'y7\., //7 //
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manufacturing sector was too limited in scope and volume to replace private 
.bxpbrfe;'creditb* Thi^ al maturities of the conventional and soft
. loans have been progressively lenghtehed and their rates of interest /./7 7  
lowered,.^ these loans, the cost Of which we used to compare the cost of
contractor finance, were not readily available*
7  :77'/ jn^ 'addition; to the above, two alternatives open to the developing 
countries were either not very helpful or inadequate* The first is direct 
foreign investment* But the emergence of Strong nationalist policies in a 
number/ofdeveloping countries reduced the at tract ivenessof this alternative 
tbhpieniial lenders7pr investors i in some/countries , ;the flow of private 
foreign investment actiially decreased* In Africa, for instance, it fell by 
44!$ from/147 Itlllion dollars during 1951-55 to 83 hillion dollars during 7 
1956-59*^° > In Nigeria, in particular, there, was a net outflow of tl*k*
private investment;■Of £4i6m^ /in: /1S>6£/ The next alter­
native would be borrowing at home oh favourable termS ^followed by the pur­
chase/ of /needed capital and other goods against cash payment; or borrowing
88• Suppliers* Credits from Industrialised to Developing countries IBRD
7 QPYoitp M » • - 7/
89 * For./ instance, between 1961 and 1963 the proportion of loans pledged by 
7/ ; ’ the industrialised countries at a rate of /interest of less than yfo p*a* / 
more than doubled) and the proportion .at 5?7or more dropped from about 
• 70% of the total amount to about 40^ * 7 Sinalarly, the proportion of 7 
/ 1 oan.commitments of relatively short tenor-less than ten years - hasy7.
; 7 . more than ha^^ to about one-ei£hi of the amount pledged in 1 9 6 3  and 
/ 1964 while the propprtion ;Ient f or 20 years andv6ver has almost doubled
"7fhOiiab0ui7ofe ;/the:Ytbtal/;ih/^^/;to/, about two-thirds in I964• ':-
vV-7&ee Ihteiriiatlbhal FI long-term Capital and Official Donation tf*N*
v 7 7 p ¥ ^ ^  7 7 7 ^ ^  ■
90. See Tablefi|5 of the appendix £4 f  5 9 1
91* See Table ft the^/appendix $pOy:\: ■ ■ 7-7.,;’ v/y17-;v;7;
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abroad from private financial institution than fromsuppliers * 7
/The/ firstalterative r^ financial markets with Sufficient
capacity to supply the needed funds at competitive interest rates and, at 
:the sbme time, the/predisposition and ability of the monetary authorities 
to sell the needed foreign exchange * Nigeria’s money and capital markets 
are yet at their embryonic stages and although the central bank of Nigeria ; 
is; /tryirig/ to speed up their development, it wi 11 be a long time in the 
future before much reliance can be placed oh them to satisfy the country's 
demand for longtermtinaTi^ alternative^ that of 7
from foreign private s ource s, requires, among other thingsy that financial/ / 
policies be pursued in the debtor cotmtries vdiich would; inspire confidence 7 
. and Indus# lending by private foreign financing ins tut ions ♦ Upto the end
of;1965, Nigeria pursued such policies but the political disruption which
\  J > always/Hq; 7 1'/
occured since 1966 shows that these requirements can nevep' be guaranteed#
/77771y&&s/ it;is the' strong desire to industrialise rapidly and the ..7;y_r 
inadequacy^8! of the conventional forms of financing Mat has left suppliers’ 
credits or contractor finance virtually the only available source of 
finance to achieve the objectives of the developing countries# To this is 
added the inexperience of governments and the ignorance of indigenous 
politicians and project approvers? and there may also have been cases of 
sheer corruption# As. the Sunday Times pointed out, thib-situation/ has offered 
tri^meitibus^7ppportupiM%7tp7 been exploited by some unscrupulous 7  7
91a* There are many reasons for this 5 co^ehtiphal; loans are not always
y 77 available on mutually acceptable terms and are; unsuitable for industrial
7 : projects* Governments may insist on uiiacceptable terras for private ;
, investment5 and the projects may be economically unsound* In shortv
the problem is not always from the side of supply* 7 7 7 ;:
" t  ■'■'■7 / 7 / -  /  ; - ; 7  7 7 ' 7 ' 7 7 . / .  /  . / 7 - v  7  .. /  7-336
financiers ’of unquestionably dubious standing?- who specialise * "in 
dangling tempting offers before African Governments and ministers - offers 
which make the general run:of 1 suppliers1 credits!look paltry* "93
The inadequacy of the. traditional forms of financing has been.part­
icularly responsible for the resort to contractor finance in establishing 
the cement and textile projects in Mid-Western Nigeria and for the glass 
factory ill Eastern Nigeria. Foreign private investors were probably.,
. doubtful of the economic soundness of establishing textile and cement fac- 
tories in the Mid-West, the smallest region with a population of about 
2*5mNwhen these factories/ had already been duplicated in the surrounding 
areas in Eastern and Western Nigeria* In the case of the glass factory,
; the problem was complicated by regional competition. , The Eastern Nigeria 
, Government had been contemplating the. establishement of a glass factory 
for some time and when the FBI Mission in 19 61 reported that there was; wome 
scope for a moderate sized factory to supply bottles for the breweries, a 
new momentum was added to the project* But private foreign finance was. 
surprisingly not forth-coming for the project. In June 19 6l, however, it 
was announced that the Western Nigeria Development Corporation had signed: 
a contract with an American firm for a brewery and glass factory* "The 
East, which had been conducting, tests on its sands, reacted immediately: .
■ 92♦ Sunday Times June 12 "1966. \•’/7;J77.;, 7
95j West Africa June 18 1966 page 681-83* These machine sellers often pass 
under flamboyant names such as economic cp-ordinator *, industrial co- 
■•■■■//'!ordinaM^1/’-®?1^  'general' manager1 of some foreign companies., They dress 
their offers in.highly sophisticated legal terns, the implications of 
.which become too late to remedy after they Have been committed to and 
understood by ignorant politicians* One of these expert machine 
? sellers floated a £13m development project. in Iybia, although the com- 
. pany handling it had only a paid-up capital of only £4* :
obviously at this stage there was no room in Nigeria for two glass 
/ • container plants• Because no private enterprise was then, ready to join
in partnership, it was decided that the ENBC would proceed on a 100 per cent 
ownership basis**..♦•to be sure, ,noyreputable/ private enterprise was 7
v/willing to iuvest^ in a glass Jnaairi^ acturing, facility in I96I* If it were, not ■/'
7 V for,regional;rival^, lieiMer the^  West nor the Eastwould have committed
/ themselves ,tp/i(?hat may prove ;to be: a preimture e f f o r t 777 : : :
While the urge for rapid industrialisation in the developing /./y-I
••■ ;countries, their inexperience, and the inadequacies of the traditional 7
; forms of finance have been largely responsible for the resort to, and .
viV/ the increase in the use of suppliers’ credit or contractor finance, fac-
/ ; v 7/ tors ; on the supply side also c ontributed * As the World Bank survey found 7 7
out, creditor countries have supported the mechanism largely in response 7
;/.;to pressures -on. their /^la/nce of parents,; and from their export sectors 
but also due to/ competition from other exporting countries*?^ :
; , It;is: thus seen M a t  factors in the developing and the creditor
, countries have contributed to the increasing use of the mechanism of .
contractor finance* It must be stated/, /however,, that despite all the
77 / > 95* Alan Sokol ski: 7,,The Establishment of tlanuf acturing. in Nigeria / ^
7./..' 7 77-7 00 oit pp 233 and 234* 77 77 .77 7 7 7 7 7 ’‘ 7/777" 7 ■ v* 77 7
7,7 96* Suppliers’ credits IBKD op cit p 18* '7-77- 7; .7 -
defects in the mechanism noted above, there is nothing wrong with con­
tractor finance per se* In deed, it is difficult to see what can replace 
contractor finance in Nigeria if substantial progress is to be made in 
initiating a veriety of industries that can serve as a basis for industrial 
education and growth* Conventional and soft loans are desirable but are 
in short supply and at any rate are hardly available for medium sized 
industries; and she cannot hope to attract foreign equity capital in the 
amount and form she would require* On the other hand, she has decided 
against, financing all her investment from her internal resources as she 
considers that this would make her development to be painfully slow and 
extremely difficult♦ This is why she has planned to depend heavily on 
foreign/resources, and: contractor finance or suppliers* credit seems to be 
more readily available * However, this would not benefit her if the projects 
thus, financed fail* jt is for this reason that it is necessary to note some 
of the conditions under which contractor finance would benefit her*
: Some Conditions under which Contractor 
• Finance, may Benefit Nigeria \V
The first condition is that the contractor must be persuaded to have 
a bigger share in the equity of the project than the 105$ which has so far 
characterised all the contractor - financed industrial projects in Nigeria*
This need not be a controlling interest: some thing like 45$ may be appro- 
priate; but each case must be treated on its own circumstances • The governments 
desire for Nigerians to own the project substantially or wholly may be met by I .
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an agreement for a phased sale of theyforef^/partners 7  ihteMst M  
Nigerians at agreed dates in the future after the project has been able > 
to stand on its own#
/>. Mbicase/f>9r  ^the obntracMr/haM^ .in the equity /
of the project rests on the influenee such interest will bear on the 7 
selection of the site and oh the management of the project» We pointed out 
in chapter 5 that the foreign private investors have generally been left " 
free to select a site, for their project and that this has generally been 
based on economic considerations # This has not always been the case with 
.contractor financed projects* Because he has a 'token* interest, of about 
10$ in the equity of the project (which probably was convered by the 
7 commission he expects /from the sale .of the :machinery , ) ; the contractor ;
" leaves the government fre e t o s  elect the site * But, Nigerian Governments 
; and political leaders; generally regard., projects/not!as U'/nieahs of7an7 
efficient procurement of goods and servi ce s but as an instrument for re - 
warding loyal constituents fir for punishing recalcitrant ones * Guided by , 
these/ political considerations* they have not always selected the most 
appropriate sites for projects: The siting of the /Paper Mi lle ;at Jebba
and of theSokoto cement factoiy dn this; reepootdffere illustrated in ,
Ghapter \* In a genuine partnership where the foreign partner is interested 
not in his commissions alone^ but also in the success of the project^such y 
uneconomic sites would probably not have been chosen for either the government
agrees on a site based on a balance of economic considerations or the foreign 
partner may not invest in the project* . . .
77 The success of a project also depends on an efficient management
and the foreign partner or contractor is likely to be more careful in the 
management of the project if lie has a substantial stake in the equity* : Y/hat 
has so far happened in Nigeria is that the contractor undertake to manage the 
project for some time during when he trains indigenous managers • But these 
contractors are not^ iridustrial managers but skilled machine sellers. At 
any rate, contract managers, because they have no substantial stake in the 
equity of the project, can only lifck forward to their fees; if they had 
substantial stake in the equity of the project, they would additionally look 
forward to the success of the project. 11A company brought in 
manggf, and not as a substantial contributing partner*, rarely achieves 
maximum results•"
A corollary to the/ above is that the government should not own or 
finance a project except in genuine partnership with the foreigner who is 
prepared to have a Substantial equity in the project* This is partly because 
of the unreliability of contract managers and partly because the government 
is riot an industrial manager but an admiriis tr at or and when a government owns , 
the project, political considerations tend to override economic considerationss 
expert adviee is bypassed; posts are created that may not be very necessary 
on economic grounds? and unqualified people may be employed as rewards for 
political services elsewhere*
The third condition is that contractors should be selected after open 
and competitive bidding rather than by negotiation ^ so as to have the; 
benefit of alternative costs and conditions. This has not been the case in 
most contractor-financed projects in Nigeria. In two cases in Western Nigeria,
1* U*N* E*C*A* Industrial Finance and Management for Africa n 16*
Addis Ababa Nov* 1966*
soleMto
the contractor was "guaranteed11 a contract of £30m to he executed by- 
negotiated tendering over a five year period; and it was specifically stated 
: that no open tendering would be invited from other contractors during the 
period, 1960-65* In the case of: the Sokoto cement factory, while alternative 
offers were being considered the contract was, awardtA to a German firm and , > 
. it was latter/found that the costs were considereably in excess of the what .
. was originally planned. In these two bases, the government lost the 
benefit of alternative bidding and costing from other contractors# Moreover, 
a guaranteed contract carries a risk that in order to honour the contract, 
the government may be persuaded to undertake projects which otherwise would 
have ranked lowest in priority thus distorting the planned programme*«:
/. The fourth condition concerns the guarantee itself* The guarantee, is 
necessary to assure the creditor that ihe credit he, advances will be repaid "7 
■v during the. agreed period* In Nigeria all foreign loans pass through the 
Federal Government which gives the guarantee where this, is necessary* Before 
doing so, the. Federal Government should insist' on the regional government or 
public corporation obtaining at least three;alternative offers, if possible, 
from different, countries, to.ensure that alternative costing and conditions 
have been considered* ■’
The government should also insist on obtaining longer spread of the 
repayment period* Moreover repayment of interest and; principal should commence 
from the date the project starts operation and not from the, date of signing 
the contract, There are two advantages here. It wi 11 ensure that the 
project contributes to/servicing the loan through export promotion or import 
substitution; and it will help to impart caution on the creditor who would
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then ensure that the project is economically sound and would take steps 
to avoid delays in cons true ti on arid provision of equipment since he would 
, otherwise/not he receiving any repayments Until the project^ starts pro­
duction* The Sokoto cement factory illustrates this. The contract for this
• was sigped in 1961 hut the project only started production in May, 1967*
However one of the reasons for such a long delay before the project started 
operation is that the original machinery: supplied was found to be xrnsuitable 
for the type of clay in Sokoto and a new machinery had therefore to be 
installed* The terms of the contract or guaa^ntee are not published* But 
if repayment had to start immediately on signing: the, contract, it means that 
the government might have paid 60$ of the contract price before the project 
starts operation. It also means that no contribution was received from this 
/• pro ject in terms of import savings or export promotion towards the servicing 
cost of. the loan* If the contract provides for repayment to begin when the 
project starts operation, then the foreign partner would have lost interest 
and tied up capital for six years without receiving anything* An awareness 
of this contingency will be ensured if, as a general rule, it is provided 
that repayment would not start until the project comes into operation. This 
wi 11 caution as* the creditor who would take steps to avoid mistakes and 
ensure that the pro ject to be financed is economically sound before 
committing his resources *;, Finally interest repayments should be on a 
diminishing balance method* 7 / ' 7
The fifth condition for the. success of a contractpr-finariced project 
is that the government should never enter into the contract without taking 
an expert advice. Again the Sokoto cement factory illustrates this* The
contract,, for this was signed during the German tour of the Minister of 
Economic Planning without consulting the staff of the Northern Nigeria 
Development Corporation, ,the government partner, and when the staff were 
still considering,three offers for the project, The agreement was signed. . 
without; any financial projection and it was /later found that the ultimate 
cost of the project was very much higher than what the Minister was made to 
belfcive when he signed the contract* It is possible that much of the extra ; 
costs and delay in starting the project would have been avoided had the 
Minister not committed the government in the way he did for;the expert opinion 
and alternative ’ costing would have uncovered much of the defects in the !/ 
/contract* ■ ' ,v
Finally since the creditor/countries have, also contributed to the wide / 
use ofythe mechanism by insuring the credits in their home countries, it will 
greatly help to, improve the situation if they paid; greater scrutiny and 
attention to the economic soundness of the project for which the credits are 
being insured#! The World Bank found that by using selective criteria the 
creditor countries would have prevented or discouraged ae* the unwise -tran­
sactions# As it found, however, that "creditor countries may not have 
been sufficiently aware of the consequences of such credits extended by their 
own residents*; If there was such awareness, these consequences probably 
weighed laes heavily in some cases than the commercial and balance of 
payments policy objectives of the creditor countries.n% However, it is 
possible that even if they did otherwise and thus attempted to 1prescribe *? 
/such, prescription would be politically resisted# The whole argument about
1. Suppliers! Grddits from Industrial! ged to. Developing Countries IBRD 
!.!,//-' January 1967 p 18*
345
independence is that a country should "be largely left free to develop 
according to its preferences* The test of rationality is for the 
wise ‘borrower and not for the creditor*
The conditions stipulated above will help to make the borrower 
"wise1* and to benefit from contractor finance*
‘ chapter seven
THE CHANNELS OF FOREIGN PRIVATE > INVEBMfJQi NIGERIA
IH TR Q H tJC TIQ H  . . . v ' '  , ■
There are two main channels of foreign private investment in 
Algerian manufacturing. One is institutional; the other is non- 
institutional. This chapter discusses these two channels. The non- 
institutional channel is discussed in part one and the institutional, 
channel in part two of the chapter.
part ‘one , ' /-■
The Ron-Institutional Channel
The non-institutional channel of investment does not involve an 
/external1 organ other than the company itself and, or, its foreign 
principal or agent. ; It consists of retained earnings or unremitted , 
profits^  of the companies, trade or suppliers* credits, and other 
foreign liabilities, principally with the companies* head office.
During 1961 ?;&*<, 1964, the total inflow of foreign private investment 
into Nigeria amounted to £145*9m. . The breakdown of the sources or 
channels of this investment is whown in Table 7*1* It shows that the non- 
institutional channel^as defined ihbove, accounted for a total of ElOlm or 
69$  of the £145.9m/the 'institutional* channel accounted for £44.9m or 
31fc, Of the three segments of the non-institutional channel,"other foreign 
liabilities" accounted for the highest,£4^ *2m or 334' the total, againsh 
29$  by unremitted, profits, and &fo by suppliers1 and trade credits.
h^ile the latter ..consistently accounted .for the lowest percentage , 
throughout the fotir years, the relative contributions, of unremitted : 
profits and other foreign liabilities varied. From about 10j?£ of the 
total in 1961, unremitted profits amounted to about 4S$ in 1962 and 
declined to 2&/& in 1964* On the other hand, from abotvb 5^ of the 
total in I96I, other liabilities fell drastically to 157° iu 1962. ylt 
doubled tb 32$ in 1963; and dropped again to 31$in 1964. Over the ' 
four-year period other liabilities accounted for a higher percentage 
than unremitted profits; but the latter is more important as ah indication 
of the extent to which the companies are self-financing. It is significant 
that companies in Nigeria plough back a substantial proportion of their 
total earnings. Table 7*2 shows that retained darnings of foreign \
companies in Nigeria amounted to £24m or 65.8$ of the £36.5m of^ total 
earnings during I96I-I963, the only years for. which figures are available. 
As a percentage of total, earnings, retained earnings rose steeply from 
38.6$ in 1961 to 68#7$ in 1962, and to 74*4$ in 1963* The improvements 
in 1962 and 1963 were largely due to the earnings of oil companies. :
1. Total earnings are made up of total profits, dividends and interest, 
and are.exclusive of managing agency, fees or remimerations paid to ; 
parent or affiliate companies, provisions for Nigerian taxation, and ;; 
depreciation of assets. ;
2, Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review,Vol.3» No.l, 
June,1965 p.10.
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Table 7* 2a shows that retained earnings amounted to lOfo of net new 
investments^  in 1961, 45$ 1962, and 35$ in 1963» nn^  averaged 29$ over
the three year period.
P A B T  T W O  : " - .
The Institutional Channels. ,
While the non-institutional channels are internal to the company* 
its associates, or head office, the institutional,channels are external, : 
in' the sense that the transactions, pass through:or are derived from 
sources outside the company or its associates. These external sources 
are made up of two components - the short-term or the money market 
channel, and the capital market or the long-term channel* These two 
dhannels are essentially unified through a wide spectrum of liquidity 
ranging from cash to irredeemable bonds which make for cross flows, of 
funds between the two channels. Nevertheless, the division is essential 
for analytical purposes.
- The Short-term Channels
In Nigeria the short-term or money market channel of foreign , :
private investment is the commercial banking system. Table 7*3 shows : 
that this was' made up of 1? commercial banks in 19^ 3* Bight of these 
were expatriate banks, three were mixed, and six were indigenous banks. , 
The expatriate banks are wholly foreign-owned, and the mixed banks were 
owned jointly by Nigerians, and foreigners, five of the six indigenous , 
banks Were wholly1 owned by the Nigerian governments and the remaining 
one by private Nigerians. ;
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There Were 2Q4 commercial bank offices in Nigeria in 1962* About 
two-thirds of these were owned by the eight expatriate banks. The.two . ' 
biggest expatriate banks, the Bank of West Africa Ltd and Barclays Bank 
BCG owned 112 of the 129 expatriate bank offices. The third biggest
expatriate bank, the United Banker Africa Ltd had 11 offices in 19&2* ,
' - >. • ' • . ■ • ' 1
These three expatriate banks were in operation in Nigeria before 1950*
The,other" five expatriate banks were established between 1959 and 1962* 
Following subscriptions,to the capital of Banque de LfAfrique Occidental©, 
by the First National City Bank of New York in 19^ 5» the BAO was re­
organised as Banque Internationale Four L’Afrique Occidental© with a 
capital of £2*9m*^
In December, 1965 > Nigerian branch, of the Chase Manhattan Bank
merged with the Bank of West Africa Ltd, which itself had amalgamated ; :
• ■ . . 3 -with the Standard Bank of London earlier in the.,year* One of the:
mixed banks, the .Bank of Lagos, surrendered its licence, and from 17th
September, 19&5» commenced operations as the Finance Company of Lagos,Ltd.
With these developments, the number of commercial banking companies in
operation fell ifrom seventeen to fifteen* :_>■
1. The United Bank for Africa Ltd formerly operated since 1949 as the 
British and French Bank Ltd* ;
2. Central Bank of Nigeria: Annual Report * 1965 P* 31 *
3* Ibid. p. 16. v -
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Although . Table 7*5 states that tiere. were only 204 commercial bank
’ 1 offices in Nigeria.* in 1962, the correct number was 210 at the end of the
year. By 1965 the number had reached 24O. However this is not broken
dowh between indigenous and expatriate banks; so the figures in Table 7*5
will be used in the analysis. The indigenous banks* accounted for 69
or about a third of the total commercial bank offices, the two biggest
indigenous banks, , the African Continental Bank Ltd,and the National Bank
of Nigeria accounting for 52 or about 25?^ of the total.
The above analysis shows that the Nigerian commercial banking system
is predominantly expatriate since over half of the . banks and more than two-
thirds of the bank offices are wholly expatriate owned. Although two of tl
mixed banks started operations with a majority of Nigerian capital, it is
said that subsequent increases in capital have been provided by the
2 ■ 
foreign partners. They are therefore now probably largely owned by
expatriates.
It would have been very interesting to see how this expatriate 
dominance in the number of banks and bank offices is reflected in the 
proportionate share of the Nigerian banking business. But there are 
no published figures for this exercise; and this has led to some 
guess estimates. The World Bank Mission felt that the expatriate banks 
controlled "close to 90/^ of total bank deposits" . and Dr C.V.Brown could 
not hazard a guess except that the Bank of West Africa Ltd conducts about
1. C.B.M; Annual Report 1962 p.24.
2. C.V* Brown, Development of Money & Credit Institutions in Nigeria
. Ph.D London,Thesis,1964, P*l6.
5* The Economic Development of Nigeria IBRD op.cit. p!57*
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1half of its business in Nigeria. Finally Dr* Olakanpo made two guesses 
one was that the expatriate banks ’control oyer 80$ of the total banking 
business; and the other that, what he called fthe Big Five” control 80$ 
of the total banking business* The big five are the three biggest 
expatriate banks: Barclays Bank DCO, the Bank of West Africa Ltd, 'and 
the United .Bank for Africa Ltd and the two biggest indigenous banks, the 
African Continental Bank Ltd and the National Bank of Nigeria Ltd*.
After repeated requests and refusals, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
kindly’ supplied me with the deposits and advances figures of the 
expatriate and indigenous banks for the period 1959/65* These are 
summarised in Table 7*4* It is therefore, at last, possible to make a 
definite statement about the relative shares of the Nigerian banking 
business to be attributed to each class of bark.
The Table shows that during the period deposits amounted to 
£641m and that the" expatriate banks accounted for £513^  or 80$ of this 
and the indigenous banks for £128m or 20$. Out of a total loans and 
advances of £582m during the period, the expatriate banks accounted for 
£442m or 76$ and the indigenous banks for £140m or 24$*
The above analysis of the Nigerian banking structure has been 
necessary to indicate the foreign component in the structure. It shows
1. C.V. Brown: Developments of Money and Credit Institutions in Nigeria 
op.cit. p.23* . ;
2. 0. Olakanpo: Monetary and Banking Problems in Nigeria. Bankersf
Magazine, March !966 p.l?7> and Commercial Banking in Nigeria, 
Bankersf Magazine, January 1965 p.18.
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that the expatriate banks accounted ibr 7 of the 15 commercial banks and 
for more than two-thirds of the banking offices at the end of 1965* They
also- accounted for 80^  of the deposit business.and for 7^ of the
loans and advances business during 1959/65* Thus in discussing the role
of the Nigerian c pmmercial banks as a channel of foreign private
■ investment in Nigerian manufacturing, we are indirectly largely discussing 
the role of another group of foreign private: investors in Nigerian 
manufacturing.
The Banking1 System as a Channel of Investment in Manufacturing
The. role of the Nigerian' commercial banks as a channel of foreign
■ private investment, in Nigerian manufacturing is.to provide short-term 
working capital for industry* To examine!this role it is necessary 
to analyse the available banking statistics. These are shown in 
Tables 7.5^^ 7*6 ^ Gr the period 1944/65* The analysis will be 
conducted;in two time periods, 1944/54* ahtd 1955/65* h
Table 7*5 shows that commercial bank loans and advances rose from 
£0.3m in 1944 to £12m in 1954* This represented 5*4?^  of total deposits 
in 1944 and 58,1^  in 1954* The breakdown of these advances is not .
, available;; but it can be asstimed that the proportion that went- to 
manufacturing was very small. This is because, as we showed in chapter 
one, there was little manufacturing in Nigeria by 1954* Although the 
increase in loans and advances was very rapid over the ten years, the 
Table shows that little overall credit was extended to the local economy 
and this was mainly due to lack of effective demand for bank credit and 
of acceptable investment outlets. The result was/that the banks
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invested much of their resources in foreign assets during the period*
In 1944 these amounted to £8.5m; by 1954 they amounted to £24*8m or 
86*6$ of total deposits in 1944 an<i to 61.2$ in 1954* These investments 
resulted in a net capital outflow of £5*7m from Nigeria through the 
banking system during the period.
A different asset structure resulted in the period 1955/65* Loans 
and advances increased in absolute terras by Jjp.ve times from £26m in 1956 
to £135m in 1965. This represented 55$ of total deposits in 1956 and 
102$ in 1965* Deposits however increased at a lower rate by three 
times from £46m in 1956 to £152m in 1965. To meet the increased demand 
for advances the banks invested less in foreign assets. In fact they 
drew down these foreign investments which decreased from £25m in 1954 
to £15.9m in 1958. As a percentage of total, deposits foreign assets 
fell from 61.2$ in 1954 to; 15.5$ in 1965* These movements also resulted 
in a net capital inflow of £14*9m during the decade.
It is thus seen that during 1944/54 the banks channelled a net. 
capital export of £5*7m from Nigeria and a net capital inflow of £14*pm 
during 1955/65* Over the period 1944/65, therefore, the Nigerian 
commercial banks accounted for, a net capital inflow of £9*2m to Nigeria. 
The biggest single,outflow during the period was £8m,in 1965 and the 
biggest single inflow was £21.5m in 1964* This net inflow was to meet 
the increasing demand for bank loans and advances. A breakdown of these 
advances is shown in Table 7*7 fo^  the,period 1958/65*
The Table shows that during the 8 years 1958/65 commercial bank 
loans and advances amounted to £620iiu £258m or 58.5$ of these went
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to general commerce, 25*7$ to agriculture, 6*2$ to real estate and
construction and 8.5$ to manufacturing. Over the 8 years, the share of
general commerce fluctuated between 55$ and 43$> and that for agriculture
declined from 51$ in 1958 to 25$ in 1965? while manufacturing doubled
its share from 5$ to 11$. s '
The predominance of general commerce is partly explained by the
fact that it han been the traditional sector which commercial banks
finance. Indeed all the expatriate banks were established with this
principal motive. In recent years, however, the reasons have been more
fundamental. : First, there has been a genuine increase in the demand for
working capital which it is the legitimate function of the banks to
provide. Secondly the withdrawal of expatriate firms from retail and
. oy& . ,
wholesale trading, and from the agricultural marketing of produce §# 
buying agents has reduced the volume of. self-generated finance which was \ 
a major source of finance in.this sector in the,past; and the entry of 
indigenous firms replacing the.expatriate firms as produce buying agents 
with neither sufficient resources of their own nor access to foreign,. ; 
funds has meant increased reliance on the banks for short-term finance ; 
for this sector., Thirdly, it has been observed that in recent years 
stock turnovers have been sluggish and this has involved a slower ,
clearing of overdrafts thereby increasing the outstanding credit to this 
sector , at any. one time; and that ..most firms have switched their stock 
financing reqitirements from short-term overseas funds to domestic credit 
in consonnance with the official policy of the Nigerianisation of the ; 
credit base.1 .
p 1,: The Modernisation Budget.in the Six Budget. Speeches of Fed. Minister, 
of Finance op.cit. p.175.
The doubling of the credit to the manufacturing sector from 5$ in,19^  
to 'llfo in .1965 is partly due to the transformation that has taken, place 
in manufacturing in Niger la. Por instahc?e, manufacturing output, increased 
from in 1950 .to about £15m in 1960 .and to £63m in 19^5> representing . 
an annual compound growth rate of 25$ from its 1957 level of £llm.^  The 
increase in loans and advances to the manufacturing sector, therefore^  
represents a genuine increase in the demand for. bank credit in this sector 
This is partly because the large expatriate banks who withdrew from 
wholesale and retail trading have looked to the local banks for short-term 
■> working capital* Moreover, it has been suggested that owing to fears of , 
political instability and nationalisation, some of the.large expatriate;
firms who formerly maintained large balances in Nigeria to finance their\
working capital requirements have since repatriated or run them down 
. and are now working on overdraft facilities from the local banking 
system. These factors therefore explain the increase in the,volume of 
loans and advances to the manufacturing sector.
Although the commercial banks concentrate on the provision of
short-term working/capital, they also provide long-term finance for 
industry by rolling over some of their short-term advances in such away 
that they, in fact,, constitute long-term credit. . They also lend long- ;
1. Central Bank of Nigeria? Annual Report 1965 P> 25. 5: /
2. G.?. Brow: Banking in Sierra Leone; A,Comparative Survey, Bankers1 ;i 
Magaaihe, March 1966 p.195* .
3»11 Private Conversation, with an ex-manager of em-ef the African-
Continental Banlt Ltd. One technique said .to be employed is '’window 
dressing” of balance sheets by the banks,; and *a rob Peter to pay 
Paul1 devise by the customers. The process is as , follows: the; banks.
. , submit returns to head office at different dates and the customers ,
generally maintain accounts with more than a, bank. So customer ,.
A, with an overdraft with Bank B, borrows from his other account with
. > ‘ /qontinued over/
term through debentures*. During 19.52/55 two expatriate banks and 
one indigenous bank took up six debentures amounting to £63?»600 as 
Table 7*0 shows. Unfortunately no published information is available t 
on this after 1953* •
Although the banks thus roll over their , short-term advances, , and 
also grant long-term credits, it'Is customary for.the;commercial banks 
to emphasise that their primary function is to restrict themselves to. 
short-term financing. This is because most of their liabilities are short­
term and repayable on demand or .short"notice; and they therefore must • 
correspondingly lend short-term. . nPut in this extreme form, the 
argument is fallacious: the banker is able to make a living because he 
knows that repayment of his deposits is in:fact not .required in total at 
any one time, and ,he could not .make any living, by matching his assets
reference 5 'continued:
Bank C to" clear his overdraft on Bank B!s balancing'day, perhaps, 
at the end of the month on the understanding that the entries will 
be reversed the following day. On Bank C*s balancing day, which 
is normally not the same day with Bank BTs, the process is repeated 
"perhaps with customer D this time and so on. By this process the 
accounts are overdrawn between, but, repaid or balanced on, balancing 
days and the short-term advances are rolled over'for 1 ong periods.
1. That the. Nigerian copaercial bajiks. roll over their , advances is
further confirmed in the first Annual Report of. the NIPB for 1964
p. 10. - ' , , ■’ ■
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precisely to hie liabilities. On the other hand, be cannot behave, like 
an investment trust. The liquidity he must maintain is a matter of 
degree; there ban be no absolute rule on this ground forbidding the
holding of medium-term and long-term assets, and every banker of
' ' ; ‘ - > ■; ' 1 l ' •strength does, in facthold some of these assets".
It might be argued that since time and savings deposits now
constitute more than 50$ of total deposits in Nigeria, the commercial
banks should grant more long-term advances* However, much of the time
deposits are really very short-term. For instance, to* time deposits of
three months duration constituted 68*3$ of total time deposits in 19&4
' ■ ’
t ' s  2 ' '" - “ ■ ' *" • •and 78*9?° fn 1965* , "This shift was mainly at the expence of demand
and time deposits of over six months1; maturity, and reflected a preference
on the part of the public for relatively liquid, yet income-yielding
• 3 - \. -deposits"* Assuming, however, that all the time and savings .deposits
are really long-term, the commercial banks generally lack the experience
and expertise for long-term lendingi ; "Thevlogically sound basis for ;
the presumption against long-term commitments is that it is much more
difficult to estimate a borrowers1 credit-worthiness twenty years ahead,.
than six months ahead. The factors relevant to credit-worthiness are
1. R.S. Savers. Central Banking.After, Bagehot, Oxford, 1958, p.121.
2. ’ Central Bank, of Nigeria; Economic & Financial Review. Vol.4,No*2t
p *18* ; '■ ■
3* Ibid. , y ’
3?8
substantially different over the longer period and the capacity and ' ' ' , 
experience required in the bank manager are.of an altogether different 
order, an order it is not reasonable generally to expect (unless he, 
has specialised expert staff)M. . "
One general solution to the problem has been to establish specialist 
long-term financial institutions/which, while, providing capital and
expert knowledge, encourage the commercial banks increasingly to lend
- - 2 medium and long-term without jeopardising their liquidity. The
specialist institutions established in Nigeria,for this purpose are the
Nigerian industrial Development Bank, the Lagos Stock Exchange, the
Northern Nigeria Investments Ltd, ^ andthe Finance Company of Eastern
Nigeria Ltd. :3?he last two are established in equal partnership with the
Commonwealth Development Corporation, which, in itself, though a public
corporation, is a specialist long-term channel of investment in selected
commonwealth countries. In the next section we,discuss the role of
these three institutions.
1. R.S* Sayers, on.cit. p*122. ,
2. For two specialist works on this see W. Diamonds Development Banks, 
1957 and S. Boskey: Problems.and Practices of Development Banks? 
1959 -
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PARI? .THREE 
THE L0IG:TEEB1 CHANNELS
. ■; ’ -  x  - : ■ . ‘ '
The Nigerian Industrial Development Bank Ltd* >•
The Nigerian industrial ‘Development Bank Ltd .was. established in 
1964 hut its two antecedents were the Central Industrial Corporation, and > 
the Investment Company of Nigeria* The Central Industrial. Corporation was 
proposed by the Nigerian Government in ,1953 as an instituion to "be res­
ponsible for executing and managing major industrial schemes and to focus
thought and activity on non-governmental development by bringing
1 :investment opportunities, capital, and management together". This 
proposal was subject to approval by the World Bank mission which was then 
visiting Nigeria. The mission felt that there was much merit in the
scheme but felt that: it would be impracticable as a result of the political
v 2 re-organisation of the country under the 1954 Federal Constitution .
The proposal was therefore dropped.
The investment Company of Nigeria Ltd.
It was not, however, ,■ dropped for ever. In 1958 the Federal 
Government thought that "the factors which influenced the Mission’s 
recommendations in 1953 will not have the same cogency in 1958> and 
the original proposal might be considered again". Accordingly, the 
Commonwealth Development,Finance Company Ltd was invited to participate
with the Government "to establish an institution to furnish 1 ohg-term
> . 3credit and technical management to approved industrial enterprises".
1* Statement of the Activity of the Department of Commerce and Industries, 
Sessional Paj>er nq7, 1953 •
2* IBRD. Economic Development of Nigeria op.cit. 3. /pver/
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The CDFO in 1959 examined the need and the scope for a free
enterprise investment and development company in the Federation of
Nigeria on the lines of those already established in India, Pakistan,
1Ceylon and elsewhere*1. The examination revealed that if good progress
wonld continue to be made a well planned machinery would be necessary
to ensure an appropriate flow of industrial capital. The key to this
was found to Mbe a strong, centrally planned institution to mobilise
private capital both Nigerian and external, and to apply it to projects
strictly on their economic merits as seen from the point of view of the
Federation as a whole in alliance with skilled technical advice and
2competent management*1.
The result was the formation, in 1959 > °f the Investment Company 
of Nigeria Ltd with an authorised capital of £5m °f which £lm was issued 
and fully paid up immediately* TJse breakdown of the capital holding
is not available; but it is known that the GBC subscribed £0.1m and
. 3 ' ■
that subscribers numbered over 8Gt and that although substantial
Nigerian investment from Nigerian private enterprise institutions was
expected, the bulk of the capital had to come from overseas in view of
footnote 3v3. The Hole of the Federal Government in Promoting Industrial Developmer 
Sessional Paper No*3 1958 P*3*
1. CBFG Ltd. Londons The Investment Co* of Nigeria Ltdt Explanatory Memc 
July 1959 v ; . . .  .....   . ' ’
2. Ibid. - ■ . *
3. GISG: 'Annual Report 1959 P*96.
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uthe present sta|e of the country’s development0 The Federal Government
lent the company £0.5m 'on favourable terms* subordinated to the equity,
of the Company’s other indebtedness so as to facilitate negotiations for
%
loans or,other credits from other sources
The Investment Company of Nigeria (ICON) was to assist industrial, 
commercial and agricultural enterprises in Nigeria in general by assisting 
the creation, expansion and modernisation of such enterprises; encouraging, 
sponsoring and facilitating participation of internal and external capital 
in the ownership of investments, shares and securities; creating, expanding 
and stimulating investment, shares, and security markets; and in particular 
by providing finance in the form of long- or medium-term loans or share 
participations; sponsoring and underwriting the issue or conversion of 
shares and securities; guaranteeing, and counter-guaranteeing loans and 
obligations; making funds available for re-investment by causing the 
transfer of .shares and securities, and by revolving investments, as 
rapidly as prudent; and finally by furnishing managerial, technical, and 
administrative advice and services to Nigerian industry, commerce and
•z
agriculture. Within this broad framework, the Board of the Company 
worked out the broad policy and the precise nature of the Company!s 
activities, which, were- to provide assistance in the form of equity, loans 
or debentures, or in any other form most appropriate to the particular 
project under consideration.
.1. CDFO Ltd. op,oit;
2* Ibid.
3. Ibid.
Table 7*9 summarises the ICON’S operations between its formation 
in 1959 and 1964* During this period ICON approved 7 projects with a 
total share capital of about £5m in which it invested £217,500* The 
projects include aliminium, thread, biscuit, tyre and stationery 
manufacture and sugar refinery. During the same period it also made 12 
loans and equity investments amounting to £707>300 in food and beverages, 
rubber and rubber products, textiles, metal products, financial 
institutions, paper products, and furniture. Of this £707*500,
£571*500 or 81% of this came from foreign sources and £136,000 from 
Nigerian sources. 9 of the 12 projects in which the company made loan and 
equity investments were controlled by foreign interests and 3 by Nigerian 
interests.
ICON also engaged in new issue and underwriting activities and 
played a leading part in the development of the Lagos Stock Exchange.
On 30th June, 1962, it formed two wholly-owned subsidiaries, Icon . 
Securities Ltd, to carry on its new issue, stockbroeking and stock­
jobbing operations, and ICON Nominees Ltd to act as a nominee company.
Ill
The Nigerian Industrial Development Bank Ltd.
The Investment Company of Nigeria Ltd was reorganised in 1964 to 
form the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank. One of the reasons for 
the reorganisation was the need for an institution ’’which must have the 
full backing of all the Governments (of Nigeria) without being under 
their direct control, and command and enjoy the full confidence of local 
and foreign investors. Such an institution would be in a position to 
promote Nigeria’s economic development effectively because it would be
independent of political or other influence. fhis was the rationale ,
behind the establishment,, on 22nd January, 19&4* of the Nigerian
Industrial Development Bank Ltd which took over from that date the
1
functions of the Investment Company of Nigeria Ltd.
It would appear, however, that ICON had most of these requirements. 
Being a private institution, it obviously was independent of political, 
influence and it probably enjoyed the confidence of foreign investors, 
obvious, at least, from its sponsorship by the CDFC Ltd and its foreign 
connections; and the backing of all Nigerian governments would appear to 
be implicit in the £0.5m of Federal Government1 s loan; and there was 
no reason why, nor evidence that it did not enjoy the confidence of local 
investors. If ICON could not Effectively1 promote Nigeria*s development, 
and, indeed, if there was any real reason or need for a different 
institution, it would appear to be either because its issued capital of 
£lm was too small (the answer here would appear*, to have been to increase 
its Issued capital since it already had an authorised capital of £5m) or., 
because it was a predominantly foreign owned institution and the Nigerian 
'Governments, wanted a predominantly Nigerian owned institution.
However, in 1962 the Federal Government informed the ICON of its 
intention to create a Nigerian Development Bank and subsequently 
discussions took place with ,a view to merging ICON with the new 
Development Bank* During these discussions it became evident, that, 
rather than set up a new company for this purpose, it would be more 
satisfactory to reconstruct the Company as the new Development Bank.
1. Nigerian Trade Journal, Yol yi2, No. 3, July/Sept,1964*
The reconstruction involved the reorganisation of ICONfs issued share 
capital, the adoption of new Articles of Association and the change of
j
* /Tnd.uflt!Ti£il
lCONfs name to Nigerian/Development Bank Ltd* It also involved a cash 
offer By the Central Bank of Nigeria of one quarter of each of the 
existing shareholding of the capital of ICON, and the subscription of a 
substantial amount of further share capital by th© Central Bank, the 
International Finance Company, and leading financial institutions in 
Europe, Japan, and the United States of America. Shareholding in the 
company is illustrated in Table 7*1C.
The NIDB has an authorised capital of £5m, of which £2m was issued 
and fully paid at once as ordinary shares and £250,000 in non-voting 
preference shares. £1,020,000 of the ordinary shares, or 51^  of 
the Companyfs voting capital, was designated ,!Atf Ordinary Shares, and 
reserved for Nigerians and international organisations, such as the 
IFC, of which Nigeria is a member. Of this amount, the IFC held 
£499»027, the Central Bank £499,828, while £13,120 was held by Nigerian 
private investors. The remaining £980,000 ordinary share, classified as 
"B11 shares may be subscribed to by any interested investor, whether 
Nigerian or foreign. The issued capital has been converted into stock.
In addition, the Fed. Government gave the NIDB an interest-free long-term 
loan of £2m repayable In equal annual instalments during 1980-1994*
This loan is subordinated to the other debts and liabilities of the NIDB 
which it can repay at any time, if it wishes, but cannot issue further 
shares to which the loan would be subordinated without the prior consent 
of the Federal Government. This £2m loan brought the NIDB's initial 
resources to £4*25m. In addition, the NIDB was empowered to borrow up
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to three times its issued share capital, reserves and subordinated 
borrowings, This broiight NIBBfs initial potential resources to £12*75m* 
b. Objects and Functions
BIBB was established to provide medium and long-term finance to 
enterprises in Nigeria which are privately owned and managed. Thus 
public corporations or government projects are excluded. However, the 
existence of government or other public interest in an enterprise is not 
expected generally to rule out financing by the BIBB, provided the 
Government1 s interest as measured by voting power or control of the 
management of the enterprise is not predominant and especially if the 
Government*s investment is temporary, pending its selling out to private 
interests.
The projects the BIBB is expected to finance are limited to mining
and industry. Thus agriculture, trade and transport are excluded.
Being an investment institution, it does not undertake ordinary commercial
banking such as accepting demand or time deposits. It is also barred
from investing in social infrastructure projects such as schools,
hospitals and roads. The projects which the BIBB are expected to
finance are those which, by reason of their size, will make a significant
contribution to Nigeria*s economic development. It does not finance
cottage and small-scale industries; nor will it assist proprietory or
partnership enterprises. , v
Plan
The role assigned to the BIBB under the National Bevelopment^is tha' 
of joining foreign skills and capital with Nigerian skills and capital 
in developing new industrial enterprises and expanding existing ones.
It is expected to stimulate indigenous enterpreneurs by helping them to 
develop sound and well conceived projects in which it could take 
financial interest. Where the size of the investment warrants foreign 
participation, the Bank is expected to help in working out the financial 
aspects of collaboration.
Technique of Investment
The guiding principles of NIBBTs investment are that the project 
to be financed should inspire confidence of being expeditiously carried 
out and efficiently operated. To this end, reputation, experience 
and capital structure of the Company or the worth and experience of the 
promoter are taken into account. The project should also be economically 
desirable, i.e., show promise of raising living standards, providing 
employment or conserving foreign exchange; it should also be 
technically feasible and commercially viable, adequately costed, 
properly managed and have favourable market prospects for the product.
The NIBB finances projects in a number of ways: either through 
direct subscriptions or underwriting of equity, preference stock or 
debentures, medium or long-t^rm loans, or any combination of these 
methods. In either case it limits its overall financial participation 
in any one enterprise between a minimum of £10,000 and a maximum of 
£200,000 which is related to its own equity capital. The total cost of 
the project may, of course, be quite different. The minimum limit is 
relaxable in exceptional cases. Furthermore, BIBB cannot invest in, or 
underwrite more than 22$ of the capital of a company; but this does not 
preclude the BIBB from arranging additional financing from other 
sources. Since it plans to recoup its cash in future years by selling
£67
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out its portfolio to the public, it prefers investment in easily 
realisable form with present or future prospects of obtaining stock 
exchange quotation.
Loans, which must be adequately secured, are granted between 5
and 15 years, but a longer, though not a shorter amortisation period can 
be considered in exceptional cases. "Grace" periods are generally allowed 
during which only interest need be paid while loan repayments ahead of, the 
agreed amortisation schedules will be permissible only if it is to be 
from cash accruals and would in any case attract penalty rates determined 
by the degree of deviation from the amortisation s chedule. Loans are not 
disbursable in a lump sum but against evidence of equipment purchased 
or expenditure incurred. This and the preceding requirement are 
probably designed to prevent loans being used for other than the purpose’ 
for which they are granted and against repayment ahead of schedule out of 
borrowings from other sources and thereby prematurely escaping the NIBB*s 
beneficial supervisory activities.
BIBB and ICON Compared
It is interesting to compare the nature and functions of the NIBB 
with those of the ICON. While ICON was largely sponsored by the CDFC Ltd 
and other U.K. interests, the NIBB was largely sponsored by the V/orld Bank 
and the IFC, and the Nigerian Central Bank. Besides, the interest 
free long-term Federal Government loan was a glaring evidence of the 
Governments interest and confidence in the NIBB. "With the support of 
the Government, it stands a very good chance of obtaining substantial 
credit from the World Bank and other overseas financial institutions as
similar corporations in other countries”. In addition, although it 
has the same authorised capital of £5^ like the ICON, unlike it, the 
NXDB started off with an initial actual and potential resources of 
£12.75ni as compared with ICON's £lm, The NIBB is therefore 
considerably bigger than the ICON which it replaced.
Differences also occur in the functions of the two bodies. Whereas 
financing public or government projects were excluded from the share of 
both companies, ICON'S area of operation was wider than NIDB's. Nhereas 
the latter excludes agriculture and trade, the former includes them, and 
whereas infrastructure and small scale enterprises were specifically 
excluded from the NIDB's operations, they were neither specifically 
included nor excluded from the ICON'S operations, though it is unlikely 
ICON would ordinarily have undertaken them.
NIDB Operations 1964-1966.
fable 7*11 summarises the operations of the NIDB between its ^ 
establishment in January, 1964 an(^  30th September, 1966, During this 
period, the NIDB made 40 loans and equity investments amounting to 
£3,166,200 in various industrial enterprises which included textiles, 
food and beverages, mining, and metal products. Its equity investments 
alone amounted to £430,000 in many industrial projects with a total 
share capital of £3,500,000. Its role as a channel of foreign 
investment is manifested in the fact that £2,043,700 or 6 °^/o of the total 
loans and equity investment dame from foreign sources* Foreign investors 
had controlling interests in 24 of the 40. projects. On ther other hand,
1* The National Budget: Government Printed, Lagos, 1964,p.5„
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£1,122,500 or 55$ of the equity and loan investments came from Nigerian 
sources which had majority interest in 16 of the 40 projects,
Table 7*12 summarises the combined operations of the ICON and the 
NIDB from 1959 to Sept. 50,1966. It will be seen that the companies 
made a total of 52 loans and equity investments amounting to £5,871,500, 
of which £2,606,000 or 6f$ came from foreign, sources.. The controlling 
interest in 55-of the 52 projects was foreign against 19 projects con­
trolled by Nigerians, These projects had a combined share capital of
£8,578,500.
It is however interesting to note,.as a comparison of tables 7*11 
and 7*12 shows, that while the ICON patrohised 12 projects with total 
equity and loan investments of £707,500 during its 5 years existence from 
1959 to 1964, the NIDB, during its relatively shorter period of less than 
three years from 1964 to Sept. 1966, invested in 40 projects a total of 
£5,166,200.. However, the total share capital of the ICON’S 12 projects 
is considerably higher at over £5m than that of the NIDB’s £5,6m in 40 
projects. tftiile the proportion of foreign contribution in the loan 
and equity operation to indigenous Nigerian contribution w as 6 to 1^ 
through the ICON it-was only 2 to 1 through the NIDB. Thus for every £1 
contributed from Nigerian sources through the ICON, foreigners contributed 
£6 against £2 for every £1 through the NIDB.
This is significant for, if it is accepted^ that'Hhe success or
failure of the Bank will be measured in part by the amount of private
investment capital it is. able to channel to the productive sectors of
1private enterprise**, then it means that the NIDB, with considerably more
1. Nigerian Trade Journal,Vol.12 No.5 July/Sept,1964*
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potential resources 4X2 • 75m) than the ICON has not heen as successful
as the ICON with an initial paid up capital of Elm,
The NIDB must however^ he judged not only by the amount of private
foreign capital it is able to attract to Nigeria but also by its
promotional activities. It assists entrepreneurs, both Nigerian and
foreign to prepare ijell-articulated projects and to find technical staff
and managerial assistance both in Nigeria and abroad. Another promotional
role of the Bank is the development of the capital market, by encouraging
promising enterprises to incorporate as limited liability companies and
by offering to take up their shares after Incorporation* It further
encourages such companies to seek to apply at the appropriate time for
stock exchange quotation for their shares, which thus become available to
the public. This policy has two important advantages. It helps the
growth and development of the Lagos Stock Exchange as the companies seek
a quotation for their shares; and secondly, it engenders public
confidence in industrial shares, for the association of the NIBB with
any company is increasingly recognised as a good indication of the
1
company’s viability and sound management. In addition, with the effect
*
from the beginning of 19^5 an arrangement was made whereby the Lagos 
Stock Exchange’s management Committee of three would include the General 
Manager of the NIBB thereby further enabling the Bank to be more closely 
associated with, and assist the development of the Exchange.
1. The Rededica'bion Budget','™Government Printer Lagos 51et March, 19&5*
2. NIBB: Annual Report, 19&5 p*10.
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These promotional activities help to broaden the Nigerian capital
market and therefore help to strengthen the NIBB's role of attracting
investment to Nigerian manufacturing. This role could be further
strengthened by the following three methods.
The NIBB tfstands ready to assist entrepreneurs, both Nigerian and
foreign, to prepare well-articulated projects ... to obtain the
necessary advice in carrying out feasibility studies that precede actual 
1investmento. This is fair and good if the clients can come forward
to its "stand" with sufficient projects. But one of the main bottlenecks
in Nigeria's development is the lack of market and feasibility studies.
If the NIBB can prepare these studies, it would then be easier to interest
prospective investors in the development of these projects and this would
enable it to attract more investment.
Secondly the NIBB does not set up projects on its own; and the
reason is that "to investment its resources in a few large projects
2
would negate the ends for which the Bank is set up". It rather partici­
pates in preparing and financing the projeots* If the NIBB takes the 
initiative to formulate, initiate, and develop the projects, it would 
then be easier to sell them to prospective foreign and indigenous 
entrepreneurs when the projects have been successful. The proceeds will 
then be used to establish other projects which, when successful, would 
again be sold’to prospective investors. In this way, the impact of the 
Bank in attracting and channelling investment to Nigerian manufacturing
1. NIBB; Sixnlanatory Memorandum and Guide to Applicants. Lagos, no date, 
pp.4-6.
2. Nigerian Trade Journal July/Sept. 1964.
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would be greater.
The two modifications in the NIDB’s technique envisaged above are
not unusual. Similar institutions in other countries undertake them.
For instance, the Industrial Development Bank of India undertakes
"market research and surveys, techno-economic studies, planning,
promoting, and developing new indiis tries to fill the gaps in the
country's industrial structure".^ If the NIDB takes similar measures
to fill the gaps in Nigerian industrial structure, the prospects
for attracting more foreign and domestic capital to Nigerian manufacturing
would be considerably improved.
Thirdly, the NI DB only finances "enterprises which, by reason of
their size, will make a significant contribution" to the Nigerian
economy,*and it does not finance small scale industry. Size and
significant contribution were not, of course, defined; nor is there
2
any standard definition of small industries. If small-scale 
industries mean those employing between 10 and under 50 persons per 
establishment, then their 'significance' in Nigeria is that they 
constitute about 60$ of Nigerian manufacturing establishments.
It was recently pointed out that "in the context of African 
countries with chronic shortage of capital, on the one hand, and 
insistent demands from several sectors, on the other hand ... small 
industries appear to offer a good solution to the problems". Although
1. G-.O. Nwankwo: Monetary Problems and Monetary Policy in India since
Independence - an unpublished thesis submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the Master's Degree of the University of London, May 1965.
2. Development of Small-Scale Industry in Africa: UN.EGA; Sumposium on 
Industrial Development in Africa.Cairo,Jan 27 1966 p.l. Ghana
/continued over/
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this view may have been over-stated, the following states the obvious
"small industries are an excellent primary school in industry and a
stepping stone in the process of evolution of the African entrepreneur to
become owner and manager of large enterprises. It should be emphasised
that successful small-scale enterprises are an economic asset to every
1
African country’.'
In the light of the above observation, by excluding small-scale 
industries from its sphere of operation, the NIDB excluded a sector that 
is likely to make the most significant contribution to Nigeria’s develop­
ment. This itfould not have mattered much if there were a separate 
institution specifically charged with promoting and assisting the 
development of small industries in Nigeria. But there is no such 
institution. Yet it is in the small industries sector that the lack 
of capital and expertise is greatest in Nigeria. The NIDB is an 
institution through which such international institution as the World 
Bank, the International Development Association and other foreign 
commercial banking and insurance institutions invest in Nigerian
reference 2 continued;
considers as small scale establishments employing less than 9 
persons; less, than 20 for Sudan; less than 50 for UAH and the Cairo 
Symposium adopted as small scale those employing less than 100 
persons.
1. Ibid, p.12.
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manufacturing . As we pointed out above, this investment is either by 
taking up. sharesian the projects or through loans. If the NIDB can 
include the small industries in its operations, this would broaden the 
projects that the Bank would be able to finance and therefore be an 
additional inducement to attract more foreign capital to Nigerian 
manuf acturing.
In conclusion it will be seen that if the NIDB can take the 
initiative to formulate projects and interest prospective foreign 
investors; if it £an develop projects on its own, and when successful 
sell them to the public; and if it includes small industries in its 
operation then its prospects for attracting more foreign capital to 
Nigerian manufacturing would be considerably improved.
1
The Commonwealth Development Corporation
Although the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) is a 
public Corporation established under the Overseas Resources Development 
Act (U.K.), 1948, to assist the economic development of the then
2
dependent territories of the Commonwealth with stipulated public funds,
it is such a powerful investor in the private sector and such a powerful
1. Until it changed its name in 19&3* it was formerly known as the
Colonial Development Corporation and was not allowed to operate in 
independent countries of the Commonwealth. As colonies gained inde­
pendence, its area of operations was progressively contracted. Ghana 
was first to be hit by this requirement* when she became independent 
in 1957> then followed Nigeria, i960, and Sierra Leone in 19&1,
Southern Cameroons having separated from Nigeria, after a UN plebiscite, 
to'join the Republic of the CamerofcHn. CDC’s operations in West Africa 
were thus limited to Gambia, following these developments: it could 
continue to manage already established projects, but would not under­
take fresh financial commitments, though it could act as consultants to 
the Governments concerned. By an Act in 19^3» CDC was empowered to 
operate in the independent commonwealth countries, except, as under the
original Act of 194$» the Old Dominions, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, 
though it could operate in these areas as managing agents and 
consultants. 2. Over.
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charnel for foreign private investment that it qualifies for a separate
and fairly detailed discussion. By the end of 1965 it had committed a
total of about £133^  in 134 projects in the various parts of the
Commonwealth, of which £llm was committed in more than 1^ projects in
Nigeria! indeed, the CDC appears to be the third single biggest foreign
investor in the private sector in Nigeria after Shell BP and the United
Africa Company Ltd. It is therefore worthwhile to discuss the CDC*s
operations as a channel of foreign private investment in Nigerian
manufacturing.
The Operations of the Commonwealth Lev. Corporation
a. Type of Projects
The GDC provide* supplementary finance to both the Commonwealth
Development and Welfare Funds and private capital in the territories
of its operation. It operates on commercial lines and has to pay its
way "talcing one year with another". It finances a wide range, of
projects in agriculture, factories, mining, manufacture, public
utilities, transport and communications, housing, hotels, marketing,
and engineering construction, but not welfare services such as buildings
1
for public services, schools, colleges, or hospitals. Table 7*13 
illustrates the sectoral allocation of CD^s resources in 1951,1959 a^d
1965.
Originally the CDC was empowered to borrow up to £10m in short-term 
and £100m in long-term loans from the TJK Treasury. This was increased 
by £50m long-term loans in 1957 of which £150m, £130in could be out­
standing at any one time.
1. CDCs Partners in Development. Finance Plus Management, London, no 
date, p.l.
The table shows that primary production accounted for 57$ of the
total allocation in 1951> and for 43$ In 1959* Public utilities came
second with 5g$ in 1951 and 45$ in 1959- Commerce and Industry
accounted for the least with 12$ in 1951 and 12$ in 1959- This pattern
of investment results from the GPC*s primary purpose which was to stimulate
the production of primary products for export in the colonies. In general,
the CDC "aimed at selecting the projects which show promise of either
earning or saving dollars in the interest of the territory itself and
1
the Sterling Area as a whole". In particular, "the policy was to
discourage production for the internal market unless costs for such
production would be less than the cost of import, or the ddvantages
greater or that the production would supply a market for which imports
2do not exist or are not available". This policy precluded high cost 
substitute manufacture 
import/and largely explains the low rating of commerce and industry
in CPC!s investment allocation.
Emphasis on primary production seems to have been substantially
modified since 1959i this is evident in the reversal of priorities in
the allocation schedule. Thus in 19&5 public utilities accounted for
the biggest quota, 53$ of the total allocation, and thus maintained the
lead it took since 1959* Primary production at 21$ was the least in the
allocation. On the other hand, the share of trade and Industry more than
1. CPC: Annual Report, 1949» p*10.
2. Ibid.
doubled from its 1951 a^d 1959 levels of 12$ to 26$ in 1965* This 
reversal of policy was neither acknowledged nor explained by the CPC.
b. Territorial Operations
The GDC operates in six overseas regions of the Commonwealth - in 
the Caribbean, Par East, East Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, 
and West Africa. Table 7*14 summarises its operations in these areas*
It shows that the CDCTs total commitments in these areas increased from 
about £54& in 1951 through £96m in 1959> and at £155m in 19&5> were three 
times their 1951 level. Central Africa accounted for the highest amount 
of investment throughout the period; it accounted for 28$ in 1951» 22$ 
in 19591 Qttd 21$ in 1965. The Par East came second with 25$ in 1951>
20$ in 1959» and 18$ in 1965. In terms of number of projects, East
Africa received the biggest number, 44 or a third of the 154 projects 
in all the regions in 19^5» followed by 25 for the Caribbean and 25 for 
the Par East and 19 for West Africa. Throughout the period, West Africa
received the lowest proportion of investment which was 12$ in 1951> 10$ "
j 1
in 1959» and 11$ in 19&5* Indeed, it was only by 1959 that the total 
commitment in West Africa approached £10m: even then the percentage
1. CPC supplements rather than supplants other sources of capital such as 
public funds and private capital. When projects are proposed, its 
main consideration, apart from profitability, is why it could not be 
financed from other sources; and acceptable reasons may be that the 
CDC's management or name is required, perhaps to encourage other 
foreign investors or that profits are too low to interest them. Other 
consideration is the effect of the investment on the regionfs overall 
development; for instance it finances hotels where tourist industry 
necessitates it or as temporary residence for prospective foreign 
investors. See British Aid-5 Colonial Development, Overseas Develop­
ment Institute, 1964 pp.47-48*
of the total that was disbursed by that date was only 28$ compared with
^disbursed
the percentage of total commitments that wereyin other regions which 
ranged from 41$ in Central Africa to 97$ in East Africa. West Africa 
is the only region where total disbursements by 1959 were less than 
total commitments in 1951* There is no official explanation for this 
imbalance; and it will be difficult to attempt any detailed explanation 
without studying CDCfs operations in detail in all the regions (which is 
outside the scope of the present study). A general explanation is, however, 
attempted belovj and since this ties closely with the CD^s operations in 
Nigeria, it is discussed in that context*
III
C.D.C^s Operations in Nigeria
One explanation seems to be that the GDC1s operations in West
Africa were almost synonymous with its operations in Nigeria. Table 7*14
shows that Nigeria accounted for 73$ of the total commitments in West
Africa in 1951, 92$ in 1959» and 76$ in 1965. She accounted for 15 of the
18 projects in 1959, and for 14 of the 19 in 19&5* This predominance
is partly due to Nigeria*s great size and resources, and partly due to
1low absorptive capacity of Sierra Leohe and Gambia and of an apparently
2
unfavourable attitude of the Ghana Government towards foreign investment.
1. For instance, Sierra Leone Investments Ltd, a local development company 
jointly owned by the GDC and Sierra Leone Government was closed down 
because it was unable to attract sufficient business to warrant its 
continued existence. It ceased operations in 19&5 ^Le CPC manager 
was withdrawn. See CPC. Finance Plus Management: West Africa Region, 
London, no date, p.10.
2. By 51st March, 1965, CPC had only one engineering project with approved 
investment of £77,500 - Stirling Astaldi (Ghana) Ltd. The reason given 
by GPG was "Government policies discouraging overseas investment in 
recent years". CPC: Finance Plus Management op.cit. p.9.
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A second explanation is suggested in the CDC's statutory prohibition 
from operating in independent countries of the Commonwealth until 1963* 
Since Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone achieved independence^in 1 9 5 7 »  
i960, and 1961 in that order, earlier than the East and Central African 
territories and the Caribbean, this prohibition obviously affected West 
Africa much earlier and longer than these other countries and this may help 
to explain the imbalance between CDC!s investment in these countries and 
in West Africa.
A more convincing explanation, however, appears to be the nature
of the projects undertaken in the various regions. These fall under
three main groups, public utilities, primary production, and commerce
and industry. Table 7*15 shows that, with the exception of the £1.25^
loan for land reclamation to the Lagos Executive Development Board, the
CDC made no public utility investment in Nigeria. Since public utility
undertakings are generally capital intensive, their absence in CDCfs West
Africa projects and their inclusion in the projects of the other regions,
largely explains the overwhelming imbalance in investment allocation. For
instance a single loan of £7*lm to the ©entral Electricity Board of the
1States of Malaya is about JOfo of all the sanctioned commitments in West
Africa in 1965; while the CDCVs loan of £15m to the Central African
2 >
Power Corporation for the Kariba Dam is higher than the £10m total 
commitments in 19 projects in West Africa by 1965*
CDC. Annual Report, 1964* P*56.
2. Ibid. p.88.
In the primary production sector, CDC1 s operations in West Africa 
were apparently limited by the /customary and legal prohibitions against 
alienation of land for estate or plantation agriculture unless under / 
African labour and peasant settlement schemes. The Calaro Oil Palm 
Estate in Eastern Nigeria illustrates this. This was a proposal for 
a tripartite partxiership between; the CDC, the Eastern Region Production/ /, 
Development Board, and a European plantation interest for a 1,000 acre 
oil palm estate at Calaro in which the CDC was to own. 51c/o interest.
After arrah^ments had been nearly completed, it was abandoned after, a 
Government lotion passed in the Eastern-House of Assembly was carried to / f 
; the effect that f,no European firm' should own estates in this, 'country1!,; ^ / 
This did not rule out plantation agriculture in Nigeria; but it had to / 
be under a peasant settlement scheme. But the CDC1 s experiement with this: 
spheme in theNiger Agricultural Project was a failure* The project 
was established in 194?., but was abandoned in 1954 by.the. CDC after it Vy 
had accumulated a loss of £123,494* In contrast, European plantation . 
agriculture was allowed In all the other regions, with the exception of 
Hganda* Its virtual prohibition in West Africa and the unsuccessful
1.. Eastern House of Assemblyi Debates .August, 1952* The CDC , of course
. owned 50..4$ interest in the Omp Sawmills in Western Nigeria. Besides,
the TJAC ltd had 11 e^erimehtalH plantations for oil palm. Neverthe- ; 
less.; the opposition to European plantation sys tern was very real . See 
W.K. Hancock(below);for a discussion of Unilever *s futile attempts to 
secure plantation, concessions:in/West Africa* The CDC how has a £0*9m 
commitment in :&e\£l*.77m''Pl^tation. .and small holder project in Eastern 
Nigeria. This, however, is largely based on peasant, settlement.
2i GDGi Annual Report* 1954. 0*48* ,
3* See V/.K. Hancock* Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs* Vol. 11,
part II, Section III. / ,
experiments with peasant settlement plantation schemes explains the 
insignificant proportion of primary production in 0DG*s investment 
schedule in West Africa and again helps to explain the disparity in total 
allocation between West Africa and other regions.
Table 7*15 shows that the greater part of GDCs investment in 
Nigeria is industrial and financial. However the first industrial
investment was in the Nkalagu Cement Industry, in 1957t three years after
the introduction of the Federal Constitution in 1954, and after the East 
and the West had acquired internal self rule in 1957* Thereafter, other 
investments followed, either directly through the CDC itself, or 
indirectly through some finance or development companies in which the 
CDC is an equal partner. Before discussing these other investments, 
however, it is necessary to examine the reasons for the absence of 
industrial investment by the CDC before 1957*
Two factors may be offered in explanation. One is government
policy before 1952 against establishing modern manufacturing; and the
other is the CDCfs declared policy against high cost import substitute
manufacture. The prohibitive effect of government policy up to 1954 was
explained at length in chapter One. These two factors are obviously
related, the one reinforcing the other; and their combined effect is that
until they were reversed or modified as a result of political and other
changes, the CDC could not invest in manufacturing in Nigeria because
nno project is undertaken without the assurance of the territorial
1government concerned that they want it". At least, two projects were
1. CDC. Teaching Notes For the Wall Chart on the CDC, London, no date p.3.
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investigated and dropped by the CDC before 1954* The reasons for 
dropping them obviously tend to support or were evidence of the operation 
of the above two interacting factors. It is therefore necessary to 
examine these projects more closely. One was a project for groundnut 
processing and the other for sack manufacturing,
The possibilities for large scale groundnut processing in Nigeria
were discussed by the CDC and the Nigerian Government ih 194$ as a
result of which it was agreed to appoint an expert to study the project.
The CDC later withdrew, and the Nigerian Government, proceeding alone,
appointed Mr J.C. Gardiner, a Chartered Accountant, to study the
project, I asked the CDC why it withdrew from the project and the
following was the reply: "As to the investigation into groundnut
with
processing, this was one of several schemes/which the CDC decided not to 
proceed after initial investigations. CDC comment at the time in 
reference to a number of development projects was that the financing of 
such activities was particularly difficult for an outside corporation to 
operate unless substantial local participation and/or commercial
An additional reason seems to be the attitude of the government 
towards the groundnut processing industry in Nigeria. We showed in 
Chapter One that between 1942/48 ’the government banned local processing 
of groundnuts in Nigeria? and up to 1954? i't restricted the expansion 
of the industry. Since the CDC had to get approval from the government, 
it must have considered that the time was not opportune for such 
application.
1, CDC: Letter dated Jxd. Nov, 1966,
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The second industrial project was a joint cotton spinning and
sack manufacturing project for which the Nigerian Fibre Industries Ltd
was formed in 1949 by the CDC and the Cotton and Cocoa Marketing Boards.
The intention was to use Indian and Pakistani Jute for the manufacturing
process, but the steep rise in $ute prices in 1950 made it clear that a
factory using imported jutes would run at a loss. An "independent" expert
investigation later recommended that the sack factory be replanned and
1
the spinning project dropped. A revised scheme for a sack factory was 
eventually dropped partly because another investigation found that, as a 
result of a steep fall in world jute prices, it was cheaper to import 
complete jute sacks than to manufacture them locally. It was because of 
these cost considerations that the CDC abandoned the project.
The CDC did not give details why the expert investigation 
recommended that the cotton spinning project be dropped* During this 
period, textile imports were the biggest single import item in Nigeria 
accounting for about a third of her total imports. It seems, however, 
that the reason for abandoning the project was-because it was cheaper 
to import than to manufacture textiles in Nigeria at that time. This 
seems to be suggested in the GDC's statement that projects for textile 
manufacturing were abandoned because of the fear of Japanese competition 
since import duties were advalorem and therefore did not give adequate 
protection for local manufacturing.
1.Ibid.
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It is thus seen that cost, considerations, unfavourable government
attitude, and absence of tariff protection were responsible for the
dropping of the textile, sack, and groundnut processing projects
investigated by the CDC before 1957* This was in accordance with its
policjr against high cost import, substitute manufacture if it was cheaper
to import than to manufacture the goods locally.
Ity- 1957 > however, the position had begun to change. There was a
determination on the part of the Nigerian governments to industrialise
rapidly and tax and tariff concessions were available to make realistic
projects which otherwise would not have been undertaken. The first
industrial project undertaken by the CDC in Nigeria was the Nkalagu
cement project. As we showed in chapter two, this project would not have
been possible but for active encouragement and participation by the
Nigerian governments.
In 1958 the CDC expressed a concern that many projects had not
already been started. The "failure", the CDC complained, "to finalise
even one new project in Nigeria which has by far the largest population
and potential for development of all territories, was a special and sore
1
disappointment”. It blamed this to government intransigence. The CDC 
continued: "schemes for joint development companies in association with 
regional governments were held up despite their importance as a sharing 
responsibility for investigating and launching new projects. Regional
2
governments and other local authorities were hard to bring to decision11.
1* GDC: Annual Report 1958, p.64.
2# Ibid.
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One of the reasons for this anxiety was that independence was drawing
near and "there.....may he many schemes still in the air when the CDC
1 • 
is shut out", since after independence, it could no longer operate in
Nigeria under a statutory prohibition which was lifted in 1963. The CDC
therefore was anxious to set up as many projects as possible before it
2
would be shut out by independence in i960.
One of the devices to meet this contingency was to formulate with 
the various Governments in 1959 some pattern of development companies.
On the federal level the ICON was formed on 17th October 1959; this was 
later reorganised as the NIDB. In the Northern region, Northern 
Developments Investments Ltd, was formed on.9th September, 1957? and. the 
Industrial and Agricultural Company Ltd, in the Eastern Region on 13th 
October, 1959* None was formed for the Western Region probably because 
the Western Region Government already had a finance corporation of its oSiil 
Northern Nigeria Investments Ltd.
The Northern Developments Nigeria Ltd was established in 1959 after 
Lord Leith (TheChairman of the CDC) visited the North in 1958 and held 
discussions with the Northern Region Government on launching nA company 
to promote commercial development projects within the region where so far 
they (the CDC) have done so little so far".
1. Ibid.
2. The writer asked an official of the CDC whether any special reasons 
coxxld explain Governments intransigence. "No definite reasons", he 
said, "experience shows that in other colonies when independence date 
has been fixed, but not yet granted, colonial civil servants are reluc­
tant to make any firm decisions or contracts about the prospective 
independent country while business men and indigenous civil servants 
stand on the fence awaiting the tx'ansfer of pox-rer. ?
3. The East established a financigai* corporation in 195?* After a year's 
operation it was merged with the HifpC.
The initially authorised share capital of 1.25 million was subscribed 
60$ by the CDC and 40$ by NRDC. An interest free loan of £25,000 was
1made by the Northern Region Governments towards administrative expenses.
In 1963 the issued capital was raised to 3* 6m fully paid and a loan
capital of £594*000 both held equally by the CDC and MDC and the name
was changed to Northern Nigeria Investment Ltd. To implement the capital
expansion scheme, investments in 11 projects valued at £1,796,995* were
transferred by the NNDC to NNIL in 1964 and CDC subscribed £1152,500 in
2cash for investment in 8 projects.
The Industrial and Agricultural Co.Ltd.. was established with an 
initial capital of £286,000, later increased to £1,036,000, and 
originally, held 68$ by CDC and 32$ by ENDC. In 1965* ordinary shares 
were raised to £2.636m made up of £2m.equally held by the CDC and the 
. Eastern Nigeria Government. The latter however retains a majority 
interest by owning the balance of £36,000 deferred shares. As part of 
the expansion arrangements the company's name was changed to Development 
Finance Company (Eastern Nigeria) Ltd. Thus the CDC owns 50$ interest in both 
the NNIL Ltd. and the DPC(EN) Ltd• The CDC1 s local agent. (Commonwealth 
Development Corporation West Africa Ltd.) was appointed managing agents 
for both companies*
1. CDC Annual Report. I960, p.101.
2. , CDC Annual Report 1964. p.118.
3. CDC Annual Report. 1965* P-105*
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The Development Companies were designed to promote and assist 
the economic development of the East and the North by investigating, 
initiating, and supporting commercial schemes in industry and agriculture. 
The CDC*s main industrial effort has been channelled through these 
development companies. With the CDC as a partner, and a managing agent 
they are able to draw not only on CDCfs Dagos and London services, they are 
also enabled to be a powerful channel of foreign private investments into 
Nigeria through CDC's contacts with commerce, industry, and international 
financial agencies. Indeed the 1 potentialT pull of resources, enterprise 
and expertise through this arrangement cannot be exaggerated for the 
GDC is in association with the West German Governments and Netherlands 
Governments* Development Agencies, the World Bank, INC, CDFC, and the 
leading Banks, Insurance and Commercial Companies from Australia, Britain, 
Canada, Holland, New Zealand, South Africa and the U.S.A.
By the end of 19<^ 5> the Development Finance Co. (Eastern Nigeria) Ltd 
had invested or committed to invest £l,596m in various projects. For MIL 
it was £4*643^ Dy the same date. Table 7*1^ shows also the importance 
of these development companies as channels of foreign investments. Of the 
total caj)ital of £14,3Q7m involved in NNIL projects 75?^  came from foreign 
sources and 2 came from Nigerian private and public sources. For DFC 
(E.N.) Ltd, 84$ of the £6.2m total Investments came from foreign sources 
and only 16$ from Nigerian private and public sources. NNIL projects 
numbering about 27 at the end of 1965 cover such fields as textiles, 
cigarette and food manufacture, commercial, housing, metal manufacture, 
tanneries, and others. At 51st December, 1965» (E.N.) Ltd had
14 projects which included textiles, basic metal industries, logging and
manufacture of wood products, vehicle assembly and distribution, civil
engineering and other manufacturing and agricultural projects.
2
The Lagos Stock Exchange.
A. The need for a stock exchange
Two courses are open to the entrepreneur who decides to invest.
He can either seek the capital from resources within the business or its
associates or he utilises the savings of others outside the business
through issuing shares or securing loans. As we have shown above, 69fo
of foreign private investment in Higeria between 1961-64 was channelled
through resources within the business or its associates}in the form of
retained earnings, and suppliers1 and other credits from associates.
With most joint stock companies, however, an issue of shares becomes
desirable sooner or later not only to secure new capital but also - and
what may perhaps be more important in the long run - to associate the
public with their owner ship^The time has come for developments in this
direction in countries of tropical Africa and the need now is to bring
1
local people into the ownership of local concerns". It is at this point
at which investment capital comes to be sought from the investing public
outside the business rather than from inside that the need arises for a
2
capital market or stock exchange.
1. Finance Plus Management op.cit. p.2.
2. Statistical and Economic Review. UAG Ltd, June 1962 p.5-
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A capital market, of -which its stock exchange is the realfmarket 
place1 is a market in titles to productive assets»stocks and shares. 33y 
providing for the buying and selling of these assets, it serves as its 
main function to reduce the risks attendant upon capital investment, 
especially the risk of illiquidity. The more easily stocks and shares 
can be bought and sold, the more predictable, and in general, the 
steadier will be their price and the more willing, - other things being 
equal - will investors be to risk their capital in dealing in them. A 
stock exchange in these circumstances, therefore, would make it possible 
for enterprises to raise, or dispose of additional capital on more 
economic terms. It thus introduces an element of flexibility in capital 
management.
A stock exchange properly arises in response to the above needs, viz, 
the need for dealing in stocks and shares; but it also arises in 
response to a need, which at a certain stage in the development of share 
dealing becomes evident, for an organisation to help protect the public 
(over and above the available legal protection) against a misuse of the 
funds committed to investment. Working through its controlling council 
or committee, a stock exchange, like the London Stock Exchange, serves 
to provide such a protective organisation, without which the full growth 
potential of a market in stocks and shares could not be realised. Itfot 
only does it regulate the conduct of its members, it carefully vets the 
shares of all companies that it permits to be quoted on its official 
list, so as to ensure, within the limits of practicability, against the 
offering of shares being used as a device for securing money under false
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pretences. A stock exchange therefore is both a market for dealing 
in securities and also an institution designed, as far as practicable, 
within the legal context, to protect the investor against all.but the 
genuine demand and supply hazards of a free securities market. 
fhe Lagos Stock Exchange
It is such needs as the above, in particular*, the need for an 
institution to mobilise public and private savings, to make these savings 
available to business and the government through stocks and shares and to 
protect the public from shady practices in quoted securities, that induced 
the Federal Government of Nigeria, in May 1958, to appoint a committee 
under the chairmanship of Professor R.H. Rarback to consider ways and means
of promoting a stock market in Nigeria. The committee*s report, published
1 . 
in 1959* recommended the creation of facilities foij dealing in shares,
the establishment of rules regulating transfers, the reduction or elimin­
ation of stamp duties on transfers and the elimination of tax deduction at"', 
source including measures to encourage sayings and issue of securities 
by the government and other organisations. The result of these recommenda­
tions was the establishment of the Lagos Stock Exchange on June 5> 1961* 
under the Lagos Stock Exchange Act of preceding May. The business on the 
Exchange is regulated by a Stock Exchange Gouncil (incorporated on Sept.15, 
I960) on which are represented the three firms of stockbrokers at present 
dealing in the exchange, two Lagos finance houses, and five leading 
Nigerian, businessmen. With, effect from the beginning of 1965 an •
1. Report of the Committee- Appointed1 to Advise on Ways and Means of 
Postering a Share Market in Nigeria. Government Printer, Lagos, 1959*
2. . The United Africa Co Ltd, Statistical and Econ. Review, op.cit. ,
pp.11-15.
arrangement was made whereby the Exchange is managed by a committee of
three members, one of which is the General Manager of the Nigerian.
' . 1 
Industrial Development Bank,
The importance of the Lagos: Stock Exchange as a channel of foreign 
private investment in Nigerian mianufacturing lies on two grounds. First 
it facilitates dealings in government stocks. To the extent that this 
provides the governments with funds to participate with foreign investors 
in establishing industrial projects, the. Exchange indirectly facilitates 
foreign investment in Nigerian manufacturing.
Secondly the Exchange is a channel through vrhich the foreign 
investors offer their shares to the Nigerian public to associate 
Nigerians with the ownership of their projects and thereby qualify for 
privileges under the Aid,to Pioneer Industries Ordinance, Transactions 
on the .Exchange since Its inception in 19&1 to the end of 1965 are. 
summarised in Tables 7*17 and 7*16* Dy the end of 1964* total
1. Nigerian Industrial Development Bank .Annual Report. 19^4> P*10*
2, Statistical and Economic Review. UAG Ltd, June 1962, p.3* :
3- A capital market in its full sense can include a number of institu­
tions including a stock exchange, issuing and discounting houses, and 
investment; and unit trusts. We here are concerned only with the stock 
exchange where the values of shares are determined impersonally 
through the price mechanism and risks minimised to a degree that 
facilitates dealing by those, best. equipped for the business.
number of stocks listed on the Exchange was 40, after quotations
1
were given to eleven stocks, in that year. They show that, although
there were only 334 transactions amounting to nearly £0.8111*. in 1961,
there were 3743 transactions amounting to £23.2m "by the end of 1965,/or.
I35O,of the total transactions were in government stock. On the other 
although
hand,/there were 243 transactions in industrial stocks in 1961  ^ fey 1965 
there were 2,385%, The value of government stocks has, however, been 
considerably greater, for although the number of transactions in 
government stock by the end of 19&5 was only 3 of the total, the value 
was £21m or of the £23m of all the transactions. Nevertheless both 
classes of securities had recorded considerable growth both in number 
of transactions and in value.
Dealings in government securities had been encouraged by the 
stimulating effect of Government policy. Under the Income Tax 
Management Act, no.21 of 1961, existing pension and provident funds 
were required to invest at least one-third of their funds in Nigerian 
Government stocks at the penalty of forfeiting valuable tax concessions. 
Pension and Provident fund established after I96I were reqviired under 
the Act to invest half of their funds in these stocks. Under the 
Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1964* insurance companies 
operating in Nigeria were required to invest locally at least two-fifths 
of premia received on insured local risks in any financial year. The Act 
also stipulated that by 1st April 1966, investments of insurance companies
1. Rededication Budget, Government Printer, Lagos, 19^ 5, P*7*
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in Nigeria must not be less than the value of funds covering endowment
assurance policies as from 51st March, 1962. The Act further required
that at least 2$fo of local investments by insurance companies must be
in government securities. These proportions, of course, were not meant
to be the minimum to be invested and it was expected that they would be
exceeded by handsome margins and that, in particular, at the earliest
opportunity the. institutions would ensure that their assets in Nigerian
securities at least would equal their liabilities in Nigeria.’*' Another
is who
stimulating factor/the activities of the government broker/buys and sells
these securities at par, that is, aat 100, plus or minus accrued interest.
In this way the investor is enabled to obtain a long-term rate of
interest on what, in effect, is short term investment.
Dealings in industrial stocks were stimulated, on the one hand, by 
the desire of foreign investors to associate Nigerians in the ownership 
of their business partly in order to qualify for benefits under the 
Pioneer Industries Act which stipulates,/alaleast 10fp of the stock must 
be Nigerian-held; and on the other, by the activities of the Nigerian 
Industrial Development Bank and its new issues subsidiary, Icon Securities 
Ltd. These institutions encourage companies to seek stock exchange 
quotation, and offer from their portfolio the stocks of companies that 
have passed initial difficulties and been successful. These were 
designed not only to increase the number of industrial stocks on sale but 
also to broaden share ownership in the country.
1. Six Budget Speeches op.cit. p.87.
These developments encouraged new issues in the Exchange. The
first public issue in Nigeria was the Nigerian Cement Company fs £0*2m shares
in 1959 followed by £0.1m by the Nigerian Tobacco Company Ltd in i960.
These were both oversubscribed. Other issues followed but in 19&4 the
only shares offered through the Exchange were the £lm issues of Nigerian
Tobacco Company which was oversubscribed by £220,000. In 1965?
Iconsec put out two new issues. One was the issue of the debentures by
the Textile Printers of Nigeria Ltd amounting to £1.3m and the other an
offer of £0.6m ordinary stock of Guineas (Nigeria) Ltd. Both were over­
ly
subscribed by J O O /o . The Textile Printers issues were the first time 
that a Debenture Stock wholly denominated in Nigerian currency was issued. 
The whole stock was fully taken up and this represented an important 
change from the other issues which had previously been made. "The fact 
that the stock was denominated in Nigerian currency without any sterling 
cover is a sign that the capital market is gradually developing on its 
own and is a mark of confidence not only in the capital market but also 
in the Nigerian currency.
Despite the above developments, the Central Bank states that public 
demand for industrial securities has been limited and this, in turn, has 
limited the willingness of the companies to seek quotation on the
p«v
Exchange. It attributes this to the fact that the Nigerian public
has not yet become accustomed to investment in stocks and shares, that the
volume of personal savings is small and that those who have investible
1, CBN: Annual Report 19•
2. NIDB. Annual Report. 1965 p.11.
Z ol C.B.N. Annual Report. 1965 p.33*
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funds find alternative higher yielding investment outlets outside the 
1
Exchange* There is no doubt that personal savings are limited or that 
higher yielding investment outlets exist outside the Exchange. But the 
oversubscriptions,of the issues that have been made through the Exchange 
does not indicate a lack of public demand for industrial securities; on 
the contrary, it indicates unsatisfied demand for such securities.
However)details, are not published about the holders of the stocks; and it 
may well be that the oversubscriptions came from institutional investors, 
or that only the issues that have been oversubscribed have been 
publicised. But until details are available, the oversubscriptions 
may be taken to indicate unsatisfied rather then a lack of public demand 
for industrial stocks.
The limited willingness of companies to seek quotation on the 
Exchange seems to be political. Most industrial projects of any 
significance were established in partnership with the Nigerian governments 
or their development corporations and it is the declared policy of the 
governments to offer the government holdings to the public at appropriate 
periods. However, because of strong regional competition, the govern­
ments hesitate to offer these shares through the Exchange for fear that 
they might be bought up by the indigenes of rival regions. The result 
has often been private dealings in these shares so as to retain ownership
zwithin the regions. The following statement illustrates this tendency.
jfc* Report of the 4th Conference of Leading Personalities of Eastern Nigeria 
Origin Dec. 19&3 Official document no 28 19&4? P*4*
1. GBN. Annual Report, 19&4* P*54*
"The Government would have introduced the projects to the Stock Exchange
which is the normal medium for raising new capital for companies and
loans for governments and public authorities. But because the Government
would like these shares to remain with our people, we are making the first
offer of participation to you. We will not go to the Stock Exchange
without first giving you the first opportunity of participation in this
1
alliance for progress". Given the desire to retain ownership, it is very
unlikely that the Exchange would be used if the first opportunity is not
utilised. The odds are that, in such cases, second and subsequent
opportunities would continue to be given as an excuse for not going
through the Stock Exchange.
This political factor means that the public is not given the full
opportunity to become familiar with the mechanism of the Stock Exchange
and, added to the general scarcity of funds, limits the scope of the
Exchange as a channel of investment. As a result "business enterprises
in Nigeria have, therefore, had to depend to a large extent on their
internal resources, overseas capital and increasingly on credits from
local commercial banks not only for short-term operating funds, but also
2
for long-term funds".
2. CBN Annual Report, 19^ 4* P*54*■ 1 J------------- i (
1. Ibid.
*
CHANNELS OF FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT II NIGERIAN MANUFACTURING
FINAL CONCLUSIONS
Nigeria. One is non~institutional through retaihed earnings, supplier;
There are two main channels of foreign private Investment in
credits and other liabilities with head office or foreign associates.
investment in Nigeria. Retained profits accounted for 2 9 suppliers1 ^ 
credits for 8fo9 and other foreign liabilities for 33°f°»
The other channel is institutional or external, that is, it passes 
through, or is derived from sources external to the business or its 
associates. This institutional channel is made up of the commercial 
banks, the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank Ltd, the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation, the Northern Nigeria Investments Ltd, and the 
Development Finance Company of Eastern Nigeria Ltd. The last two are 
equally owned by the CDC and the regional Governments.
The commercial banks, which are about 80jjowned by non-Nigerians, 
are used mainly as sources of short-term working capital. During 1944/45 
their deposits rosej&pm £10m to £133^  and their advances rose faster from 
£0.3m to £l35m. To meet the increasing demand for advances they ran 
down their previously accumulated foreign assets which fell from 87fo 
of total deposits in 1944 to l&/i in 1965* In addition they imported a 
net capital of £9*2m over the period. Between 1958 1965 commercial
banks1 loans and advances amounted to £620m of which 38$ went to general 
commerce, 24$ to agriculture and 8fa to manufacturing. The resources of
Between 1961 and 19^4j the years for which complete figures are available
this non-institutional channel accounted for 69°fo of total private V
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the commercial hanks are strained by heavy loan demands. This is 
illustrated in their high loan deposit ratios which were 110^ for the 
indigenous hanks and 86% for the expatriate hanks, and 91$ for all the 
hanks at the end of 1965 (see Tables 7*19-,7*2l). The bank's continued 
ability to satisfy loan demands depends on their ability to attract 
further cash, both internally and externally and on the ability and 
willingness of the central bank to expand further credit to the economy 
through deficit financing, with their inflationary and balance of 
payments implications.
The NIDB has a great potential as a channel of foreign private 
investment in Nigeria. Within the period of less than three years of 
its operation since 19^4> it made 40 loan and equity investments 
totalling £3.2m in projects with a total share capital of £3*6m* &5$
of the loan and equity investments came from foreign sources and 35$ from 
indigenous sources. The NIjDB's ability to attract further finance can 
be improved if it includes small scale industries in its operations; if 
it -undertakes feasibility studies and interests prospective investors and 
if it develops projects to be eventually sold to the public when they 
have,been successful and the proceeds used for developing other projects 
which would eventually be similarly sold, and so on.
Though a public institution, the CDC is a powerful channel of 
foreign private investment in selected Commonwealth countries. Nigeria, 
along with the whhle of Commonwealth West Africa, has so far received 
the lowest allocation of its investment. The reasons for this were 
discussed in the text. Operating through its two industrial finance
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agencies which it owns equally with the Northern and the Eastern 
Region Governments, the CDC is likely to he a greater force in the 
industrialisation of the country than hitherto.
The Lagos.Stock Exchange is used by foreign firms as a channel for 
associating Nigerians in the ownership of their projects. Its scope for 
this, however, is limited by the general lack of capital in the country 
and more particularly by the reluctance of regional governments to 
offer the shares of the companies in which they participate through the 
Exchange for fear that they would be bought up by indigenes of rival 
regions•
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONTRIBUTION Off FOREIGN PRIVATE MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION
Section two of this chapter summarises the main findings of this 
study, and section three sets out the main defects in Nigeria's industrial 
strategy which ha^-limited both the amount and contribution of foreign 
private investment in Nigerian manufacturing. We begin in the following 
section to analyse the main contributions of foreign private investment 
in Nigerian manufacturing to Nigeria's economic development.
CONTRIBUTION OR.FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN NIGERIAN''MANU- 
. FACTURING. TO NIGERIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Unfortunately information on this aspect of the study is very scanty. 
This is probably because industrialisation is very recent in Nigeria and 
emphasis has so far been placed more on how to assist the projects to stand 
on their feet than on what they have contributed. ’Nevertheless it is 
proposed here to examine, with such information as is available, the main 
contribution of foreign manufacturing investment to Nigeria's economic 
development in the context of Nigeria's industrial objective^ which is to 
raise Nigeria's standard of living. This is expected to be achieved 
through increasing the level of capita,! formation and through the establish 
ment of industries to manufacture goods previously imported and to process 
Nigeria's raw materials before export, thereby providing more employment^ 
and opportunities for Nigerians to acquire managerial experience and
technical skill* rIo achieve the above objectives, the national Development 
Plan? I962/6Q, relies on foreign capital and expertise to the extent that 
50 per cent of the Plan's capital expenditure is expected to come from 
foreign sources to finance half the capital formation in the public and 
private sectors of the economy*
Oontribution to Capital Formation
The National Development Plan, 1962/68 b^udgeted for a total capital 
formation of £1183*3m over the Plan period, of which £793*8m was expected 
to be undertaken by the Government, and £389*5m W  ^he private sector.
The private sector’s share works out at about £65m p*a. and £33m this 
was expected to come from foreign private sources and £32m from domestic 
indigenous sources 5 but the Plan,did not attempt to allocate this invest­
ment to any specific economic sectors.
Table 8.1 shows that the Plan's assumption of the private sector's 
gross investment approximated the experiences in 1959 and i960 when it 
was £63m and £66m respectively. In 1961-and 19^2 it was £84m and £82m 
respectively. Throughout the five year period, however, foreign private 
investment was coiisis-tently; lower than the Plan's assumption of £33ra P*a.
In fact, during the first year of the Plan, 1962/63? foreign pribate 
investment was about £18m. This means that the bulk of the private 
investment during the period came from private indigenous sources.
Table 8,1 shows that foreign private investment fluctuated between 38 per 
cent of total gross private investment in 1959 a*i& 22. per cent in 19&2.
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1962, however, was exceptional in the shortfall in foreign 
investment because of the net disinvestment in that year of £13*6m by 
U.K. investors in the trading and services sectors, and the switch by 
some companies from overseas sources of finance to the domestic hanking 
system. Table 8.2 shows that in the subsequent three years to 1965? 
foreign private investment exceeded the Plan’s assumption by very 
handsome margin#s. During the first four years of the Plan, I962-I965, 
the net inflow of foreign private investment amounted to This
is about £22.5m short of the £200m expected to come from foreign private 
sources over the six years of the plan period. Assuming the 1966 
total of foreign private investment to equal the Plan target of £33^? 
then the £200m will have been exceeded within five of the six years of the 
Plan.
Thus although foreign private investment during 1958 "to 1962 fell 
short of the Plan assumption of £33*n annually during I962-I968, this was 
exceeded with handsome margins during 1963-1965 when it was £38m, £63m 
and £59m respectively. Figures for gross private investment during these 
three years are not available; but if we assume the indigenous sector’s 
gross investment to be constant at the 1962 level of £64m, then the 
percentage of foreign private investment to total gross private invest­
ment will be greater during the three years, 1963-1965 than in the 
previous years. As a percentage of total gross fixed investment in 
the economy, however, foreign private investment fluctuated between 6.9
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per cent and 15 per cent during 1950/55> and between 12 per cent and 
17*7 Per cent during 1956/60, averaged 12.8 per cent over the decade, 
1950-1960.
Contribution to Gross Domestic Product
Between 1950 and 1962, Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product, at 1957 
prices, increased by about 56 per cent from £688,’Jm. to £1072.5m. This 
represents an annual growth rate of about 4g‘ per cent over the twelve 
years. During the same period, net annual foreign private capital 
inflow in Nigeria rose by about 7 times from £2.6m in 1950 to £17*7m
in 1962. But we have shown that 1962 was exceptional for the net
outflow of £15.6m from the trading sector of the economy. Annual private
foreign capital inflow fluctuated between £19m in 1956 and £27m in 1961
and in 1964 was £65m. As a proportion of the Gross Domestic Product, 
however, foreign private capital inflows constituted only 0.4 per cent 
in 1950 and 0.7 per cent in 1955* For the rest of the years the 
proportion varied during 1956/62 between 1 per cent in 1952 and 2.6 per 
cent in 1959 and 2.9 per cent in 1961. Over the twelve years, it 
averaged about 1.6 per cent of the GDP.
The above proportions, however, considerably understate the 
significance of foreign private investment in the Nigerian economy.
This can be seen in its true perspective when it is related to the contri­
bution to Nigerian manufacturing. For instance, manufacturing in 1962. 
accounted for 5*5 Pe r cent of Nigeria's GDP and for 5*4 per cent in 1961.
On the other hand, net inflows of foreign private capital accounted 
for 2,7 Per cent of the GDP in 1961 and for 1.7 percent in 1962, Of 
course all the foreign private capital inflows did not go to manufacturing, 
but these proportions indicate that the contribution of net inflows of 
foreign private capital to the ©>DP is comparable with the contribution 
of manufacturing to the GDP.
The significance of foreign private investment in Nigerian manu­
facturing can also be measured in terms of its constribution to the value 
added by manufacturing in Nigeria. This is shown in Table 8.5* The 
foreign sector comprises all the sectors except timber, wood and paper 
products, printing and furniture, and clay, glass and cement products 
where more than 50 per cent of the total paid up capital is subscribed 
from foreign sources. This sector accounted for £45m or 82 per cent 
of the £54* 9m value added by manufacturings in 1965* rfhe indigenous 
sector, comprising the timber, wood-products and clay and cement products 
accounted for only £9* 8m °r 18 per cent of the value added by manu­
facturing in that year. Thus although foreign private investment 
accounted for 12.8 per cent of the capital formation and 1.6 per cent 
of total GDP over the years 1950/60, it accounted for about 82 per cent 
of value added by manufacturing in 1965. '
Wages and Salaries Paid by Foreign manufacturing firms
Another indication of the contribution of foreign private 
investment is wages and salaries paid by foreign manufacturing firms in 
Nigeria. Total industrial wages and salaries in Nigeria are summarised 
in Table 8.5 for 1963. It shows that total wages and salaries in all
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the industrial sectors amounted to £15*5m 19&5? 20 per cent of which 
was accounted for by the timber, wood and paper products, rubber and 
rubber products sector and 17‘ per cent each by machinery and transport 
equipment, and food, beverages and. tobacco sectors. It is not possible 
to specify how much exactly of these wages and salaries is attributable 
to foreign firms and how much to indigenous firms; it is obvious, 
however, that foreign proportion is considerably greater. For instance, 
the indigenous sectors, viz. timber, wood and paper products, printing 
and furniture, and in glass, cement, and clay products accounted for only 
25 per cent of the total industrial wages and salaries, and the remaining 
sectors in which foreign investors hold controlling interest accounted 
for 75 Per cent. Wages and salaries per employee are higher in three 
of these sectors at around £240 than the £250 in clay, cement and glass 
products sector, and in three of the remaining four sectors than the 
£161 in timber, wood and paper products sector.
The contribution of these wages and salaries to the economy follows
the familiar multiplier process - higher incomes leading to higher
savings, consumption and so on, limited by leakages in the form of foreign
remittances and payments for imports, depending on the marginal propensity
to consume and to import. The size of these propensities is*not known
for Nigeria but are likely to be high in view of Nigeria's generally low
"bo
per capita incomes. However,/the extent that the consumer goods are
manufactured in Nigeria, the propensity to import is likely to be relatively 
low since imports would be mainly limited to capital goods and raw 
materials.
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Expenditure on goods and services by foreign firms
The same multiplier process will also obtain in respect of the
expenditure of the foreign manufacturing firms on goods and services 
. 1m  Nigeria. As Table 8.5 shows, this amounted to £14*3^ in 1963°
Again, the seven industrial sectors in which foreign investors have the 
controlling interest accounted for 75*2 per cent of the total. The 
leakages in this respect are considerably greater than the leakages from 
the expenditure on wages and salaries, and can be quantified as in 
Table 8.4* Great caution is needed in reading this Table as some of 
the expenditure figures were not disclosed for confidential reasons. 
Nevertheless, of the £14.3m total net capital expenditure of the 649 
reporting firms, £8-4m or 59 per cent was expenditure on imports and 
£4.3m or 30 Pe^  cent was expenditure on local goods, such as land and 
buildings. Import expenditure here means expenditure 011 vehicles, 
machinery and equipment, which obviously are not yet manufactured in 
Nigeria. With this high proportion of imports, constituting about 
three-fifths of total net expenditure, it is obvious that the resulting 
multiplier effects of these expenditures is considerably reduced. 
Contribution to Nigeria's Balance of Payments
Foreign private investment in Nigerian manufacturing is expected 
to contribute to Nigeria's economic development by improving hex* 
balance of payments through the local manufacture of some goods previously 
imported, through the processing of some of her raw materials before 
export, and by financing an uncovered gap in the 6 Year National
For footnote see p«406*
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Development Plan* This section examines to what extent, if at all, 
this objective has been achieved,
1. The Local, manufacture of goods previously imported
Nigeria's industrial objective is geared towards reducing her
dependence on imports of certain essential goods by manufacturing them
locally. At present, emphasis is on the local manufacture of basic
consumer goods and some consumer durables which is preferred to the
manufacture of heavy capital goods because of the combined impact of
capital intensity, the large size of the market and the high skills
2
required for an efficient operation of heavy industries. As the 
consumer goods are manufactured locally, their imports would tend to 
fall. Table 8.7 shows that this has happened with the import of some 
products which are now locally manufactured in Nigeria. With i960 as 
the base year,, the import index for cement fell to 20 in 19&5? f° 77 
for manufactured tobacco, 60 for rubber goods, 41 for enamel ware, 6 for 
beer, and 99 for textiles. But for increasing domestic production the 
index for textiles could have exceeded 100 in 1965* In fact, import 
subs ti tut toft manufacture has proceeded so much that there is a potential 
threat of overproduction in some cases,
1. There is also a tax advantage. Foreign nationals and companies are 
easier to tax than indigenous nationals and companies5 if the taxes 
are paid from earnings which otherwise would have been repatriated 
and if the Government invests them successful capital projects, 
they help to increase the capital accumulation within the country.
2. Central Bank of Nigeria: Annual Deport. 1965, p.24.
In the case of cement, local output as a proportion of total
domestic consumption (defined as imports plus domestic output) has grown
1
from about 21 per cent in i960 to about 90 Per cent in 1969. Even
then, actual production at the end of 1965 was about 270,000 tons short
of potential domestic production, compared with a shortfall of 441*000
tons in 1964. With additional cement plants of various capacities at
Sokoto (100,000 tons), Calabar (50,000 tons), and Ukpilla (150,000 tons),
scheduled to commence production in 1966, it was estimated that the
industry1s;capacity must have well exceeded 1.7m tons by the end of 1966,
"Even if imports were prohibited, and the expected increase in consumption
allov/ed for, the industry may still be left with excess capacity of close
2to 200,000 tons at current prices".
The Table shows that the greatest fall in the import index since 
i960 is in beer which fell from 100.in i960 to 6 in 1965* Estimated 
domestic consumption of beer in 1965 was 12.8m gallons compared with 
13*4^  gallons in 1964 but the share of local production increased during 
1965 by about 400,000 gallons while imports amounted to 377*000 gallons, 
compared with 1.6m gallons in 1964- Potential over production in beer 
is illustrated by the fact that in 1964 the industry operated with an 
excess capacity of 4*8m and 4*4^  gallons in 1965*
The textile industry illustrates a case of actual or potential 
overproduction existing side by side with increasing imports. Domestic
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demand for and outpiit of textile goods were estimated at 310m and 
square yeard respectively in 19&5* Thus domestic production supplied 
about 39 cent of total domestic demand and imports accounted for 6l
per cent. Since total plant capacity in 1965 was about 200m square yards,
this indicates that aggregate plant capacity utilisation was only 60 per 
cent in the year. What accounts for this existence of excess capacity 
in the face of unsatisfied local demands ? The explanation lies in the 
limited lines of textile production in Nigeria. There has been an over­
concentration in the production of some limited lines, such as bleached 
and unbleached cloth, and less on the production of high quality printed 
cloth. The former was very popular at low levels of income in Nigeria. 
However, with "rising incomes, Nigerians are becoming more quality conscious. 
It is a fact that better quality textile prints have been arriving in
increasing yardage and variety since textile plants started production 
1
in Nigeria". Rationalisation of the existing plants is necessary here 
to produce the type of cloth now in demand but presently satisfied from 
imports.
Other manufacturing industries have also witnessed some impressive 
advances, the most rapidly growing one being tobacco manufacturing. 
Production and sales rose by 11 per cent in the financial year ending 30th 
September 1965j compared with 8 per cent during the previous year. The 
British American Tobacco Company pioneered tobacco production in Nigeria
1. Ibid
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in 1953; tout by 1905 Nigeria .had .five cigarette factories able to produce 
at least 80 per cent of her needs. Nigeria’s demand for manufactured 
tobacco was estimated at 19,000 metric tons, in 19&3, and is practically 
certain to.have increased, while her imports of manufactured tobacco 
which was 827 metric tons in 19^3» were down.to less than a third, 278 
metric tons in 19&5> owing to increasing production from local factories. 
Domestic production of rubber goods, including tyres, shoes and household 
goods have also increased rapidly in the past few years.
It is thus seen that import substitution has stimulated the 
production of many goods previously imported and that there already exists 
potential over-production in certain lines such as cement and beer and. 
textiles.- This is illustrated in the unutilised capacity which exists 
in some of these sectors.
2. The Processing of Raw Materials Before Export.
Nigeria’s industrial objective also aims at increasing the country’'s 
export earnings by processing some of her raw products before export. 
Processing plants have been established by foreign private investors for 
groundnut processing and for timber and plywood. Recently petroleum 
refinery and cocoa and palm kernel processing plants v/ere established in 
partnership with foreign private investors. The oil refinery is so far 
geared towards meeting Nigeria’s requirements; and cocoa and palm kernel 
processing plants have only recently gone into production and no exports , 
have resulted from the plants so far.
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Table 8.6 shows Nigeria's exports of processed products. It 
shows that the value of the exports increased from about £15m in 1964 
to £18m in 1965? representing about 6.8 per cent of Nigeria’s total 
export earnings in 1965* The major component of the exports are 
groundnut oil and groundnut cake. All the exports come from processing 
plants which are wholly foreign owned. These include four Lenanese 
groundnut processing plants in the North, and the African Timber and 
Plywood Company at Sapele in the Mid-West. .
As the other processing plants come into full production and as 
more plants are. established, it is expected that exports of processed 
products would increase. However, the extent of the increases would 
depend on the competitive ability of the Nigerian plants to compete in 
price and quality with similar products in the export market.
Import Substitution, Exports and the Balance of Payments
To what extent hayfcthe local manufacture of goods previously 
imported, and the export of Nigeria’s manufactured products contributed, 
or are likely to contribute, to her balance of payments ? The answer 
is that.the scope for any substabtial contribution so far is considerably 
limited. Although the proportion of consumer goods imports has steadily 
fallen, total imports have risen from £115m in 1954 to £275*3m in 19^5•
At the same time, exports rose much more slowly from £146.2m to £263.3^  
during the same period, and the visible balance deteriorated from a 
favourable balance of £35*7& in 1954 to a deficit which was highest at 
£49m in I96I. Largely due to increased oil exports, it narrowed to £9m 
in 1965 (Table 8.7).
The above state of affairs is not, of course, peculiar to Nigeria.
"The experience of all countries: engaged in this policy has been that
they are pretty soon confronted with a very acute balance of payments
crisis. Imports rise; exports are stagnant, and they become
1
Increasingly dependent on foreign assistance'.' At first sight this 
seems paradoxical because, after all, the substitution of home for 
imported manufactures should have improved, not worsened the balance of 
payments. What in fact happens is that the new industrial activity 
raises national and personal income inside the country; and this in turn 
raises the total demand for imports to such a level that it more than 
cancels the savings on manufactured imports achieved by the new industries.
Imports rise for.three reasons? partly because the industrial 
machinery for construction has to be imported. As we saw from Table 4,
69 per cent of total*net capital expenditure was spent on imports, mainly, 
machinery and vehicles. Secondly, because raw materials and perhaps 
some industrial fuels have to be imported; and thirdly, because there is 
an import element in rising standards of living. These have all been 
demonstrated in the case of Nigeria. As import substitute manufacturing 
progressed, the imports of capital goods have risen from 22 per cent of , 
total imports in i960 to 31 per cent In 19&5* During the same period, 
imports of raw materials rose from 17 per cent to 24 per cent. The
1. Ronald Robinson ,(ed.)s Industrialisation in Developing Countries, 
Cambridge University Overseas Study Committee, 1964, p°15*
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result is that, as Table 8.8 shows, while imports of consumer goods fell, 
from 81 per cent in 1954 to 45 P©3" cent in 1965 s that of capital goods 
rose from 19 per oent to 55 Per cent during the same period. Thus 
rather than reduce the total volume of imports, local manufacturing 
has helped to increase it in Nigeria; while the proportion of consumer 
goods imports to total imports has fallen, that of capital goods imports 
has risen.
At the same time, as we have shown, exports have not expanded in 
proportion to imports, and the proportion of manufactured exports has 
remained very small at around 7 P©33 cent. In addition, industrialisation 
is so recent in Nigeria that it will take quite some time in the future 
for industries to be firmly established in the domestic market before 
exploring and developing export markets for manufactures.
Foreign Capital and the Uncovered Gap in the Development Plan
The Government, of course, recognised that in the development 
process, imports would rise faster than exports and there would be an 
uncovered gap in the balance of payments. This gap was estimated at 
£480-5^ over the National Development Flan period, 1962-1968. This gap 
was expected, under the Plan, to be financed from foreign resources with 
foreign aid contributing about and foreign private capital £200m.
As we showed in the previous section, although the annual foreign 
private capital inflow fell short of the Flan tagg^t in 1962, it 
recovered and exceeded it during the three years, 1965-1965*
As Table 8.9 shows, firm offers for foreign aid during the first 
two years of the Plan amounted to £171.7m or 53 Per cent of the £J27m 
expected over the Plan period. Under the Plan, foreign aid was expected 
to finance 50 Per cent of total public expenditure. But as Table 9*10 
shows,- during the first two years of the Plan, it only financed 12.5 per 
cent of total public capital expenditure of about £150m. Foreign aid 
did not therefore fulfil the high hopes raised for it in the Plan.
Several reasons were given for this shortfall of about 58 per cent.
These include the fact that negotiations for foreign assistance for the 
Plan merely started with the adoption of the Plan in 1962; that it was 
difficult to obtain foreign aid for the 1955-60 projects carried forward 
under the plan; that executive capacity was limited; that some prepared 
projects could not attract aid because they did not satisfy lenders’ 
specifications; that most donors would only finance the offshore costs 
of projects and would not release funds unless the domestic counterpart 
funds were forthcoming; and that most of the firm offers were tied to 
specific projects in the plan and could not be used to finance other
1
projects no matter what their importance in the development strategy.
The effect of the failure of foreign aid to fulfil the planned 
targets meant that although the annual inflow of foreign private 
investment exceeded the annual target from 1963 onwards, ,over all foreign
1. Central Bank of Nigeria; Annual Report, 1964* P*H.
capital did not meet the Plan’s target* Since Nigeria pushed ahead 
with the Plan, she had to finance the resulting import deficit by running 
down her external reserves, which fell from £172*5m in i960 to £86*8m in 
1964* Thus, "The growing need for imports of capital goods for the 
execution of Plan projects and the shortfall in external finance have 
made it necessary for us to run down our external reserves in order to 
finance the deficit in our international transactions. The low level of
1
reserves is now causing some concern and increasing attention is "being
given to ways and means of.checking the downward trend in the level of 
1our reserves”.
It would "be wrong to conclude that foreign private investment $as 
not contributed to easing Nigeria*s balance of payments simply because 
local manufacturing has facilitated a rise in total imports while exports, 
have not prdpbrtionately risen. Although total imports would not have 
risen as much as they did in the absence of local manufacturing, never­
theless foreign private capital inflows contributed to paying for these 
imports. Table 8..7 shows that net private foreign capital varied between 
9 "per cent of total imports in .1954 "bo about 25 per cent in 1964> an<^  
during,1954/65? 4‘k averaged about 14. per cent of total imports, and 16 
per cent of total domestic export earnings. Thus although Nigeria's 
external reserves were drawn upon to supplement export earnings to pay 
for the imports, in the absence of foreign private capital inflows, the 
strain on the reserves would.have been greater. Foreign private capital
inflows therefore contributed to easing Nigeria’s balance of payments 
by financing about 14.1 per cent of Nigeria’s imports during 1954/65*
SECTION THREE
CONTRIBUTION TO 3MPL0IMEHT AND SKILL
ITnemployment is a very serious problem in Nigeria. Owing to
the adoption of universal5free primary education in the East (presently
up to standard four) and in the \Yest, thousands of school leavers every
year graduate from the primary schools and flock into the towns in search
of employment. In the Western Region, for instance, the output of
successful primary school leavers rose from 54?000 in 1950 to 129,000
in I960, but provision of employment opportunities has not increased at
1a proportionate rate. Moreover, about 420,000 school leaversFwere
during I962/67
expected to enter the labourimarket in the Western Region/ The figures 
for the East and the North are not available. It is clear, nevertheless, 
that the employment situation in these regions is equally grave, 
especially in the Eastern Region. • To help, to solve this serious 
unemployment problem, Nigeria’s development strategy has been directed 
towards the creation of more employment opportunities. One of the 
economic sectors in which great hope has. been placed in this endeavour 
is industry. This section therefore considers the contribution of 
industry or of foreign private .manufacturing investment to employment in 
the country. ; -
1. National Development Plan, 1962-1968, pp.527-529*
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This is shown in Table 8.11 which also classifies the industrial 
employment according to the various sectors for 1965- In that year, 
the 649 reporting industrial establishments employed a total of 67?978 
persons. 25 per cent of this was in the timber, wood and paper products, 
printing and furniture sector, and 14 per cent each in food, beverages 
and tobacco, and machinery and transport equipment sectors, respectively. 
About 94 per cent of the total employees were Nigerians; in fact in all 
the industrial sectors, more than 90 per cent of the employees were 
higerians, the biggest percentage being 97 per cent in three sectors, 
chemicals, oils, paints and petroleum products', clay, glass, and cement 
productsJ and leather, leather products, rubber and rubber products.
About 5*2 per cent of the total employees was non-Digerian and others, 
comprising working proprii-tors, unpaid apprentices and family workers 
constituted 3*2 per cent.
Table 8.12 compares total industrial employment in relation to 
employment in other sectors of the economy. It shows that total 
employment increased marginally from 476,000 at the end of September 1957 
to 519,000 at the end of December 1962. Throughout the period, the 
services sector offered the most employment which rose from 26 per cent 
of total employment in 1957 to 35 Per cent in 1962. The next biggest 
contributor to employment was construction, 19 per cent, followed by 
10 per cent each in 19^2, by transport and communications, and 
manufacturing. In 1957? manufacturing accounted for only 6.6 per cent
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of the total employment and 10 per cent of the total in 1962. Xn
concrete numbers, however, total employment in manufacturing increased
by more than 105 per cent from 32,000 in 1957 "to 68,000 in 1963* The
comparative figures for.other sectors are not available after 1962; but
it is obvious that manufacturing so far accounts for a very small
proportion of total employment, and that this was not likely to have
greatly exceeded 10 per cent of the total in 1963*
It does appear, therefore, that Nigerian manufacturing, two-thirds
of which is foreign owned, has not contributed very significantly to
solving the unemployment problem in Nigeria. This is not unusual.
The belief that manufacturing industry will provide substantial employment
is a fallacy for n there is by noJ plenty of evidence to show that a growing
manufacturing sector does not provide much employment, even if care is
taken to make it labour intensive. The correct proposition is that if
industry develops, the consequent rise in incomes will permit a
substantial expansion of employment to take place in the economy as a 
1whole11. Moreover, owing to its capital intensive nature, foreign 
manufacturing would not be expected to contribute very significantly to 
employment in quantitative terms. Qualitatively, its contribution can 
be immense through training in industrial management and in handling 
complicated machines and other industrial operations. As Professor Lewis
1. The Role of Industry in Developments some Fallacies, Journal of
Modern African Studies, December 1963, p.4164
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pointed out, ’’the crucial test of an industrialisation policy is not how
rapidly it increases employment or output, "but how rapidly it builds up
1indigenous enterprise”o The acquisition by Nigerians of technical 
skill and managerial experience through employment in manufacturing is 
one of the primary objectives of Nigeria's industrial strategy and the 
main reason for seeking partnership with foreign capital. This is 
because there are simply not enough foreigners in Nigeria to initiate 
and develop all the projects Nigeria would want, so that progress would 
be slow until Nigerians learn to start and run industries by themselves.
TECHNICAL SKILL ANN MAMGERIAL EXPERIENCE - 
How foreign private manufacturing investment in Nigeria has 
enabled Nigerians to acquire technical skill and managerial experience 
may be illustrated in two ways. One is a functional analysis of 
industrial employment, and the other is the examination of the practical 
steps most foreign manufacturing firms have taken to train Nigerians in 
the various skills.
The functional analysis of industrial employment in 19&3 is shown 
in Table 8.11. It shows that 38 Pe^ cent of the total industrial 
employment in 1963 was unskilled labour, 43 per cent was skilled and 
semi-skilled, 12 per cent clerical and only 2 per cent was employed in 
the professional and managerial grade. Highest proportion of uhnskilled 
labour occurred in the leather and leather products, rubber and rubber
1. W.A. Lewis? Industrialisation and the Gold Coast, Accra, 1953? p.12.
products sector. This sector, it will be remembered, accounted for the 
biggest proportion of unskilled labour. It seems, therefore, that it 
is a sector that requires the least skill in its operations.
Compared with skilled and semi-skilled, the number of Nigerians 
employed in the managerial and professional grade is very low, at 2 per 
cent of the total, industrial employment. Out of the 1326 employees 
in the managerial and professional grade, the seven industrial sectors 
in which foreign private interests contributed more than $0 per cent of 
the paid up capital accounted for 718 or 54 per cent and the other two 
sectors in which indigenous capital is dominant accounted for 608 or 
46 per cent. This is made up of 552 in timber and wood products sector 
and 56 in the clay, cement and glass product sector. Since foreigners or 
non Nigerians obviously would be professional and managerial personnel, a 
comparison of the number of non Nigerians with the number of Nigerians 
employed in this grade would give an idea of the extent of Nigerianisation 
at this level. This shows that while 2 per cent of the total industrial 
employment in 1963 were Nigerians employed at the managerial and 
professional grade,. 2.4 per cent were non-Nigerians. Figures for the past 
years are not available; but it may be said that the state of Nigerian­
isation at this level in 1963 was that approximately, for every non 
Nigerian employed at the managerial and professional level, one Nigerian 
was similarly employed. This proportion is not uniform in all the 
industrial sectors. In textiles and metal product sectors, the 
proportion was one Nigerian to 5 Nigerians, and two Nigerians to three
non Nigerians in the machinery and transport equipment and chemical
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sector and in the clay, glass and cement product sector. The reverse, 
however, is the case in the timber, wood and paper product sector where 
the proportion was three Nigerians to one non-Nigerian.
A considerable space has been devoted to analysing the employment 
at the professional and managerial level because of its importance. As 
Professor W#A. Lewis pointed out: "it is a common error in under-developed 
countries to believe that entrepreneurship requires mainly technical 
knowledge and capital to work with# What makes a business successful is
1the efficiency of its management,, for, given this, all else will follow". 
This is because capital can be borrowed, and technical knowledge can be 
learnt at schools, but managerial skill can only be acquired by working 
over a number of years. It is on this basis that the number of Nigerians 
employed at the managerial and professional grade and thus offered the 
opportunity to acquire the necessary skills has to be judged. In view 
of the absence of industrial tradition in Nigeria the levels attained in 
this grade by 1963 is no mean contribution from foreign private invest­
ment; this becomes more so when it is considered as a measure of 
co-operation by foreign firms with government policy which did not specify 
the number of. Nigerians, .to be employed; at this level; but merely relied . 
on persuasion. If these Nigerian managers are given adequate scope and
1. W.A. Lewis, op.pit., p.12.
422
opportunities to acquire the necessary skill, then the contribution 
would be more tremendous.
Opportunities for Nigerians to aoquire the necessary skill are 
generally provided by the firms both through training within industry 
and by training overseas. The system of training within industry 
originated in , the United States and was widely adopted in the United 
Kingdom during the second world war to meet the urgent need for increased 
productivity, and it has since been generally adopted by most companies 
in Commonwealth West Africa. The-principle is based on an analysis of 
the essential skills and knowledge required of a manager and it endeavours 
to develop the skills through training in job instruction, job relations, 
and job methods with the objective that those trained should be able to 
train others. This method has been adopted by the United Africa Company 
Ltd. and some other big foreign firms in. Nigeria.
Training is also given by sending promising candidates overseas.
Most contracts of partnership provide, for such training either overseas 
or in Nigeria. The United Africa Co. first started sending selected 
African managers to the United Kingdom in 1947 in order to broaden their, 
experience in factories and other training. institutions in the U.K.
The Company1 s policy is that no African brought to the United Kingdom who 
is an actual or potential manager should return without attending a course
in industrial relations and other courses which enable him to study the
, . • .1
more important functions of management.
1. United Africa Co.Ltd., Statistical Econ.Review, 1954> P*55»
Technical training is also offered at other levels. The United 
Africa Gompany, for instance,’ opened its first training school in West 
Africa at Burutu in Nigeria-in 1954- She school offers five types of 
trainings a;five-year course for indentured apprenticeships, a two-year
course for trade trainees? booster, classes for craftsmen and supervisors?
1evening classes? and courses, in new techniques. In addition, by 
arrangement with the Federal Government, the company offers articleship 
to boys who have spent three years in a government trade centre to give 
them the opportunity of spending the remaining two years of their 
apprenticeships with the company in one of its training schools and 
workshops. . One ..significant point about these trainees is that, unlike 
those trained by the Government,, they are not bound by any contract to 
serve the sponsors for a specified number.of years.after their training. 
The, view is generally taken that each individual, should be allowed to 
choose freely for himself, and that it is preferable, to risk losing a man 
altogether than to retain him as an unwilling employee.
CONCLUSIONS
F o re ig n  p r iv a te  in v e s tm e n t i n  N ig e r ia n  m a n u fa c tu r in g  has c o n t r i ­
b u te d  to  c r e a t in g  more employment o p p o r tu n i t ie s .  A t  th e  end o f  1963 
t o t a l  i n d u s t r i a l  employment i n  N ig e r ia  amounted to  a b ou t 6 8 ,0 0 0 . T h is  
re p re s e n te d  a 105 p e r c e n t in c re a s e  fro m  th e  3 2 , 000 ' i n d u s t r i a l  la b o u r  fo r c e  
a t  th e  end o f  Septem ber 1957- Seven i n d u s t r i a l  s e c to rs  in  w h ich  fo r e ig n  
p r iv a te  in v e s to r s  have th e  c o n t r o l l in g  in te r e s te d  acco un ted  f o r  71 Pe r
1° I b i d , ,pp.22-24.
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of the total industrial employment in 19&3? bhe balance of 29 per cent 
being accounted for by the remaining two industrial sectors with 
indigenous Nigerian majority interests. Even at the high level in
f
1963? industrial employment merely accounted for about 10 per cent of 
total employment. Manufacturing has thus accounted for a very small 
proportion of total employment and apparently has contributed little 
to solving Nigeria's pressing unemployment problem.
Of more significance, however, are the opx)ortunities manufacturing 
has offered to Nigerians to acquire managerial and technical skill.
About 75 Per cent of those employed in skilled and semi-skilled grades 
in manufacturing were in industrial sectors in which foreign private 
interests have majority interestj this sector accounted for 56 per cent 
of those employed at the managerial and professional level while the 
indigenous sector accounted for 44 Per cent. It is thus obvious that 
although total industrial employment in 1965 was very small relative to 
all employment in the economy, the foreign sector accounted for
an overwhelming proportion of this both absolutely and in the various 
functional levels. Besides, this sector offers considerable training 
facilities at technical and other levels. Relative to the indigenous 
sector, therefore, the foreign sector contributed significantly to 
creating employment opportunities in manufacturing.
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Manufacturing in the National Economy
Having thus, considered the contribution of foreign private 
investment in Nigerian manufacturing to the growth of the gross domestic 
product, to the improvement in the balance of payments and to employment 
and training in technical skill and managerial experience, we consider 
in this final section the position of manufacturing in the national 
economy. This can be illustrated by comparing the contribution of 
manufacturing to the GBP with the contribution from other economic 
sectors# 0?his is shown in Table 8*15*
Nigeria's GBP at 1957 prices grew from £688*7m in 1950 to £1072m 
in 1962• The biggest contributor to this, as the Table shows, is 
agriculture which grew from £465m in 1950 to £694m in 1962$ next came 
distribution, including the marketing boards, whose contribution increased 
from £107m to £132m over the period. Although the contribution from 
manufacturing increased by about 12 times from £3m in 1950 to £37^ in 
1962, its share was only 3*5 Per oen,t in 1962 compared with 65 per cent 
from agriculture, livestock, fishing and forestry, 12*4 P©r cent from 
distribution, and 4*8 per cent from public utilities* That industrial­
isation is a post-1957 phenomenon in Nigeria is illustrated in the fact 
that it never contributed up to 1 per cent of total GBP until that date 
when its share was only 1*2 per cent. That manufacturing accelerated 
after 1957 is illustrated in the fact that by 1962, its share of the 
GBP was nearly four times its 1957 share*
Even at this rate, manufacturing in Nigeria is still insignificant 
relative to such sectors as agriculture and general commerce. Nigeria,
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after all, is still overwhelmingly an agricultural country, since 
agriculture still contributes about two-thirds of her GDP. Comparative 
figures for other African countries are given in Tables 8.14 and 8.15•
Althoixgh manufacturing is thus insignificant, it must be emphasised 
in conclusion that even the ^ich manufacturing that exists today, 
foreign private investment plays a key, and indeed a dominant role.
Table 8.14 shows that in 1965 the foreign sector or foreign private 
investment accounted for 68 per cent of total paid up capital in Nigerian 
manufacturing, 75 per cent of net capital expenditure, 82 per cent of 
total value added, 71 Per cent of total employment, and 75 Per cent of 
total wages and salaries paid by Nigerian manufacturing firms. This is 
no mean contribution.
SECTION
Foreign Private Investment in Nigerian Manufacturing,
1939/65s Summary
There was l i t t l e  m a n u fa c tu r in g  in  N ig e r ia  d u r in g  1939 /54* T h is  
i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  1950 m a n u fa c tu r in g  m e re ly  accoun ted  
f o r  0 .5  Pe^  c e n t o f  N ig e r ia 's  C ross D om estic  P ro d u c t ( a t  1957 p r ic e s ) 5 
i n  1954 p ro io o r t io n  was 0 .7  p e r c e n t.  Even i n  t h i s  s m a ll degree  o f  
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n ,  f o r e ig n  p r iv a te  in v e s tm e n t p la y e d  a ke y  r o le .  I t  
a cco u n ted  f o r  52 o r  a b o u t 25 p e r c e n t o f  th e  2 0 ^ m a n u fa c tu r in g  p la n ts  
e x is t in g  i n  N ig e r ia  by  th e  end o f  1954* 46 o f  th e se  52 fo r e ig n
m a n u fa c tu r in g  p la n ts  were engaged in  p i ’o c e s s in g  N ig e r ia 's  a g r ic u l t u r a l  
raw  m a te r ia ls ,  th e  f i v e  b ig g e s t  fo r e ig n  p la n ts  b e in g  th e  N ig e r ia n  
Tobacco Company, th e  N ig e r ia n  B re w e r ie s , th e  A f r ic a n  T im ber and P lywood
Company, a steel drum fabricating plant and the Unilever's soap factory.
In addition there were four Lebanese groundnut processing factories in,, 
the North.
Numbers alone, of course, grossly understate the significant© of 
foreign private manufacturing investment during the period. Out of 
the £3*ltn value added by manufacturing in 1950, the two sectors, food 
beverages and tobacco and timber, wood products, printing and furniture 
which included three of the biggest foreign manufacturing plants ttot-. 
at that time accounted for well over 10 per cent. In 1954 these two 
sectors contributed for £4«5m or 10 percent of the £6*5m , value added 
by manufacturing. In view of the fact that the foreign plants are 
generally bigger in terms of employment and capital investment and since 
they were spread among the other sectors, it may be assumed that the 
foreign sector accounted for more than 80 per cent of value added by 
manufacturing in 1954*
In contrast to the first period, 1959/54? manufacturing made a 
tremendous.advance in Nigeria during the second period, 1955/65* During 
this period, 955 manufacturing plants were established, compared with 204 
during 1939/54? afld. the foreign sector accounted for 45 percent or 425 
of these establishments, compared with 25 per cent during 1939/54*
Finally by 1962 manufacturing accounted for 3*5 per cent of the GDP 
compared with; 0*7. per cent in 1954* There was thus greater manufacturing 
in the country during 1955/65*
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H ow ever, th e  g re a te r  p a r t  o f  t h i s  m a n u fa c tu r in g  o c c u rre d  s in c e  . 
1958. O ut o f  451 r e p o r t in g  p la n ts  e s ta b lis h e d  betw een 1953/1963?
65 per cent or 295 were established during 1958/63 &*id 156 or 55 Per 
cent established during 1952/57* More significantly, more manufacturing-* 
occurred in the five years after Independence, 1961/65, than in the 
six years, 1955/60. For instance, 70.per cent or 298 of the 425 
foreign, plants established during 1955/65 were established during 1961/65 
and only 227 °r 30 per cent were established during 1955/60. This 
pattern is also illustrated in .the flow of foreign private investment.
Out of a total foreign private capital inflow of £345m during 1950/65? 
£205? or 59 por cent was attracted during 1961/65, and £140m or 41 P®*1 
cent during 1950/605 while the average annual inflow during 1950/60 was 
£13m, it was £41$ during 1961/65. These figures illustrate that instead 
of discouraging,Independence, in fact, encouraged more foreign private 
investment in Nigeria.
The paid up capital of 649 reporting manufacturing establishments 
in 1963? according to the 1963 industrial survey, amounted to £56.7*11 
of which the foreign sector accounted for £38.4111 or 68 per cent, and 
the indigenous sector accounted for £18m or 32 per cent. The foreign 
sector is dominant in all the sectors except clay, glass and cement 
products where it. accounted for 29 per cent of the paid up capital, 
and timber and wood products sector where it accounted for 39 per cent 
of the paid up capital. In all the other sectors, the foreign sector's 
proportion of the paid up capital varied between 52 per cent in the
leather and leather products sectors, to 98 cent in the machinery 
and transport equipment sector; The foreign sector's proportion of 
. the total number of establishments varied between 50 per cent in the 
textiles and wearing apparel sector to 92 per cent in the metal products 
sector.and was least in the timber, wood and paper products, printing 
and furniture at 18 .per cent.
F o re ig n  in v e s tm e n t in  f i x e d  a s s e ts  in  the  m a n u fa c tu r in g  s e c to r  
in c re a s e d  fro m  £39**1' i&  1962 to  £ 6 3 .5m i n  1964 o f  w h ich  th e  fo o d , 
beverages and tobacco  s e c to r  accoun ted  f o r  35 Pe r  c e n t in  1964? fo l lo w e d  
by th e  c h e m ic a ls , o i l s ,  p a in ts ,  and p e tro le u m  s e c to r  w h ich  in c re a s e d  i t s  
.p r o p o r t io n  fro m  9 Pe r  c e n t i n  1962 to  18 p e r c e n t i n  1964. V a lue  added 
by  m a n u fa c tu r in g  in c re a s e d  by  664 p e r ce n t fro m  £7m in  1955 Vo £55m 
1963* A g a in  th e  ^ o o d , beverages and tobacco  s e c to r  accoun ted  f o r  th e  
b ig g e s t  p r o p o r t io n  a t  38 p e r c e n t fo l lo w e d  b y  the c h e m ic a ls , o i l s ,  p a in ts ,  
and p e tro le u m  s e c to r ,  though  th e  g re a te s t  in c re a s e s  were re c o rd e d  i n  th e  
m a ch in e ry  and t r a n s p o r t  equ ipm ent s e c to r ,  955 Pe^  c e n t ,  and le a th e r  
and le a th e r  p ro d u c ts ,  863 p e r c e n t.
Among the various factors which influenced the above foreign 
investment in Nigerian manufacturing during 1939/65? two are most 
significant. One'is government policy and the other is the Nigerian 
market,. But their effects varied b.etv/een 1939/54 and 1955/65* ' •
During 1939/54 foreign manufacturing investment was limited by 
inadequate market for some products and inadequate raw materials*, and 
lack of skill for some manufactures. Two other factors y/ere the
shortage of capital goods, and the disturbed political situation in 
Nigeria which followed the militant nationalism resulting from the 
return of the demobilised soldiers at the end of the Second World War. 
This, in turn led to rapid political and constitutional changes which 
reacted adversely on the foreign investors’ assessment of Nigeria's 
investment prospects. This induced among’ them an attitude of "wait 
and see"| and, added to the other factors mentioned above, led to the 
abandonment of some projects. Even if these factors had not occurred 
or had been favourable, the abandoned projects would probably not have 
been established during the period because of government policy.
Government policy is the most important factor which limited foreign 
private investment during 1939/54* Although the war and early post-war 
inflationary pressures and the need to economise 011 imports made possible 
the change of government policy in 1941 to encourage local manufacturing, 
industrial policy until 1952 was against establishing modern industries 
on a factory scale. It rather preferred industries to be established 
on a village and peasant basis. Since foreign manufacturing had to be 
on a factory level, it is obvious how this policy worked against foreign 
private manufacturing investment during the period. The various direct 
and indirect methods which the government, in pursuance of this policy, 
used to prevent foreign manufacturing during the period were discussed 
in Chapter One,
The corrollary to the above policy was, of course, the refusal or 
failure to adopt measures to stimulate factory-level industrialisation.
Tariff policy was geared to raising revenue and a demand for some 
tariff preference to assist the ..establishment of a textile project was 
refused on the ground that it would deprive.the government of its 
source of revenue. Another aspect of the policy against factory level 
industrialisation was the ban on the establishment of new groundnut 
processing factories between 1942 and 1948 aud the increasing restrictions 
on the expansion of the four Lebanese groundnut processing factories in 
Kano, against the advice of many experts such as the World Bank mission, 
Professor,Bauer, and Mr. J.C. Gardner.
Exceptions were made to the above policy to permit the establishment 
of the Nigerian Breweries, 1949? the African Plywood and Timber Factory 
and the Nigerian Tobacco Company Ltd. in.1958 and 1951- These 
exceptions were necessitated by the need to economise on non-sterling 
spending in the interest of the sterling area. These exceptions were 
discussed in detail in Chapter One. -
When the 1951 constitution, which gave Nigerians more say in 
running the affairs of the country by introducing ministerial government, 
came into effect in 1952? the policy against factory level industries 
underwent a change. One of the first acts of the Ministerial Government 
was the enactment in 1952 of the Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance 
with retrospective effect from July 1951? ar*d the amendment of the 
Income Tax Ordinance, all with a view to stimulating factory level 
industries, through granting "pioneer" privileges, and income tax concessions 
to qualified industrial projects. All this, however, was on paper, q
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Although Nigerian, ministers were now included in the Cabinet, the 
policy level civil services were still expatriate and with the prospect 
of further political changes granting more autonomy foreshadowed in the 
1953 constitutional conference, there was an apparent reluctance by the 
Government to take any positive decisions on Nigeria*s economic future. 
Accordingly, although the pioneer industries ordinance had retrospective 
effect from 1951? by the end of 1954? no industry had been declared a 
pioneer, nor any venture granted a pioneer status. In fact the first 
industry to be declared pioneer was cotton seed, processing in September 
1955* This apparent inefficacy of the ordinance was due to the narrow 
interpretation of the oprdiaiaricfeni by the governor in council, although 
two official reasons were given. The first was the decision to postpone 
decisions on Nigeria*s economic development pending the report of the 
World Bank Mission then due to arrive in Nigeria. The second was the 
receipt of the report in September 1954 which coincided with the intro­
duction of the Federal Constitution in October 1954- This constitution 
created strong and autonomous regions and made industry a concurrent 
subject between the regions and the centre. Accordingly, action on the 
pioneer business and other problems was postponed further pending 
classification of issues under the new Federal Constitution.
1954 may therefore be called a great divide in the evolution of 
economic policy and economic development in Nigeria just as the war and 
post-war changes constituted a land-mark in the country’s political 
and economic history. ‘ 1954 was also significant because with decontrol
measures introduced in the United Kingdom and the return to free market
trading, it was the first post-war year in which trading and economic 
conditions approached normality.
The 1954 constitution gave Nigerians the freedom to develop their 
economy and to pursue their interest in industrialisation. . Five year 
plans followed in 1955 with emphasis on the development of infrastructure 
as a basis for future development and to facilitate private enterprise 
development. The Eastern region government in 1955 and the Western 
region in 1956 sent out economic missions to Europe and North America 
to attract foreign investment. In 1956? all the five Governments of 
the federation issued a joint statement welcoming foreign capital in 
certain sectors. With the East and the West becoming self-governing in' 
1957, incentive laws were passed in that year and in 1958 0^ stimulate 
economic development? the scope of the pioneer industries Ordinance and 
the Income Tax Amendment Act of 1952 was widened, and liberalised; andv 
following the report of the committee to advise on ways and means to 
stimulate industrial development, tariff concessions and tariff protection 
. became available to .qualified industrial investors for the first time in 
Nigeria under the various Acts and regulations passed in 1958? as 
amended.
The above m easures im p roved  th e  in v e s tm e n t c l im a te  i n  th e  c o u n try .
I n  a d d i t io n  th e  la u n c h in g  o f  th e  S ix  Y ea r^  1962/68 D evelopm ent P la n  w ith  
d e f in e d  p r i o r i t i e s  and t a r g e t s : foreshadow ed even more g ro w th  p ro s p e c ts  
w h ich  re a c te d ’ fa v o u ra b ly  on in v e s to r s ' m inds . On to p  o f  a l l  t h is  v/as 
an a p p a re n t p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y . .  In d e e d , N ig e r ia 's  g re a te s t  a s s e ts  i n
attracting foreign, private investment during 1955/56 were political 
stability and her large and growing domestic market. An apparent 
political stability coupled with the firm guarantees against 
nationalisation without adequate compensation and the general freedom 
to bring in and take out capital and profits, singled Nigeria out in 
a politically unstable continent as the safest country for foreign 
investment in Africa, outside South Africa*
On the other hand, Nigeria's large population of about56m 
which is more than half the population of all West Africa, and more 
than a sixth of the population of all Africa, and the third largest 
population in the Commonwealth, coupled with the favourable growth 
prospects envisaged in the 6-year Development Plan made her the biggest 
single market in Africa* This market was also growing. The indicators 
of this growth and the main factors which limited the effective size 
of Nigeria as a single market were discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
Despite the limitations, however, foreign private investors saw 
in Nigeria a market potentially larger than any other market in Africa 
and. this was a powerful factor, in their choice of ,Nigeria over other 
countries. To this was added the pull of her geographical position 
among smaller countries in north, east, and west of Africa, the potential 
economies of scale in her potentially large internal market and the 
prospect of a West African or an African Customs Union which made her a 
most convenient base for manufactures to supply to the rest of Africa;
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All the above factors, Including, especially, the government’s 
incentive laws to encourage local manufacturing of some goods previously 
imported, made for an active competition for the* Nigerian market. These 
measures affected two classes of prospective foreign private investors 
in Nigerian manufacturing. They i'6?9^ fef^ 0feose manufacturers for whom 
Nigeria had long been a traditional export market with the loss of the . 
export market in Nigeria? and those who regarded Nigeria as a key global area 
for manufacturing felt that because of the government measures, if they 
delayed investing further, it might be too late to get a foothold in the 
Nigerian market.
In view of its growth potential, these two classes of investors 
actively competed for the Nigerian market, the one to retain or defend its 
established trading relations? and the other to gain a foothold in the 
market. This competition, which was gathering momentum by the late 1950's,, 
turned to what might be called a ’’scramble” for the Nigerian market when 
the return to convertibility in January 1959 removed or relaxed the formal 
restrictions on non-sterling investments, and independence in i960 removed 
any remaining inhibitions on non-Commonwealth countries from entering the 
Nigerian market. This .competition resulted in a progressive decline in 
the U.K’s share of Nigerian imports as other countries gained access to 
the market and other sources of supply became available. With the 
exception of the United Africa Co.Ltd., the U.K. industrialists first 
viewed this competition with some coolness, amounting to unconcern, despite 
warnings to the contrary from the United Kingdom Trade Commission in 
Nigeria and pleas from Nigerian ministers. It was felt that the time
was not yet ripe for industrialisation in the country* However with 
Independence ’in .1960 the threat to established market implicit in the 
foreign competition could no longer be ignored, The U.K. industrialists 
reacted swiftly after Independence5 an investment mission was sent to 
Nigeria in January 1961; and this ushered in a new era in the U.K. 
industrialists1 attitude towards establishing manufacturing in Nigeria.
The immediate result of the mission was a number of feasibility studies 
and a list of 21 projects worth about £10m. Most of these have since 
been established. Besides, the FBI decided on establishing a permanent 
office in Nigeria so as to "maintain a continuing link".
Another development'in the Nigerian market which influenced not 
only the character of the old established trading firms but also the v/hole 
course of economic change in Nigeria was indigenisation and its corollary,. - 
redeployment. The enormous upsurge in the worldfs demand for Nigeria* s 
raw materials during and since the war and the accumulation of and, later, 
the release of sterling reserves, marked a turning point; in Nigeria*s 
economic history. From a tiny market before the war, the post-war 
Nigerian market attracted new competitors, ushered in people with new 
income levels and varieties of demand. Moreover, the growth of the market 
generally and the release of accumulated sterling resources in particular, 
gave the Nigerian Government increased revenues and facilitated increased 
industrial development; and the Nigerian govern^ fifpts emerged as a new and 
powerful competitor or participant in the economic scene. As a result of 
these developments, the old established merchants found it desirable to
457
some of
withdraw from/their traditional activities of general merchandising and 
retailing to expand or take up others• This trend was made possible 
by declining relative demand for staples, increasing competition, both 
domestic and foreign, rising costs, greater government intervention in the 
economy,and the need for specialisation.
The result was redeployment of resources into manufacturing and 
specialist trading such as multiple and departmental stores. The latter 
stimulated industrial development by influencing new classes of consumers 
through displays in the shops and advertising. On the other hand, ’ . 
redeployment into manufacturing stimulated industrial development through 
the provision of finance, through investigation of projects and seeking 
out technical partners- and by providing local knowledge and marketing 
facilities for the products.
The process was slow, however, until the approach of independence, 
which brought with it increasing political pressures and .government policy 
to, accelerate the pace of redeployment. The United Africa Company Ltd., 
after restrictions on her industrial attempts during 1959-54? owing to 
lack of official encouragement and incentives, utilised the opportunity 
presented by redeployment and between 1954 an& 19&6 investigated and 
abandoned 71 projects and developed This was not surprising. As
the biggest importer,and exporter in Nigeria the firm was in a better 
position than some other U.K. merchants to appreciate the industrial 
opportunities in Nigeria and the attendant foreign competition. As a 
subsidiary of the Unilever, the UAC could not have been an exception to
the parent company<S- policy of "jumping tariffs". As Charles Wilson
pointed out, ’’the story of Lever’s 'European development is largely 
concerned with attempts to defeat the tariff legislator”, and it might , 
he said with some justice that the story of United Africa’s 'Company’s 
redeployment is largely concerned with attempts to defeat the Nigerian 
tariff legislator.
The most important factor which the investors emphasised now and
again was political stability and the freedom to bring in and take out
their capital and profits. It was mainly because .of political uncertain” 
ties under the new federal constitution in 1954 that the Mission of the 
Federation of the British Industries advised prospective investors in 
1955 to suspend decisions on investment pending the clarification of issues 
under the new constitution. It was also because the 1961 mission was 
convinced on the ability of the Nigerian governments to maintain political 
stability that the mission decided on immediate investment on selected
projects worth about £10m.
Given political stability, the two most important factors which 
affected foreign private investment during 1955/^ 5 were government policy 
and Nigeria’s market, as has been illustrated above. It should be 
stressed, however, that it was government policy more than the market 
which played a key role, though the importance of the one reinforced the 
other. Without a.genuine determination to industrialise and the incentive 
laws to encourage and protect the local manufacture#' of goods previously 
imported, it probably would have been uneconomic1 to manufacture most of 
the goods now being manufactured in the country? and the investors would
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have probably preferred to utilise the benefits of the economies.of scale 
in their own countries to supply the.Nigerian market. The determination 
to industrialise rapidly , and the incentive and protective measures 
which threatened the j^ospective investors with the loss of their exports 
to Nigeria made for an immediate decision to invest in Nigeria. This 
decision was facilitated by Nigeria’s potentially large and growing 
internal market.
The presence of raw materials also helped to attract foreign 
manufacturing investment. Here again,, it, is not the raw materials per 
se that induced the investment but government determination- to manufacture 
the goods or process the raw materials in Nigeria. The establishment of ■ 
the oil refinery, for instance, was the result of an agreement with the 
oil company concerned, that if oil was found up to a certain quantity and 
quality, a refinery would be established. Furthermore, the Nigerian 
Sugar Company Ltd., the Nkalagu cement factory and the ICaduna Textiles, . 
are other instances of the processing of local raw materials as a result 
of government initiative and encouragement. But for substantial contri- . 
bution of the capital by the government, none of these projects would have 
been established, at least, by the time they were established. Finally 
the.various contractor-financed projects are other instances of industrial 
projects which would not have been established but for the government's 
active participation and encouragement.
Given political stability it is thus to government-policy that one 
must turn for the explanation of the paucity of foreign private manufacturing 
investment during the first period, 1939/54, and its sizeable amount during
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the second period, 1955/65* Indeed, the contrasts in government policy 
during the two periods are striking. In the earlier period, as has been 
shown, the government opposed the establishment of industries on a 
factory-level basis but preferred.'them on a village and peasant basis.
It therefore took steps to prohibit the establishment of such industries 
by direct prohibition, by refusal to, grant tariff concessions and by 
refusing to participate in .sucfc establishments. Although this policy 
was modified or changed under the Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance 
'which had a retrospective effect from July 1951* it is shown shove that 
the same negative attitude prevailed, though for other reasons, until the 
end of the first period in 1954*
By contrast, this’ negative, approach changed during the second 
period, 1955/65? indeed, one of the main findings of this study is the 
strong correlation that is found to exist between Nigeria's political 
advance and the adoption of positive measures to stimulate industrial 
development and to attract foreign private investment. We have already 
pointed out that one of the first acts of the inclusion of Nigerians in 
the Cabinet under the 1951 constitution which introduced ministerial 
government in Nigeria for the first time was to amend the policy against 
factory level industrialization. This amendment was obvious in the passing 
of the Aid to Pioneer-Industries Ordinance in 1952.
The 1954 federal constitution brought with it internal regional 
autonomy,and made industrialisation a concurrent subject over which the 
regions and the centre could legislate. The freedom thus offered to the
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Regions to develop their economies and stimulate industrialisation was 
significants the East in 1955 an -^ 'the West in 195& sent out economic 
missions abroad to attract foreign investment and incentive measures 
to stimulate industrial development and encourage foreign investment 
followed the attainment of internal self-government in the East and 
the West in 1957* After Independence in I960, political pressures for 
rapid development -were given full play. These pressures accelerated 
indigenisation and redeployment as a strong factor attracting foreign 
manufacturing investment during the period.
The foreign investors adopted two mechanisms of investment. One 
is partnership with Nigerian capital. This mechanism, which is now 
popular is a direct opposite of the position in early and mid 1950’s 
when the foreign investors viewed it with ’’apprehension". Its popularity 
since the late 1950’s is that it is a compromise between Nigeria’s genuine' 
demand for foreign capital and expertise, and the desire to be associated 
in the ownership and management of industrial projects in the country 
on the one hand and the foreign investors1 reluctance to invest because 
of the fear of arbitrary treatment including compulsory nationalisation 
without adequate compensation^ . 0n the other hand i The anticipated benefits 
of this mechanism to Nigeria and to the foreign investor were discussed 
in Chapter Six,
The second mechanism is a variation of the first. This is private 
investment guaranteed by the governments. Again the reasons for the 
resort to this mechanism and its defects as well as suggestions on how
it oan be employed to Nigeria's advantage were discussed in Chapter Six.
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Because of the paucity of indigenous private capital, government 
participation has Become the normal procedure, and, in many cases, such 
participation is the only way By which a project can Be estaBlished at 
all. (The governments emphasise this need for its participation and the 
fact that it is temporary as the investments would Be sold to the Nigerian 
puBlic at appropriate future dates, and the fact that it is made only 
when it is necessary to call forth the attendant foreign capital or when 
it is a condition for the projects to Be estaBlished.
As a result, the governments now control 22 per cent of Nigeria's 
industrial sector compared with 10 per cent By the private indigenous 
sector and 68 per cent By the foreign sector.
Foreign private investment in Nigerian manufacturing during the 
period passed through two main channels. One is institutional, the other 
is non™institutional. The non™institutional channel is internal to the 
companies or their associates and is made up of their retained earnings, 
suppliers', credits and other liabilities principally with their head 
offices. During 1961/64, 69 per cent of foreign private investment passed 
through this channel, and retained earnings averaged about 29 pea? cent of 
net new investment during 1961/63.
, The institutional channel of foreign investment in Nigeria is made 
up of the short-teiffl channel and the long-teriji channel. The short-term 
channel is composed mainly of the commercial Banking system which is used 
as a source of short-term working capital. During 1958/65 total commercial
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"banks’ loans and advances amounted to £620m of which £51*6m or 8*3 pe** 
cent was advanced to the manufacturing sector, £147m ox 23*7 per cent to 
agriculture, and £237*7m ox 38-3 per cent to general commerce. Some of 
these short-term advamces are rolled over to such an extent that they in 
fact "become long-term. Nevertheless the commercial banks concentrate 
on and emphasise their role as purveyors of short-term capital.
The long-term channel is made up of the NIJjB, the Lagos Stock 
Exchange, the CPC, the Northern Nigeria Investments Ltd., and the 
Development Finance Company of Eastern Nigeria Ltd, The last two are 
50 per cent owned by the C'.DC and the other 58 per cent by the regional 
governments.
The NIDB was reconstructed in 1964 from the Investment Company of 
Nigeria which vra,s established in 1959• The combined operations of the 
two institutions during 1959/66 show that they made 52 equity and loan 
investments amounting to £3»9m in various industrial projects with a total 
share capital of £8,6m^«P 68 per cent of the equity and loan investments 
came from foreign sources and 32 per cent from Nigerian sources.
By th e  end o f -1 9 6 5 'th e  CDC had in v e s te d  o r  co m m itted  to  in v e s t  
£ 1 0 .7m in  14 p r o je c ts  in  N ig e r ia .  T h is  compares w i t h  a t o t a l  commitment 
i n  a l l  Commonwealth West A f r i c a  w h ich  amounted fct) £ 14 . 2m in  19 
p r o je c ts  a g a in s t  a t o t a l  commitment o f  £27«5ei I n  E a s t A f r i c a ,  £ 2 5 *6m 
in  th e  F a r E a s t,  and £19°7m in  th e  C a rib b ea n , The rea son s  f o r  t h i s  
d is p a r i t y  were d is c u s s e d  in  C ha p te r Seven.
Between their inception in 1959 an& 19^5 ? MIL invested or 
committed to-invest £4*.6m in 27 projects with a paid up. capital of 
£14o3m« The DFC(EN) invested £1.4ni in 14 projects with a total capital 
investment of £6.2m. , 75 P®*4 cent of the MIL and 84 per cent of .the
DEC(EN) came from foreign sources.
The Lagos Stock Exchange is used by foreign investors as a means 
of raising further capital and a means of associating Nigerians in the 
ownership of their projects partly to qualify the investors for privileges 
under the Aid to Pioneer Industries Act which requires at least 10 per 
cent Nigerian participation as one of the qualifying, conditions. The 
Central Bank of Nigeria states that' this mechanism is limited by the lack 
of public demand for industrial stocks and that.this, in turn, has limited 
the willingness of the foreign investors to issue- further shares through 
the Exchange. This statement is not borne.out by the facts. Indeed, the 
reverse seems to be,the case, viz. that the mechanism is limited by lack : 
of supply of industrial stocks. This is suggested by two factors.
First, some of the issues through the Exchange have been over-subscribedj 
at times, by about 330 per cent. These over-subscriptions do not -
evidently indicate lack of public demand; they rather indicate a shortage 
or.failure of supply to meet the demand for industrial stocks.
Secondly, owing to strong regional rivalry and the desire to retain 
ownership within the regions, there is a reluctance pn the part of the 
regional governments to offer the shares of projects in which they 
participated through the Exchange for fear that they might be bought by 
indigenes of rival regions.
The location of manufacturing in Nigeria is concentrated in the. 
South. Although the North accounts for about four-fifths of the land 
area and more than 53 per cent of the population,.it. only accounted for 
17 per cent of the industrial plants established between i960 and March
1964, and 16 per.cent of all existing manufacturing plants in Nigeria in
1965, On the other hand, the South, with about a fifth of Nigeria’s 
land area,- and about 47 per cent of the population, accounted for 83 per 
cent of the manufacturing, plants established between i960 and March 1964s 
and for 84 per cent of all the existing, manufacturing establishments in 
Nigeria in 1965- Within the South, the Federal Territory accounted for 
the biggest proportion of industries in 1965, accounting for 35 per cent, 
followed by the East, 25 per cent',the West, 17 Per cent,V and the Mid-West 
8 per cent.
The reasons for the concentration in the South include the South’s 
proximity to the 0oast, concentration of purchasing povfer and markets, 
better distribution facilities, and proximity to raw materials compared / 
with the North.
Within the regions, industrial plants are concentrated in the 
regional capital and_principal port or town. This is more marked in the 
North than in the South and more in the West than in the East. 6l per 
cent of the industrial establishments is located in Kano and Kaduna, the 
principal town and regional capital; in the West the proportion is 55 per 
cent and in the East it is 42 per cent. This means, that only’39 per cent 
of the industrial plants in the North at the end of 1965 was located 
outside the regional capital and principal town. The corresponding
proportions in the West are 45 percent and 58 Per cent in the East, 
and 29 per cent in the Mid-West. ' . .
The same reasons which explain the concentration in the South 
relative to the North also explain the concentration within the regional 
capital and the principal town within the regions?- the availability 
of large markets, higher incomes, and better distribution facilities 
within than outside these areas.
The final conclusion that may be drawn from, the above summary is 
that there was greater foreign private investment in Nigerian manufacturing 
during 1955/65 than during 1939/54; that more foreign private investment 
was attracted into the country during 1961/65 than during 1958/60; and 
that the most important single factor which favourably influenced this 
inflow was government policy and government’s industrial strategy, 
reinforced by the attractions of Nigeria’s potential market. However, 
certain errors in government policy also limited the amount and the 
contribution of foreign private manufacturing investment in Nigeria during 
the period. These’are discussed in the next section.
■ INADEQUACIES IN GOVERMENT POLICY
Inadequacies in government policy during 1955/65 maN he discussed 
under four headings?- errors in planning, errors in execution, the 
results and causes of these errors.
Planning Errors
The first planning error concerned the position of the private 
sector. £389*5^ of hhe £1183.3^ gross fixed investment under the 
National Plan, 1962/68, was expected to he invested in the private sector 
during the six years of the Plan. This worked out at about £65m per 
annum out of which £33m was expected to be foreign and £32m indigenous 
private investment. However, the plan did not specify a desired structure 
for this investment and the assumption seems to have been that any 
investment mix would suffice. In addition, no study of the private sector 
was made to discover whether, in fact, it could have been allotted more or 
less of the investment; and, indeed, the private sector'^projected invest­
ment was derived in the plan as a residual item after deducting the 
estimated public investment from the projected aggregate investment under 
the Plan.
The second planning error concerned the position of industry.
Although industry was given second priority after agriculture, its position 
in the strategy of development was not always clearly specified. For 
instance, Eastern Nigeria’s original plan (1955“60) made no mention of 
industry nor allotted any funds for it; yet an investment mission was sent 
to Europe and North America to attract foreign private investment to
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manufacturing. How could such a mission hope to attract sizeable 
investment into.manufacturing if ho provision was made for industry 
in its strategy of development ?
Even when industry was specifically provided for, as under the 
1962/68 Plan, the type of manufacturing to be undertaken was stated in 
such general terms as to leave the private investor with no specific 
direction0 For instance the industrial policy aimed at encouraging the 
manufacture of•consumer goods previously imported and processing Nigeria’s 
raw'materials before their export; but there was no specification of what 
type of consumer goods1 substitutes or raw materials should be locally 
manufactured or processed and to what extent the activity should be 
undertaken. This lack of definite criteria partly meant that the pioneer 
privileges designed to encourage local manufacturing were too liberally 
applied so that.almost every industry has benefited from them.
This lack of definite criteria of industries to be encouraged also 
meant that often investment missions were sent out without prepared projects 
and feasibility studies to interest, investors. The. result was that
1
"external finance did not fulfil the high expectation of the plan"; 
and the Western Higerian Government, stressed that "Representatives of 
foreign countries and donors who visited the Region indicated that more 
foreign capital would have come into the country if adequate and detailed
1. The Rational Plans Progress Report 1964, p*34«
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analysis of projects indicating costs and benefits to the economy could
1
be got ready to 'sell*. to their organisation11.
The third planning error was the absence of a national industrial 
location policy* The federal government concentrated on the provision 
of the basic infrastructure, while the regional governments additionally 
took into consideration such, matters as proximity to markets and distri­
bution facilities in providing industrial estates. The industrialist 
was therefore almost left free to site his industry at his place of choice. * 
The advanced economy can afford the loss which such a laissez faire 
brings about, but in an economy like Nigeria, where investment resources 
are very scarce, and where there are wide disparities in per capita 
incomes and concentration of populations within the regions, a national 
location policy is essential* "While aiming to maximise the advantages 
of industrial concentration in particular areas or regions as a long­
term measure, such a policy would have created incentives aimed at 
dispersing industrial projects over wide areas and to avoid excessive 
industrial concentration and urbanisation in particular areas with all 
their attendant social and political, problems.
Errors of Execution
Having decided on some broad priorities and set-up of the Plan, 
the Government committed, many errors in its execution, The first type 
of error was simply demonstrably mistaken decisions to invest. For 
example, in the Federal Plan, C^Om was allocated for the establishment of
• iron and steel
1. Western Nigeria development Plan 1962-68,. 1st Progress Report*
official eocument ho*2, 1962, p*2. .
mill. After-a Technical report had established that only one mill would' 
be economic and had recommended the most suitable site for it, the 
governments decided on establishing three mills, one in each of the three 
regions, East, North, and the': West.- As the mills would be established 
with the participation of foreign private capital and expertise, none of
‘ 1 1 ■ * h h
the mills has as. yet been established as. the foreign investors were not 
prepared to risk their capital in what is bound to be.uneconomic propositions 
Secondly, all the governments complained of lack of capital as 
limiting the establishment of .projects in which foreign investors needed 
Nigerian participation. "It is quite; clear", said the Eastern Nigeria 
development plan’s first progress report, "judging from.the' total 
commitments during the first two years of the. Plan, that Government parti­
cipation is. severely limited by the Plan allocation, and of course, by the 
more general problem of scarcity of financial resources".^ Yet, through
its development corporation, the government lent £lm to a real estate
" %
company for development of real estate in Lagos. This loan calls for 
some further comment... in the first place, real estate is not a suitable 
area for the use of Development Corporation (or Marketing Board) funds. 
Particularly is this so when the company is engaged in activity primarily 
in Lagos rather than in the Region concerned. Par more damning, however.
G. K. Helleiners The Eastern Nigeria Development Corporations A Study 
in sources and uses of Funds for Public Developments Nigerian Journal 
of Economics and Social. Science, March 1964, p.117*
1. It is .stated that the World Bank* s view is that an iron and steel 
.. ■. industry could only be possibly done in only one place in the whole
of West Africa and that this is unlikely to be in Nigeria. See Sir 
Francis Turton Harts The Growth of West African Industry, African 
Affairs, October 1966, p.287'. ' ~ ~
2.. Sessional Paper ,no. 15> 1964, P*13*.
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is a second issue - that the chairman of the real estate concern happens 
also to "be chairman of the Development Corporation. The ENDC has 
carefully omitted the mention of this particular loan, which amounts 
to 31oS per cent of total loans during the period, in the texts of its 
Annual Reports; indeed, the Report for the year in which it was granted 
goes so far as to state that no new loans were issued during that year.
The ENDC is thus clearly not at ease about this abuse of its responsibi­
lities to the public - an abuse which, incidentally, is strikingly reminiscent 
of those uncovered by the Coker Commission in the Western Region11.
The progress report of the Northern Region development plan stated*
"It would appear that the plan target will be surpassed in this sector.
It becomes more and more common for foreign investors to make local 
participation a condition for their projects. In the case of important 
and viable industries it is clearly in the interest of the country that 
such participation (public or private), takes place. A major difficulty,
J
however, is the shortage of local capital*. Yet it is this same Government, 
through its development corporation which, out of a total allocation for 
the Corporation of £4«5m during 1964/65 and 1965/66, used £1.17Rp ^ 0 acquire 
existing foreign private interests at heavily inflated prices. £554>441
to
of this siim was used to acquire interests in property and road transport.
The progress report for the Western Region Development Plan 
commented* "The overall performance for the two years (of the plan) is not 
particularly encouraging. Both the absolute level of expenditure and its
1. The National Plans Progress Report, oplcit., 185*
2. White Paper on the Military Government Policy for the Reorganisation 
of the N.N.D.C., Kaduna, 1966, p.47.
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distribution among the, various sectors do not give cause for satisfaction. 
The principal reason responsible for the low level of expenditure is a 
shortage of f u n d s " Y e t  in some cases it was found that no provision 
was made in the estimates to secure allocation of funds. Besides, the 
Beport of the Coker Commission had already revealed the same pattern of 
misinvestment of funds in transport and property business.
The above investments were no doubt apparently based on selected 
priorities. However they were defective in many ways. First, they 
contradicted the priorities given to trade and industry in the development 
plans. Secondly}the wisdom of using scarce public :funds to buy up 
established foreign private business is questionable unless it is 
justified on the grounds of national interest. This is doubtful in the 
investments made. Thirdly, the capital should have been used to set up 
new businesses. Fourthly, given the general freedom to repatriate' 
capital, there was the possibility that sucfc investments could lead to 
outflow of funds from the country; it becomes more questionable when the 
governments themselves noted that the scarcity of local capital limited 
foreign private investment since some of the foreign investors made 
indigenous participation a condition for some of their projects. Finally, 
government investment in real estate and road transport was not justified 
in Nigeria where indigenous private capital is generally available for, 
such projects.
1. The National Plans Progress Report, p.168.
The Northern Nigeria Military Government's White Paper on the
above investments is telling; "In view of the need to conserve finance
for investment in productive projects, there was no justification for
the Northern Nigeria Development Corporation to Enquire building property
other than houses and offices for Corporation use...a considerable sum
has been spent# ..in acquiring existing assets. Government does not
consider that such acquisitions normally contribute to the development of
the economy but may, on the contrary^ facilitate the expatriation of
capital from Nigeria. The investment of the Corporation's limited
capital in the development of new enterprises must in any case take
1priority over the purchase of existing assets". This should apply to 
all public investment in Nigeria.
The third error of execution concerned the criteria and mechanism 
of investment. We have already pointed out that pioneer privileges 
have been wastefully used by applying it almost to all types of industries . 
including those deserving and those not deserving the privileges. While 
it might have been necessary to encourage all industries initially, the 
denial of the privileges should obviously have been used to discourage 
the third and subsequent plants in such industries as brewing, textiles, 
and cement where already there is a potential excess capacity.
It was an error of policy for the governments not to have made the 
contractor-partners in contractor financed projects to contribute more 
than the nominal 10 per cent interest in the projects. Thisjms dealt with
1. White Paper.Military Government op.cit., p.54*
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at some length in Chapter Six.
Fourthly, some projects were encouraged by the governments with 
loans without security and some contracts were entered into with foreign 
private firms without definite conditions. It was found, for instance, 
that during the negotiations leading to the incorporation of the 
Nigersol Construction Co.Ltd. owned 40 per cent and 60 per cent 
respectively by Israeli firms and Western Nigeria Government, the 
Government guaranteed the Company a £50m contract during 1960/65; but 
the guarantee did not include a proviso to ensure either that the quality 
of the service should be very high or that the contract prices should be 
fair
Ihe Northern Nigeria Development Corporation lent about £100,000 
during 1965/66 without security. One of them was a piggery project 
established in i960 in par trier ship with the United Africa Company Ltd.
The NNDC owned about 20 per cent of this £95?GOG project to which it lent 
£12,000. The project continued to show annual losses and in 1964 if 
was found that the loan had not been secured or*a debenture prepared.
,?As far as can be ascertained from Corporation records, no interest on 
the loan was received until 19&5? when £676 was paid to the Corporation.
Up to 18‘ March 1966, there was still no record on the file of the prejjara- 
tion of the debentures or of the rate of interest to be paid annually.
The farm, produces pigs to supply raw materials to a pork processing plant 
in Lagos which is wholly owned by the United Africa Company Ltd., and is 
believed to be operating profitably? thus the United Africa Company have
1 Federation of Nigeria, Tile Report of Coker Commission o-p t„ •
the Affaire of Certain 3 ? ^ ^ ---?-----------------------------into
_ Vol.II, p.28. See also 1'Coiinentf o T ° s 13e 1Ti Nigeria, 1962 
Report" Sessional Paper 4,19^2, p^f
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some compensation for losses incurred at the farm whilst the Northern
1Nigeria Development Corporation has none",
In another project, the Northern Steel Works, the NNDC made a
loan of £20,000 between March and July, 1965* In 1966 it was found
that the loan "has not been secured in spite of the company's piromise
in 1963 to execute a first Deed of Debenture in respect of all fixed
and floating assets of the Company...the loan was never secured because
the plot occupied by the company has been registered in another name...
and no loan agreement has been drawn up...This haphazard state of affairs
2
cannot be allowed to continue".
The Results of the Errors
With the exception of 1962 when it was about £18m, the annual 
inflow of foreign private investment exceeded the Plan's target of £33ni.
In fact aboxit £178m of the £200m expected from foreign private sources 
over the six years of the Plan was realised over the first five years.
It would therefore appear that although this target was a residual, it 
seems to.have been about right although rather conservative. This result 
however appears to have been luck rather than judgment. A proper 
projection might have planned for a higher figure.
As a result of lack of direction and because the global target 
was not allotted to the different economic sectors, the structure of the
1. A Y/hite Paper on the Military Government Policy for the Reorganisation 
of the Northern Nigeria Development Corporation, op.cit., pp.18-19.
2. Ibid., pp.29-30.
investment was most unsatisfactory. More than half of the realised 
foreign private investment went into the mining’, principally petroleum 
sector and, in fact, only about 18 per cent went to the manufacturing 
sector. Even here, the investment is concentrated in the food, 
beverages and tobacco, and in the chemicals, oils, and petroleum sectors. 
Thus as a result of the lack of definition of the desirable content of 
the investment mix, foreign private investment has not been evenly spread 
in all the industrial sectors. Moreover, because the pioneer privileges 
were applied almost without discrimination, many projects were established 
which duplicated existing or other planned capacity. Brewing, textiles, 
and cement are among the sectors which have suffered from this.
As ‘a result of these mistakes of execution, many projects were
"recklessly" encouraged and considerable public funds were lost. For .
instance, between 1959 and March 19&2, the Western Nigeria Development
Corporation, which is the main agency through which the Western Nigeria
Government participates with foreign private investors in industrial
projects, invested about £5*5m in various partnership projects with foreign
private investors and it was found that "many of the projects were
running at a lost, and where they did not run at a loss, no figures for
profits have been recorded at all", and that tj>ey were "recklessly
entered into without any regard whatsoever for the safety of the monies
1that were being invested in the various undertakings", "Of the
1. The Report of the Coker Commitsion of Inquiry,
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twenty-seven commercial ventures examined in which the Northern Nigeria
Development Corporation nhas financial interests, only six can he
regarded as successfil so far. Even in one case where the Corporation’s
investment proved most -profitable, it sold out its interest tp t]je other
shareholders of the venture at a fantastically low price contrary to
the advice of its Auditors and Officials." ^
The Causes of the Errors
One cause of the mistakes in planning and execution has been lack
of statistics and centralised information, especially in the industrial
field. This has made rational decisions very difficult. Even the
National Plan on which the whole strategy of development very heavily
depends^ was prepared against this background of acute shortage of
statistical information. As one of the architects of the plan confessed,
"frequently, analysis revealed gaps in our knowledge, and we had to make
do with whatever our imagination could devise as rational criteria of 
2
analysis." The result was that the plan is "a hodge-podge of
miscellaneous projects, ideas and wishes of uncertain priority, utility,
and structural interdependence. An objective ratio d&cidendi for the
3industrial sector lies in the future".
1. A White Paper on the Military Government Policy for the 
Reorganisation of the NNDC, op.cit., p.2.
2. W.P. Stolper, "How Bad is the Plan ?", Nigerian Journal of 
Economics and Social Sciences, July 1962, p.107° “
3. A Lardner: A Presidential Address., delivered at the Annual Conference
of the Nigerian Economic Society, held at the University of Nigeria 
in January 1964*
Secondly, inost of the projects were undertaken without expert
advice, and where expert advice was.taken, it was generally not heeded*
It was, for instance, pointed out that the Western Nigeria Development
Corporation did not refer to technical advisers in most of the projects
in which it invested the £5*51*1 referred to above and where references were
1
made, the advice was not heeded.
Another instance is that when the participation.of the NNDCwas
sought in the Northern Steel Works Ltd., mentioned above, in August 1962,
the feasibility of the project was .discussed but the details provided
2were "scanty and the figures given doubtful". Nevertheless, the Board
invested £20,000 in loans and £10,000 in equity of the project. Not
only was the loan not secured, "no accounts, minutes of the meetings,
Balance Sheets, or other records have been submitted to the Corporation
which also has no knowledge of investments made by other subscribers.
In fact, no meetings of the Board of Directors have ever been held and no
documents filed with the Registrar of Companies as required by the
Companies Act. The Company is now in its second year of operations and
so far had made a net loss of £396, after allowing for repayment of loan
interest to the Northern Nigeria Development Corporation, although no
interest had yet been paid...Government will require the Corporation to
report the company’s failure to comply with the Companies Act to the
3
Registrar of Companies".
1. The Report of the Coker Commission, op.cit.
2, "White Paper of the Northern Nigeria Military Government Policy, op.cit. 
3* Ibid.
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Thirdly, there was no effective co-ordinating agency and no 
central pool of information. There are five planning units in the 
country (one each for the four regions and the centre)? and the 
national■Plan was nothing more than five different plans bound in 
one, volume and called the National Plan. Each of the five planning 
•units planned in relative isolation one from the other and the rival 
regional governments jealously guarded their constitutional positions 
and obligations. They were, in effect, almost planning for four 
different countries instead of for one country and each statistical or 
investment information related specifically to its region of origin as 
their respective names illustrates ,TThe Industrial Potentialities of 
Northern Nigeria’1? "The Investment opportunities in Eastern Nigeria"; 
and nThe Western Eegion of Nigeria, a Gate ??ay to Africa"; "The 
Industrialists1 Guide to Northern Nigeria". Apart from the Industrial 
Potentialities of Northern .Nigeria, none of these publications contained 
any information of real value to the prospective investor and none of 
them related specifically to the whole of Nigeria. Besides,such 
feasibility studies as exist in the country are scattered throughout 
the five planning units and various departments within the different 
governments and there is no central co-ordinating agency to which 
investors could readily turn for a fairly comprehensive information about 
the investment possibilities in Nigeria. The National Economic Council 
which was supposed to be a forum to discuss and co-ordinate policy 
and information proved to be a weak consultative and advisory group with
neither a strong secretariat nor a significant power base, and therefore 
was unable to give philosophy and direction to the planning units.
The full realisation of the above state of affairs after studying 
the progress of the National Plan during its first two years of operation, 
led to a decision to establish a Project Evaluation Unit and an Invest­
ment .unit which are to conduct feasibility studies and project evaluation 
on a nation-wide scaJe to ensure that our industrialisation programme is 
properly oriented to those industries which will ensure the maximum
growth in our economy.'*' For the prospective investor, this was welcome
{
news. The Investment Unit was to serve both as an information centre
and a liaison office for new investors and as a registry for industrial
projects established in Nigeria. It was hoped that this would remedy
the lack of "focus" that chax,acterised most government measures to attract
not
nev/ foreign investment. So far, however, this has beoaa. been established. 
Given the weakness of the National Economic Council as a co-ordinating 
power, the four or five economic planning units continuedl to plan in 
relative isolation, one from the other. Thus, instead of getting his 
information from one central point in Nigeria, the prospective investor 
has to turn to five governments, assemble and digest whatever information 
is available, and decide for himself which projects and which government 
he would sponsor. This is bound to be a frustrating task: it is not the 
strategy of a government all out to attract maximum foreign private capital
1. Federal Nigeria, Lagos, Nov. 1962.
Fourthly, mistakes arose from the inexperience of the politicians
and their unwillingness to accept the technical advice from the bureau­
crats on the one hand, and the inexperience, and in some cases, incompetence
service was modelled on the lines of the colonial civil service, which 
was geared largely to maintaining law and order; but this is different 
from what is required for a rapid.implementation of a development plan* 
J.D. Kingsley’s study of the civil service in Eastern Nigeria found it 
to be youthful and inexpeiuenced and this was reinforced by the rapid 
Nigerianisation policy of the 33astern Nigerian Government, which led to 
a rapid turnover in the civil service. He noted also' that most of the 
expatriates who left were generally the more experienced ones.^ Most of 
these problems also characterise the federal public service and the other 
regions. The 1961 report on the Federal public service Commission stated
that Mby the end of 19^2, at least 61 per cent of overseas pensionable
- 2 officers will have left the Service since Independence’1, and an official
report found that the officers employed in the Northern Nigeria Marketing
Board v/ere not ’’qualified" for the post for which they were employed
It seems that the transition from a civil service largely designed to
maintain law and order and protect commerce to one oriented to the design
and implementation of development plans^ is being made at a time when even
the burdens of administration have been changing and this has contributed
3
to mistakes in planning and in execution.
1. Eastern Nigeria, Staff Development in the Public Services of Eastern
of the indigenous civil servantsj, 0n the other hand^ the Nigerian civil
Nigeria, .official document No.7 of iqfil. by Dr. J.D. Kingsley, Enugu,
I
3* bee next page.
2.
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The historical evolution of the Nigerian civil service also 
affected its relationship with the political decision makers. 1 The 
British civil servants in Nigeria, more desirous of protecting their 
own interests, and more conscious of the defects of the nationalist 
politicians than was the government in London, fought a rearguard 
action, if not against independence, at least against v/hat they 
considered its excessively fast onset. The conflict over the integration 
of the ministries and departments was a salient epidode in the read­
justing of the roles of politician and administrator. Especially in 
the Southern regions the difficulties of such readjustments generated a 
lack of trust Between the politicians and the administrators. That lack, 
of trust, added to the heady wine of new power, left the politicians less 
willing than they might have "been to accept technical adgice of the
bureaucrats. When the Nigerian administrators succeeded the British
1they stepped into this situation". This is one of the reasons why the 
politicians either did not seek for advice at all or failed to heed to 
some of the technical advice in some of the investments.
3. There is also the problem of sheer inefficiency or civil service red 
tape or over caution in taking decisions. The politicians took little 
detailed interest in the day-to-day running of their departments. This 
lack of interest together with the frequent absence of politicians on 
.tour (more for the lavish expence accounts which for them constitute an 
important source of revenue) offered fascinating opportunities for the. 
civil servants to amass power. By and large they did not do so partly 
for fear of being seen as competing with the politicians for power, and 
at' times for other obscure reasons, "One has the impression in visiting 
office after office, in both federal and regional governments, of 
officials who have 'arrived1 and are quite content ,with being, rather 
than doing. The atmosphere one encounters is almost-always friendly, 
but it is much too relaxedin terms of the objectives that Nigerians have 
set.for themselves. All too often the impression is one of haphazard
operation, where the compass of competence and knowledge of individual
K }' \ ,SLe ft&JidJ (jl&M ^ /AMjvVMfconta_
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But the politicians* decisions were not always based on rational
economic considerations and some of them, as are illustrated above, were
mis-investments. "Basically the failure of the politicians to contribute
substabtially to economic growth derived from a lack of developed modem
attitudes. In other words, they were deficient in analytico-causal,
historical and inventive attitudes; they tended too often to defend
themselves against the risk of social change by financial corruption; and
they excessively ignored national considerations for the sake of their
own communities'*.* In some cases they appeared to be in an undue hurry
3 Ccontd*) officers is very narrow, self criticism is rare, co-ordination 
is sparse, records are unevenly maintained (complaints of lost files 
are numerous), and the presumption is against initiative and action. 
Frequently, one can find greater concern and enthusiasm for moving 
ahead with Nigerian industrial development among expatriates than among 
Nigerians". P.Q. Proehlt Foreign Enterprises in Nigeriam op.cit.« pp. 
132- 133*
1. "They were careless in working out the connections between government 
investments and the returns on the money invested. Little accustomed 
to the exigencies of mathematical time they were unresponsive to the 
pressing need for feasibility studies and the strategically timed award 
of contracts; economic decisions waited indefinitely on cabinet 
meetings; and cabinets were most unwilling to delegate financial 
decisions where their members might be able to get a cut. They thought 
that censuses could be manipulated as political weapons and they had no 
conception of a census as a tool of economic development. They paid 
small heed to the proper and relative autonomy of public corporations, 
and saw no incompatibility between using these organisations as instru­
ments of patronage and personal gain and using them as instruments of 
public investment. In short, there was missing an understanding of the 
structured relations between resources, expenditure, timing, and 
allocating... They wanted to divert - and of ten succeeded in doing so - 
projects to their areas of origin, irrespective of the national or 
regional economic considerations...one of the most ironic illustrations 
of political communalism was seen in the siting of the national second­
ary schools that were intended to foster political integration. The 
three ministers who decided their location came from Sokoto, Warri, and 
Afikpo. The three schools were located at Sokotp, Warri and Afikpo.
An unfortunate consequence of communalism was that the distrust of
communities for one another was deepened* National planning was diffi- 
cult In that kind of atmosphere". 4^  y u  < V &
p,ia yyyfy.
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to establish projects. For instance, a less than optimum size of a 
palm kernel processing mill was preferred- by the Eastern Nigerian 
Development Corporation because the government could not "wait for six
months" to enable a prospective investor complete his studies for a
■ 1 mill double the capacity of the one decided upon.
A fifth cause of the errors was regional competition. This is
due partly to the fact that under the federal constitution, each of
the five governments could legislate on industry within its own. region,
and partly-to the geographical and economic imbalances in the federal
set up. ' Moreover, the political parties in charge of the various
governments regard industry as a social service with which to reward
loyal constituents.and punish recalcitrant ones. The political power
rests with the North which under the 1963 census has a population more
than the rest of the country and a land area four times that of the rest
of Nigeria. On the other hand, the economic power rests with the South
which additionally has the natural advantage of proximity to the sea.
Because "the North is the most backward, the most remote, and the least
desirable area in which to establish a new industry from a purely business 
2point'of view", the North endeavours to redress this imbalance through 
its political power with a consequent resentment in the South.
1. Report on the 4'fch Conference of Leading Personalities of Eastern 
Nigeria origin Enugu, 13-14 December 1963? official document No.28,
1964,. pp.32-33.
2. E.O. Proehl, op.cit., p.128. - . 6
I n  a d d i t io n ,  because o f  th e  a cu te  unem ploym ent p ro b le m , e s p e c ia l ly  
i n  th e  S ou th  ( p a r t i c u la r l y  i n  th e  EEast), in d u s t r y  i s  seen as a weapon 
to  re d re s s  th e  unem ploym ent s i t u a t io n  a t  th e  expence o f  o th e r  c o n s id e ra t io n s  
Thus, each o f  th e  governm ents competes w ith  th e  o th e rs  i n  e s ta b l is h in g  
i n d u s t r i a l  p r o je c ts  and i n  a t t r a c t in g  p r o je c ts  to  t h e i r  r e g io n s .  T h is  
has no d o u b t le d  to  th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f  more p r o je c ts  th a n  v/ou ld  
o th e rw is e  have been p o s s ib le  (some o f  w h ich  a re  o f  d o u b t fu l  v i a b i l i t y ) ;  
b u t i t  a ls o  l im i t e d  th e  in f lo w  o f  fo r e ig n  p r iv a t e  in v e s tm e n t to  manu­
f a c t u r in g .  F o r in s ta n c e  th e  £30m i r o n  and s te e l  m i l l  has n o t  been 
e s ta b lis h e d  because o f  th e  d isa g re e m e n t o v e r s i t i n g  w h ich  le d  to  the  
d e c is io n  to  e s ta b l is h  th re e  m i l l s  in s te a d  o f  th e  one t h a t  was recommended 
as econom ic i n  N ig e r ia ’ s p re s e n t c irc u m s ta n c e s . As th e  m i l l s  w ou ld  have 
to  be e s ta b lis h e d  w ith  th e  p a r t i c ip a t io n  o f  f o r e ig n  c a p i t a l ,  the  
p ro s p e c t iv e  in v e s to r s  were n o t p re p a re d  to  r i s k  t h e i r  c a p i t a l  i n  o b v io u s  
uneconom ic p r o p o s i t io n s .
R e g io n a l c o m p e t it io n  a ls o  l im i t e d  fo r e ig n  p r iv a t e  in v e s tm e n t 
th ro u g h  a d m in is t r a t iv e  d e la y s . " I t  i s  w id e ly  su sp e c te d  t h a t  much o f  
th e  d e la y  i n  p ro c e s s in g  a p p l ic a t io n s  f o r  p io n e e r  s ta tu s ,  o r  s im p ly  f o r  
p e rm is s io n  f o r  a fo r e ig n e r  to  do b u s in e s s  in  N ig e r ia ,  i s  a t t r ib u t e d  to  
c o n te n t io n  among fe d e r a l  o f f i c i a l s ,  e x p re s s in g  r e g io n a l  p o in ts  o f  v ie w , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  th o se  o f  th e  N o r th ,  ( b a c k e ^ t^ h e ir  p o l i t i c i a n s ) .  G iven  
th e  u rg e n c y  t h a t  i s  exp ressed  on e v e ry  s id e  f o r  r a p id  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n ,  
th e  need f o r  f o r e ig n  c a p i t a l  and know-how, and th e  v a r ie t y  o f  e n te rp r is e s  
t h a t  c o u ld  f i n d  room in  N ig e r ia ,  t h is  appears to  be th e  o n ly  p la u s ib le
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e x p la n a t io n  fo r .  d e la y " *  ' A c c o rd in g  to  th e  F e d e ra t io n  o f  B r i t i s h
In d u s t r ie s ,  th e  p io n e e r  c e r t i f i c a t e  "was n o t p ro v in g  easy to  a d m in is te r ,
la r g e ly  Because th e  g ra n t  o f  th e  c e r t i f i c a t e  in v o lv e d  th e  e x e rc is e  o f
c h o ic e s  Between r i v a l  p r o je c ts  sometimes lo c a te d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  re g io n s *
We came upon cases when th e  p o l i t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  had le d  to  d e la y s
2o f  many months i n  re a c h in g  d e c is io n s " .
The a d m in is t r a t iv e  d e la y s  were a ls o  s e r io u s  i n  custom s muddles 
and i n  g ra n t  o f  v is a s .  A t  one s ta g e  th e  M ic h e l in  f a c to r y  a t  Enugu in  
E a s te rn  N ig e r ia  e x p o rte d  ty re s  to  tT.K* and S c a n d in a v ia  fro m  N ig e r ia .
T h is  e n t i t l e d  i t  to  a "d ra w b ack" u n de r th e  1958 A c t5 B u t though  th e  
c la im  la s te d  f o r  more th a n  two y e a rs , n o th in g  was re c e iv e d  and .the  
company abandoned e x p o r t in g .  As a p io n e e r  company, M ic h e lm  o u g h t 
n o t ,  i n  f a c t ,  have p a id  any d u ty  a t  a l l  011 i t s  e x p o r ts ;  B u t i t  had n o t 
re c e iv e d  th e  c e r t i f i c a t e  and i t  was suggested  By aa to p  c i v i l  s e rv a n t i n  
Enugu th a t  th e  F e d e ra l Government was d e l ib e r a t e ly  o b s t r u c t in g  E a s te rn  
R eg ion  Government p r o je c ts  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  o r  s p i t e f u l  reasons
The e f f e c t  o f  th e  e r r o r s  d is c u s s e d  above l im i t e d  B o th  th e  q u a n t i t y  
o f  fo r e ig n  p r iv a te  in v e s tm e n t and th e  e f f i c ie n c y  o f  such in v e s tm e n t as 
e n te re d  N ig e r ia  up to  1965* The im p o rta n ce  o f  e l im in a t in g  d e fe c ts  i n  
Government p o l ic y  to w a rd  fo r e ig n  p r iv a te  in v e s tm e n t i n  m a n u fa c tu r in g  
m u s t Be ju d g e d  n o t  o n ly  a g a in s t  th e  s e c u r i t y  o f  c a p i t a l  i n  N ig e r ia ,  B u t
«£, New T h in k in g  in  E a s te rn  N ig e r ia ,  W est A f r i c a , December 1965s 
P -1457.
t£f* I b i d .
1. P.O. Proehl, op.cit.
2. FBI Nigerians an Industrial Reconnaisance, op.cit.
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also in the, light of the fact^the inflow of recent years was partly 
the product of a boom mentality on many investors* If as a result 
of past experience, of "bureaucratic inefficiency, political hazards, 
and the other problems discussed above, foreign private investors 
lose interest in Nigeria,, the Government may find that the inflow of 
foreign private capital for the next Plan will be very much reduced*
FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
, It may be said in final conclusion that, compared with the 
1939/54 period, foreign private investment in Nigerian manufacturing 
was immense during 1955/65* The dominant factor which influenced it 
throughout the period was government policy: during 1939/54 it was 
negative; but during 1955/65 ib was positive. The second most 
important factor was Nigeria* s potentially large market; during 1939/54 
it was limited by the overall low economic development and low per 
capita income; but during 1955/65 it was enhanced by the government*s 
positive industrialisation and economic policy, by higher per capita 
incomes relative to the earlier period., and by the prospect of an 
African or a West African Common Market of which Nigeria was expected 
to be the "workshop"*
However, the size, and the effective contribution of foreign
*
manufacturing investment during 1955/5.6 was limited by the govern­
ment’s failure to take or heed expert advice before encouraging and 
participating in establishing some projects, by imsound investments
and strategies, by lack of statistical and centralised information, 
and by regional competition. These other factors may be overcome but
regional competition is the most serious and the most intractable.
It led to the virtual division of the large o¥"potentially large
Nigerian market into five components? it led to administrative delays
and to duplication and waste of industrial projects. It has now
1
threatened the very existence of Nigeria as one country. Nigeria's 
problems are politicals she has a tremendous economic potential. If 
the right political solution can be found, and if priorities can be 
established, and reasonably adhered to, the prospect for future foreign 
private manufacturing investment in the country would be very bright.
1. This thesis is a factual study of what happened in foreign private 
manufacturing investment in Nigeria during 1939/65* It does not 
therefore cover the period since the Military Disruption in January, 
1966. This Disruption and the political turmoil in Nigeria since 
then are evidence of the strains and stresses in the Nigerian 
political and economic structure which have been -indicated in many 
parts this study. Until long after/ftutually agreeable political 
solution is settled, it would be futile to speculate 011 the effect 
of the crises on the prospect for foreign private investment.
But one thing is certain. It has shaken the very foundation of 
the foreign investor's confidence in Nigeria as the most politically 
stable country in Africa, outside South Africa. It has also 
threatened the second most important factor in the foreign investor's 
choice of Nigeria over other African countries - her potentially 
large internal market of about 56 m people. If these two factors 
go, Nigeria may still attract sizeable foreign private investment, 
especially because of her rich oil resources; but she may no longer 
be regarded as a "key global area" for investment or as the "workshop" 
of a prospective African or West African Common Market.
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; APPENDIX A .
STOCK, FLOWS.'SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION, AND NATIONALITY OF 
ALL FOREICN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA, 1939/65.
The National Development Plan, 1962/68, set a target for
anticipated aggregate foreign private investment in Nigeria during the
period of the Plan; but it did not attempt to allocate this aggregate
to particular sub-sectors or projects. Thus there are no separate
targets for industry or agriculture* The preceding chapters have
studied foreign private investment in manufacturing; but it is thought
necessary to relate this to and give a general picture of the overall
foreign private investment in Nigeria. This is attempted in this
appendix. It is divided into two parts. The first part discusses
the stock and flows, and the second part examines their sources.
PART ONE. THE STOCK OF FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT
IN NIGERIA .
The first attempt to estimate the stock of foreign capital in
Nigeria, and indeed, in the whole of Africa, was made by Professor S.H.
1
Frankel. He estimated that between 1870 and 1956, total foreign capital 
in Africa amounted to £1222m of which £117m or about 10 per pent was 
invested in West.Africa, and.£110m in East Africa. Table A.I shows 
that £75^ was invested in Nigeria during the period, compared with 
in Ghana, £46m in Kenya and Uganda, and £51m in Tanzania.
1. S.H. Frankeli Capital Investment in Africa 1870-1936. O.U.P., 1958.
Frankel listed £35® of the £75® invested in Nigeria as public and 
£57® as private capital. He based his calculations on separate examina­
tion of all the known foreign investment according to purpose and 
geographical area. Public listed capital was traced to its published 
sources, where possible, and private capital, comprising equity and loan 
capital, was extracted from the quoted shares in the London stock exchange. 
He estimated that undisclosed private capital and loans including ploughed 
back profits, constituted about 10-15 per cent of the total listed capital. 
He called this "non-listed" sapital and for Nigeria this amounted to £4m 
during the period.
The Bank of England's Estimate
The next important estimate of foreign private investment in the
1
African Commonwealth countries was made by the Bank of England, covering 
the period 1958/57- This showed that the U.K's investment in West Africa 
dropped from £55® in 1958 to £44® in 1958 and rose again to. £46m in 1957* 
This compared with U.K's investment in East Africa which rose from £24m 
in 1950 to £69m in 1957* In South Africa it fell from £199® in 1958 to 
£147® in 1957 and rose from £92m in 1958 to £136® in 1957 in Rhodesia, and 
Nyasaland.
The Bank of England's estimates resembled Frankel's. Both were 
limited.to stocks quoted on, unofficially dealt in, or otherwise known to
1. Bank of Englands United Kingdom Overseas Investments, 1958-1957
the London Stock Exchange. They referred only to "nominal values"
of the shares and hence did not reflect additions to invested capital
through capital appreciation or ploughed back profits. They did not
therefore reflect the current market values of the physical assets,
The two estimates however differed in some respects.
First, Frankel's figures covered all known quoted or listed foreign
capital in Africa, while the Bank of England figures covered merely the
quoted investments of U.K. residents opex-ating entirely, or almost
entirely in Africa but excluded those U.K. firms which also operated 011
a big scale both at home and abroad. Accordingly, unlike Frankel's
figures, the Bankfs figures 'excluded "many important companies, all
insurance companies, and all shipping companies. These limitations
greatly influenced the computation ... and may account for the fact that
the figures showed a reduction in total outstanding investments over the 
1
period.
Secondly, unlike Frankel’s, the Bank of England figures did not 
include public loans and Commonwealth Development and Welfare grants. 
Moreover, they did not give country breakdowns which Frankel did, 
especially for East and West Africa. But it is the breakdov/n for Nigeria 
which is of interest here. I wrote to obtain this from the Bank. The
reply dated 25th May 1966# stated that "separate figures for Nigeria
1* tf.N. The Int. flow of ■Long., term private capital ..and officiaJL 
donations. 1946-1952, Dept. African Affairs, New York, 1954•
cannot be isolated, from the British Y/est'African investment figures 
which appeared in the pamphlet ."United Kingdom Overseas. Investments" /. ; . . : ■ 
published by the Bank.• This series ended in 1958 and since that time, 
no analysis of portfolio investments' by countries is available from ' 
official, sources".
Board of Trade Surveys :-r . V . .
Since 1958, the U.K. Board of Trade had been conducting annual 
surveys of U.K^ overseas,direct investment, the result of which is . ■ ;
published in the Board of Trade Journals. . In 1982 a stock survey v/as
made;. ■ This showed a net asset value .of all U.K.. ^ private overseas ;-
investment, of £1964m, excluding oil, banking'.‘and-insurance. Table A.2 
shows that £901 or 57 per cent of this was in the. developed overseas. / 
sterling area countries. Nigeria accounted for £79m or 4 P®** cent of 
the. total^ compared; with £256m or 15 per cent in India.
Table'A.5 shoYfs that £40.8111 or $l.-6 per cent of- the £79m was in
distribution and Elj?;5*9? or 18.2 per ; cent in ;electrical> mechanical and/ V
other manufacturing industries.^ ' The United Africa Company stated, that their
. -  ■ -  v - - 2 ' - -.
..net investments in Nigeria amounted to £40*5m in ,1981. . Assuming the
same figure for 1962, it means that UAC accounted for more than- 6l per •
cent of. the.,£79m worth of U.K. investments in Nigeria in 1982, excluding
oil, banking and .insurance.. • , ■ ' . ‘
1. During his speech on the, British; day at the Lagos ...International. Trade 
Fair, Alan Green,.a British M.P., stated that Britain's private,-
. investment in Nigeria exceeded £150m, of which £'50~£4.0m- was invested: 
in the. two years following Independence. .He did not give details of 
. howr this..figure ."was made up. 1. See London Times! October. 29* 1982;.
2. ■ ^Unilever Ltd.: Annual Heport, : 1962, ■
The .Central Bank1 s Surveys
The Bank of England’s surveys and the estimates of the Board of 
Trade were limited to U.K. investments and therefore did not give an 
accurate account of the stock and.flow of all foreign capital in Nigeria. 
The need for such information became urgent during the preparation of the 
1962-68 Development Plan, the implementation of which depended on a 50 
per cent contribution from external sources. Besides, the assessment 
of the effect of such inflow on Nigeria’s balance of payments and 
consequently on her foreign exchange position became highly important, 
especially in view of the Plan’s assumption of a balance of payments gap 
of about £4S0m to be covered by foreign capital inflows* Prompted by 
these considerations, the Central Bank of Nigeria instituted a survey of 
foreign private investment in Nigeria stating with a pilot survey in 
1962* With the experience gained from the pilot survey, an expanded 
enquiry was conducted in 1965 to obtain information not only on the 
amount of private foreign investment in Nigeria, but also on the flow 
of private capital.
The 196? survey covered 588 large and medium-sized concerns chosen 
from those listed in the Register of Companies as having an authorised 
capital of £10,000 or more, part or all of which were believed to be 
foreign. Banks, air transportf shipping, and insurance oompanies were
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excluded. Only road transport companies known-to be foreign owned.were
solicited. The principal data requested were related to their external
capital transactions during 1961 and 1962. In addition the$ were 
requested to furnish data ori profits and dividends; capital structure, 
ownership, and fixed investments.
About 79 Per cent of the firms surveyed in 1962 responded while 
the returns received which contained relevant information were 61 per 
cent of the sample or 7 7 * 3  P®^ cent of those responding. The reason for 
the divergence was principally that a number of the responding concerns, 
were still in the process of organisation during the reporting period; 
others were dormant or defunct, while some proved to be wholly indigenous 
companies without foreign capital.’/
The survey showed that total paid up capital and reserves and other 
net liabilities of foreign companies in Nigeria amounted to £218.4m and 
total net investments in fixed assets amounted to £151- 7 1)1* Further 
information revealed that foreign private investment in Nigeria was . 
conducted principally through a) Branches of foreign incorporated 
dompanies with their head office abroad from where they were controlled; 
b) subsidiaries of foreign companies wholly or partly owned by a foreign 
company which exercises a partial control over the subsidiaries' 
operations; c) other companies which, while neither a branch nor a 
subsidiary, are partly or wholly foreign owned. This category includes 
a number of companies established in Nigeria with foreign and Nigerian 
capital participation. It.was found that about 81 per cent of foreign
1. Central Bank of Nigeria, Econ. and Statistical Review, Vol ?
No.l June 1964? p.10. ~ ‘ ’ * 5
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investments in Nigeria are channelled through subsidiaries, the remainder
1about equally divided between branches and other forms of organisation.
The 1963 survey, which covered 481 companies compared with 383 in 
1962, tried to improve the conceptual methodology of the survey and this 
led to a revision of the 1962 figures. The firms surveyed in the 1963 
survey were in the same category as those surveyed in 1962 and the 
response to the two surveys averaged 75 VeT cent. An extrapolation 
procedure was then developed to provide an estimate of total private 
investment in the country. Banks, air transport and insurance companies 
were omitted in the 1962/63 surveys but were covered in the 1964 survey.
The results of these surveys are summarised in Tables A.4 and A. 5*
Table A.4 shows that mining has consistently accounted for the 
biggest quota of foreign private investment in Nigeria. It accounted 
for £65m or 41«5 per cent of net investments in fixed assets by all foreign 
firms in 1962. By 1964 this had risen to £146.2m or 52.2 per cent of the 
total. Manufacturing and processing accounted for £39m or 25 per cent 
in 1962 and for £63.5m °r 23 per cent in 1964. Table A.5 shows the same 
pattern. In 1962 mining accounted for £81m or 37 Per cent of all the paid 
up capitalj Reserves, and other liabilities of foreign private firms in 
Nigeria By 1964 this had risen to £128.7m or 40 per cent of the total. 
Manufacturing and processing accounted for £38.3m or 17 per cent of the 
total in 1962 and for £58.5 m or 18 per cent in 1964.
1. Ibid., p.11.
The concentration of investment in mining is principally due to
the investment of the oil companies since the discovery of oil in
commercial quantities in Nigeria. According to the Petroleum Press
Service, "Nigeria is now the tenth biggest oil producing country in
the world, with hopes of an expansion even greater than that which has
1
already taken place". The big rise in investment in this sector in
1964 is probably due to the establishment of the £9m Oil Hefinery at
Port Ilarcourt in Eastern Nigeria.
Disinvestment has been occurring in the trading and services sector.
In 1962 alone, there .was a total disinvestment of £13.6m by the U.K.
2
companies in this sector. This was partly due to the Nigerian govern- 
ment policy of encouraging the foreign firms to withdraw from, and 
reserve these sectors to Nigerians, This process, which is continuing . 
was responsible for the overall net disinvestment of £4-6m by the U.K. 
companies in 1962 and £4*8m in 1964'it (Table 14 below). As the firms 
moved out of retail and general trading, they invested some of the funds 
withdrawn in specialist trading^such as department stores. This explains 
the increase in net fixed investment in the trading andsery.ic.e.§ sector 
from £37m or 21 per cent of the total in 1963 to £47»5m in 1964) although 
the proportion fell to 17 per cent. Part of the withdrawn resources 
also went to the manufacturing sector and helps to explain the increase
1. Petroleum Press Services June 1967, p.208.
2. .Txa-dq? May 1966.
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in investment in this sector from £47m in 1965 to £64m in 1964*
Stock of Foreign Private Investment in Nigeria; Summary.
According to the surveys conducted by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
net foreign investment in fixed assets rose from £156.7m in 1962 to 
£280.2m in 1965? of which 52 per cent was in the mining sector, 25 ppr 
cent in the manufacturing and processing sector, and 17 per cent in 
trading and services. The surveys also showed that the total paid up 
capital, reserves, and other liabilities of foreign private firms in 
Nigeria rose from £220.9m in 1962 to £521.2m in 1964 of which 40 per cent 
was in mining, 18 per cent in manufacturing and processing, and 52 per 
cent in trading and services. Thus foreign net private investments in 
fixed assets increased by about 79 per cent and paid up capital, reserves 
and other liabilities by about 46 per cent during 1962/64.
II
The Flow of Foreign Private Investment in Nigeria 1959-1965 •
The figures relating to foreign private investment in Nigeria are 
not available for the years prior to 1950* Table A.6 shows the flow &£ 
figures between 1950 1965* it shows that foreign private investment
in Nigeria during the 16 years., in flow terms, amounted to £545 *lm or an 
average of £21.5m per year. About 41 per cent or £140m of this was 
invested in the 11 years 1950/60 and 59 P®*1 cent or £205m in the first 
five years of Independence, 1961-65. This represents an annual inflow 
of £12.7m during 195°/60 and £41<¥) during 1961/65. Thus more investment 
v/as attracted in the five years of Independence than in the 11 years,
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1950/60. This supports the finding in Chapter Two that more foreign 
private investment was attracted in the first five years of Independence 
than during 1959/60.
The factors responsible for this pattern of inflows were the lack 
of government incentives, and government inhibitions up to 1954*
Although government incentives to attract foreign investment became 
available in the incentive laws passed in 1957/58* their full impact was 
felt in the years after i960. Other factors included foreign competition, 
apparent political stability during the first five years of Independence, 
freedom to bring in and take out capital and interest especially after the 
return to convertibility at the end of 1958* the attractions of the 
Nigerian market, the prospects of a Y/est African or an African Common 
Market, and redeployment. These factors were examined in detail in 
Chapters One - Four above.
Sectoral Distribution of the Capital Flows.
The sectoral breakdown of the net capital flows is available only 
for three years, 1961/63 a <^i is illustrated in Table A.7* It shows that 
£14.6m or about 54 per cent of the £27.3m inflow in 1961 went to the 
trading and services sector. On the other hand, there was a net out­
flow of £15.4m from this sector in 1962. About 33 Pe^ cent of the £37«9m 
inflow in 19&3 went to the mining sector, 29 per cent to manufacturing and 
processing, and 28 per cent to trading and services.. The predominance of 
the mining sector in private foreign capital investment in Nigeria is 
again illustrated in the Table.
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PART TWO
THE SOURCES ARP SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN PRIVATE 
IFVESTMMT IN UIGERIA
I
Sources and Sectoral Breakdown of the Plows
The breakdown of the flow figures according to source is
available for the years 1955/59 and 1961/65 and is shown in Table A.8.
Caution is required in interpreting the figures. The U.K. figures
during 1953/59 included those for the rest of the sterling area
countries. The exact proportion is unknown, but it is unlikely to be
much. This is illustrated by the fact that there was practically no
1
difference in the figures for the years after 1960 when they only
included U.K. Investment. The investment from the rest of the sterling 
area has been included in the figures after i960. Up to 1959 'khe 
Dollar Area included Canada. Under the Central Bank’s surveys after 
1961, it relates only to the U.S.A.
Table A.8 shows that the total inflow during 1953/59 amounted 
to £102.5m. The U.K. accounted for £65.7m or 62 per cent of this, 
the OEEC countries accounted for 21 per cent, the Dollar Area for
13*5 Per cent and the rest of the world for 3 P®** cent. During 1961/65
the total inflow was £145*9m. The U.K. accounted for £61.7m or 42 Pe^
1. 1962. was exceptional for the £13*6m net disinvestment already
explained and 1964 for investment in oil.
cent of this, the OEEC countries for 28 per cent, the hollar area
for 21 per cent and the rest of the world for 9 per cent- Over the
eleven years, total inflow amounted to £248.4m of which the U.K.
accounted for £125*4m or 51 per cent compared with 25 per cent by
the OEEC countries, 18 per cent by the Dollai* area, and 6 per cent
by the rest of the world.
It is thus seen that the U.K. is the biggest foreign private
investor in Nigeria, Of the £65.7m which came from the U.K. during
1953/59> the United Africa*accounted for £15.3m or 15 per cent of the
A
total foreign private capital inflow during the period. This 
illustrates the importance of the Company as a private investor in 
Nigeria.
The second biggest foreign investor is the OEEC countries which 
accounted for 25 per cent of the total inflow during 1953/65* 
Unfortunately the breakdown of this is not available. It is not 
therefore possible to say which of the OEEC countries invested more 
than the other. However, the stock figures throw some light on this.
II
The Sources of the Stock of Foreign lDrivate Investment in Nigeria 
The breakdown of the stock of foreign private investment is 
available for the years 1962/64 and is shown in Tables A.9 and A.10. 
Table A.9 shows that of the net investment in fixed assets of £156.7m 
in 1962, the U.K. accounted for £104*8m or 67 per cent, the United
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States for 10 per cent., Western Europe for 13 per cent and the rest 
of the world for 11 per cent. In 1964 the net investment in fixed . 
assets of foreign firms was £208,2m, of which the U.K. accounted for 
58 per cent, the United States for 12 per cent, Western Europe for 
23 per cent and the rest of the world for 8 per cent, Table A,10 
shows that in 1964 the total paid up capital, reserves, and.other 
liabilities of foreign firms in Nigeria amounted to £321.2m of which 
the U.K. accounted for 57 Per cent, the U.S.A. for 12 per cent, Western 
Europe for 24 per cent and the rest of the world for 8 per cent.
The above figures show the same pattern as the flow figures -
that the U.K. is the biggest foreign investor in Nigeria, followed by
Western Europe, and the U.S.A. i.1 that order. Table A.11 shows that
£5?m of the £63.6m net investment in fixed assets that came from
Western Europe in 1964 came from the Common Market countries, of which
the Netherlands accounted for 83 per cent and Erance for 8 per cent.
£58.7m of the £75*7m ^be paid up capital, reserves, and liabilities 
*
of the foreign firms that came from Western Europe in 1964 came from 
the Common Market countries. The Netherlands again accounted for 
the biggest at 65 pe3? cent of the total compared with 16.2 per cent 
by Erance and 16 per cent by Italy. No investment has come from 
Belgium or Luxembourg.
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The dominance of the U.K. as the leading foreign private 
investor in Nigeria is understandable for there is a correlation 
between long established trade relations and the motivation to invest 
in a country. Of all the three major sources (Sf foreign private 
capital inflows to Nigeria* the U.K. has the greatest export business 
with Nigeria, followed by Western Etirope and the United States of 
America in that order. Table 4«5. in Chapter Four makes this clear.
In 1950. the U.K. supplied 60 per cent of Nigeria's imports and only 
4 per cent came from the United States. I11 1965 proportions were
31.1 per cent from the U.K., 31*7 per cent from Western Europe, and 
12 per cent from the United States. We pointed out in that chapter 
that investment from these other countries in Nigeria before i960 was 
limited by the fact that they had-little established markets with 
Nigeria to defend, and by the restrictions on non-sterling transactions 
imposed,in the interest of the sterling area until 31 December, 1958. 
Until these restrictions were removed or relaxed shortly before Nigeri^ 
independence in i960, these countries were in a disadvantageous position
to invest in Nigeria while the U.K. was in a particularly favourable
. ■ *
position. The U.K. is therefore the biggest foreign private investor 
in Nigeria because she is the ex-colonial power and because she has the 
biggest and longest established export business relation with Nigeria, 
The correlation between established trade relations and invest­
ment is illustrated in the case of the U.S. investment in Latin America. 
Table A.12 shows that Latin America accounted for over 86 per cent of
all of U.S. private investment in low income countries in 1957- In
1956 the proportion was 75*5 P©^ cent and 52.1 per cent in 1958* This
is partly because the TJ.S. has had long trading relations with the
Latin American countries. By comparison vri.th the U.K. the U.S.
private investment in Nigeria was small, accounting for about a quarter
of the U.K. inflows during 1955/59* Indeed, according to the U.S.
Department of Commerce, the book value of U.S. direct investment in
the whole British West-Africa amounted to no more than /l0.5m in 1950,
of which /8.6m represented investment by petroleum companies mainly
in distributive facilities.^* In 1955 only £o.lm was invested by the
U.S. in Nigeria. This was partly due to the very small volume of
trade between the U.S. and Nigeria.throughout the period, which was
also due to a lack of knowledge in the U.S. of Nigeria’s full potent- 
2 -ialities.
Another factor which explains the paucity of non-British 
investment in Nigeria before i960 is the regulation about mining mineral 
oils. According to the Nigerian mineral ordinance, ”no lease or 
licence shall be granted except to a British subject or to a British 
company registered in Great Britain or in,a British colony, and having 
its principal place of business with His Majesty’s dominions, the 
Chairman and the managing director (if any) and the majority of the
1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign business investment of the
U.Ss Supplement to Survey of Current Business, 1955*
2. U.S. Department of Commerces Investment in Nigeria; Basic inform­
ation for U.S. Businessmen, New York, 1957? P*4*
other directors of which are British subjects". There is no evidence 
that this Ordinance was repealed before i960 and it seems to have 
lapsed with Independence in i960.
It means that non-U.K. investors could not invest in oil 
prospecting in Nigeria as long as that Ordinance was in force. This 
contrasts with the position in Latin America. In fact the concentration 
of U.S. private investment there is,much because of long commercial 
relations with Latin America as it is because of the mineral oil 
investment,.there, especially in Venezuela,
Two other factors that come into the'explanation are income 
levels and political stability. Generally, investment is attracted to 
higher income countries with rich resources where profits can be 
maximised. Table A.13 shows that Latin America accounted for 66 per 
cent of all foreign private capital inflows into the developing countries' 
in I96I and for 68 per cent in 1962. On the other hand the proportion - 
which went to Africa dropped from 16,per cent in 1960/61 to 8 per cent 
in 1962. The dominance of Latin America is explained by the generally 
higher incomes and rich oil resources than in Africa. The same pattern 
is also shown in U.K. investment in the Overseas sterling area countries. 
Table A .14 shows that £129.3ni or Q6°f° ... of the £150m U.K.
investment in 1964 went to the three developed overseas sterling area 
countries - South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand - while only 
£15* or.- 16)/ went to 6 underdeveloped sterling area countries -
1. Laws of Nigeria, (1948 edition), Vol.IV, Cap.135*
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India, Nigeria, Sierre Leone, Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda. The low incomes 
prevailing in these countries evidently reinforced the other factors 
mentioned above to explain the paucity of non-U.K. investment in 
Nigeria before i960.
(Table fi.14 also reveals another factor. This is political.
formally a country may have high per capita incomes and potential
resources, but unless the investor feels that his investment is safe
and that he can take in and take out his capital and profits, he may
not invest. The Commonwealth Development Corporation, for instance,
complained that unfavourable government attitude to foreign investment
was one of the main factors which limited foreign investment in Ghana
and the disinvestments of £0.8m and £0.3m in 19^3 and 19&4 "by
U.K. investors in Ghana may have some connections with the unfavourable
political atmosphere. The net disinvestments in Nigeria in 19&2 and
1964 have already been explained as due to the government policy that
. withdraw
foreign firms should/fo?oia and leave retail and general trading to 
Nigerians.
Table A.15 seems to illustrate the effects of political factors 
in attracting or .repelling, foreign investment in Africa. It shows that 
the flow of foreign private capital to Africa fell by 44 per cent from 
$147m during 1951/55 to_.jif83 during 1956/59* Evidently the latter 
period witnessed the beginning of the political 11 wind of change11 in 
Africa which tended to frighten away investors or to make them adopt 
a f,wait and see attitude'1. We showed in Chapter One that during 
1939/54 foreign private investors adopted this attitude towards
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investment in Nigeria owing to rapid political and constitutional 
changes in the country. If the U.K. investor could and did adopt 
this attitude in Nigeria which is within their sphere of influence, 
it is obvious that other countries would be even more cautious.
To summarise, the main factors which explain the paucity of 
non-U.K. private investment in Nigeria before i960 are the mineral 
ordinance which excluded non-U.K. investors, the general restrictions 
on dealings with non-sterling area countries, including the requirement 
that any investment from the U.S. had to be net dollar earner or saver 
before it could be authorised, the small volume of trade between Nigeria
and these other countries which ____ their incentive to invest in
defence of the markets? and generally the lower levels of income in 
Nigeria compared with some Latin American countries, and ignorance of
Independence changed most of the above. The exclusion of non- 
U.K. investors in mineral oil prospecting and.the general restrictions 
011 transactions with non-sterling area countries in the interest of the 
sterling area lapsed with Independence in 19,60 and the return to 
convertibility in 1959* Independence enabled Nigeria to negotiate 
business vd-th any country in the world and the discovery of oil in 
commercial quantities in the late 19501s added to an apparent political 
stability and the general freedom to repatriate profit and capital to 
improve the investment climate in Nigeria. American and Italian oil 
companies now operate side by side with U.K. companies in mining
Nigeria's full resource potentials.
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mineral oil in Nigeria and the mining sector accounted for the 
biggest proportion of foreign private investment in Nigeria during
1962/64.
The effect of the above developments in attracting non-U.K. 
private investment to Nigeria is ilTustrated by the fact that although 
during the seven years 1953/59 the flow of U.S. investment in Nigeria 
amounted to £13*7m which was about a quarter of the U.K. total 
inflows, during the four post independence years, 1961/64? the total 
inflow from the U.S. amounted to £30.3m or about 50 per cent of the 
U.K. inflows during the same period (Table A.8)j tJQhile the total 
inflow from Western Europe during 1953/59 amounted to £21.7m or 
about two-thirds of the inflows from the U.K. during the same period. 
Similarly, while the U.K. accounted for 62 per cent of the total 
inflows during 1953/59?. it accounted for 51 pe** cent of the total 
during 1961/64. Western Europe improved on its proportion from 21 
j>er cent in the earlier period to 25 pc3? cent in the latter period 
and the U.S. from 14 per cent in the earlier period to 18 per cent 
in the latter period.
The above factors help to explain the fact that Nigeria received 
2.8 per cent or the 11th highest proportion of the net international 
flow of long term capital and official donations to developing countries 
during 1960/62 as Table 8.16 shows. India received the highest - 
12.6 per cent.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
During 1950/1965 there was a total inflow of £345*1® of foreign 
private capital into Nigeria, of which £140.3m or 41 Per cent related 
to the.period 1950/60 and £204*8m to the first five years of Independence 
1961/65. The United Kingdom is the biggest source of foreign private 
capital for Nigeria, Of the £248,4m inflow during 1953/65? the U.K. 
accounted for £125-4m or 51 per cent, Western Europe for £63.2m or 
25 per cent, and the U.S.A. for £44m or 18 per cent. The balance of 
£15*8m or 6 per cent came from the rest of the world.
The United Kingdom also accounted for the biggest proportion of 
foreign private*investment in fixed assets and in paid up capital, 
reserves, and other liabilities. These proportions were 58 P®r cent 
and 57 Per cent respectively in 1964? compared with 23 per cent and 24 
per cent by Western Europe and 12 per cent respectively by the U.S.A.
The Netherlands accounted for 83 per cent of the net fixed investment 
in fixed assets and for 65 per cent of the paid up capital, reserves 
and other liabilities of the foreign private firms of the European 
Economic Community in 1964.
The mining sector has attracted the biggest proportion of foreign 
investment during 1962/64. It accounted for 52 per cent of net foreign 
investment in fixed assets and of 40 Per cent of the paid up capital, 
reserves and othei’ liabilities in 1964.
TABLE A.l
CAPITAL l i m S W S m  IH AFRICA; 1870-1936
Country Public listed Private listed Hon listed Total Percentage of
African Total
West
Africa 50871 60450 5429 116750 9.56
Nigeria M m 56790 m k 75087
Ghana 15462 20160 1681 55505 2.98
Sierra
Leone 2454 750 160 5564 0.28
Gambia 254 - 12 246 0.02
Sundries - 2750 - 2750 0.22
East
Africa 75180 25424 11585 110189 9.02
Kenya-
Uganda 51542 8585 6019 46144 5-78
Tanzania 51540 15841 4718 51899 4-25
Hyasaland 10298 1000 848 12146 0.99
P
Hotess The total for whole Africa was £1222m.
The Higerian total is about 64 per cent 
of West African total.
Source: S.H. Frankel: Capital Investment in Africa, 
O.U.P. London, 195Q> pp.l5&-60*
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TABLE A* 2 -
NET BOOK VALUE OF U.K. INVESTMENTS IK SELECTED 
OVERSEAS STERLING AREA COUNTRIES, 1962
Country Amount £m Percentage of total OSA
Developed OSA Countries
Australia 522,0 27.0
South Africa 269.0 14*0
New Zealand 110*0 6*0
Totals Dev. OSA. 901*0 57-0
Undeveloped OSA Countries
India 256.0 15*0
Pakistan 52*0 2.0
Ped. Malaya 126*0 6.0
Nigeria 79*0 4-0
Sierra Leone 16.0 1.0
ICenya 20.0 1,0
Totals Undev. OSA 529*0 27*0
All OSA Countries 1964.O 100.0
Notes The figures exclude oil, hanking and insurance.
Sources U.K. Board of Trade Journal, August 7? 1964j P * 2 .  
Extract kindly supplied hy the Board of Trade.
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TABLE A. 3
TOTAL BET ASSET VALUE OF UNITED KINGDOM PRIVATE 
DIRECT IIWESTMENT IB NIGERIA AT M )  1962
Industry Amount Percentage
£m
Agriculture 2*8 3*5
Mining 5*6 7 * 6
Electrical & Mechanical Engineering 0.2 0.3
Other Manufacturing Industries 14.4 18.2
Construction 1*5 1*9
Distribution 40.8 51*6
Transport, Communication & Shipping 7*0 8*9
Other activities 6*7 8*5
Total 79.0 100.0
Sources Board of Trade: Statistics Division, May 1966; 
excluding oil, insurance ..and banking.
TABLE A.4
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF NET FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
IN FIXED ASSETS IN NIGERIA, 1962-64
Sector 1962 1963 1964
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
£m £m £m
Mining 65.O 41.5 75*6 43*0 146.2 52.2
Mfg. & Processing 39.0 24*9 46.5 26.4 63*5 22.7
Agric. & Pishing 6.1 3*9 5*0 2.8 5*9 2.1
Transport & Comm. 1.5 1.0 2,6 1.5 3*0 1.0
Building Const. 4*9 3*1 7*5 4*3 8.2 2.9
Trading & Services 39*7 . 25*4 37*0 21.0 47*5 16.9
Other activities 0.5 0.2 1.8 1.0 5*9 2.1
Total 156.7 100.0 176.O 100.0 280.2 100.0
Sourcei . Central Bank of Nigerias Statistical and Economic 
Review, June. 1966.
TABLE A.5
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION 'OF.FOREIGN PRIVATE PAID UP- CAPITAL RESERVES
AND OTHER LIABILITIES IN NIGERIA, 1962-1964
Sector 1962 1963 1964
Amount
£m
Percentage Amount Percentage 
£m
Amount Percentage 
£m
Mining 81.0 36.7 93.4 36.1 128.7 40.0
Manuf ac tur ing 
& Processing 38.3 17.3 49.3 19.0 58.5 18.2
Agri c.Pore s try 
& Pishing 4.3' 2.0 4.9 1.9 5-4 1.7
Transport &
C ommuni c a t i on s 2.4 1.1 2.6 1.0 3.5 1.1
Building
Construction 8.5 3.8 10.9 4.2 12.3 3.8 .
Trading and 
Sergices 84-9 38.4 96.5 37.3 101.0 31.5.: .
Other
activities 1.5 0.7 1.2 0.5 11.8 3.7
Total 220.9 100.0 258.8 100.0 321.2 100.0
Sources Central . Bank of Nigeria? Economic and 
Financial Review, June 19669 p.6
TABXJ3 A.6
FOREIGN PRIVATE iroSTMENT IN NIGERIA; NET FLOW;
1950 - 1965
Year Amount £m
1950 2.6
1951 8.6
1952 ' 7.6
1933 5.5
1954 10.4
1955 9.6
1956 19.1
1957 17.1
1958 16*8
1959 24.0
I960. 19.0
Sub total 140.3
Average for 11 years 12*7
1961 27.3
1962 17.7
1963 37*9
1964 63.O
1965 58.9
Sub total 204*8
Average for 5 years 
Grand Total 343*1
Average for 16 years
Sources Fed. Nigeria* Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1964? p*105 
Central Bank of Nigeria* Annual Report, 1965, p.52.
CBN; Economic & Financial Review, July 1965? P*10.
TABLE A. 7
SECTOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE PLOW OH MET EOBEIGK 
' HtlVATE IME3T1VIEHT IK NIGERIA, 19o1>-1965
Sector 1961 1962 1963 i* (1963)
Mining 6.9 7.5 12.5 32*9
Mfg. & Processing 5.9 20.5 11.0 29.0
Agric* Forestry & Fishing -1*1 -0*2 0.5 1*5
Transport & Communications 0.5 0.2 0.1 0*5
Trading and Services 14*6 -15.4 10.5 27.7
Building & Construction 0*7 4.6
1—I •
rr\ 8.2
Other Activities
•*»
0.5 0.2 0.6
Total 27.3 17.7 37*9 100.0
Sources Percentages calculated from the figures* 
Central Bank of Nigeria: Bjconomio and 
Financial Revievf, July 1965j P * 1 0
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TABLE A.8
FOREIGN PRIVATE CAPITAL IN NIGERIA? SOURCE OF PLOWS
Year
1950-1965 ^
United Kingdom OEEC 
Total Of which
UAC accounted 
for
Dollar
Area
Rest of the 
World
Total
1955 4.2 1*5 1.0 0.1 0.2 5.5
1954 4.7 1.5 5.9 1.5 0.3 10.4
1955 5.5 2.1 2.2 1.7 0.4 9.6
1956 11.5 2.6 4.7 2.5 0.6 19.1
1957 10.1 2.7 4.2 2.2 0.6 17.1
1958 10.2 2.1 2.4 5-7 0.5 16.8
1959 17-9 2.8 5.3 2.0 0.8 24.0
Sub­
total 65.7 15.5 21.7 13.7 3*4 102.5
fo of 
total 62.1 15.0 24.2 13.5 3*4 100.0
1961 15.8 2.7 5.9 5*9 1.7 27*3
1962 2.9 - 6.9 4.0 3*9 17.7
1965 17.0 - 13.4 5*4 2.1 37.9
1964 28.0 2.7 15.5 15.0 4*7 63.0
io of 
total 42.5 28.4 20.8 8.5 100.0
Total
1961/4 61.7 41.5 30.3 12.4 145*9
1953/59 63.7 15*5 21.7 13.7 3*4 102.5
Total
1953/65 125.4 18.0 63.2 44*0 15*8 248.4
fi of 
total 50.5 7.2 25.4 17*7 6.4
Sources Up to 1959s Annual Abstract of Statistics, Nigeria,
1964? p.105? 19^1“19^5 from CNB Economic and Financial 
Review, June 1966.
UAC figures from Economic & Statistical Reviews
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■TABLE A,9
TOT FIXED PRIVATE FOREIGN INKESIllBNT BY ORIGIN, 1962-64
Country 1962 1963 1964
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage 
£m £m £m
United Kingdom 104.8 66.9 116.5 66.2 162.2 57.9
United States 15.0 9.6 14*5 8.1 32.7 11.7
Western Europe 19.7 12.6 36.6 20.8 63.6 22.7
Other unspecified 17.2 11.0 8.5 4*8 21.7 7.7
Total 156.7 100.0 175.9 100.0 280.2 100.0
Sourcei Central Bank of Nigeria? Statistical and Economic 
Review, June 1966
TABLE A.10
NATIONALITY OP FOREIGN PRIVATE- PAIL UP CAPITAL RESERVES 
AND OTHER LIABILITIES IN NIGERIA1962-64
Nationality 1962 1963 1964
Amount
£m
Percentage Amount
£m
Percentage Amount
£m
Percentage
United Kingdom 135.6 61.4 154.1 59.5 181.4 56.5
United States 
of America 19.4 8.8 24.0 9.3 39.0 12.1
Western Europe 46.8 21.2 60.3 23.3 75.7 23.6
Other unspecified 19.1 8.6 20.3 7.9 25.1 7.8
Total 220.9 . 100.0 258.8 100.0 321.2 100.0
Sources Central Bank of Nigeria: Economic and Financial 
Review, June 1966, p.5*
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TABLE A.11
FOREIGN
PRIVATE /SyESTMENT & INVESTMENT IN FREED ASSEST OF 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMDNITY. IN- NIGERIA» 1962 - 1964
Country 1962 1965 1964
Amount Percentage 
£m
Amount
£m
Percentage Amount
£m
Percentage
Prance 3.0 17.6 3*5 12.1 4.2 7*9
Italy 0.5 2.9 1.2 4-2 3*2 6.1
Netherlands 15.3 78.3 23.6 81.7 44*1 83.2
Belgium & Luxemburg - - - - - -
West Germany 0.2 1.2 0.6 2.0 1.5 2.8
Total EEC 19.0 100.0 28.9 100.0 53*0 100.0
All We stern Europe 19.7 - 36.6 - 63 • 6 -
Outside EEC. 0.7 - 7*7 - 10.6 -
PAID-UP CAPITAL RESERVES AND OTHER LIABILITIES OF E.E*C.
COUNTRIES IN NIGERIA 19.64-a
France 7*8 21.3 14*5 28.8 9*5 16.2
Italy 4.1 11.2 7*5 14.8 9*1 15.5
Netherlands 25.4 63.7 26.5 52.6 37*9 64*6 .
Belgium & Luxemburg - , ~ - - - -
West Germany 1.4 3.8 1.9 3.8 2.2 3*7
Total EEC
All Western Europe
56.7
46.8
100.0 50.4
60.3
100.0 58.7
75*7
100.0
Outside EEC 10.1 9*9 17*0
Sources Central Bank of Nigeria* Economic and Financial 
Review, June 1966, p.4*
a = Percentages are of E.E.C. totals.
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TABLE A.12
DISTRIBUTION OF THE FLOW OF U.S. LONG TERM PRIVATE CAPITAL
TO LOW INCOME ■ COUNTRIES
Country
Latin America 
All others 
Total
Latin America 
as fo of total
1955
89
205
294
50.3
1954 1955 1956
191
328
519
36.8
403
112
667
243
515
78.3
910
73*3
1957
1249
200
1449
86.2
195Q
440
404
844
52.1
Source; Percentages my calculation.
BN Department of Economic & Social Affairs; 
The international Flow of Private Capital, 
1956-58, p.20.
THE FLOW OF FOREIGN PRIVATE CAPITAL,INTO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY REGION, 1960-1962
Region i960 1961 1962
Africa 16 16 8
Latin America 54 66 68
West Asia 9 8 ' 10
Far, East 21 11 15
Total 100 100 100
Sources United Nations; International Flow of
Long Term Capital and Official Donations, 
New York, 1964) P*25
TABLE A,14
FLOY/ Off UNITED KINGDOM’S PRIVATE INVESTTlBNT IB SELECTED 
STERLING AREA COUNTRIES, 1958-1964 
£m
Country 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1965 1964
Developed OSA Countries
South Africa 19.9 6.8 12,1 9*6 12.1 55.7 45 * l
Australia 19.6 27.5 59.9 55.7 48.5 55*6 79*5
New Zealand 4.0 4.2 6.0 6.1 8.0 4.5 6.7
Developed OSA 
Total 45-5 58.5 78.0 49.4 68.6 95.6 129.5
Undeveloped OSA 
Countries
India 5.9 12.4 15.5 14.5 14.3 I4.4 14.2
Nigeria 4.0 5.9 6.9 10.5 -4*6 6.6 -4.8
Sierra Leone 1.5 - 1.1 2.5 4.1 1.6 5.1
Ghana 0.1 2.8 4.1 1.9 0.9 -0,8 -0.5
Kenya 2.7 1.2 2,6 - 0.9 -0.8 0.5
Uganda 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 -
Undeveloped OSA 
Total 14.8 20.5 28.2 29.O 50.5 21.2 15.7
Sources Board of Trade Journals.
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TABLE A>15
IMER-DEVELOPED COTMTRIESs AVERAGES OF REGIONAL FLOWS -OF 
- -PRIVATE CAPITAL, 1951-55-to 1956-59
yfeinu
Region 1951-1955 1956-1959 Change over Percentage
1951-55 change
1 2 3 4
Africa 147
t
K\00 -64 -44
Latin America 445 1071' *628 h-142
Middle East 42 87 +45 +107
South East Asia 55 21 —8 -24
Others 239 363 *124 +52
Total 904 1625 +721 +80
Sources The Capital Heeds of Less Developed Countries;
UN Department of Economic & Social Affairs, N.Y.,
1962, p*22*
Columns 3 axih 4 were calculated from the figures*
EABKE A. 16
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MET INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF BQKG- 
TERM CAPITAL AND OFFICIAL DONATIONS IN SELECTED DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES. 1960-1962
Country Percentage Distribution
India 12.6
Argentina 6.4
Puerto Rico 5.7
Brazil 4.9
Pakistan 4.7
Israel 4;6
Republic of Korea 4.0
Mexico 3*8
Indonesia 3.8
Republic of Vietnam 3.1
Nigeria 2.8
Chile 2.6
United Arab Republic 2.2
Ghana 1.9
China (Taiwan) 1.8
Total* countries listed 65.O
Other developing countries 35-0
All developing countries 100.0
Sources International Flow of Long-term Capital 
and.Official Donations, 1960-62, U.K. 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
K.Y., 1964, p.24.
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V  ,v\.; TABLE 1,1 - -
INDUSTRIAL PLANTS IN NIGERIA,,1939-1954 ;
ISIC No. Industry: Total FOREIGN
• Total Pre- 
1959
1959. -.1954
2 0 1 - 2 1 4  Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco.
251-245 ; Textile & Wearing
• apparel! including 
foot wear.
2 5 1 - 2 8 9  . . Timber, Wood &
Paper Products, 
Printing: & Farv 
niture
29.I-5O O  , Leather & Leather
Products, Rubber &
•.. ; Rubber Products,
except footwear.
3 1 1 - 5 1 9  Chemicals, oils,
Paints ■&Petrol-; ', 
eum. Products
3 5 9  . Clay, Glass &
.Cement Products
3 5 0  Metal Productsj
. except Transport
Equipment , . / '
381 ’ . Machinery & Trans-
. port .Equipment
3 9 9  Miscellaneous;
Products
56
18
94
16
25
5.
4.
7
1
8
■1
22
9
1
2
4
20
9; 
1
2
5
204 52 9 45
Sources Computed from Industrial Directory - a list of
. manufac turing plants in Nigeria. Fed. Ministry of
Comm. & Industry, Lagos, 1964. . . . .
- TABLE 1.2
GROSS OAPI^AL EXPE3E)rJURE OK FIXED ASSETS BY MAJOR 
.COMPANIES,.1950-1952 . ;
£000
Activity Sector 1 1950 1951 1952
Amount $ Amount 1° . Amount 1°
Agriculture, Forestry 
& Fishing 527 12.0 =■ 495 7*5 864 11.4
Mining 808 ' 18.4 2035 50,8 2405 31.8
Manufacturing & 
Processing, 271 6.2 575 ! 8.7 947 12*5
Transport & Communi­
cations . .813 18.5 1274 19*5 704 9*5
Trade & Business Services^gg
38*5 1895 28,6 2068 27*5
Building & Construction/ 276 '6.3 548 5.5 577 7*6
4583 100 6616 100 7565 100
Source! IBRD The Economic Development of Nigeria, 
John Hopkins, Baltimore, 1955? p.659*
. TA B L E  1.3
S E C T O R A L  D I S T R I B U T I O N  O P  M A H U E A C T U R I N G  OUTPUT, 1950 & 1954 
£000 at 195.7 -Prices-.
Industrial Sector ; Value Added Percentage of Total
1254. 195Q 1954
Pood, Beverages &
Tobacco r I69O.7 5060.2 54.O . 47*-3
Textiles, Wearing .
Apparel, etc. .4*5 50*0 : 0.1 \ .8
Timber, and Wood V .  ^  ^.
Products . 544.O ’ 1465.6 17.4 22.6
Leather.'& Leather . . .
Products 25*4 154*5 0.8 , 2.4
Chemicals, Oils & ~ .
Paints ; : > 615.O 1222.6 19.7 18.9
Clay,. Glass & ; . ,
Cement Products 241*5 499*5 7*7 7.7
Transport Equipment 6.9 . 2 1 . 6 . 0 . 2  0.3
3129.3 V 6474*0 100.0 100.0
Sourcei Computed from:P,N.C. Olcigbos Nigerian, National 
Accounts I95O*1957> Government Printer, Enugu, 
1961, p.79* ?
507
■’V TABLE 1.4 >V 
EXPORTS, IMPORTS - AMP VISIBLE BALANCE, 1958-1954 £000
Year Total Imports Total Exports Visible Balance
1938
1939:
1940
.1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
8632
7479
6505
10490
12418
15748
19824
32637
41946
58231 
.61868
84569
115180'
108291
II4O69
716227
9701
11604
13783
14524
15152
17189
18057
24643
44321
62472
8IO69
90222
120068
12898?
.146236
933835
IO69
3712
4125
7278
4034
2734
1441
4468;
,11855 
21091
22704
28354
35499
158O7
17047
32167
217501
Sources For 1938-39 > Digest of Statistics, Nigeria, 
v For 1954? Nigerian Trade Report, ,1955*
' '•" TABLE 1.5
INDEX NDMBERS OF ; VALDES, VOLUMES ANN PRICES • - OF IMPORTS . ANN EXPORTS,
Year.
INCLIIXUNG THE COST OF LIVING INDEX,
' I M P O R T S -  
VaTue :, Volume-’ Price
"v 1 : 3 '
~ - E X P O R T S'
Value V olume Pr i ce
' ;4 5 . 6
Cost of Living
1939 100- . 100 / 100 100 100 . 100 100
1940 112 ,<  84 .134 110 . 95 116 •
1941 97 y-s 7':r C 146 . 131-. 116 113 -: - ’■
1942 156 94 l66 138 112 123 147
1943 185 ■ '83 ;222 - • - 145 105 138 - 159 :
1944 231 " 96 / 242 ' V- 164 - - 100 163 165
1945 : 201 ■;9PV. 223 - r ■ 171 , 95 - 180 176
Sources Cols. 3? 6 .& 7, from A.R. Prests War Econs of Primary Producing
countries, Camb.U.P., 1948
- Cols . 1, 2, 4 & 5 from H.M.A.'Onitiris Nigerians Balance of
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, TABLE 1.6
MONEY SUPPLY ANI SAVINGS, 1939-1954
£000 . as at 31st March
Year M O  H E ! r S. U P P L Y ■ S A V I N G S
, r .
Currency 
1 ;
Demand -f 
Deposits
2 \
Total .
? ..... ■...  -
Time' &. 
Savings 
Deposits 
with Comm. 
Banks
4. .
Post Office Savings 
No. of Total 
.Accounts POSB
■ 5 6 .
1939 . 5857 5857 . 41737 - 185
1940 5549 _■ 5549 . - 49200 210
1941 6060 - 6060 . ' - 49658 - 255
.1942 ;. 17453 , - 7453, ‘ /■ •*, 54320 366
1943 11409, 615.8 17547 2036 64814 604
1944 ■ 13514; 7267 ' , 20781 \ 2599 71397 . 879
1945 15386 . 9033 24419 2880 84130 1185
1946 I8I40 : 9401 ■27541 3260 98184 1697
1947 25429 .10589 : 33818 '3308 112711 1847
1948 24602 11435 .56037 . 3062 132693 2458
1949 '51272: IO267 41539 V; 3199 159418* 2554*
.1950 31577 15190 44767; , 3212 178742 2688
1951 59240 18450 57670' 3992 168954 3096
1952 .‘ 50286 22250 72516 . . ,5614 177012 3724,
1953 51365:; 24468 75833' : \ ' 677O * 197656 4059
1954 53139 52870: ; 86009' . 7734 209472* . 4315*
-.
Notes -  means not available; f 
* from Nigerian Digest of
ho.l, Jan. I96I, p.17.
as at 31st Dec. 
Stats., Vol.10,
.
Sources Nigeria:.Annual Reports 
of Statistics.
BMS0,, and Digest
A
4:v ; v gAHLE:l.7: :J ■’ 7 
RETOMB AKD KXPJaCDIgDRE OF SIGatlA, 1938-1954 :' 
,.r. £000 as at Jlst March' each year.
Year , ■ ,V.Revenue:. , . j . ‘.-Expendi-tare = Surplus
■ ■: . ‘ y..-:' ■-; = Deficit
1938-39 5811 r;V;; 7.7, f  I*. -1056
1939-40 6499 ' 7 7  - 385
1940-41 ; 7273 : ' : 7254 ,77'.: ' :+;oi9' 7
1941-42 :' ■ .^ 7975 ' ' ,yV7 94j3.; '
1942-43 - V ' : vy '
1943-44 10913 . '":|^^ ; :.,^ 9977 ' • 937 ' ■
1944-45 11445 • :.%r4vix)i33V. '7 ;' 77;77Vi3i2 3;;7'-
1945-46 13200 ■ . ':'r:;>;lo693 ,7 7 ...77' ' : ; 2508 7
, 1946-47 7y; 14032 ,>■•; „ ■ ■ ■ ' ,  ;"7 14051 ”5 3 ’' %  ^aoX "::'
1947-48 . -y,; 18404 ' 17186 ; 1218 ■
1943-49 7 ‘7.7^ 3 8 1 1 7 7  . • ■ . /7'77- ;08f
1949-50 ; ■ -'VJasas?/.;;;''" '-'xi^ y +2512 V:"
1950-51 ’ •■■/, ’ ,32f94:'4 ' ^ 2405 7
1951-32 - 30327 77.,y 7 !,;';f.'43673v :. 7 "’ ’ 6654 '. -7
1952-53 V ^ :;50906;-v .7 y y  6e02 7- ■
1953-54 v 59256 • ; 7.y'..y./ 55003 7 '; 4252 ;
352859 ; 7 -. 7/7 324004 ' "'■! 7 28854 ■ ■ ’■
Source: Accountant General's Annual Eeports.
TABLE 1.8
EXPORTS OF BAW' COTTON A M L #  IMTORTS' OF COTTON TEXTILES, 1957-1954
Year;
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1948
1949
1950 
1951; 
1952
1953;
1954
Raw cotton exports 
tons
,;i-'\: "**
9587 
5729 
4364 
9331 
10235 
18517
4328 
1060 : 
6612 
5248
9984
12623
15374:
17707
Imports of - cotton textiles as 
of total merchandise imports
, -4 2
 ^1 '•--■:';23;;' ■
: ' ''^ *\
v:r-' \ ; v ■ 28
\  ■
v ; . . : ^ Q - \  - > ' /v:..;’'
■4;,;(v'-;4 -41; ' V ■
38 . .;
. •. 4; 4/; '
'■ V - ' v^' —
■ " 28 \ v \ .
;v-.-
■■S’" •-31 "v; ' ■ J; •
' 26 ‘ ■ ■ V: :
- ,24
Monthly averages only, , 4 : v‘
Source'!; Export figures, from Digest of Statistics.
4 ■ :^7calcu^ for 1937-46 "
:: 3 . >•' and annual. ahstract of statistics for 1947- '
• V, \ ; ; 1 9 5 4 * -percentage for ,l950 includes 5$ .
l‘r ; : 4 v for rayon' ■iapprtsJ^dV9^.>4pr each year 1951-54*
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a f o
' ' V ' ^ X X ' - ^ X X X ^ ' X X - : X  -V V ’V X ■  ^;i':’V ;" Vi X
'■ BEEE Ii-ffOR'i'S IlTgQ MIOBKIAi j o DIBmiBOTIOft FROM U.K.; BlffiOPB ! •>,
. -V AHD OTHERS ’':-{;XX{XvX ’ ' X  > ' } : ? ■  i A ’ X ;  " X’ ';:X;X ? :SX/X;;
"\.vX '{ " V;'v:aiue.'£000;,'/ XX X;X;i946-1954*
:Year Quantity 
Imp.Gallons
Value 'Western'.'Europe- U.K.. l-;,l';v^ 
■V9J.;; v; 7::.
V Others. ; V
■ xfio V ’V -V';":
: V'VU
1946 vV-...; 461 .165 v .. v 6s ’V;{-;w :,v 31'
.1947 V ,1415 : 543 . ' v-w;v v 90 , v 7 - v ; V ; :;-:'v:3v;v:vv
19481 1192 - 411 ,4V V 56 '• 43 v -'-}^ :^xxV-
1949 V 2387 v 838
V" ■•'6244l  444 37 V,v V;V';;1I?V VV VVV1
1950 2578 » v-*/ w - -9 0 4 . i v •^439;4:4x.:4;:4,x 59f7iV'i;vvv^; ;Vlll;l;;:7VV
1951 4, 4289 ; } ^ ^"i.' 11 e -1768 v: V ' 72 44-V -V{ 26 ■ • ■- B . ■
1952 ■ .3661 1747 '■■•IV.VVV-62m-I— "'' -32IVVv;.-,v ' 6
1953. ; ; 5090 I ■ . T:2390 v 466 V-; V :32V;-,V;v:; 2
1954 . 4767, 2265. .V - 71 x V’ . t' '.'v.V.:- ■.•-'V2;4
Bourcej Calculated from Mgerian Blue Books. /”;V'VV/V-U;'-
'V- VV
^ ; oi yalu^vpnly ;f 4;. : V . 
+ 000 imperial gallons. / ’Vvi:-V
W; TABLE 1410 x ' V 44;:':..;.?- -V;;
'■ V ' .:•
. BflPORTS OF . M M m A S m m ) TOBACCO, 1938-1954 l;:;:VV.;ecfeo"‘'‘
Year Vi?ptklV:.V,V^ , Total V 7:V; imports from the TJnited States: . V , ■ /■
,Quantities vl Jalue'";V;v: Qua^tit?r ■. °/o oi?■> v\-’-ValueV; -$> of v total
thousands x\.;x-;in 000 total . ■ .!
, V • lbs ’ x■ > 'X ' -.V.  ^"44./' x ’VVlbsV:- v - V.  ^ • • y "-■ v.;.-
1938 ; - 2558 ^4 Vlv V;2447i
V-' •r
' 97 132':v-l;V; v-.,;.95
1939 2236 ■ / . 128 - V - -V:-::V:V'V 2203 ■ 99 VV,'V-'-v125:VV:';■>; 98
1940 ■ 2139 - 147 :V4V ■,;1/VV;.;;1975^ c 92 V 133  ^?■;:;- v 91
1945 ' ; 3142 V-V,384 ;W  v-v. u; 254.6 ,\V.i*V81. 325 85
1946 V 4070 -^V^YOiVV ."Vi; ; 3590 v V 88 V . 509 ; : V 89
1947:: 3390 499 2836 V7vir;4iiv:.-,.: V 1 82
1948 . 4271 V 641 / V ; rh 84 :;vVV ’85
1949: ;‘V ■■ 4625 -V Vi'i806;; x'ViV, . V’ 3028 83 UV;V:i:682c';; ,85
1950 VvV V 4334 947 ;VV / V u  3405 79 - 816 86
1951 5996 - 1362 V: .-V.V.7/V-., *■ 3052 64 v^:;Vft-983-vV V 72
1952 380J  ^-1805' V : V . ;' "Vv. v-4501V':VV<-.5i'  ^ ;.1262 ViV ;v 70
1953 \ ;. i5690, - . 1354 :;vV4.M\43g81-::.Vl':;n65, , 1078 : .80
1954 : 66803a , 1642 4 V ,j 41480a V'v;:vl62;:.77;V;ii95u^ -V' 73
'■'" V’V ‘ ■- . ^ £1 = CVvrt. vVfV:i;]::' ] " . * S ' ' • s • ,'V., * i'i*. ; V - ■ - ' "■
•
Source s Calculated from;i;the Mgerian Trade Reports • ^v. 7* “-1'
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'4-4;. 4'-; 4V 44y-4,4:.Table 2.1 V \ 4 44-.' -x4 4.44.4 4~4.. ' . : 444-' V-- 4.; * 4/;
;Manufacturing Establishments in Nigeria: 1952*1963.
ISIC No. 4 Industrial Sector; Total: 4 Total Bate Established
= :x 4 V , /■ 4- 7 4. V; :4V. 1952-63 1952-57 1958-1963
X' ;X'';:x\ ;xx-X:;,' x.x.xXxX ' ' ■ x X . w 7 x X 4 n V 4  2 3 (1) 4 5 °/° (1)
201-220 Pood, Beverages & Tobacco 82 • 25 30• 5^ of 57 S$ry/o ot
23I-244 Textiles» Wearing. Apparel & x. ' . •• 4 • -ll
;' ;'44 v4:4 Footwear 444 x; • -4 .' ;4:■;-i 454x - 4, 16 29*6 . 38 70*4: 4
251^280; Tiniber, Wood & Paper ^  • ..44.x ’ x':;'4 V ;
Printing & Furniture; ,4 7 x - ,1191. 46 438*7 : 73 61.3 -
291-300 Leather. & Leather Products, . 4. 44 4 •;
4 : V x- Rubber & Rubber Products, 4 4 4 : 4 4 4 :;4 4 ‘Vvvv
v Except footwear. >4 29 .'x 'x' 12 41*4 . 17 5$*6
311-329 :Chemicals v Oils, Paints & ' 4
; Petroleum Products 4. ' 41 10 :42*4 31 75*6
331-339 CBiay, Glass & -Cemeht Products ■ 22 4 x 6 27*3 16 72.7 4
;34i-350 x. Metal.xProducts, except x
V: 4 x : Machinery & Transport Equipineht 28 7 25*0 21 75*6
;! 346-385 Machinery & Transport Equipment 68* V x,: 33^ 48*5 35° 51*5 ;
3994 Miscellaneous J'4ix ■■'4,x 8 1 12.5 7 87*5
Totals ;4r t»x 451 1564 34*6 295 4 65*4
Notes: a* of which 49 are motor & cycle repair shops
xx ; b. of which 27 are motor & cycle repair shops
,4 : 4 .c.v of which 22 :•........ ditto ........... *.
SoUrbe: Federal Office of Statistics: Industrial Survey, 1963* P*l6.
4 Lagos* 19664 x'V':. .,
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- Table 2#2
FOBEIGN INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN NIGERIA, 1955 - 1965
Isle Industrial Sector.: Totals
Ho. . .. ; "■ . '' ’ f o r e i g a
. . \  i o Of 1955-60 1961-65 $ Of
total Total No. to-tal -;
1 2 : 3 ■’ 4. " 5 ■' 6";■■■■ ■
201-220 4Fbod, Beverages &
Tobacco 17S V 25.8 . - 46 15 - 31 67.4
25I-244. Textiles & Wearing 
Apparel incl.Footr 
w£ar. / 110 5^ *0
251-280. Timber,Wood & Paper 
Products,Printing &
Furniture 307 ' 17.9
29I-3OO Leather & Leather Pro­
ducts, Rubber & Rubber
products + footwear. 47 ,63.8 30 15 15 5p.0
311-300. Chemicals,. Oils, paints
& Petroleum products 110 58.2 64 20 44 68.8
331-339. Olay,Glass & Cement
\ Products . 54 81.5 44 9 35 79.5
341-35Q* Metal Products Except 
Transport Equipment &
> Machinery 87 92*0
36O-385. Machinery & Trans­
port Equipment . . 36 88.9
391-842 Miscellaneous Products 26 73*1
Totals 955 44.5 425 227 298 ' “70.1
Sources Federal Ministry of Industry: Industrial Directory, 3rd edition,
Lagos, 1965.
Column 3 '« Total number of foreign firms
" 4 = M 11 . 11 M - " established 1955-60.
«* 5 *= .«■ *» *« » . 1961-65
'* 6 » f a of those established 1961-65 to all firms i.e. °/o of 5 to 3*
80 22 58 73.5
32 8 24 75*0
19 3 16 84.2
55 9 . 46 83.4
55 26 29 52.7
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•■■ . gy: TABLE 5.6 ;:  ^ i ■ ' ■ V V ^ V V V / V V V ’VV^'V
1955-1960 DEVELOHYIEM} : PLANS s ■ BREAKDOWN OF INDUSTRIAL ALLOCATION:
• . VVV‘:-. -Vt/-. A. Federal ' . ;■ ' .v-\;
t^ActivityvSedtorK vVvvV -1;v--'V VVVt . >vt”"’'"■■/'■Amount-'' V ^ of tot
-Industrial; Finance ;t.'V'. :Pvt/';:9 :t;v-/t
. : ■ ; £000 .. v'. V-;
. , Industrial Loans .(BWderal’, Loans - .
: " ; : ; '• ' - ‘v t V : ;.:V • Board) , ■ ;v-:V/V- ' ■*■ 500.0 . ; <. 'V 22.8 .
Direct investment to. industry V .;.'51*'5,9
975.0 , v 74.1
, Industrial Research -,v, ‘Vt;tvt:jy’ V.t 260.0 19.8
. Industrial Estate v\- . \-tt V- ’v:' - >.;v,80.;0-';.; \v-'v vv:6.1;/'
: ' t vttvivvt V'-;'^^,;/:,Grand\Total:.^ :;,: \ . .1515*9.:. ;■ 100.0
. /• V - •. -.v'' ’ .-V.W- B. Eastern Region. .';v ;;>;£o9o;^ :V/; .V - '■ '■ ■
Industrial Finance 7 v:-/t. "vt V ^ V. t ,f. V-. '■
';V ■ V! .■V*3^iiirs 1. s tite-ixtt” t"." tv'tt/ tv :;t.V -:V' :■ ,;V58 .vv;v:;;30^;-.
; : Rural Loans (cottage. Industries) vv : 8>5: 0.7
'■V,; ,V, investment". ’Companied V/VV V-; Vtt/tvJv" /. 196.0 ^ >,;■'.'■ .VV 15*5V^
Development Corporation > - t-t vK' ; 4oo;.9 . y; 51.6
•' :...; 'V V ’*; ; ; ;V;\--:-V..V Sub total : .,V 1 .: V 78.2
Indus trial Research :• 56.6 ■/; / -• t;;v;-vvv;-2v9v'
tV Ahakaliki Lead & Zinc Minest\VVv_. : • 50.0 /- tv tV; 5*9
■;•: Nigerian.SkippingLine "V tv'-/ V/t . 40 0^. '• V/,-
. Enugu"& P.H. Hotels ; v. v. tv.;., tvt; 150.0 ;; vp; t-vii.8^ .;
;t.V ‘ , • vt .V-V t v / . Grand lotai • , 1,266.1 100,0
C. Western Region . : ;£bo99 ; y. v.vV-
^-Industrial Finance V . - v t . t - . - / .V.
Department 61 .Industries ttt'rt./■472.0 >; ';t;t;t;';'6.5--'
. ■ Production Dev. Bodrd 4500.0 59.9
't-tt- Finance Corp. -. t ;t . -Vtt- 2250.0 j •/<V'-'--V;/50.0:-;
■ ■ ' V". . ‘ v; '/’vv "' Sub -total/' ; 7222.0 96.2
. Statistics . ' ' tV- . -t'-t/t; . 100.0 . ■ 1.5
■ Exercise Book,Factory 190.0 ; : Vv; V-- t'V'2._5t-
, V -; '- ■ • . ; 'vtt / Grand Total : 7512.0 IOO.O;
"v ttt :'y: ■ .':y / D. Northern Nigeria i ^ £900 : ' * t ; vl.: / v -
; Industrial Finance ■ .1, . ’ ‘ ■ '
.Rural industries & schemes '-Tr.£- 59O.O -t t.: 12.0
. N, Rig.Dev. Corp. ' . • . 2000.0 t":..tv 61.7 .
' //• ; -■• ■: '■.'-;■ -. 2590.0 , ■ 75.7
: Head quarters . 185*0 1 5*7
- Housing . _-■■■ 2.5
. Trade .(Product Inspection & ■■ "v. - ■" /
.  ^ : marketing) . : ' . \ 590. 9 tvVt' 18.5
5240.0 ■ 100,0
Source: ...The. 1955-6® .Development Plans
::"':;;:';:';':?t- ;y-y;'\ '■ - ---‘y7
' -• NATIOM^x;: H m / -196^8:-" PLANNED MUSyRIAL, EXP£M1)ITUBE £000
T ■ :<l - : ■ -i:;r ■;■V  federal
: Indus t r iaP^ y -:
r;V':;._;Iiq'ai3is(Fed.Loans' /Beard) ; ; 
yVyBirect^
y Iron & Steel -foadusl^ i^
$int; & .Security'^  ^ jilting y. y*; • / 
Nat*Dev. Bank vy.y-’.y>yy: > y.v^ : •
Amount
. 500. 
y7,000 
30;000 
-300 
4,000
Amount
1.1
15-9
68.1
0,7
9.1
i
.//'r-;y.y. ' y  . ; y 41,800 94.9
Industrial Rehear oh i: 7 ! : -.>y , :y 1,000
Nigerian, Goal Corporation. y yyyyyy y . 330 m
Maidceting ^blici^L ^ rade Pair ; : • .v  ^ ■■•- v 500 : -- 1.1
-: v'~.'v.’;' > yyvyV-’yyV ~ "y--O'-' ^ -.y;j7:y y 400 .:v
.;y-:y y ; y ■ ■ ^ y y  - - 44,030 y,
■Sour6e^Nationalr;Pl£^ ’,p.65w’i: ■ ’" y . ,’y-T yyy ;V. y- y>- y. -
-yy'-C'— y^yyy-y vy;:y y.r B.y/EasternRegion y . ■ y'y-''V' : r y; \
lnduBt2^M^;Pihance!v:v.vly,:~ y--'Vy yv;Nyy: ■ ?-Vr Vy /■ ;y.“::-
yy :• Indnstriaiy^ Centres - , • .!.: V- - 494 4*0
yy Direct Investment to Bidustry yy'^yyyy y y : . , 10,000 ■ 74* 0
y^ y Small Industry, &/ Loan Scheme ,yy / . - . y ■;y": y y 500 y 4. 0
y ;L:' Miscellaneous InvestigatiOn y y^y : : ; y "--'yy 60 . y. ' 0. 0
■yy -v: \yy?y;: ■.,sub''ifetaiy\;;-v-:y-/ yyy ;yvy V. : ' -• 10,054 : 82 .0
Industrial Estates V’ y^'y y vV\ V - y 1,804 ,yy 13*0
...., Co-cpenativeev "y; ,: W  ■ ‘yy* • r - ; / y • V .- ' ■ y ■y''V'V-' 520 4*0
, : Iradey Bivision ; =. . . yy .,y \ y; ; 140: ' 1 * 0
Source y W.:" Plan p, 238 y
; y y 13,518 100. 0
y y ■ C. Western Region
Industrial Unahee : : ; ‘
y Loans etc. ,:y'; y . yyVv” 6,800 y 30.6
y/Direct Investment to Large Scale Industries; 10,000 45 * 0
y ;y Cottage.'& Rure,lyindust^ieb ; 235 " . 1* 0
Small Scale Industries , y y • y. 1,372 6.2
Integrated Rural Beveiopnient Indus . Schemes : J O O 2.2
: y ;y - y . ST^ ltottal . y,y V' y : 18,907 85.0
Industrial Estates • . , 3,333 15. 0
Source, N. Plan p,299 , ,
r X p. . Northern Region;
Industrial Pinance ; ■
Birect Investment to Industry 9,275 100. 0
Source National Plan p.139
TABLE 4. A
ECONOMIES OF SCALE IB STEEL PRODUCTION COSTS PER TON
(IN 1948 U.S. DOLLARS).
Items Annual Capacity of Plants in 1,000 tons of
finished steel.
50 250 500 1,000
Raw Materials. 33-84 . 51-26 51-26 . - 25-68.
Maintenance, & 
Miscellaneous 20.59 11.11 10.57 9.85
Capital Charges ■ 122,93 101.20 87.10 85.05
Labour Cost 52.00 15.20 8.57 6.60
Total Cost 209.36 158.77 137.50 127.16
Source: B.N. Economic Bulletin for Africa* Vol.IV. Jan 1964, P-51.
TABLE 4.B
ECONOMIES OP SCALE IH CEMENT PRODUCTION COSTS PER'TON (in Dollars)
Annual Capacity of Plant in 1,000 tons
35 50 100 250 450 ‘900 180C
Operating
Costs ' • 16.2 15.5 15.2 14.7 11.0 9.4 8.4
Capital Charges 12.5 11-5 . 10.0 8,8 7.0 5.5
Total Copts 28.7 ■ 27-0 , 26.0 24-7 ' 19.8 I6.4 13.9
Source: as above.
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TABLE 4*1
REGIONAL COMPARISON Off POPULATION IN AFRICA, 1964
Region
Nigeria
n °/o of W. African 
population
West Africa
East Africa
North Africa
Middle Africa
South Africa '
Total: Africa
Total: World
Population
millions
56
96
35
72
52
20
505
5220
fo of total 
Africa1s Popu- 
.lation
18*5
58*0
51.7 
27-4
25.8 
10*6
6*6
100.0
Average Annual 
Growth Rate* 1958-64
2*5 (1950-1960)
2*2
2.5 
2*4 
1*9 
2*4
2.5 
1*7
Sources For Nigeria, Annual Abstract of Stats.
For others cols 1 and 5* N.N. Demographical Yearbook, 1965 P*105; 
Col*2 was calculated from the figures.
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TABLE 4.2
POPULATION, G.D.P. and per Capita Incomes of Selected 
African Countries
'
Country Tear Population
Millions
G.D.P. G.T.P. Per*
Capital U.Sjjf
Algeria 1964 n . o . 2,463.5 224
Lybia tt 1.6 936.3 5B5
U.A.R. . M 28.9 4,333.2 150
Congo (Kimshasha) 1963 15.1 1,185.2 78
Kenya i960 9.2 778.0 78
Uganda t 7.4 500.0 64
Tanzania ft 10.5 626.0 58
Zambia ; tt 5*7 603.O 181
Nigeria I965 54.6 3,890.0 71
Niger _ ft 3.0 253-0 33
Dahomey t 2,3 160.0 71
Ghana ft 7.3 1,489.0 205
Sierra Leone , t 2.6 211.0 81
Sources A note on the Present stage of Industrial Growth in Africa, IJ.N. 
EGA 1966.
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fJABLE 4*3
SOURCES OF. NIGERIA’S IMPORTS,' 1950,1958-65 
 % of total imports:_____________ _^_
1950 1958 ,1959" I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
U.K. 59.8 45.6 45.5 43-6 58.8 36.8 34-5 '"31-2* 31.1
W.Europe 17.8. 18.5 26.0 26.2 27.4 28.6 29-8 31.7'
U.S.A. 4.1 5.8 4*4 5*4 5-4 7.5 8.7 11-5 12.1
Eastern Europe - 2.1 2.0 2.0 2-5 3*0 3-4 3.0 2.9
Japan ,9*4 11.6 10.5 13*3 15.8 12.4 13-1 12.2 9-4
West Africa - - -r - - - •
Other Common­
wealth Countries - - - 5-9 7-8 7-3 6.2 6.2 6.0
Others 5*5 . 4.0 3-5 5-2 5-4 5-2 5-7 6.5
West Africa - — 0*5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3
Notes - not available •
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 10010 100.0
Source: Calculated from Nigerian Trade Reports,
Annual Abstract of Statistics,1964 
and Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic 
and Financial Review.
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Table 5>7 '
Table of Road Vehicles Registered in Nigeria 1965
Ifrpe Lagos ''•,;.'West' East ; North Total
1 • Commercial 1,206 1,321 1,2^6 1,677 5,490
2. Private Cars 7 ••.,-.•.7
7 7  and taxis : 4*643 : 2,123 3,157 1,636 11*559
3* Motor Cycles 2,103 2,089 2,467 2,415 9,074
4* Tractors and • • . * - 7-, :V :; ’
. Trailers 53 6 0 ; 107 m 612
Totals 8,005 1\ 5,593 7,017 6,120 26,735
fo of Totals , 29.9 : 20 #9 26.3 : 22*9 :• 100.0
■ ' - ; = > - V ■'SMcskws x ■ , ■ • - ' •
Notes* The Region in which a car is registered is not necessarily that in
which it will operate. r;""- ■ ; ' V ' _
(2^1 Commercial vehicles exclude Government and Government owned service
cars and privately owned trucks (Kitcars) which have been registered 
z , as private# ;
Source s Nigeria: Annual Abstract of Statistices 1964.
Table 5#8
Comparison of Average road densities in Nigeria and
other selected African countries.
Country Square miles of territory
/. • •. per mile of road*
SasternrNigeria 2
' Western Nigeria v^J.
if or them Nigeria - v - ^  • . \v v 13 o:'''-.' -
All Nigeria.; " V;'. v'..- 7 ; .
Ghana- 7 7. . . 7 '7,V - ' :
Uganda ■ ■■,/_; .7. 7 y - - ^ 7 .
' Kenya V V  7 ■ V ' 10 . ' '; v-
Tanganyika '7. . ...:=rv7'“/'V ■' -■7.; 12
Central African Federation . 9 \W
' Source! industrial Potentialities of Northern Nigeria, Kaduna 1963 p 224
gable £.10
Raw
Regional Distribution of Principal Raw Mate rial S' i n -
' \ * \ ' ■ Dominant
Nigeria, 1965.according t o P r o d i i c i n g  Rendon
- : £ 0 0 ° ' "  ' .
; Value. fo oi5 ttota3l. . Region of .
• Exports Dominant produ.ce
Cocoa : V : 42,691 15.9 \ West ,
Groiuidnxvts 87,805 >'• - I4.I/. . - . ; ; ' y;-:;/North -;'
Cotton & Cotton seed ; 5 >650 1.3  ^ J ■ ; North .
Palm Kernels — V .' 26,541 9*9 East
Palm Oil V;'. : 13,591 . ■ ,5*1 . ^ East'.'/
Groundnut oil 10,0)13 . 5*7 North
Soya beans ’ , 10,988 . 4*1 ; . North
Rubber: . ' \v V 146 , / - v Mid-West '
Timber-logs 4*953. 1*9 "
Timber Sawtv ' ; 1,494 0.6 M
Tin Ore & Metal , .14,912 5 . 6 - \;v ' ‘V ' North : ’ V-'
Columbite ; : I,l6l 0.4 . ? : 1
Benniseed - . • 1,451 0.5 : 1 .
Hides & Skins \ - : • •, 4,563 . . . 1.7 /■ ;
Coal ; ' /"-y 85 . - • ■ vvi. East
Petrolium oil 68,097 25,4 11
Natural Gas • \y ' : ":'V: '4 yy;. 11 y;
Limestone 
Clay .
All Regions
Note: Dominant produced*= Producing more than 80^ of the Nigeria's'
output * >-• ■
Source; Nigerian Trade Journal, April/June 1966 p 7^
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Indicators of Suppliers1 Credits in Selected Countries *
Area and Country.
..As.-at the end of 1965.
. III* m u  --LfclfrQ I I. T O W  « . T V * t ' W l f t  '
Service Payments on 
Suppliers1 Credits, as 
a percentage of total; 
Service; Payments on all 
External Public Petit, ;
Suppliers1 Credits as. 
a .percentage of Out­
standing external in­
debtedness .
Latin America. 
Brasil 
Chile ;
" Peru ' ' • •
Argentina 
•Venezuela - 
Africa.
n i n * *  i n t n  ■ i i m i i
Liberia
Tanzania P
Asia.
Korea 
Thailand: 
Pakistan' . v!
Middle East 
U.A.R. . 
Iran ’
Europe•
Spain’ - 
Yugoslavia
63
25
52 
22 
14
60-
53
26
90
36
10
24
23
26
49
30
11
33
28
4
24
20
2
39 
19 
; 4
15
7
11
35
Sources Suppliers1 Credits from Industrialised 
to Developing Countries IBRD Jan. 1967*
q?ABLEna
CHAMELS Or FOREIGN- PRIVATE INVi^TMENT IN NIGERIA 1961-1964
Year Total Unremitted
■ ■ £m
tfo' . Trade & <fo Other <fo Share & ■<
Invest­
ments
1
Profits
. 2 \ 3
Supplied
Credits
4 5
foreign
liabili­
ties
6 7
Loan
Capital
8 9
1961 27.3 2.7 9*9 2.3 8.4 13.6 49.8 8.7 ■31.9
1962 17.7 7.9 44.6 2.3 13.0 2.6 14.7 4.9 27.7
1965. 37.9 13.4 35.4 1.8 4.7 12.2 32.2 10.5 27.7
1964, 65.0 17.8 28.3 4*6 7.3 19.8 31.4 20.8 33.0
145.9 41.8 28.6 11.0 7.5 48.2 33.0 44.9 30.8
Source: CBM: Econ & Financial Review,Vol 4 No.l June 1966.
TABLE 7» 2
RETAINED AND TOTAL EARNINGS OP FOREIGN COMPANIES IN NIGERIA,. 
 1961 - 65_____________  £m___________
. . .  1
Year . Total Earnings Retained Earnings Jo of 3 to
1 2 3 4
1961 7.0 2.7 38.6
1962 11.5 7.9 68.7.
1963 18.0 13.4 74.4
Total 36.5 24.0 65.8
1. Total Earnings = Profits, Dividends & Interest
Source: CBM: Econ. & Fin. Review, Vol.3, No.l, July 1965-
TABLE 7.2a
RETAINED EARNINGS OF FOREIGN COMPANIES IN NIGERIA AND NET NEW 
 . . INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA.1961-1963 _________
Year
1961
1962
19 63
TOTAL
Nefc new In v e s tm e n t 
2?.3 
17.7 
37 .9
82*9
Retained Earnings
2 .7
7.9
1 3 .4
24,0
Source:
Columns 1 & 2 fro m  CBH Scon* & F in  .R e f*  J u ly  19&5* 
Column 3* c a lc u la te d  fro m  th e  f ig u r e s *
P e r cen tage
' 9*9  
45*0  
35*3
29*0
547
TABLE 7*5
THE NIGERIAN BANKING STRUCTURE AS AT 51.12 *61.
Glass of Banks
Expatriate Banks
Name of Bank
1962
Bate
Licensed
Total
Mixed Banks
1. Arab
2. Bank of We st/1894
5. Bank of America i960 
4* Bank of India 1962 
5• Banque de.L'Af ri-
que Occidental© 1959
6. Barclays BOO 1925
7. Ohase Manhattan 1961
8. United Bank For 
Africa
8
1961
1* Bank of Lagos 1959 
2. Bank of the
North 1959
5. Berini 1959.
Total
Indigenous Banks
1. African Conti™
nental 1947.
2• Agbomagbe 1945
5. Co-operative 
Bank of Eastern' 
Nigeria 1962
4* Co-operative 
Bank of W.
Nigeria 1962
5. National 1953
6. Muslim 1958
Head Office
Amman
No. of Nigerian 
offices.
London
San Erancisco 
Bombay
Paris 
London 
New York
Lagos
Lagos
Kano
Lagos
Lagos
Lagos
ABA
Ibadan
Lagos
Lagos
55
1
1
2
57
1
11
129
4
1
21
9
4
31
1
Total 6
Source: C.Y. Brown: The Nigerian Banking System London 1966, p.32.
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TABLE 7.6
- /
LIABILITIES OF THE; NIGERIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS 1944/65
Total Foreign D E P 0 S I T S Time & Othex
Liabilities Banks Total Demand i*'
Bee^lst
1944 10*5 0.02 9.9 7.3 73.7 2.6 0.6
45 12.8 0,09 11.9 9.0 75.8 2.9 0.8
46 14.4 0.04 12*7 9.4 74.3 3.3 1.7
47 15.1 0.1 13.7 10*4 75.8 3.3 1*3
48 16.7 0.2 14.5 11*4 78.9 3.1 2.0
49 14.2 0.1 13.4 10*3 76.3 3.2 0.6
. 50 17.8 0.7 ■ I6.4 13.2 80.4 3.2 0.6
51 26.1 i.o 22.4 18.4 . 82.2 4.0 2.7
52 36*0 2.4 27.8 22.2 *79-8 5.6 5.8
53 38.9 1.8 31.2 24.5 78.3 6*8 5*9
54 52.1 2.8 40.6 32.9 81.0 7.7 8.7
55 57.7 5.3 42.2 31.6 74.9 10.6 10.2
56 67.7 7.2 46.O 35-4 76.8 10.7 14.4
57 72.9 8.2 51.9 , 37.3 71.9 14*6 12.9
58 79.7 5.6 58.1 40.3 68.8 17.8 16.0
59 100.5 12.7 65.3 40.2 61.5 25.1 22.5
60 117.9 18.4 68.5 41,1 60*0 27.4 31.0
61 147.3 22.0 76.9 41.7 54.2 35.3 48.4
62 142*6 8.7 86.9 45.3 52.1 41.6 47.0
65 162.6 13.1 95.9 48.8 50*9 47.1 53.6
64 198,0 • 24.7 . 115.0 57.8 50.2 57.2 55.2
65 217.1 20.3 132.5 62.0 46.8 70.6 64.6
Sources Nigeria Annual Abstract of Stats. & O.B.M. Reports*
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TABLE 7* 8
REGISTERED DEBENTURES OF NIOERIM COMMERCIAL BANKS
. 125,2^ , 195?
Bate Created, 
or
Registered
Company Creating Bank
11*5*55 2ik's Enterprises Ltd
50*5*55 J. Allen & Go.
26.6.55 Costain (West Africa)
17*11*52 . Tin and Assoc. Minerals Ltd
29*6.55 Kigerian Oil Mills Ltd
15*7*55 , The Kano Oil Millers
A.C.B. Ltd
Bank of West 
Africa Ltd
ditto
Barclays DCO
ditto
ditto
Source i Nigerian Trade Journals.
Amount
50,000
550,000
60,000
52,500
110,100
55,000
657,600
TABLE 7/f
•OPERATIONS OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY Off NIGERIA LTD 1959-1964
Nigeria
Foreign
Total
No of loans &
equity Investments °/»
5 25
9 -'__________J Z1
12 100
Amount
1J6.0
571.5
707.5
£000
■
19.2
80.8
100.0
TOTAL SHARE CAPITAL « £5.007*5 
« EQUITY INVESTMENT £217.5 .
Sources Nigerian Industrial Development Bank.
TABLE 7.11
OPERATIONS OF THE NIGERIAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK LTD 
1964-" 50th Sept. 1966.
Nationality No. of loans &
equity Investments °/o Amount °/o ,
Nigerian 16 40 1,122.5 55*5
Foreign 24 60 2,045*7 64*5
Total 40 100 3,166.2 100.0
TOTAL SHARE CAPITAL £3,571*0
Amount of EQUITY INVESTMENT £480.0
Sources N.I.D.B.
TABLE 7.10 
NIGERIAN INDUSTRIAL- DEVELOPMENT BAM LTD.
AUTHORISED SHARE CAPITAL .
Authorised Issued & Fully Paid
£250,000 5W° Cumulative Pref.Stock 250,000
£1,050,000 "A" Ordinary Stock £1,020,000
980,000 "B" -do-. 980,000
2,750,000 Unclassified Shares of £1 each Nil
£5,000,000 £2,250,000
Issued & Fully Paid "A** Ordinary Stock
Unclassified 7,225
£1,020,000 Holders: Central, Bank of Nigeria 499,828
IFC 499,827
Nigerian Private Investors 15.120
£1.020.000 1,{D20,00Q
B* Ordinary Shares £
£980,000 Holders: Bank of America 71,188.
Chase Int.Investment Co 160,825
Commea Bank 38,580
Irving Int.Fin.Corp. 38,500
Instituto Mobiliere Italiano 75,100 
North West Int.Bank . 38,500
Societe-Anonyme 28,200
Bank of Tokyo Ltd 38,500
U.K. Institutions
Bank of West Africa 25,000
Barclays 0'seas Dev.Corp 25,000 ^
CDFC ■ 100,425
UAC 37,500
Unclassified 154,75°
£980.000 980,000
SourceL N.I.D.B*
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-TABLE 7; 12
COMBINED OPERATIONS OF NXDB AND ICON 1959-1966 £000
Nationality
Nigerian , 
Noreign
No. of loans & 
Equity
, 19 
35
' io
36.5
63.5
52 100.0
Total share Capital of Companies £6,578*5 
Amount of Investment £697*5 
Source: .NIDB.
Amount
1,258.5
2,606.0
3,864.5
32.3^
67.5
100.0
TABLE 7.13
COMMONWEALTH LEVELOPMEBT CORPORATION 
Sectoral Allocation of Investment
. 1951, 1959, 1965
Sector 1951
, 1°
Public Utilities 30.4
Primary Production 57*2
Commerce & Industry 12.4
*
1959
i
45*2
43.1
11.7
1965
i
53.1
21.0
25.9
Source: CSC Annual Beports
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TABLE 7.15
COMMOHWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION: OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA 
& S  ftfc DEC. 1965______
Sector. A
Agriculture
1*Eastern Nigeria. Nucleus ,
Estate & SmsutliJkHolder Scheme 
2.IIlushin Estates Ltd
Total
Public Utility
1, Lagos Executive Development Board
Commerce & Industry ..
Finance Companies
1Nigerian Industrial Dev.Bank
2.Northern Nigeria Investments.Ltd 
3*Development Finance Co.(EN)
b. Hotel St Housing .
1.Nigerian Hotels Ltd
2.Nigerian Housing Development 
Society Ltd
. , 3.Northorn Housing Estates Ltd
Amount £ & q q
500.0
900.0
75.0 
1,800.0 
1,500.0
4*5.0
2,225.0
10.0
1,400.0
1,250.0 1,250.0
5,375.0
2,680.0
c. Industry
1.Coast Construction Ltd.
2.Dorman Long & Amalgamated Eng.
3.Dunlop Nig, Industries Ltd
4. The Nigerian Cement Co Ltd 
5*Textile Printers of Nigeria Ltd
Total
Unidentified
Final Totals
155.0
100.0
350.0 
372.5
200.0
1,177.5
861.0
10,744.0
Source: Computed from CDC: Annual Reports
TABLE 7.16
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE COMPANY OF EASTERN NIGERIA LTD
and
■______NORTHERN NIGERIA INVESTMENTS LTD_______
Summary of Operations. 1959 - 1965 £m
NNIL
a. Total Investments/Commitments 4*643
b. Total capital involved in
projects (excl.(a) ' 14*307
c. Percentage of a & b from
foreign sources 75*1
d. ditto: Nigerian Sources 24*9
e. Number of projects 27
DFC(EN)
1.396
6.200
83.7
16.3
14
Source; Commonwealth Development Corporation
TABLE 7*17
MMBER, VALUE ,& TYPE OF QUOTED STOCKS 0$ THE LAGOS 
 STOCK EXCHANGE ____
NUMHBR
Government fo Industrial 7° T O T A L
1961 92 27.5 242 72.5 334
1962 105 25.2 520 74.8 695
1963 296 41.6 415 58.4 711
1964 404 41.0 581 59.0 985 .
1965 391 38.4 627 61.6 1018
1358 36.3 2385 63.7 3743
. T A B L E 7.18
V A L U E Itoo
1962 21X5.9 92.8 165.3 7.2 2281.2
1963 4868.3 93.8 323.1 6.2 519I.4
1964 5909.5 84.5 1,086.6 15.5 6996.1
1965 7194.9 90.7 734.8 9.3 7929.7
1961 710.4 93-4 49.8 6.6 760.2
20,799.0 89,8 2,559.6 10.2 23,158.6
Source: OHYIi Economic & Financial Review Vol.4» no.2, 1966.
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Average
TABLE 7.19 ........
' s  ^ > f ' i  ■■ /- ■ III I I II W M  |IIH.IIH|III,|4«I  i r f l H  • v , *  ^  , ‘t ; y '  r %J ' J
advances/deposit ratios op indigenous and expatriate banks in
>• •■• ■»■. NIGERIA 1959-65.   ■
Year
1959 ■:
Indigenous Banks
7°
85*6 .
Expatriate Banks 
\ fo
54.4
. 1960. 90.7 81,0
1961 85*8 7$.2
1962 107,6 83*7
1963 135.4 85*3
1964 121,5 102,8
1965 155.8 95*7
% w m 109.5 86.1
Note * As at 51st Dec.
Source: Derived from Table 
TABLE
7*4*
7.20
EXPATRIATE BANKS* ADYADCES/OEPOSIT RATIOS
Year .
y 1
B^ank of West Africa Ltd.
s& 1
%
a Barclays Bank DCO.
fo 2
1955 12.4 42-9 a. As at 31 Mar
1956
1957
19.2
25.8
38.8
40.0
b: As at 30 Sep 
1: Average !055 
/64 = 29.7/o
1958' 30.1 43*0
2 .Average
1955/63-43*5
1959 26.9 41*2
i960 26.7 48.8
1961 46 • 5 49*0
1962 38.8 48.4
1963
1964
Source: Statis: World Banking Survey,
M r :
, December 1964, pp. 5*9 and 193*
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TABLE 7.21
CURRENCY AND ADVANCES RATIOS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES
Year Nigeria Chana United Kingdom United States India
I .2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1955 57.6 45 66.9 26.9 33*8 31 20.6 45*4 70.9 73
1956 61.0 55 68.2 33*7 35*6 30 20.6 48.4 69*3 76.6
1957 56.1 66 67*2 34*1 37*1 31 20.8 49*4 69.4 66.5
1958 55.7 66 67.7 25.O 37*1 50 20.5 47*4 71*0 62
1959 55.5 65 64.2 43*4 39*0 38 20.4 55.6 71*0 59*3
i960 55.0 85 64.6 50.4 39*2 45 20.5 54.4 73*1 75*6
1961 61.8 78 61.6 61.8 40.2 47 20.5 53.6 72.5 73*2
1962 62.6 89 56.6 51*0 40.2 45 20.7 55.9 71*9 77*8
1965 58.4 93 53-9 57*7 38.4
-* * #*
51 21.1 59.3 69*4 .79*5
1964 57.8 106 48.5 39*4 33*0 52 21.5 61.0 68.0 78.9
Average 58 74*4 61.9 42.3 37*4 39*2 20.7 53.8 70.6 72.2
* As at June -X-X- As at 16 December
Notes; 1 percentage of currency to total money supply
2.percentage of loans and advances to depesits.
Sources; 1. Nigeria: Annual Abstract of Statistics and Central Bank 
Annual Reports and Statistics & Econ. Reviews.
2. Ghana: Annual Abstract of Statistics and Bank of Ghana 
Annual Reports.
5. United. Kingdom: Annual Abstract of Statistics, Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin, and the 'Banker*.
4* United States: Annual Abstract of Statistics and Federal 
Reserve Bulletins.
5* India: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, April 1965*
pp.584 & 567*
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TABLE 8ol
FOREIGN PRIVATE COMPONENT OF GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT
IN.
Year
THE'PRIVATE SECTOR
Gross Private 
Investment 
1
^58-1962/63
£m
Foreign Private 
Component 
2
Percentage
3
1958-59 59 1608 28*5
1959-60 63 24.0 38.0
1960-61 66 19.0 28.8
1961-62 84 27.3 32*5
1962-63 82 17-7 21.6
Total 354 104*8 29.6
Sources Column Is Nato Plan Progress Report, 1964? P«8 
Column 2 s Adapted from Table 
Column 5? Calculated from the figures
563
Table 8,2
Contribution of Foreign Private Investment to Gross 
Domestic Product and Gross Fixed Investment
1950 - 1965
Net Foreign Gross Gross 1 as 1 as
Year Private Domestic Fixed fo %
Investment Product Investment of of
a a 2 3
1 2 3 4 5
1950 2.6 688.7 48«4 0,4 5*4
51 8.6 741.4 59*7 lo2 14,4
52 7.6 793*5 75.0 1 .0 10.1
53 5.5 811.6 79*9 0.7 6.9
54 10.4 872.1 92.9 1.2 11.2
55 9*6 895*2 102.6 1.1 9*4
56 19.1 873*7 108,0 2.2 17*7
57 17.1 910.0 113.0 1*9 15.1
58 16.8 900.0 122.3 1*9 13*7
59 24.O 938.5 136.7 2.6 17*6
60 19*0 981.3 158.0 1*9 12.0
61 27*3 1014.0 na 2.7 -
62 17*7 1072.3 na 1*7 -
63 37*9 11a na na -
64 63,Q na na na -
65 58.9 na 11a 11a, -
345.1 11492.3 1096„5 1.6 12,8
notes a*at 1957 prices
na = not available.
Sources! Federation of Nigeria. Nat, Dev. Plan
Column 1 see table ch.
2 Fed of Nig. Annual Abstract of Stats
p.144*
3 National Plan, 1962-68 p.13 
4 & 5 Computed from figures.
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Table 8*4
Analysis of Bet Capital Expenditure 1965
Industrial Sector Imported Materials 
Imports 
Value °fo 
1 2
Local
Local
Value
3
Total 
Expenditure 
fo To tal
4 5
Food, beverages and 
tobacco 2433 51*9 1847 39*4 4*689
Textiles, wearing apparel 
and footwear 742 48*5 713 46* 6 1.529
Timber, wood & paper pro­
ducts, printing and 
furniture 647 65 *,0 274 27*5 996
Leather & Leather Pro­
ducts, Bubber & Bubber 
Products, except footwear 901 67.2 417 31.1 1340
Chemicals, oils, Paints & 
Petroleum Products 728 6§*8 385 33*7 1141
Clay, Glass & Cement 
Products 1679 66* 0 31 12 • 2 2545
Met&l Products, Except 
Transpox't Equipment 727 66*2 349 31*8 1099
Machinery & Transport 
Equipment 345 54°2 256 40*2 637
Miscellaneous 212 73-9 71 24*7 287
Totals 84I4 59*0 4343 30.4 14263
Notes Columns 1 and 3 do not add up to column 5 nor 
columns 2 and 4 add up to 100 owing to non­
disclosures to ensure confidentiality.
Sources Computed from Federal Office of Statistics? 
Industrial Survey, 19&3, p*14*
Table 8.5
The Effect df Import Substitute Manufacture on 
Selected Imports I960 - 1965
Product i960
Cement 100
Tobacco (manufactured) 100
Rubber goods 100
Beer 100
Textiles 100
Enamelware 100
1960=100
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
68 44 37 25 20
106 96 106 93 77
104 92 93 61 60
101 72 20 ■ 18 6
118 83 96 104 99'
121 89 99 ‘47 ■ 41
1. But for domestic production, this index would have been 
in excessof 100.
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria
Annual Report 1965? p.24.
Table 8.6
Exports of Nigerian Manufactures, 1964,1965
C O M
Item 1964
Groundnut Cake
Groundnut Oil
Cotton Goods,. Textiles
Leather
Plywood
Others
Value
4654
8155
69
881
1071
201
fo  of
Total
Exports
2.2
3.8
0,4
0.5
0.1
1965
Value
5251
10013
66
1459
1207
76
fo  of
Total
Exports.
5 2.
3.
0.6
0.5
14991 7.0 18072 6.8
Source: Nigerian Trade Journal April June, 1966,p.71.
Year
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
I960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
567
Table 8.7
Merchandise Exports Imports and Visible Balance
1954 - 1965 £000
Imports
Net
foreign 
Invest­
ment as 
$> of 
Imports
Exports
Domestic
Foreign 
private 
invest­
ment as
fo of
domestic
exports
Visible
Balance
114,069 9.1 146,242 7.1 i 35,463
136,117 7.0 129,816 7.3 - 3,583
152,770 12.5 132,261 14.4 -18,197
152,468 11.2 124,177 13.8 -24,934
166,274 10.1 132,791 12.7 -30,724
178,405 13.5 160,505 15.0 -14,908
215,891 6.8 165,619 11.5 -46,177
222,519 12.3 170,067 16.- -48,891
203,217 8.7 164,013 10.8 -34,681
207,477 18.3 184,865 20.5 -17,778
253,880 24.8 210,462 29.9 -39,314
275,322 21.4 263,341 22.4 - 6,861
3278,409 14.1 1,984,59 16.2 -250,685
1. including re-exports and parcel post.
Source: Nigeria Annual Abstract of Statistics 1964,
p.67;
Nigerian Trade Journal April-June 1966, pp.
70-71.
    — ------------ — -
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Table 808
Percentage fsafc Distribution of Capital and 
Consumer goods Imports in Nigeria. 1994“1969
Import Index
Year Capital Goods Consumer Goods i960 « 100
$
1954 19 81
1955 22 78 -
1956 23 77
1957 22 78 „
195a 25 79
1959 26 74 «
i960 99 61 100
61 99 61 103
62 42 98 94
63 49 99 96
64 92 48 118
65 99 49 127
Sources 1994-1999 from Nigerian Trade
1960-1969 Central Bank of Nigeria 
Annual Report 19^5? p°24c
Table 8.9
Firm Offers of Foreign, Aid 1962 - 1964
Source and Details Amount £m
International Financial Institutions* 
IBRD
Niger Dam
EC® (Transmission lines) 
Nigerian Ports Authy. Apapa Ext.
IFC
IDA
Nigerian Ind. Dev. Bank
Education Projects 
Northern Roads
United States Government 
United Kingdom Government?
C’wealth Asst. Loan i960 
Nigerian Railway Corpn. (Rails) 
Telecommunications Loans 
C*wealth Asst. Loan, 1962 
Exchequer Loan 
Apapa Industrial Dev. Plan 
Niger Dam 
West German Government 
Swiss Government 
Netherlands Government
Polisy Government 
Israeli Government 
Italian Government?
London Money Market - Bonny Bar Loan Stock
1:29.3
10.7
4 .8
0 .5
7.1
5*5
45.0
2.84
1.5
1*6
10.0
3 .0  
1.25
5 .0
Total
44.8
0.5
12.6
45.O
25*19
8.5
1.7
4*0
15.0
17
0
4*25
171.7i
Sources Fed. Repub. of Nigeria,. Nat. Dev. Plan. 
Progress Report 1964, p. 31*
Table 8*10
Foreign Aid Component of Capital Expenditure
1962 - 1964 eooo
Disbursing Authority.
Federal Government 
Eastern Government 
Western Region 
Northern. Region
Capital Exp.
95,340 
20,226 
15,575 
19,117
Foreign Aid 
Component
15,924
0.522
0.984
1.010
i
16*7
2.7
6 .3
5*3
Total 150,254 18,470 12.3
Source; Fed. of Nig. Nat. Dev. Plan, 1962-1968 
Progress Report, 1964, p.33.
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TABLE 8,14
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OE INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN OP GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN AFRICAN SUB-REGIONS, 1963.
io
Sector North
Africa
Central
Africa
East
Africa
West
Africa
■ ■ 1 - ■ ■  -  1 i--ru t t a
All
Africa
Agriculture 27 34 41 54 39
Mining 10 6 6 3 6
Manufacturing 13 12 8 4 9
Other Sectors 50 48 45 39 46
Total 100 100 100 100
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
100
Source; A note on the present stage of Industrial Development 
in Africa, U.N.E.C.A. Addis Ahaha, Jan. 1967, p. 3*
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TABLE 8.16
SELECTED INDICATORS OP RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS BETWEEN INDIGENOUS So 
PQREIGN SECTORS IN NIGERIAN MANUFACTURING 1965 ______
Reporting Estabs.No.
Net Capital S-f{>• feMr 10,722
Wages So Salaries fel 9*9^5
Value Added fci* 45»053-
Total Employment No. 48,350'
IvIanagerial & Pro­
fessional Employment
No. 718
Paid-Up Capital 38 >43*0
Foreign Sector 
Value £000 
428
Indigenous Sector
$
65.9
75.2
74.8
82.1
71.1
54.1 
67-7
Value £000 
221
3540
5554
9802
19628
608
18,013
$
54.1
24.8
25.2
17.9
28.9
45-9
52.3
Notes: Foreign Sector - Those sectors in which more than 50$ of paid up
capital is owned by foreign private investors.
Indigenous Sector^ Those sectors in which more than 50$ of the paid-
up capital is owned by indigenous Nigerian
private and public interests.
APPENDIX C
MAPS FOR CHAPTER 5
Sources for these two Maps: Industrial Potentialities of
Northern Nigeria, Kaduna, 1963.
Reproduced with the kind permission of the Ministry 
of Trade & Industry, Kaduna.
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